mm 


<y/e 


%, 


WUs 

h 


Cc 


7 


?r/ua 


<^rv.  ^yfut/^e C/£eAA&ri6 


GERMANY 

AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 


F.  von  BERNHARDI 


I 


Briefly  summarized  in  our  own  terms,  Von  BernWai  s 
gospel  is  as  follows: 

i.  The  first  duty  of  every  citizen  is  to  the  State. 

2.  As  war  is  not  only  an  integral  part  of  humanity, 

but  the  great  civilizing  influence  of  the  world,  it 
is  the  duty  of  every  State  and  of  every  citizen 
of  every  State  to  be  prepared  for  war. 

3.  England  is  stationary  or  retrogressive  in  the  world's 

progress.  Germany  is  the  coming  world-power, 
who  by  her  rise  will  elevate  the  world's  standard 
of  civilization,  art,  and  commerce.  Germany's  rise 
is,  in  fact,  civilization's  greatest  asset. 

4.  Germany's  inevitable  expansion  is  being  jealously 

watched  by  France  and  England,  who  are  deter- 
mined to  thwart  it  by  all  or  any  means. 

5.  It  is,  therefore,  the  duty  of  Germany  to  utilize  all 

and  every  means  to  protect  her  legitimate  inter- 
ests; and  in  this  world  if  might  is  not  right  it  is 
so  alike  as  to  be  hardly  distinguishable  from  it. 

The  abstract  logic  of  the  volume  hardly  concerns  us, 
but  it  is  permissible  to  draw  attention  to  the  almost 
cynical  frankness  with  which  is  proclaimed  the  ultimate 
crushing  of  England  and  France.  In  England  soldiers, 
sailors,  newspapers  have  preached  to  the  people — and  to 
the  politicians — the  inevitability  of  such  a  war;  and  in 
the  main  such  preaching  has  fallen  upon  deaf  ears. 

Captain  H.  A.  WILSON 
In  the  PALL  MALL  GAZETTE. 


GERMANY 
AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 


BY 

GENERAL  FRIEDRICH  VON  BERNHARDI 


TRANSLATED  BY  ALLEN  H.  POWLES 


POPULAR  EDITION 


NEW  YORK 

CHAS.   A.   ERON 

1914 


**U'¥? 


HCNay  MOPtSE 


STEPHENS 


••••■•      I  ." \ 


PREFACE 

All  the  patriotic  sections  of  the  German  people  were 
greatly  excited  during  the  summer  and  autumn  of  191 1. 
The  conviction  lay  heavy  on  all  hearts  that  in  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Morocco  dispute  no  mere  commercial  or 
colonial  question  of  minor  importance  was  being  discussed, 
but  that  the  honour  and  future  of  the  German  nation  were 
at  stake.  A  deep  rift  had  opened  between  the  feeling  of 
the  nation  and  the  diplomatic  action  of  the  Government. 
Public  opinion,  which  was  clearly  in  favour  of  asserting 
ourselves,  did  not  understand  the  dangers  of  our  political 
position,  and  the  sacrifices  which  a  boldly-outlined  policy 
would  have  demanded.  I  cannot  say  whether  the  nation, 
which  undoubtedly  in  an  overwhelming  majority  would 
have  gladly  obeyed  the  call  to  arms,  would  have  been  equally 
ready  to  bear  permanent  and  heavy  burdens  of  taxation. 
Haggling  about  war  contributions  is  as  pronounced  a 
characteristic  of  the  German  Reichstag  in  modern  Berlin 
as  it  was  in  medieval  Regensburg.  These  conditions  have 
induced  me  to  publish  now  the  following  pages,  which 
were  partly  written  some  time  ago. 

Nobody  can  fail  to  see  that  we  have  reached  a  crisis  in 
our  national  and  political  development.  At  such  times  it 
is  necessary  to  be  absolutely  clear  on  three  points :  the  goals 
to  be  aimed  at,  the  difficulties  to  be  surmounted,  and  the 
sacrifices  to  be  made. 

The  task  I  have  set  myself  is  to  discuss  these  matters, 
stripped   of   all    diplomatic    disguise,    as    clearly   and    con- 

iii 

865820 


iv  PREFACE 

vincingly  as  possible.     It  is  obvious  that  this  can  only  be 
done  by  taking  a  national  point  of  view. 

Our  science,  our  literature,  and  the  warlike  achievements 
of  our  past,  have  made  me  proudly  conscious  of  belonging 
to  a  great  civilized  nation  which,  in  spite  of  all  the  weak- 
ness and  mistakes  of  bygone  days,  must,  and  assuredly  will, 
win  a  glorious  future;  and  it  is  out  of  the  fulness  of  my 
German  heart  that  I  have  recorded  my  convictions.  I 
believe  that  thus  I  shall  most  effectually  rouse  the  national 
feeling  in  my  readers'  hearts,  and  strengthen  the  national 
purpose. 

THE   AUTHOR. 
October,  191 1. 


CONTENTS 

PAGES 

PREFACE iii — iv 

INTRODUCTION 
Power  of  the  peace  idea — Causes  of  the  love  of  peace  in  Ger- 
many— German  consciousness  of  strength — Lack  of  definite 
political  aims — Perilous  situation  of  Germany  and  the  con- 
ditions of  successful  self-assertion — Need  to  test  the 
authority  of  the  peace  idea,  and  to  explain  the  tasks  and 
aims  of  Germany  in  the  light  of  history     .         .         .        9 — 15 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  RIGHT  TO  MAKE  WAR 
Pacific  ideals  and  arbitration — The  biological  necessity  of  war 
— The  duty  of  self-assertion — The  right  of  conquest — The 
struggle  for  employment — War  a  moral  obligation — Benef- 
icent results  of  war — War  from  the  Christian  and  from 
the  materialist  standpoints — Arbitration  and  international 
law — Destructiveness  and  immorality  of  peace  aspirations — 
Real  and  Utopian  humanity — Dangerous  results  of  peace 
aspirations  in  Germany — The  duty  of   the   State     .         16—37 

CHAPTER  II 
THE  DUTY  TO  MAKE  WAR 
Bismarck  and  the  justification  of  war — The  duty  to  fight— The 
teaching  of  history — War  only  justifiable  on  adequate 
grounds — The  foundations  of  political  morality — Political 
and  individual  morality — The  grounds  for  making  war — 
The  decision  to  make  war — The  responsibility  of  the 
statesman 38-55 

CHAPTER  III 

A  BRIEF  SURVEY  OF  GERMANY'S  HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
The  ways  of  Providence  in  history — Christianity  and  the  Ger- 
mans— The  Empire  and  the  Papacy — Breach  between  the 
German  World  Empire  and  the  revived  spiritual  power — 
Rise  of  the  great  States  of  Europe  and  political  downfall 
of  Germany  after  the  Thirty  Years'  War — Rise  of  the 
Prussian  State — The  epoch  of  the  Revolution  and  the  War 
of  Liberation — Intellectual  supremacy  of  Germany — After 
the  War  of  Liberation — Germany  under  William  I.  and 
Bismarck — Change  in  the  conception  of  the  State  and  the 
principle  of  nationality — New  economic  developments  and 
the  World  Power  of  England — Rise  of  other  World 
Powers — Socialism,  and  how  to  overcome  it — German 
science  and  art — Internal  disintegration  of  Germany  and 
her  latent  strength 56 — 71 


viii  CONTENTS 

PAGB6 

training  for  war  on  the  grand  scale — Need  of  giving  a  new 
character  to  our  manoeuvres  and  to  the  training  of  our 
commanders — Practical  training  of  the  artillery — Training 
in  tactical  efficiency — Practice  in  marching  under  war  con- 
ditions— Training  of  the  train  officers  and  column  leaders 
— Control  of  the  General  Staff  by  the  higher  commanders — 
Value  of  manoeuvres :  how  to  arrange  them — Preliminary 
theoretical  training  of  the  higher  commanders — Training 
of  the  cavalry  and  the  airmen ;  of  the  pioneers  and  com- 
missariat troops — Promotion  of  intellectual  development 
in  the  army — Training  in  the  military  academy     .        206 — 225 

CHAPTER  XII 
PREPARATION  FOR  THE  NAVAL  WAR 
The  position  of  a  World  Power  implies  naval  strength — De- 
velopment of  German  naval  ideals — The  task  of  the  Ger- 
man fleet;  its  strength — Importance  of  coast  defences — 
Necessity  of  accelerating  our  naval  armaments — The  build- 
ing of  the  fleet — The  institution  of  the  air-fleet — Prelimin- 
ary measures  for  a  war  on  commerce — Mobilization — Gen- 
eral points  of  view  with  regard  to  preparations  for  the 
naval  war — Lost  opportunities  in  the  past     .         .        226 — 240 

CHAPTER  XIII 
^  THE  ARMY  AND  POPULAR  EDUCATION 
The  universal  importance  of  national  education — Its  value  for 
the  army — Hurtful  influences  at  work  on  it — Duties  of  the 
State  with  regard  to  national  health — Work  and  sport— 
The  importance  of  the  school — The  inadequacy  of  our  na- 
tional schools — Military  education  and  education  in  the 
national  schools — Methods  of  instruction  in  the  latter — 
Necessity  for  their  reform — Continuation  schools — Influ- 
ence of  national  education  on  the  Russo-Japanese  War — 
Other  means  of  national  education — The  propaganda  of 
action 241 — 259 

CHAPTER  XIV 
FINANCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATION  FOR  WAR 
Duties  of  the  State  in  regard  to  war  preparations — The  State 
and  national  credit — The  financial  capacity  of  Germany — 
Necessity  of  new  sources  of  revenue — The  imperial  right 
of  inheritance — Policy  of  interests  and  alliances — Mould- 
ing and  exploitation  of  the  political  situation — The  laws 
of  political  conduct — Interaction  of  military  and  political 
war  preparations — Political  preparations  for  our  next  war — 
Governing  factors  in  the  conduct  of  German  policy      260 — 282 

EPILOGUE 
The  latest  political  events — Conduct  of  the  German   Imperial 
Government — The  arrangement  with  France — Anglo-French 
relations  and  the  attitude  of  England — The  requirements 
of   the   situation 283 — 288 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 


INTRODUCTION 

The  value  of  war  for  the  political  and  moral  development 
of  mankind  has  been  criticized  by  large  sections  of  the 
modern  civilized  world  in  a  way  which  threatens  to 
weaken  the  defensive  powers  of  States  by  undermining 
the  warlike  spirit  of  the  people.  Such  ideas  are  widely 
disseminated  in  Germany,  and  whole  strata  of  our  nation 
seem  to  have  lost  that  ideal  enthusiasm  which  constituted 
the  greatness  of  its  history.  With  the  increase  of  wealth 
they  live  for  the  moment,  they  are  incapable  of  sacrificing 
the  enjoyment  of  the  hour  to  the  service  of  great  concep- 
tions, and  close  their  eyes  complacently  to  the  duties  of 
our  future  and  to  the  pressing  problems  of  international 
life  which  await  a  solution  at  the  present  time. 

We  have  been  capable  of  soaring  upwards.  Mighty 
deeds  raised  Germany  from  political  disruption  and  feeble- 
ness to  the  forefront  of  European  nations.  But  we  do  not 
seem  willing  to  take  up  this  inheritance,  and  to  advance 
along  the  path  of  development  in  politics  and  culture. 
We  tremble  at  our  own  greatness,  and  shirk  the  sacrifices 
it  demands  from  us.  Yet  we  do  not  wish  to  renounce 
the  claim  which  we  derive  from  our  glorious  past.  How 
rightly  Fichte  once  judged  his  countrymen  when  he  said 
the  German  can  never  wish  for  a  thing  by  itself;  he  must 
always  wish  for  its  contrary  also. 

The  Germans  were  formerly  the  best  fighting  men  and 
the  most  warlike  nation  of  Europe.  For  a  long  time  they 
have  proved  themselves  to  be  the  ruling  people  of  the 
Continent  by  the  power  of  their  arms  and  the  loftiness  of 
their  ideas.     Germans  have  bled  and  conquered  on  count- 

9 


io     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

less  battlefields  in  every  part  of  the  world,  and  in  late 
years  have  shown  that  the  heroism  of  their  ancestors  still 
lives  in  the  descendants.  In  striking  contrast  to  this 
military  aptitude  they  have  to-day  become  a  peace-loving 
— an  almost  "too"  peace-loving — nation.  A  rude  shock 
is  needed  to  awaken  their  warlike  instincts,  and  compel 
them  to  show  their  military  strength. 

This  strongly-marked  love  of  peace  is  due  to  various 
causes. 

It  springs  first  from  the  good-natured  character  of  the 
German  people,  which  finds  intense  satisfaction  in  doc- 
trinaire disputations  and  partisanship,  but  dislikes  push- 
ing things  to  an  extreme.  It  is  connected  with  another 
characteristic  of  the  German  nature.  Our  aim  is  to  be 
just,  and  we  strangely  imagine  that  all  other  nations  with 
whom  we  exchange  relations  share  this  aim.  We  are 
always  ready  to  consider  the  peaceful  assurances  of  foreign 
diplomacy  and  of  the  foreign  Press  to  be  no  less  genuine 
and  true  than  our  own  ideas  of  peace,  and  we  obstinately 
resist  the  view  that  the  political  world  is  only  ruled  by 
interests  and  never  from  ideal  aims  of  philanthropy. 
"Justice/'  Goethe  says  aptly,  "is  a  quality  and  a  phan- 
tom of  the  Germans."  We  are  always  inclined  to  assume 
that  disputes  between  States  can  find  a  peaceful  solution 
on  the  basis  of  justice  without  clearly  realizing  what 
international  justice  is. 

An  additional  cause  of  the  love  of  peace,  besides  those 
which  are  rooted  in  the  very  soul  of  the  German  people, 
is  the  wish  not  to  be  disturbed  in  commercial  life. 

The  Germans  are  born  business  men,  more  than  any 
others  in  the  world.  Even  before  the  beginning  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  Germany  was  perhaps  the  greatest 
trading  Power  in  the  World,  and  in  the  last  forty  years 
Germany's  trade  has  made  marvellous  progress  under 
the  renewed  expansion  of  her  political  power.  Notwith- 
standing our  small  stretch  of  coast-line,  we  have  created 
in  a  few  years  the  second  largest  merchant  fleet  in  the 
world,  and  our  young  industries  challenge  competition 
with  all  the  great  industrial  States  of  the  earth.  German 
trading-houses  are  established  all  over  the  world;  German 


INTRODUCTION  n 

merchants  traverse  every  quarter  of  the  globe;  a  part, 
indeed,  of  English  wholesale  trade  is  in  the  hands  of 
Germans,  who  are,  of  course,  mostly  lost  to  their  own 
country.  Under  these  conditions  our  national  wealth  has 
increased  with  rapid  strides. 

Our  trade  and  our  industries — owners  no  less  than  em- 
ployes— do  not  want  this  development  to  be  interrupted. 
They  believe  that  peace  is  the  essential  condition  of  com- 
merce. They  assume  that  free  competition  will  be  con- 
ceded to  us,  and  do  not  reflect  that  our  victorious  wars 
have  never  disturbed  our  business  life,  and  that  the 
political  power  regained  by  war  rendered  possible  the  vast 
progress  of  our  trade  and  commerce. 

Universal  military  service,  too,  contributes  to  the  love 
of  peace,  for  war  in  these  days  does  not  merely  affect,  as 
formerly,  definite  limited  circles,  but  the  whole  nation 
suffers  alike.  All  families  and  all  classes  have  to  pay  the 
same  toll  of  human  lives.  Finally  comes  the  effect  of  that 
universal  conception  of  peace  so  characteristic  of  the  times 
— the  idea  that  war  in  itself  is  a  sign  of  barbarism  un- 
worthy of  an  aspiring  people,  and  that  the  finest  blossoms 
of  culture  can  only  unfold  in  peace. 

Under  the  many-sided  influence  of  such  views  and 
aspirations,  we  seem  entirely  to  have  forgotten  the  teach- 
ing which  once  the  old  German  Empire  received  with 
"astonishment  and  indignation"  from  Frederick  the 
Great,  that  "the  right  of  States  can  only  be  asserted  by 
the  living  power;"  that  what  was  won  in  war  can  only 
be  kept  by  war;  and  that  we  Germans,  cramped  as  we 
are  by  political  and  geographical  conditions,  require  the 
greatest  efforts  to  hold  and  to  increase  what  we  have  won. 
We  regard  our  warlike  preparations  as  an  almost  insup- 
portable burden,  which  it  is  the  special  duty  of  the  German 
Reichstag  to  lighten  so  far  as  possible.  We  seem  to  have 
forgotten  that  the  conscious  increase  of  our  armament  is 
not  an  inevitable  evil,  but  the  most  necessary  precondition 
of  our  national  health,  and  the  only  guarantee  of  our  in- 
ternational prestige.  We  are  accustomed  to  regard  war 
as  a  curse,  and  refuse  to  recognize  it  as  the  greatest  factor 
in  the  furtherance  of  culture  and  power. 


12     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

Besides  this  clamorous  need  of  peace,  and  in  spite  of 
its  continued  justification,  other  movements,  wishes,  and 
efforts,  inarticulate  and  often  unconscious,  live  in  the 
depths  of  the  soul  of  the  German  people.  The  agelong 
dream  of  the  German  nation  was  realized  in  the  political 
union  of  the  greater  part  of  the  German  races  and  in  the 
founding  of  the  German  Empire.  Since  then  there  lives 
in  the  hearts  of  all  (I  would  not  exclude  even  the  sup- 
porters of  the  anti-national  party)  a  proud  consciousness 
of  strength,  of  regained  national  unity,  and  of  increased 
political  power.  This  consciousness  is  supported  by  the 
fixed  determination  never  to  abandon  these  acquisitions. 
The  conviction  is  universal  that  every  attack  upon  these 
conquests  will  rouse  the  whole  nation  with  enthusiastic 
unanimity  to  arms.  We  all  wish,  indeed,  to  be  able  to 
maintain  our  present  position  in  the  world  without  a 
conflict,  and  we  live  in  the  belief  that  the  power  of  our 
State  will  steadily  increase  without  our  needing  to  fight 
for  it.  We  do  not  at  the  bottom  of  our  hearts  shrink 
from  such  a  conflict,  but  we  look  towards  it  with  a  certain 
calm  confidence,  and  are  inwardly  resolved  never  to  let 
ourselves  be  degraded  to  an  inferior  position  without 
striking  a  blow.  Every  appeal  to  force  finds  a  loud 
response  in  the  hearts  of  all.  Not  merely  in  the  North, 
where  a  proud,  efficient,  hard-working  race  with  glorious 
traditions  has  grown  up  under  the  laurel-crowned  banner 
of  Prussia,  does  this  feeling  thrive  as  an  unconscious  basis 
of  all  thought,  sentiment,  and  volition,  in  the  depth  of 
the  soul;  but  in  the  South  also,  which  has  suffered  for 
centuries  under  the  curse  of  petty  nationalities,  the 
haughty  pride  and  ambition  of  the  German  stock  live  in 
the  heart  of  the  people.  Here  and  there,  maybe,  such 
emotions  slumber  in  the  shade  of  a  jealous  particularism, 
overgrown  by  the  richer  and  more  luxuriant  forms  of 
social  intercourse;  but  still  they  are  animated  by  latent 
energy;  here,  too,  the  germs  of  mighty  national  conscious- 
ness await  their  awakening. 

Thus  the  political  power  of  our  nation,  while  fully  alive 
below  the  surface,  is  fettered  externally  by  this  love  of 
peace.     It  fritters  itself  away  in  fruitless  bickerings  and 


INTRODUCTION  13 

doctrinaire  disputes.  We  no  longer  have  a  clearly- 
def.ned  political  and  national  aim,  which  grips  the  im- 
agination, moves  the  heart  of  the  people,  and  forces  them 
to  uiuty  of  action.  Such  a  goal  existed,  until  our  wars  of 
unification,  in  the  yearnings  for  German  unity,  for  the 
fulfilment  of  the  Barbarossa  legend.  A  great  danger  to 
the  healthy,  continuous  growth  of  our  people  seems  to 
me  to  lie  in  the  lack  of  it,  and  the  more  our  political 
position  in  the  world  is  threatened  by  external  complica- 
tions, the  greater  is  this  danger. 

Extreme  tension  exists  between  the  Great  Powers,  not- 
withstanding all  peaceful  prospects  for  the  moment,  and 
it  is  hardly  to  be  assumed  that  their  aspirations,  which 
conflict  at  so  many  points  and  are  so  often  pressed  for- 
ward with  brutal  energy,  will  always  find  a  pacific  settle- 
ment. 

In  this  struggle  of  the  most  powerful  nations,  which 
employ  peaceful  methods  at  first  until  the  differences 
between  them  grow  irreconcilable,  our  German  nation  is 
beset  on  all  sides.  This  is  primarily  a  result  of  our 
geographical  position  in  the  midst  of  hostile  rivals,  but 
also  because  we  have  forced  ourselves,  though  the  last- 
comers,  the  virtual  upstarts,  between  the  States  which 
have  earlier  gained  their  place,  and  now  claim  our  share 
in  the  dominion  of  this  world,  after  we  have  for  centuries 
been  paramount  only  in  the  realm  of  intellect.  We  have 
thus  injured  a  thousand  interests  and  roused  bitter  hos- 
tilities. It  must  be  reserved  for  a  subsequent  section  to 
explain  the  political  situation  thus  affected,  but  one  point 
can  be  mentioned  without  further  consideration :  if  a  violent 
solution  of  existing  difficulties  is  adopted,  if  the  political 
crisis  develops  into  military  action,  the  Germans  would 
have  a  dangerous  situation  in  the  midst  of  all  the  forces 
brought  into  play  against  them.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
issue  of  this  struggle  will  be  decisive  of  Germany's  whole 
future  as  State  and  nation.  We  have  the  most  to  win  or 
lose  by  such  a  struggle.  We  shall  be  beset  by  the  greatest 
perils,  and  we  can  only  emerge  victoriously  from  this 
struggle  against  a  world  of  hostile  elements,  and  success- 
fully carry  through  a  Seven  Years'  War  for  our  position 


14     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

as  a  World  Power,  if  we  gain  a  start  on  our  probable 
enemy  as  soldiers;  if  the  army  which  will  fight  our  battles 
is  supported  by  all  the  material  and  spiritual  forces  oi  the 
nation ;  if  the  resolve  to  conquer  lives  not  only  in  our 
troops,  but  in  the  entire  united  people  which  send?  these 
troops  to  fight  for  all  their  dearest  possessions. 

These  were  the  considerations  which  induced  me  to  re- 
gard war  from  the  standpoint  of  civilization,  and  to  study 
its  relation  to  the  great  tasks  of  the  present  and  the  future 
which  Providence  has  set  before  the  German  people  as  the 
greatest  civilized  people  known  to  history. 

From  this  standpoint  I  must  first  of  all  examine  the 
aspirations  for  peace,  which  seem  to  dominate  our  age 
and  threaten  to  poison  the  soul  of  the  German  people, 
according  to  their  true  moral  significance.  I  must  try  to 
prove  that  war  is  not  merely  a  necessary  element  in  the 
life  of  nations,  but  an  indispensable  factor  of  culture,  in 
which  a  true  civilized  nation  finds  the  highest  expression 
of  strength  and  vitality.  I  must  endeavour  to  develop 
from  the  history  of  the  German  past  in  its  connection  with 
the  conditions  of  the  present  those  aspects  of  the  question 
which  may  guide  us  into  the  unknown  land  of  the  future. 
The  historical  past  cannot  be  killed ;  it  exists  and  works 
according  to  inward  laws,  while  the  present,  too,  imposes 
its  own  drastic  obligations.  No  one  need  passively  submit 
to  the  pressure  of  circumstances;  even  States  stand,  like 
the  Hercules  of  legend,  at  the  parting  of  the  ways.  They 
can  choose  the  road  to  progress  or  to  decadence.  "A 
favoured  position  in  the  world  will  only  become  effective  in 
the  life  of  nations  by  the  conscious  human  endeavour  to  use 
it."  It  seemed  to  me,  therefore,  to  be  necessary  and  profit- 
able, at  this  parting  of  the  ways  of  our  development  where 
we  now  stand,  to  throw  what  light  I  may  on  the  different 
paths  which  are  open  to  our  people.  A  nation  must  fully 
realize  the  probable  consequences  of  its  action;  then  only 
can  it  take  deliberately  the  great  decisions  for  its  future  de- 
velopment, and,  looking  forward  to  its  destiny  with  clear 
gaze,  be  prepared  for  any  sacrifices  which  the  present  or 
future  may  demand. 

These  sacrifices,  so  far  as  they  lie  within  the  military  and 


INTRODUCTION  15 

financial  sphere,  depend  :r.iairily:"on  th-e-'idea  of  what  Ger- 
many is  called  upon  to  strive  for  and  attain  in  the  present 
and  \he  future.  Only-th<5se:iv ho  'share -my  conception  of 
the  duties  and  obligations  of  the  German  people,  and  my 
convictbn  that  they  cannot  be  fulfilled  without  drawing 
the  swoid,  will  be  able  to  estimate  correctly  my  arguments 
and  concisions  in  the  purely  military  sphere,  and  to  judge 
competently  the  financial  demands  which  spring  out  of  it. 
It  is  only  in  their  logical  connection  with  the  entire  de- 
velopment, political  and  moral,  of  the  State  that  the  military 
requirements  find  their  motive  and  their  justification. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  RIGHT  TO  MAKE  WAR 

Since  1795,  when  Immanuel  Kant  published  in  his  old 
age  his  treatise  on  "Perpetual  Peace/'  many  have  con- 
sidered it  an  established  fact  that  war  is  the  destruction 
of  all  good  and  the  origin  of  all  evil.  In  spite  of  all  that 
history  teaches,  no  conviction  is  felt  that  the  struggle 
between  nations  is  inevitable,  and  the  growth  of  civiliza- 
tion is  credited  with  a  power  to  which  war  must  yield. 
But,  undisturbed  by  such  human  theories  and  the  change 
of  times,  war  has  again  and  again  marched  from  country 
to  country  with  the  clash  of  arms,  and  has  proved  its 
destructive  as  well  as  creative  and  purifying  power.  It 
has  not  succeeded  in  teaching  mankind  what  its  real  nature 
is.  Long  periods  of  war,  far  from  convincing  men  of  the 
necessity  of  war,  have,  on  the  contrary,  always  revived 
the  wish  to  exclude  war,  where  possible,  from  the  political 
intercourse  of  nations. 

This  wish  and  this  hope  are  widely  disseminated  even 
to-day.  The  maintenance  of  peace  is  lauded  as  the  only 
goal  at  which  statesmanship  should  aim.  This  unqualified 
desire  for  peace  has  obtained  in  our  days  a  quite  peculiar 
power  over  men's  spirits.  This  aspiration  finds  its  public 
expression  in  peace  leagues  and  peace  congresses;  the 
Press  of  every  country  and  of  every  party  opens  its  columns 
to  it.  The  current  in  this  direction  is,  indeed,  so  strong 
that  the  majority  of  Governments  profess — outwardly,  at 
any  rate — that  the  necessity  of  maintaining  peace  is  the 
real  aim  of  their  policy;  while  when  a  war  breaks  out  the 
aggressor  is  universally  stigmatized,  and  all  Governments 
exert  themselves,  partly  in  reality,  partly  in  pretence,  to 
extinguish  the  conflagration. 

Pacific  ideals,  to  be  sure,  are  seldom  the  real  motive  of 

16 


THE  RIGHT  TO  MAKE  WAR  17 

their  action.  They  usually  employ  the  need  of  peace  as 
a  cloak  under  which  to  promote  their  own  political  aims. 
This  was  the  real  position  of  affairs  at  the  Hague  Con- 
gresses, and  this  is  also  the  meaning  of  the  action  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  who  in  recent  times  have  earn- 
estly tried  to  conclude  treaties  for  the  establishment  of 
Arbitration  Courts,  first  and  foremost  with  England,  but 
also  with  Japan,  France,  and  Germany.  No  practical  re- 
sults, it  must  be  said,  have  so  far  been  achieved. 

We  can  hardly  assume  that  a  real  love  of  peace  prompts 
these  efforts.  This  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  precisely 
those  Powers  which,  as  the  weaker,  are  exposed  to  aggres- 
sion, and  therefore  were  in  the  greatest  need  of  inter- 
national protection,  have  been  completely  passed  over  in 
the  American  proposals  for  Arbitration  Courts.  It  must 
consequently  be  assumed  that  very  matter-of-fact  political 
motives  led  the  Americans,  with  their  commercial  instincts, 
to  take  such  steps,  and  induced  "perfidious  Albion"  to 
accede  to  the  proposals.  We  may  suppose  that  England  in- 
tended to  protect  her  rear  in  event  of  a  war  with  Ger- 
many, but  that  America  wished  to  have  a  free  hand  in 
order  to  follow  her  policy  of  sovereignty  in  Central  Amer- 
ica without  hindrance,  and  to  carry  out  her  plans  regard- 
ing the  Panama  Canal  in  the  exclusive  interests  of  America. 
Both  countries  certainly  entertained  the  hope  of  gaining 
advantage  over  the  other  signatory  of  the  treaty,  and  of 
winning  the  lion's  share  for  themselves.  Theorists  and 
fanatics  imagine  that  they  see  in  the  efforts  of  President 
Taft  a  great  step  forward  on  the  path  to  perpetual  peace, 
and  enthusiastically  agree  with  him.  Even  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  in  England,  with  well-affected  idealism, 
termed  the  procedure  of  the  United  States  an  era  in  the 
history  of  mankind. 

This  desire  for  peace  has  rendered  most  civilized  nations 
anaemic,  and  marks  a  decay  of  spirit  and  political  courage 
such  as  has  often  been  shown  by  a  race  of  Epigoni.  "It 
has  always  been,"  H.  von  Treitschke  tells  us,  "the  weary, 
spiritless,  and  exhausted  ages  which  have  played  with  the 
dream  of  perpetual  peace." 

Everyone  will,  within  certain  limits,  admit  that  the  en- 


i8     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

deavours  to  diminish  the  dangers  of  war  and  to  mitigate 
the  sufferings  which  war  entails  are  justifiable.  It  is  an 
incontestable  fact  that  war  temporarily  disturbs  industrial 
life,  interrupts  quiet  economic  development,  brings  wide- 
spread misery  with  it,  and  emphasizes  the  primitive  bru- 
tality of  man.  It  is  therefore  a  most  desirable  consumma- 
tion if  wars  for  trivial  reasons  should  be  rendered  impos- 
sible, and  if  efforts  are  made  to  restrict  the  evils  which 
follow  necessarily  in  the  train  of  war,  so  far  as  is  com- 
patible with  the  essential  nature  of  war.  All  that  the 
Hague  Peace  Congress  has  accomplished  in  this  limited 
sphere  deserves,  like  every  permissible  humanization  of 
war,  universal  acknowledgment.  But  it  is  quite  another 
matter  if  the  object  is  to  abolish  war  entirely,  and  to  deny 
its  necessary  place  in  historical  development. 

This  aspiration  is  directly  antagonistic  to  the  great  uni- 
versal laws  which  rule  all  life.  War  is  a  biological  necessity 
of  the  first  importance,  a  regulative  element  in  the  life  of 
mankind  which  cannot  be  dispensed  with,  since  without  it 
an  unhealthy  development  will  follow,  which  excludes 
every  advancement  of  the  race,  and  therefore  all  real  civil- 
ization. "War  is  the  father  of  all  things."*  The  sages  of 
antiquity  long  before  Darwin  recognized  this. 

The  struggle  for  existence  is,  in  the  life  of  Nature,  the 
basis  of  all  healthy  development.  All  existing  things  show 
themselves  to  be  the  result  of  contesting  forces.  So  in  the 
life  of  man  the  struggle  is  not  merely  the  destructive,  but 
the  life-giving  principle.  "To  supplant  or  to  be  supplanted 
is  the  essence  of  life,"  says  Goethe,  and  the  strong  life 
gains  the  upper  hand.  The  law  of  the  stronger  holds  good 
everywhere.  Those  forms  survive  which  are  able  to  pro- 
cure themselves  the  most  favourable  conditions  of  life,  and 
to  assert  themselves  in  the  universal  economy  of  Nature. 
The  weaker  succumb.  This  struggle  is  regulated  and  re- 
strained by  the  unconscious  sway  of  biological  laws  and  by 
the  interplay  of  opposite  forces.  In  the  plant  world  and 
the  animal  world  this  process  is  worked  out  in  unconscious 
tragedy.  In  the  human  race  it  is  consciously  carried  out, 
and  regulated  by  social  ordinances.    The  man  of  strong  will 


THE  RIGHT  TO  MAKE  WAR  19 

and  strong  intellect  tries  by  every  means  to  assert  himself, 
the  ambitious  strive  to  rise,  and  in  this  effort  the  individual 
is  far  from  being  guided  merely  by  the  consciousness  of 
right.  The  life-work  and  the  life-struggle  of  many  men 
are  determined,  doubtless,  by  unselfish  and  ideal  motives, 
but  to  a  far  greater  extent  the  less  noble  passions — craving 
for  possessions,  enjoyment  and  honour,  envy  and  the  thirst 
for  revenge — determine  men's  actions.  Still  more  often, 
perhaps,  it  is  the  need  to  live  which  brings  down  even 
natures  of  a  higher  mould  into  the  universal  struggle  for 
existence  and  enjoyment. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  on  this  point.  The  nation  is 
made  up  of  individuals,  the  State  of  communities.  The 
motive  which  influences  each  member  is  prominent  in  the 
whole  body.  It  is  a  persistent  struggle  for  possessions, 
power,  and  sovereignty,  which  primarily  governs  the  rela- 
tions of  one  nation  to  another,  and  right  is  respected  so 
far  only  as  it  is  compatible  with  advantage.  So  long  as 
there  are  men  who  have  human  feelings  and  aspirations, 
so  long  as  there  are  nations  who  strive  for  an  enlarged 
sphere  of  activity,  so  long  will  conflicting  interests  come 
into  being  and  occasions  for  making  war  arise. 

"The  natural  law,  to  which  all  laws  of  Nature  can  be 
reduced,  is  the  law  of  struggle.  All  intrasocial  property, 
all  thoughts,  inventions,  and  institutions,  as,  indeed,  the 
social  system  itself,  are  a  result  of  the  intrasocial  struggle, 
in  which  one  survives  and  another  is  cast  out.  The  extra- 
social,  the  supersocial,  struggle  which  guides  the  external 
development  of  societies,  nations,  and  races,  is  war.  The 
internal  development,  the  intrasocial  struggle,  is  man's 
daily  work — the  struggle  of  thoughts,  feelings,  wishes, 
sciences,  activities.  The  outward  development,  the  super- 
social  struggle,  is  the  sanguinary  struggle  of  nations — war. 
In  what  does  the  creative  power  of  this  struggle  consist? 
In  growth  and  decay,  in  the  victory  of  the  one  factor  and 
in  the  defeat  of  the  other!  This  struggle  is  a  creator, 
since  it  eliminates."* 

That  social  system  in  which  the  most  efficient  person- 
alities possess  the  greatest  influence  will  show  the  greatest 

*  Claus  Wagner,  "Der  Krieg  als  schaffendes  Weltprinzip." 


20     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

vitality  in  the  intrasocial  struggle.  In  the  extrasocial 
struggle,  in  war,  that  nation  will  conquer  which  can  throw 
into  the  scale  the  greatest  physical,  mental,  moral,  material, 
and  political  power,  and  is  therefore  the  best  able  to  defend 
itself.  War  will  furnish  such  a  nation  with  favourable 
vital  conditions,  enlarged  possibilities  of  expansion  and 
widened  influence,  and  thus  promote  the  progress  of  man- 
kind ;  for  it  is  clear  that  those  intellectual  and  moral  factors 
which  insure  superiority  in  war  are  also  those  which  render 
possible  a  general  progressive  development.  They  confer 
victory  because  the  elements  of  progress  are  latent  in  them. 
Without  war,  inferior  or  decaying  races  would  easily  choke 
the  growth  of  healthy  budding  elements,  and  a  universal 
decadence  would  follow.  "War,"  says  A.  W.  von  Schlegel, 
"is  as  necessary  as  the  struggle  of  the  elements  in  Nature." 
Now,  it  is,  of  course,  an  obvious  fact  that  a  peaceful 
rivalry  may  exist  between  peoples  and  States,  like  that 
between  the  fellow-members  of  a  society,  in  all  departments 
of  civilized  life — a  struggle  which  need  not  always  degen- 
erate into  war.  Struggle  and  war  are  not  identical.  This 
rivalry,  however,  does  not  take  place  under  the  same  con- 
ditions as  the  intrasocial  struggle,  and  therefore  cannot 
lead  to  the  same  results.  Above  the  rivalry  of  individuals 
and  groups  within  the  State  stands  the  law,  which  takes 
care  that  injustice  is  kept  within  bounds,  and  that  the  right 
shall  prevail.  Behind  the  law  stands  the  State,  armed  with 
power,  which  it  employs,  and  rightly  so,  not  merely  to  pro- 
tect, but  actively  to  promote,  the  moral  and  spiritual  in- 
terests of  society.  But  there  is  no  impartial  power  that 
stands  above  the  rivalry  of  States  to  restrain  injustice,  and 
to  use  that  rivalry  with  conscious  purpose  to  promote  the 
highest  ends  of  mankind.  Between  States  the  only  check 
on  injustice  is  force,  and  in  morality  and  civilization  each 
people  must  play  its  own  part  and  promote  its  own  ends 
and  ideals.  If  in  doing  so  it  comes  into  conflict  with  the 
ideals  and  views  of  other  States,  it  must  either  submit  and 
concede  the  precedence  to  the  rival  people  or  State,  or 
appeal  to  force,  and  face  the  risk  of  the  real  struggle — i.  e., 
of  war — in  order  to  make  its  own  views  prevail.  No  power 
exists  which  can  judge  between  States,  and  makes  its  judg- 


THE  RIGHT  TO  MAKE  WAR  21 

ments  prevail.  Nothing,  in  fact,  is  left  but  war  to  secure 
to  the  true  elements  of  progress  the  ascendancy  over  the 
spirits  of  corruption  and  decay. 

It  will,  of  course,  happen  that  several  weak  nations 
unite  and  form  a  superior  combination  in  order  to  defeat 
a  nation  which  in  itself  is  stronger.  This  attempt  will  suc- 
ceed for  a  time,  but  in  the  end  the  more  intensive  vitality 
will  prevail.  The  allied  opponents  have  the  seeds  of  cor- 
ruption in  them,  while  the  powerful  nation  gains  from  a 
temporary  reverse  a  new  strength  which  procures  for  it  an 
ultimate  victory  over  numerical  superiority.  The  history 
of  Germany  is  an  eloquent  example  of  this  truth. 

Struggle  is,  therefore,  a  universal  law  of  Nature,  and 
the  instinct  of  self-preservation  which  leads  to  struggle  is 
acknowledged  to  be  a  natural  condition  of  existence.  "Man 
is  a  fighter."  Self-sacrifice  is  a  renunciation  of  life,  whether 
in  the  existence  of  the  individual  or  in  the  life  of  States, 
which  are  agglomerations  of  individuals.  The  first  and 
paramount  law  is  the  assertion  of  one's  own  independent 
existence.  By  self-assertion  alone  can  the  State  maintain 
the  conditions  of  life  for  its  citizens,  and  insure  them  the 
legal  protection  which  each  man  is  entitled  to  claim  from 
it.  This  duty  of  self-assertion  is  by  no  means  satisfied  by 
the  mere  repulse  of  hostile  attacks;  it  includes  the  obliga- 
tion to  assure  the  possibility  of  life  and  development  to  the 
the  whole  body  of  the  nation  embraced  by  the  State. 

Strong,  healthy,  and  flourishing  nations  increase  in  num- 
bers. From  a  given  moment  they  require  a  continual  ex- 
pansion of  their  frontiers,  they  require  new  territory  for 
the  accommodation  of  their  surplus  population.  Since  al- 
most every  part  of  the  globe  is  inhabited,  new  territory 
must,  as  a  rule,  be  obtained  at  the  cost  of  its  possessors — 
that  is  to  say,  by  conquest,  which  thus  becomes  a  law  of 
necessity. 

The  right  of  conquest  is  universally  acknowledged.  At 
first  the  procedure  is  pacific.  Over-populated  countries 
pour  a  stream  of  emigrants  into  other  States  and  territories. 
These  submit  to  the  legislature  of  the  new  country,  but  try 
to  obtain  favourable  conditions  of  existence  for  themselves 


22     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

at  the  cost  of  the  original  inhabitants,  with  whom  they 
compete.     This  amounts  to  conquest. 

The  right  of  colonization  is  also  recognized.  Vast  ter- 
ritories inhabited  by  uncivilized  masses  are  occupied  by 
more  highly  civilized  States,  and  made  subject  to  their  rule. 
Higher  civilization  and  the  correspondingly  greater  power 
are  the  foundations  of  the  right  to  annexation.  This  right 
is,  it  is  true,  a  very  indefinite  one,  and  it  is  impossible  to 
determine  what  degree  of  civilization  justifies  annexation 
and  subjugation.  The  impossibility  of  finding  a  legitimate 
limit  to  these  international  relations  has  been  the  cause  of 
many  wars.  The  subjugated  nation  does  not  recognize  this 
right  of  subjugation,  and  the  more  powerful  civilized  nation 
refuses  to  admit  the  claim  of  the  subjugated  to  indepen- 
dence. This  situation  becomes  peculiarly  critical  when  the 
conditions  of  civilization  have  changed  in  the  course  of 
time.  The  subject  nation  has,  perhaps,  adopted  higher 
methods  and  conceptions  of  life,  and  the  difference  in  civil- 
ization has  consequently  lessened.  Such  a  state  of  things 
is  growing  ripe  in  British  India. 

Lastly,  in  all  times  the  right  of  conquest  by  war  has  been 
admitted.  It  may  be  that  a  growing  people  cannot  win 
colonies  from  uncivilized  races,  and  yet  the  State  wishes 
to  retain  the  surplus  population  which  the  mother-country 
can  no  longer  feed.  Then  the  only  course  left  is  to  ac- 
quire the  necessary  territory  by  war.  Thus  the  instinct  of 
self-preservation  leads  inevitably  to  war,  and  the  conquest 
of  foreign  soil.  It  is  not  the  possessor,  but  the  victor, 
who  then  has  the  right.  The  threatened  people  will  see 
the  point  of  Goethe's  lines: 

"That  which  thou  didst  inherit  from  thy  sires, 
In  order  to  posses  it,  must  be  won." 

The  procedure  of  Italy  in  Tripoli  furnishes  an  example 
of  such  conditions,  wfhile  Germany  in  the  Morocco  ques- 
tion could  not  rouse  herself  to  a  similar  resolution.* 

*  This  does  not  imply  that  Germany  could  and  ought  to  have 
occupied  part  of  Morocco.  On  more  than  one  ground  I  think  that  it 
was  imperative  to  maintain  the  actual  sovereignty  of  this  State  on 


THE  RIGHT  TO  MAKE  WAR  23 

In  such  cases  might  gives  the  right  to  occupy  or  to 
conquer.  Might  is  at  once  the  supreme  right,  and  the  dis- 
pute as  to  what  is  right  is  decided  by  the  arbitrament  of 
war.  War  gives  a  biologically  just  decision,  since  its  deci- 
sions rest  on  the  very  nature  of  things. 

Just  as  increase  of  population  forms  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances a  convincing  argument  for  war,  so  industrial 
conditions  may  compel  the  same  result. 

In  America,  England,  Germany,  to  mention  only  the  chief 
commercial  countries,  industries  offer  remunerative  work 
to  great  masses  of  the  population.  The  native  population 
cannot  consume  all  the  products  of  this  work.  The  indus- 
tries depend,  therefore,  mainly  on  exportation.  Work  and 
employment  are  secured  so  long  as  they  find  markets  which 
gladly  accept  their  products,  since  they  are  paid  for  by  the 
foreign  country.  But  this  foreign  country  is  intensely  in- 
terested in  liberating  itself  from  such  tribute,  and  in  pro- 
ducing itself  all  that  it  requires.  We  find,  therefore,  a  gen- 
eral endeavour  to  call  home  industries  into  existence,  and 
to  protect  them  by  tariff  barriers;  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  foreign  country  tries  to  keep  the  markets  open  to  itself, 
to  crush  or  cripple  competing  industries,  and  thus  to  retain 
the  consumers  for  itself  or  win  fresh  ones.  It  is  an  em- 
bittered struggle  which  rages  in  the  market  of  the  world. 
It  has  already  often  assumed  definite  hostile  forms  in  tariff 
wars,  and  the  future  will  certainly  intensify  this  struggle. 
Great  commercial  countries  will,  on  the  one  hand,  shut 
their  doors  more  closely  to  outsiders,  and  countries  hitherto 
on  the  down-grade  will  develop  home  industries,  which, 
under  more  favourable  conditions  of  labour  and  produc- 
tion, will  be  able  to  supply  goods  cheaper  than  those  im- 
ported from  the  old  industrial  States.  These  latter  will 
see  their  position  in  the  world  markets  endangered,  and 
thus  it  may  well  happen  that  an  export  country  can  no  longer 
offer  satisfactory  conditions  of  life  to  its  workers.     Such 


the  basis  of  the  Algeqiras  Convention.  Among  other  advantages, 
which  need  not  be  discussed  here,  Germany  would  have  had  the 
country  secured  to  her  as  a  possible  sphere  of  colonization.  That 
would  have  set  up  justifiable  claims  for  the  future. 


24     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

a  State  runs  the  danger  not  only  of  losing  a  valuable  part 
of  its  population  by  emigration,  but  of  also  gradually  fall- 
ing from  its  supremacy  in  the  civilized  and  political  world 
through  diminishing  production  and  lessened  profits. 

In  this  respect  we  stand  to-day  at  the  threshold  of  a  de- 
velopment. We  cannot  reject  the  possibility  that  a  State, 
under  the  necessity  of  providing  remunerative  work  for 
its  population,  may  be  driven  into  war.  If  more  valuable 
advantages  than  even  now  is  the  case  had  been  at  stake 
in  Morocco,  and  had  our  export  trade  been  seriously  men- 
aced, Germany  would  hardly  have  conceded  to  France  the 
most  favourable  position  in  the  Morocco  market  without 
a  struggle.  England,  doubtless,  would  not  shrink  from  a 
war  to  the  knife,  just  as  she  fought  for  the  ownership  of 
the  South  African  goldfields  and  diamond-mines,  if  any 
attack  threatened  her  Indian  market,  the  control  of  which 
is  the  foundation  of  her  world  sovereignty.  The  knowledge, 
therefore,  that  war  depends  on  biological  laws  leads  to 
the  conclusion  that  every  attempt  to  exclude  it  from  inter- 
national relations  must  be  demonstrably  untenable.  But 
it  is  not  only  a  biological  law,  but  a  moral  obligation,  and, 
as  such,  an  indispensable  factor  in  civilization. 

The  attitude  which  is  adopted  towards  this  idea  is  closely 
connected  with  the  view  of  life  generally. 

If  we  regard  the  life  of  the  individual  or  of  the  nation 
as  something  purely  material,  as  an  incident  which  ter- 
minates in  death  and  outward  decay,  we  must  logically  con- 
sider that  the  highest  goal  which  man  can  attain  is  the  en- 
joyment of  the  most  happy  life  and  the  greatest  possible 
diminution  of  all  bodily  suffering.  The  State  will  be  re- 
garded as  a  sort  of  assurance  office,  which  guarantees  a 
life  of  undisturbed  possession  and  enjoyment  in  the  widest 
meaning  of  the  word.  We  must  endorse  the  view  which 
Wilhelm  von  Humboldt  professed  in  his  treatise  on  the 
limits  of  the  activity  of  the  State.*  The  compulsory  func- 
tions of  the  State  must  be  limited  to  the  assurance  of  prop- 
erty and  life.    The  State  will  be  considered  as  a  law-court, 

*  W.  von  Humboldt,  "Ideen  zu  einem  Versuch,  die  Grenzen  der 
Wirksamkeit  des  Staates  zu  bestimmen." 


THE  RIGHT  TO  MAKE  WAR  25 

and  the  individual  will  be  inclined  to  shun  war  as  the 
greatest  conceivable  evil. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  we  consider  the  life  of  men  and  of 
States  as  merely  a  fraction  of  a  collective  existence,  whose 
final  purpose  does  not  rest  on  enjoyment,  but  on  the  de- 
velopment of  intellectual  and  moral  powers,  and  if  we  look 
upon  all  enjoyment  merely  as  an  accessory  of  the  chequered 
conditions  of  life,  the  task  of  the  State  will  appear  in  a 
very  different  light.  The  State  will  not  be  to  us  merely  a 
legal  and  social  insurance  office,  political  union  will  not 
seem  to  us  to  have  the  one  object  of  bringing  the  advan- 
tages of  civilization  within  the  reach  of  the  individual;  we 
shall  assign  to  it  the  nobler  task  of  raising  the  intellectual 
and  moral  powers  of  a  nation  to  the  highest  expansion, 
and  of  securing  for  them  that  influence  on  the  world  which 
tends  to  the  combined  progress  of  humanity.  We  shall  see 
in  the  State,  as  Fichte  taught,  an  exponent  of  liberty  to 
the  human  race,  whose  task  it  is  to  put  into  practice  the 
moral  duty  on  earth.  "The  State,"  says  Treitschke,  "is 
a  moral  community.  It  is  called  upon  to  educate  the  human 
race  by  positive  achievement,  and  its  ultimate  object  is 
that  a  nation  should  develop  in  it  and  through  it  into  a  real 
character;  that  is,  alike  for  nation  and  individuals,  the 
highest  moral  task." 

This  highest  expansion  can  never  be  realized  in  pure  in- 
dividualism. Man  can  only  develop  his  highest  capacities 
when  he  takes  his  part  in  a  community,  in  a  social  organism, 
for  which  he  lives  and  works.  He  must  be  in  a  family, 
in  a  society,  in  the  State,  which  draws  the  individual  out 
of  the  narrow  circles  in  which  he  otherwise  would  pass  his 
life,  and  makes  him  a  worker  in  the  great  common  interests 
of  humanity.  The  State  alone,  so  Schleiermacher  once 
taught,  gives  the  individual  the  highest  degree  of  life.* 

*  To  expand  the  idea  of  the  State  into  that  of  humanity,  and  thus 
to  entrust  apparently  higher  duties  to  the  individual,  leads  to  error, 
since  in  a  human  race  conceived  as  a  whole  struggle  and,  by  implica- 
tion, the  most  essential  vital  principle  would  be  ruled  out.  Any 
action  in  favour  of  collective  humanity  outside  the  limits  of  the 
State  and  nationality  is  impossible.  Such  conceptions  belong  to  the 
wide  domain  of  Utopias. 


26     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

War,  from  this  standpoint,  will  be  regarded  as  a  moral 
necessity,  if  it  is  waged  to  protect  the  highest  and  most 
valuable  interests  of  a  nation.  As  human  life  is  now  con- 
stituted, it  is  political  idealism  which  calls  for  war,  while 
materialism — in  theory,  at  least — repudiates  it. 

If  we  grasp  the  conception  of  the  State  from  this  higher 
aspect,  we  shall  soon  see  that  it  cannot  attain  its  great 
moral  ends  unless  its  political  power  increases.  The  higher 
object  at  which  it  aims  is  closely  correlated  to  the  advance- 
ment of  its  material  interests.  It  is  only  the  State  which 
strives  after  an  enlarged  sphere  of  influence  that  creates 
the  conditions  under  which  mankind  develops  into  the  most 
splendid  perfection.  The  development  of  all  the  best  human 
capabilities  and  qualities  can  only  find  scope  on  the  great 
stage  of  action  which  power  creates.  But  when  the  State 
renounces  all  extension  of  power,  and  recoils  from  every 
war  which  is  necessary  for  its  expansion;  when  it  is  con- 
tent to  exist,  and  no  longer  wishes  to  grow ;  when  "at  peace 
on  sluggard's  couch  it  lies,"  then  its  citizens  become  stunted. 
The  efforts  of  each  individual  are  cramped,  and  the  broad 
aspect  of  things  is  lost.  This  is  sufficiently  exemplified  by 
the  pitiable  existence  of  all  small  States,  and  every  great 
Power  that  mistrusts  itself  falls  victim  to  the  same  curse. 

All  petty  and  personal  interests  force  their  way  to  the 
front  during  a  long  period  of  peace.  Selfishness  and  in- 
trigue run  riot,  and  luxury  obliterates  idealism.  Money 
acquires  an  excessive  and  unjustifiable  power,  and  char- 
acter does  not  obtain  due  respect : 

i 
"Man  is  stunted  by  peaceful  days, 
In  idle  repose  his  courage  decays. 
Law  is  the  weakling's  game, 
Law  makes  the  world  the  same. 
But  in  war  man's  strength  is  seen, 
War  ennobles  all  that  is  mean ; 
Even  the  coward  belies  his  name." 

Schiller  :  Braut  v.  Messina. 

i 

"Wars   are  terrible,   but   necessary,    for   they   save   the 

State  from  social  petrification  and  stagnation.     It  is  well 

that  the  transitoriness  of  the  goods  of  this  world  is  not 


THE  RIGHT  TO  MAKE  WAR  27 

only  preached,  but  is  learnt  by  experience.  War  alone 
teaches  this  lesson."* 

War,  in  opposition  to  peace,  does  more  to  arouse  national 
life  and  to  expand  national  power  than  any  other  means 
known  to  history.  It  certainly  brings  much  material  and 
mental  distress  in  its  train,  but  at  the  same  time  it  evokes 
the  noblest  activities  of  the  human  nature.  This  is  especially 
so  under  present-day  conditions,  when  it  can  be  regarded 
not  merely  as  the  affair  of  Sovereigns  and  Governments,  but 
as  the  expression  of  the  united  will  of  a  whole  nation. 

All  petty  private  interests  shrink  into  insignificance  before 
the  grave  decision  which  a  war  involves.  The  common  dan- 
ger unites  all  in  a  common  effort,  and  the  man  who  shirks 
this  duty  to  the  community  is  deservedly  spurned.  This 
union  contains  a  liberating  power  which  produces  happy  and 
permanent  results  in  the  national  life.  We  need  only  recall 
the  uniting  power  of  the  War  of  Liberation  or  the  Franco- 
German  War  and  their  historical  consequences.  The  brutal 
incidents  inseparable  from  every  war  vanish  completely  be- 
fore the  idealism  of  the  main  result.  All  the  sham  reputa- 
tions which  a  long  spell  of  peace  undoubtedly  fosters  are 
unmasked.  Great  personalities  take  their  proper  place; 
strength,  truth,  and  honour  come  to  the  front  and  are  put 
into  play.  "A  thousand  touching  traits  testify  to  the  sacred 
power  of  the  love  which  a  righteous  war  awakes  in  noble 
nations."t 

Frederick  the  Great  recognized  the  ennobling  effect  of 
war.  "War,"  he  said,  "opens  the  most  fruitful  field  to  all 
virtues,  for  at  every  moment  constancy,  pity,  magnanimity, 
heroism,  and  mercy,  shine  forth  in  it;  every  moment  offers 
an  opportunity  to  exercise  one  of  these  virtues." 

"At  the  moment  when  the  State  cries  out  that  its  very 
life  is  at  stake,  social  selfishness  must  cease  and  party  hatred 
be  hushed.  The  individual  must  forget  his  egoism,  and  feel 
that  he  is  a  member  of  the  whole  body.  He  should  recognize 
how  his  own  life  is  nothing  worth  in  comparison  with  the 
welfare  of  the  community.  War  is  elevating,  because  the 
individual   disappears  before  the  great  conception  of  the 

tTreitschke,  "Deutsche  Geschichte,"  i.,  p.  482. 
*Kuno  Fischer,  "Hegel,"  i.,  p.  737. 


*8  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

State.  The  devotion  of  the  members  of  a  community  to 
each  other  is  nowhere  so  splendidly  conspicuous  as  in  war. 
.  .  .  What  a  perversion  of  morality  to  wish  to  abolish 
heroism  among  men!"* 

Even  defeat  may  bear  a  rich  harvest.  It  often,  indeed, 
passes  an  irrevocable  sentence  on  weakness  and  misery,  but 
often,  too,  it  leads  to  a  healthy  revival,  and  lays  the  founda- 
tion of  a  new  and  vigorous  constitution.  "I  recognize  in  the 
effect  of  war  upon  national  character,"  said  Wilhelm  von 
Humboldt,  "one  of  the  most  salutary  elements  in  the  mould- 
ing of  the  human  race." 

The  individual  can  perform  no  nobler  moral  action  than 
to  pledge  his  life  on  his  convictions,  and  to  devote  his  own 
existence  to  the  cause  which  he  serves,  or  even  to  the  con- 
ception of  the  value  of  ideals  to  personal  morality.  Simi- 
larly, nations  and  States  can  achieve  no  loftier  consumma- 
tion than  to  stake  their  whole  power  on  upholding  their  in- 
dependence, their  honour,  and  their  reputation. 

Such  sentiments,  however,  can  only  be  put  into  practice 
in  war.  The  possibility  of  war  is  required  to  give  the  na- 
tional character  that  stimulus  from  which  these  sentiments 
spring,  and  thus  only  are  nations  enabled  to  do  justice  to  the 
highest  duties  of  civilization  by  the  fullest  development  of 
their  moral  forces.  An  intellectual  and  vigorous  nation  can 
experience  no  worse  destiny  than  to  be  lulled  into  a  Phaeacian 
existence  by  the  undisputed  enjoyment  of  peace. 

From  this  point  of  view,  efforts  to  secure  peace  are  ex- 
traordinarily detrimental  to  the  national  health  so  soon  as 
they  influence  politics.  The  States  which  from  various  con- 
siderations are  always  active  in  this  direction  are  sapping 
the  roots  of  their  own  strength.  The  United  States  of 
America,  e.  g.,  in  June,  191 1,  championed  the  ideas  of  uni- 
versal peace  in  order  to  be  able  to  devote  their  undisturbed 
attention  to  money-making  and  the  enjoyment  of  wealth, 
and  to  save  the  three  hundred  million  dollars  which  they 
spend  on  their  army  and  navy ;  they  thus  incur  a  great  dan- 
ger, not  so  much  from  the  possibility  of  a  war  with  England 
or  Japan,  but  precisely  because  they  try  to  exclude  all  chance 

*  Treitschke,  "Politik,"  i.,  p.  74. 


THE  RIGHT  TO  MAKE  WAR  29 

of  contest  with  opponents  of  their  own  strength,  and  thus 
avoid  the  stress  of  great  political  emotions,  without  which 
the  moral  development  of  the  national  character  is  impos- 
sible. If  they  advance  farther  on  this  road,  they  will  one 
day  pay  dearly  for  such  a  policy. 

Again,  from  the  Christian  standpoint  we  arrive  at  the 
same  conclusion.  Christian  morality  is  based,  indeed,  on 
the  law  of  love.  "Love  God  above  all  things,  and  thy  neigh- 
bour as  thyself."  This  law  can  claim  no  significance  for  the 
relations  of  one  country  to  another,  since  its  application  to 
politics  would  lead  to  a  conflict  of  duties.  The  love  which 
a  man  showed  to  another  country  as  such  would  imply  a 
want  of  love  for  his  own  countrymen.  Such  a  system  of 
politics  must  inevitably  lead  men  astray.  Christian  morality 
is  personal  and  social,  and  in  its  nature  cannot  be  political. 
Its  object  is  to  promote  morality  of  the  individual,  in  order 
to  strengthen  him  to  work  unselfishly  in  the  interests  of  the 
community.  It  tells  us  to  love  our  individual  enemies,  but 
does  not  remove  the  conception  of  enmity.  Christ  Himself 
said :  "I  am  not  come  to  send  peace  on  earth,  but  a  sword." 
His  teaching  can  never  be  adduced  as  an  argument  against 
the  universal  law  of  struggle.  There  never  was  a  religion 
which  was  more  combative  than  Christianity.  Combat,  moral 
combat,  is  its  very  essence.  If  we  transfer  the  ideas  of 
Christianity  to  the  sphere  of  politics,  we  can  claim  to  raise 
the  power  of  the  State — power  in  the  widest  sense,  not 
merely  from  the  material  aspect — to  the  highest  degree,  with 
the  object  of  the  moral  advancement  of  humanity,  and  under 
certain  conditions  the  sacrifice  may  be  made  which  a  war  de- 
mands. Thus,  according  to  Christianity,  we  cannot  disap- 
prove of  war  in  itself,  but  must  admit  that  it  is  justified 
morally  and  historically. 

Again,  we  should  not  be  entitled  to  assume  that  from  the 
opposite,  the  purely  materialistic,  standpoint  war  is  entirely 
precluded.  The  individual  who  holds  such  views  will  cer- 
tainly regard  it  with  disfavour,  since  it  may  cost  him  life 
and  prosperity.  The  State,  however,  as  such  can  also  come 
from  the  materialistic  standpoint  to  a  decision  to  wage  war, 
if  it  believes  that  by  a  certain  sacrifice  of  human  lives  and 


30     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

happiness  the  conditions  of  life  of  the  community  may  be 
improved. 

The  loss  is  restricted  to  comparatively  few,  and,  since  the 
fundamental  notion  of  all  materialistic  philosophy  inevitably 
leads  to  selfishness,  the  majority  of  the  citizens  have  no 
reason  for  not  sacrificing  the  minority  in  their  own  interests. 
Thus,  those  who  from  the  materialistic  standpoint  deny  the 
necessity  of  war  will  admit  its  expediency  from  motives  of 
self-interest. 

Reflection  thus  shows  not  only  that  war  is  an  unqualified 
necessity,  but  that  it  is  justifiable  from  every  point  of  view. 
The  practical  methods  which  the  adherents  of  the  peace 
idea  have  proposed  for  the  prevention  of  war  are  shown  to 
be  absolutely  ineffective. 

It  is  sometimes  assumed  that  every  war  represents  an 
infringement  of  rights,  and  that  not  only  the  highest  ex- 
pression of  civilization,  but  also  the  true  welfare  of  every 
nation,  is  involved  in  the  fullest  assertion  of  these  rights, 
and  proposals  are  made  from  time  to  time  on  this  basis  to 
settle  the  disputes  which  arise  between  the  various  countries 
by  Arbitration  Courts,  and  so  to  render  war  impossible.  The 
politician  who,  without  side-interests  in  these  proposals, 
honestly  believes  in  their  practicability  must  be  amazingly 
short-sighted. 

Two  questions  in  this  connection  are  at  once  suggested : 
On  what  right  is  the  finding  of  this  Arbitration  Court  based  ? 
and  what  sanctions  insure  that  the  parties  will  accept  this 
finding? 

To  the  first  question  the  answer  is  that  such  a  right  does 
not,  and  cannot,  exist.  The  conception  of  right  is  twofold. 
I*  signifies,  firstly,  the  consciousness  of  right,  the  living  feel- 
ing of  what  is  right  and  good ;  secondly,  the  right  laid  down 
by  society  and  the  State,  either  written  or  sanctioned  by 
tradition.  In  its  first  meaning  it  is  an  indefinite,  purely  per- 
sonal conception ;  in  its  second  meaning  it  is  variable  and 
capable  of  development.  The  right  determined  by  law  is 
only  an  attempt  to  secure  a  right  in  itself.  In  this  sense  right 
is  the  system  of  social  aims  secured  by  compulsion.  It  is 
therefore  impossible  that  a  written  law  should  meet  all  the 
special  points  of  a  particular  case.    The  application  of  the 


THE  RIGHT  TO  MAKE  WAR  31 

legal  right  must  always  be  qualified  in  order  to  correspond 
more  or  less  to  the  idea  of  justice.  A  certain  freedom  in 
deciding  on  the  particular  case  must  be  conceded  to  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice.  The  established  law,  within  a  given 
and  restricted  circle  of  ideas,  is  only  occasionally  absolutely 
just. 

The  conception  of  this  right  is  still  more  obscured  by  the 
complex  nature  of  the  consciousness  of  right  and  wrong.  A 
quite  different  consciousness  of  right  and  wrong  develops  in 
individuals,  whether  persons  or  peoples,  and  this  conscious- 
ness finds  its  expression  in  most  varied  forms,  and  lives  in  the 
heart  of  the  people  by  the  side  of,  and  frequently  in  opposi- 
tion to,  the  established  law.  In  Christian  countries  murder 
is  a  grave  crime;  amongst  a  people  where  blood-vengeance 
is  a  sacred  duty  it  can  be  regarded  as  a  moral  act,  and  its 
neglect  as  a  crime.  It  is  impossible  to  reconcile  such  different 
conceptions  of  right. 

There  is  yet  another  cause  of  uncertainty.  The  moral 
consciousness  of  the  same  people  alters  with  the  changing 
ideas  of  different  epochs  and  schools  of  philosophy.  The 
established  law  can  seldom  keep  pace  with  this  inner  develop- 
ment, this  growth  of  moral  consciousness;  it  lags  behind. 
A  condition  of  things  arises  where  the  living  moral  con- 
sciousness of  the  people  conflicts  with  the  established  law, 
where  legal  forms  are  superannuated,  but  still  exist,  and 
Mephistopheles'  scoffing  words  are  true : 

"Laws  are  transmitted,  as  one  sees, 
Just  like  inherited  disease. 
They're  handed  down  from  race  to  race, 
And  noiseless  glide  from  place  to  place. 
Reason  they  turn  to  nonsense ;  worse, 
They  make  beneficence  a  curse ! 
Ah  me!    That  you're  a  grandson  yoti 
As  long  as  you're  alive  shall  rue." 

Faust  (translation  by  Sir  T.  Martin). 

Thus,  no  absolute  rights  can  be  laid  down  even  for  men 
who  share  the  same  ideas  in  their  private  and  social  inter- 
course. The  conception  of  the  constitutional  State  in  the 
strictest  sense  is  an  impossibility,  and  would  lead  to  an  in- 
tolerable state  of  things.    The  hard  and  fast  principle  must 


32     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

be  modified  by  the  progressive  development  of  the  fixed  law, 
as  well  as  by  the  ever-necessary  application  of  mercy  and  of 
self-help  allowed  by  the  community.  If  sometimes  between 
individuals  the  duel  alone  meets  the  sense  of  justice,  how 
much  more  impossible  must  a  universal  international  law  be 
in  the  wide-reaching  and  complicated  relations  between  na- 
tions and  States!  Each  nation  evolves  its  own  conception 
of  right,  each  has  its  particular  ideals  and  aims,  which  spring 
with  a  certain  inevitableness  from  its  character  and  historical 
life.  These  various  views  bear  in  themselves  their  living 
justification,  and  may  well  be  diametrically  opposed  to  those 
of  other  nations,  and  none  can  say  that  one  nation  has  a 
better  right  than  the  other.  There  never  have  been,  and 
never  will  be,  universal  rights  of  men.  Here  and  there 
particular  relations  can  be  brought  under  definite  interna- 
tional laws,  but  the  bulk  of  national  life  is  absolutely  out- 
side codification.  Even  were  some  such  attempt  made,  even 
if  a  comprehensive  international  code  were  drawn  up,  no 
self-respecting  nation  would  sacrifice  its  own  conception  of 
right  to  it.  By  so  doing  it  would  renounce  its  highest  ideals ; 
it  would  allow  its  own  sense  of  justice  to  be  violated  by  an 
injustice,  and  thus  dishonour  itself. 

Arbitration  treaties  must  be  peculiarly  detrimental  to 
an  aspiring  people,  which  has  not  yet  reached  its  political 
and  national  zenith,  and  is  bent  on  expanding  its  power 
in  order  to  play  its  part  honourably  in  the  civilized  world. 
Every  Arbitration  Court  must  originate  in  a  certain  political 
status;  it  must  regard  this  as  legally  constituted,  and  must 
treat  any  alterations,  however  necessary,  to  which  the  whole 
of  the  contracting  parties  do  not  agree,  as  an  encroachment. 
In  this  way  every  progressive  change  is  arrested,  and  a  legal 
position  created  which  may  easily  conflict  with  the  actual 
turn  of  affairs,  and  may  check  the  expansion  of  the  young 
and  vigorous  State  in  favour  of  one  which  is  sinking  in  the 
scale  of  civilization. 

These  considerations  supply  the  answer  to  the  second 
decisive  question:  How  can  the  judgment  of  the  Arbitra- 
tion Court  be  enforced  if  any  State  refuses  to  submit  to 
it?  Where  does  the  power  reside  which  insures  the  execu- 
tion of  this  judgment  when  pronounced? 


THE  RIGHT  TO  MAKE  WAR  33 

In  America,  Elihu  Root,  formerly  Secretary  of  State,  de- 
clared in  1908  that  the  High  Court  of  International  Justice 
established  by  the  second  Hague  Conference  would  be  able 
to  pronounce  definite  and  binding  decisions  by  virtue  of  the 
pressure  brought  to  bear  by  public  opinion.  The  present 
leaders  of  the  American  peace  movement  seem  to  share  this 
idea.  With  a  childlike  self -consciousness,  they  appear  to 
believe  that  public  opinion  must  represent  the  view  which 
the  American  plutocrats  think  most  profitable  to  themselves. 
They  have  no  notion  that  the  widening  development  of  man- 
kind has  quite  other  concerns  than  material  prosperity,  com- 
merce, and  money-making.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  public 
opinion  would  be  far  from  unanimous,  and  real  compulsion 
could  only  be  employed  by  means  of  war — the  very  thing 
which  is  to  be  avoided. 

We  can  imagine  a  Court  of  Arbitration  intervening  in 
the  quarrels  of  the  separate  tributary  countries  when  an 
empire  like  the  Roman  Empire  existed.  Such  an  empire 
never  can  or  will  arise  again.  Even  if  it  did,  it  would 
assuredly,  like  a  universal  peace  league,  be  disastrous  to 
all  human  progress,  which  is  dependent  on  the  clashing  in- 
terests and  the  unchecked  rivalry  of  different  groups. 

So  long  as  we  live  under  such  a  State  system  as  at  present, 
the  German  Imperial  Chancellor  certainly  hit  the  nail  on  the 
head  when  he  declared,  in  his  speech  in  the  Reichstag  on 
March  30,  191 1,  that  treaties  for  arbitration  between  nations 
must  be  limited  to  clearly  ascertainable  legal  issues,  and  that 
a  general  arbitration  treaty  between  two  countries  afforded 
no  guarantee  of  permanent  peace.  Such  a  treaty  merely 
proved  that  between  the  two  contracting  States  no  serious 
inducement  to  break  the  peace  could  be  imagined.  It  there- 
fore only  confirmed  the  relations  already  existing.  "If  these 
relations  change,  if  differences  develop  between  the  two  na- 
tions which  affect  their  national  existence,  which,  to  use  a 
homely  phrase,,  cut  them  to  the  quick,  then  every  arbitration 
treaty  will  burn  like  tinder  and  end  in  smoke." 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  a  peaceful  decision  by  an 
Arbitration  Court  can  never  replace  in  its  effects  and  con- 
sequences a  warlike  decision,  even  as  regards  the  State  in 
whose  favour  it  is  pronounced.    If  we  imagine,  for  example, 


34     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

that  Silesia  had  fallen  to  Frederick  the  Great  by  the  finding 
of  a  Court  of  Arbitration,  and  not  by  a  war  of  unparalleled 
heroism,  would  the  winning  of  this  province  have  been 
equally  important  for  Prussia  and  for  Germany?  No  one 
will  maintain  this. 

The  material  increase  in  power  which  accrued  to  Fred- 
erick's country  by  the  acquisition  of  Silesia  is  not  to  be 
under-estimated.  But  far  more  important  was  the  circum- 
stance that  this  country  could  not  be  conquered  by  the 
strongest  European  coalition,  and  that  it  vindicated  its  posi- 
tion as  the  home  of  unfettered  intellectual  and  religious  de- 
velopment. It  was  war  which  laid  the  foundations  of 
Prussia's  power,  which  amassed  a  heritage  of  glory  and 
honour  that  can  never  be  again  disputed.  War  forged  that 
Prussia,  hard  as  steel,  on  which  the  New  Germany  could 
grow  up  as  a  mighty  European  State  and  a  World  Power 
of  the  future.  Here  once  more  war  showed  its  creative 
power,  and  if  we  learn  the  lessons  of  history  we  shall  see 
the  same  result  again  and  again. 

If  we  sum  up  our  arguments,  we  shall  see  that,  from 
the  most  opposite  aspects,\  the  efforts  directed  towards  the 
abolition  of  war  must  not  only  be  termed  foolish,  but  ab- 
solutely immoral,  and  must  be  stigmatized  as  unworthy  of 
the  human  race.  To  what  does  the  whole  question  amount  ? 
It  is  proposed  to  deprive  men  of  the  right  and  the  possibility 
to  sacrifice  their  highest  material  possessions,  their  physical 
life,  for  ideals,  and  thus  to  realize  the  highest  moral  un- 
selfishness. It  is  proposed  to  obviate  the  great  quarrels  be- 
tween nations  and  States  by  Courts  of  Arbitration — that  is, 
by  arrangements.  A  one-sided,  restricted,  formal  law  is  to 
be  established  in  the  place  of  the  decisions  of  history.  The 
weak  nation  is  to  have  the  same  right  to  live  as  the  powerful 
and  vigorous  nation.  The  whole  idea  represents  a  pre- 
sumptuous encroachment  on  the  natural  laws  of  develop- 
ment, which  can  only  lead  to„  the  most  disastrous  conse- 
quences for  humanity  generally. 

With  the  cessation  of  the  unrestricted  competition,  whose 
ultimate  appeal  is  to  arms,  all  real  progress  would  soon  be 
checked,  and  a  moral  and  intellectual  stagnation  would  ensue 
which  must  end  in  degeneration.    So,  too,  when  men  lose  the 


THE  RIGHT  TO  MAKE  WAR  35 

capacity  of  gladly  sacrificing  the  highest  material  blessings — 
life,  health,  property,  and  comfort — for  ideals ;  for  the  main- 
tenance of  national  character  and  political  independence ;  for 
the  expansion  of  sovereignty  and  territory  in  the  interests 
of  the  national  welfare ;  for  a  definite  influence  in  the  con- 
cert of  nations  according  to  the  scale  of  their  importance 
in  civilization;  for  intellectual  freedom  from  dogmatic  and 
political  compulsion;  for  the  honour  of  the  flag  as  typical 
of  their  own  worth — then  progressive  development  is  broken 
off,  decadence  is  inevitable,  and  ruin  at  home  and  abroad  is 
only  a  question  of  time.  History  speaks  with  no  uncertain 
voice  on  this  subject.  It  shows  that  valour  is  a  necessary 
condition  of  progress.  Where  with  growing  civilization  and 
increasing  material  prosperity  war  ceases,  military  efficiency 
diminishes,  and  the  resolution  to  maintain  independence 
under  all  circumstances  fails,  there  the  nations  are  approach- 
ing their  downfall,  and  cannot  hold  their  own  politically  or 
racially. 

"A  people  can  only  hope  to  take  up  a  firm  position  in 
the  political  world  when  national  character  and  military 
tradition  act  and  react  upon  each."  These  are  the  words 
of  Clausewitz,  the  great  philosopher  of  war,  and  he  is  in- 
contestably  right. 

These  efforts  for  peace  would,  if  they  attained  their  goal, 
not  merely  lead  to  general  degeneration,  as  happens  every- 
where in  Nature  where  the  struggle  for  existence  is  elim- 
inated, but  they  have  a  direct  damaging  and  unnerving  effect. 
The  apostles  of  peace  draw  large  sections  of  a  nation  into 
the  spell  of  their  Utopian  efforts,  and  they  thus  introduce 
an  element  of  weakness  into  the  national  life;  they  cripple 
the  justifiable  national  pride  in  independence,  and  support 
a  nerveless  opportunist  policy  by  surrounding  it  with  the 
glamour  of  a  higher  humanity,  and  by  offering  it  specious 
reasons  for  disguising  its  own  weakness.  They  thus  play 
the  game  of  their  less  scrupulous  enemies,  just  as  the  Prus- 
sian policy,  steeped  in  the  ideas  of  universal  peace,  did  in 
1805  and  1806,  and  brought  the  State  to  the  brink  of  destruc- 
tion. 

The  functions  of  true  humanity  are  twofold.  On  the  one 
hand  there  is  the  promotion  of  the  intellectual,  moral,  and 


36     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

military  forces,  as  well  as  of  political  power,  as  the  surest 
guarantee  for  the  uniform  development  of  character ;  on  the 
other  hand  there  is  the  practical  realization  of  ideals,  accord- 
ing to  the  law  of  love,  in  the  life  of  the  individual  and  of 
the  community. 

It  seems  to  me  reasonable  to  compare  the  efforts  directed 
towards  the  suppression  of  war  with  those  of  the  Social 
Democratic  Labour  party,  which  goes  hand  in  hand  with 
them.  The  aims  of  both  parties  are  Utopian.  The  organized 
Labour  party  strives  after  an  ideal  whose  realization  is  only 
conceivable  when  the  rate  of  wages  and  the  hours  of  work 
are  settled  internationally  for  the  whole  industrial  world, 
and  when  the  cost  of  living  is  everywhere  uniformly  reg- 
ulated. Until  this  is  the  case  the  prices  of  the  international 
market  determine  the  standard  of  wages.  The  nation  which 
leaves  this  out  of  account,  and  tries  to  settle  independently 
wages  and  working  hours,  runs  the  risk  of  losing  its  posi- 
tion in  the  international  market  in  competition  with  nations 
who  work  longer  hours  and  at  lower  rates.  Want  of  em- 
ployment and  extreme  misery  among  the  working  classes 
would  inevitably  be  the  result.  On  the  other  hand,  the  in- 
ternationalization of  industries  would  soon,  by  excluding  and 
preventing  any  competition,  produce  a  deterioration  of  prod- 
ucts and  a  profound  demoralization  of  the  working  popula- 
tion. 

The  case  of  the  scheme  for  universal  peace  is  similar.  Its 
execution,  as  we  saw,  would  be  only  feasible  in  a  world 
empire,  and  this  is  as  impossible  as  the  uniform  regulation 
of  the  world's  industries.  A  State  which  disregarded  the 
differently  conceived  notions  of  neighbouring  countries,  and 
wished  to  make  the  idea  of  universal  peace  the  guiding  rule 
for  its  policy,  would  only  inflict  a  fatal  injury  on  itself,  and 
become  the  prey  of  more  resolute  and  warlike  neighbours. 

We  can,  fortunately,  assert  the  impossibility  of  these 
efforts  after  peace  ever  attaining  their  ultimate  object  in  a 
world  bristling  with  arms,  where  a  healthy  egotism  still  di- 
rects the  policy  of  most  countries.  "God  will  see  to  it,"  says 
Treitschke,*  "that  war  always  recurs  as  a  drastic  medicine 
for  the  human  race  I" 

♦Treitschke,  "Politik,"  i.,  p.  76. 


THE  RIGHT  TO  MAKE  WAR  37 

Nevertheless,  these  tendencies  spell  for  us  in  Germany  no 
inconsiderable  danger.  We  Germans  are  inclined  to  indulge 
in  every  sort  of  unpractical  drems.  "The  accuracy  of  the 
national  instinct  is  no  longer  a  universal  attribute  with  us, 
as  in  France."*  We  lack  the  true  feeling  for  political 
exigencies.  A  deep  social  and  religious  gulf  divides  the 
German  people  into  different  political  groups,  which  are 
bitterly  antagonistic  to  each  other.  The  traditional  feuds  in 
the  'political  world  still  endure.  The  agitation  for  peace  in- 
troduces a  new  element  of  weakness,  dissension,  and  indeci- 
sion, into  the  divisions  of  our  national  and  party  life. 

It  is  indisputable  that  many  supporters  of  these  ideas 
sincerely  believe  in  the  possibility  of  their  realization,  and 
are  convinced  that  the  general  good  is  being  advanced  by 
them.  Equally  true  is  it,  however,  that  this  peace  movement 
is  often  simply  used  to  mask  intensely  selfish  political  pro- 
jects. Its  apparent  humanitarian  idealism  constitutes  its 
danger. 

Every  means  must  therefore  be  employed  to  oppose  these 
visionary  schemes.  They  must  be  publicly  denounced  as 
what  they  really  are — as  an  unhealthy  and  feeble  Utopia, 
or  a  cloak  for  political  machinations.  Our  people  must  learn 
to  see  that  the  maintenance  of  peace  never  can  or  may  be  the 
goal  of  a  policy.  The  policy  of  a  great  State  has  positive 
aims.  It  will  endeavour  to  attain  this  by  pacific  measures 
so  long  as  that  is  possible  and  profitable.  It  must  not  only 
be  conscious  that  in  momentous  questions  which  influence 
definitely  the  entire  development  of  a  nation,  the  appeal 
to  arms  is  a  sacred  right  of  the  State,  but  it  must  keep  this 
conviction  fresh  in  the  national  consciousness.  The  inevit- 
ableness,  the  idealism,  and  the  blessing  of  war,  as  an  in- 
dispensable and  stimulating  law  of  development,  must  be 
repeatedly  emphasized.  The  apostles  of  the  peace  idea  must 
be  confronted  with  Goethe's  manly  words: 

"Dreams  of  a  peaceful  day? 
Let  him  dream  who  may! 
'War'  is  our  rallying  cry, 
Onward  to  victory !" 

*  Treitschke,  "Politik,"  i.,  p.  81. 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  DUTY  TO   MAKE   WAR 


Prince  Bismarck  repeatedly  declared  before  the  German 
Reichstag  that  no  one  should  ever  take  upon  himself  the 
immense  responsibility  of  intentionally  bringing  about  a 
war.  It  could  not,  he  said,  be  foreseen  what  unexpected 
events  might  occur,  which  altered  the  whole  situation,  and 
made  a  war,  with  its  attendant  dangers  and  horrors,  super- 
fluous. In  his  "Thoughts  and  Reminiscences"  he  expresses 
himself  to  this  effect:  "Even  victorious  wars  can  only  be 
justified  when  they  are  forced  upon  a  nation,  and  we  cannot 
see  the  cards  held  by  Providence  so  closely  as  to  anticipate 
the  historical  development  by  personal  calculation."* 

We  need  not  discuss  whether  Prince  Bismarck  wished 
this  dictum  to  be  regarded  as  a  universally  applicable  prin- 
ciple, or  whether  he  uttered  it  as  a  supplementary  explana- 
tion of  the  peace  policy  which  he  carried  out  for  so  long.  It 
is  difficult  to  gauge  its  true  import.  The  notion  of  forcing 
a  war  upon  a  nation  bears  various  interpretations.  We  must 
not  think  merely  of  external  foes  who  compel  us  to  fight. 
A  war  may  seem  to  be  forced  upon  a  statesman  by  the  state 
of  home  affairs,  or  by  the  pressure  of  the  whole  political 
situation. 

Prince  Bismarck  did  not,  however,  always  act  according 
to  the  strict  letter  of  that  speech;  it  is  his  special  claim  to 
greatness  that  at  the  decisive  moment  he  did  not  lack  the 
boldness  to  begin  a  war  on  his  own  initiative.  The  thought 
which  he  expresses  in  his  later  utterances  cannot,  in  my 
opinion,  be  shown  to  be  a  universally  applicable  principle  of 
political  conduct.  If  we  wish  to  regard  it  as  such,  we  shall 
not  only  run  counter  to  the  ideas  of  our  greatest  German 
*  "Gedanken  und  Erinnerungen,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  93. 

38 


THE  DUTY  TO  MAKE  WAR  39 

Prince,  but  we  exclude  from  politics  that  independence  of 
action  which  is  the  true  motive  force. 

The  greatness  of  true  statesmanship  consists  in  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  natural  trend  of  affairs,  and  in  a  just  apprecia- 
tion of  the  value  of  the  controlling  forces,  which  it  uses 
and  guides  in  its  own  interest.  It  does  not  shrink  from  the 
conflicts,  which  under  the  given  conditions  are  unavoidable, 
but  decides  them  resolutely  by  war  when  a  favourable  posi- 
tion affords  prospect  of  a  successful  issue.  In  this  way 
statecraft  becomes  a  tool  of  Providence,  which  employs  the 
human  will  to  attain  its  ends.  "Men  make  history/'*  as 
Bismarck's  actions  clearly  show. 

No  doubt  the  most  strained  political  situation  may  un- 
expectedly admit  of  a  peaceful  solution.  The  death  of  some 
one  man,  the  setting  of  some  great  ambition,  the  removal 
of  some  master-will,  may  be  enough  to  change  it  funda- 
mentally. But  the  great  disputes  in  the  life  of  a  nation 
cannot  be  settled  so  simply.  The  man  who  wished  to  bring 
the  question  to  a  decisive  issue  may  disappear,  and  the  politi- 
cal crisis  pass  for  the  moment;  the  disputed  points  still 
exist,  and  lead  once  more  to  quarrels,  and  finally  to  war, 
if  they  are  due  to  really  great  and  irreconcilable  interests. 
With  the  death  of  King  Edward  VII.  of  England  the  policy 
of  isolation,  which  he  introduced  with  much  adroit  states- 
manship against  Germany,  has  broken  down.  The  antagon- 
ism of  Germany  and  England,  based  on  the  conflict  of  the 
interests  and  claims  of  the  two  nations,  still  persists,  although 
the  diplomacy  which  smooths  down,  not  always  profitably, 
all  causes  of  difference  has  succeeded  in  slackening  the  ten- 
sion for  the  moment,  not  without  sacrifices  on  the  side  of 
Germany. 

It  is  clearly  an  untenable  proposition  that  political  action 
should  depend  on  indefinite  possibilities.  A  completely  vague 
factor  would  be  thus  arbitrarily  introduced  into  politics, 
which  have  already  many  unknown  quantities  to  reckon 
with;  they  would  thus  be  made  more  or  less  dependent  on 
chance. 

It  may  be,  then,  assumed  as  obvious  that  the  great  prac- 
tical politician  Bismarck  did  not  wish  that  his  words  on  the 
*  Treitschke,  "Deutsche  Geschichte,"  i.,  p.  28. 


40     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

political  application  of  war  should  be  interpreted  in  the 
sense  which  has  nowadays  so  frequently  been  attributed  to 
them,  in  order  to  lend  the  authority  of  the  great  man  to  a 
weak  cause.  Only  those  conditions  which  can  be  ascer- 
tained and  estimated  should  determine  political  action. 

For  the  moral  justification  of  the  political  decision  we 
must  not  look  to  its  possible  consequences,  but  to  its  aim 
and  its  motives,  to  the  conditions  assumed  by  the  agent, 
and  to  the  trustworthiness,  honour,  and  sincerity  of  the 
considerations  which  led  to  action.  Its  practical  value  is 
determined  by  an  accurate  grasp  of  the  whole  situation, 
by  a  correct  estimate  of  the  resources  of  the  two  parties,  by 
a  clear  anticipation  of  the  probable  results — in  short,  by 
statesmanlike  insight  and  promptness  of  decision. 

If  the  stateman  acts  in  this  spirit,  he  will  have  an  ac- 
knowledged right,  under  certain  circumstances,  to  begin  a 
war,  regarded  as  necessary,  at  the  most  favourable  moment, 
and  to  secure  for  his  country  the  proud  privilege  of  such 
initiative.  If  a  war,  on  which  a  Minister  cannot  willingly 
decide,  is  bound  to  be  fought  later  under  possibly  far  more 
unfavourable  conditions,  a  heavy  responsibility  for  the 
greater  sacrifices  that  must  then  be  made  will  rest  on  those 
whose  strength  and  courage  for  decisive  political  action 
failed  at  the  favourable  moment.  In  the  face  of  such  con- 
siderations a  theory  by  which  a  war  ought  never  to  be 
brought  about  falls  to  the  ground.  And  yet  this  theory  has 
in  our  day  found  many  supporters,  especially  in  Germany. 

Even  statemen  who  consider  that  the  complete  abolition 
of  war  is  impossible,  and  do  not  believe  that  the  ultima  ratio 
can  be  banished  from  the  life  of  nations,  hold  the  opinion 
that  its  advent  should  be  postponed  so  long  as  possible.* 

Those  who  favour  this  view  take  up  approximately  the 
same  attitude  as  the  supporters  of  the  Peace  idea,  so  far 
as  regarding  war  exclusively  as  a  curse,  and  ignoring  or 
underestimating  its  creative  and  civilizing  importance.  Ac- 
cording to  this  view,  a  war  recognized  as  inevitable  must  be 

*  Speech  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  v.  Bethmann-Hollweg,  on 
March  30,  191 1.  In  his  speech  of  November  9,  191 1,  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  referred  to  the  above-quoted  words  of  Prince  Bismarck 
in  order  to  obtain  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  Morocco  question. 


THE  DUTY  TO  MAKE  WAR  41 

postponed  so  long  as  possible,  and  no  statesman  is  entitled 
to  use  exceptionally  favourable  conditions  in  order  to  realize 
necessary  and  justifiable  aspirations  by  force  of  arms. 

Such  theories  only  too  easily  disseminate  the  false  and 
ruinous  notion  that  the  maintenance  of  peace  is  the  ulti- 
mate object,  or  at  least  the  chief  duty,  of  any  policy. 

To  such  views,  the  offspring  of  a  false  humanity,  the 
clear  and' definite  answer  must  be  made  that,  under  certain 
circumstances,  it  is  not  only  the  right,  but  the  moral  and 
political  duty  of  the  statesman  to  bring  about  a  war. 

Wherever  we  open  the  pages  of  history  we  find  proofs 
of  the  fact  that  wars,  begun  at  the  right  moment  with 
manly  resolution,  have  effected  the  happiest  results,  both 
politically  and  socially.  A  feeble  policy  has  always  worked 
harm,  since  the  statesman  lacked  the  requisite  firmness  to 
take  the  risk  of  a  necessary  war,  since  he  tried  by  diplomatic 
tact  to  adjust  the  differences  of  irreconcilable  foes,  and 
deceived  himself  as  to  the  gravity  of  the  situation  and  the 
real  importance  of  the  matter.  Our  own  recent  history 
in  its  vicissitudes  supplies  us  with  the  most  striking  ex- 
amples of  this. 

The  Great  Elector  laid  the  foundations  of  Prussia's  power 
by  successful  and  deliberately  incurred  wars.  Frederick 
the  Great  followed  in  the  steps  of  his  glorious  ancestor. 
"He  noticed  how  his  state  occupied  an  untenable  middle 
position  between  the  petty  states  and  the  great  Powers,  and 
showed  his  determination  to  give  a  definite  character 
(decider  cet  etre)  to  this  anomalous  existence;  it  had  be- 
come essential  to  enlarge  the  territory  of  the  State  and 
corriger  la  figure  de  la  Prusse,  if  Prussia  wished  to  be  in- 
dependent and  to  bear  with  honour  the  great  name  of 
'Kingdom.'  "*  The  King  made  allowance  for  this  political 
necessity,  and  took  the  bold  determination  of  challenging 
Austria  to  fight.  None  of  the  wars  which  he  fought  had 
been  forced  upon  him;  none  of  them  did  he  postpone  as 
long  as  possible.  He  had  always  determined  to  be  the 
aggressor,  to  anticipate  his  opponents,  and  to  secure  for 
himself  favourable  prospects  of  success.    We  all  know  what 

*Treitschke,  "Deutsche  Geschichte,"  i.,  p.  51. 


42     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

he  achieved.  The  whole  history  of  the  growth  of  the 
European  nations  and  of  mankind  generally  would  have 
been  changed  had  the  King  lacked  that  heroic  power  of 
decision  which  he  showed. 

We  see  a  quite  different  development  under  the  reign  of 
Frederick  William  III.,  beginning  with  the  year  of  weak- 
ness 1805,  of  which  our  nation  cannot  be  too  often  re- 
minded. 

It  was  manifest  that  war  with  Napoleon  could  not  per- 
manently be  avoided.  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  the  French 
breach  of  neutrality,  the  Prussian  Government  could  not 
make  up  its  mind  to  hurry  to  the  help  of  the  allied  Rus- 
sians and  Austrians,  but  tried  to  maintain  peace,  though  at 
a  great  moral  cost.  According  to  all  human  calculation,  the 
participation  of  Prussia  in  the  war  of  1805  would  have 
given  the  Allies  a  decisive  superiority.  The  adherence  to 
neutrality  led  to  the  crash  of  1806,  and  would  have  meant 
the  final  overthrow  of  Prussia  as  a  State  had  not  the  moral 
qualities  still  existed  there  which  Frederick  the  Great  had 
ingrained  on  her  by  his  wars.  At  the  darkest  moment  of 
defeat  they  shone  most  brightly.  In  spite  of  the  political 
downfall,  the  effects  of  Frederick's  victories  kept  that  spirit 
alive  with  which  he  had  inspired  his  State  and  his  people. 
This  is  clearly  seen  in  the  quite  different  attitude  of  the 
Prussian  people  and  the  other  Germans  under  the  degrad- 
ing yoke  of  the  Napoleonic  tyranny.  The  power  which  had 
been  acquired  by  the  Prussians  through  long  and  glorious 
wars  showed  itself  more  valuable  than  all  the  material 
blessings  which  peace  created ;  it  was  not  to  be  broken  down 
by  the  defeat  of  1806,  and  rendered  possible  the  heroic 
revival  of  1813. 

The  German  wars  of  Unification  also  belong  to  the  cate- 
gory of  wars  which,  in  spite  of  a  thousand  sacrifices,  bring 
forth  a  rich  harvest.  The  instability  and  political  weakness 
which  the  Prussian  Government  showed  in  1848,  culminat- 
ing in  the  disgrace  of  Olmutz  in  1850,  had  deeply  shaken 
the  political  and  national  importance  of  Prussia.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  calm  conscious  strength  with  which  she 
faced  once  more  her  duties  as  a  nation,  when  King  William 
I.  and  Bismarck  were  at  the  helm,  was  soon  abundantly 


THE  DUTY  TO  MAKE  WAR  43 

manifest.  Bismarck,  by  bringing  about  our  wars  of  Unifica- 
tion in  order  to  improve  radically  an  untenable  position 
and  secure  to  our  people  healthy  conditions  of  life,  fulfilled 
the  long-felt  wish  of  the  German  people,  and  raised  Ger- 
many to  the  undisputed  rank  of  a  first-class  European 
Power.  The  rnilitary  successes  and  the  political  position 
won  by  the  sword  laid  the  foundation  for  an  unparalleled 
material  prosperity.  It  is  difficult  to  imagine  how  pitiable 
the  progress  of  the  German  people  would  have  been  had 
not  these  wars  been  brought  about  by  a  deliberate  policy. 

The  most  recent  history  tells  the  same  story.  If  we  judge 
the  Japanese  standpoint  with  an  unbiassed  mind  we  shall 
find  the  resolution  to  fight  Russia  was  not  only  heroic,  but 
politically  wise  and  morally  justifiable.  It  was  immensely 
daring  to  challenge  the  Russian  giant,  but  the  purely  mili- 
tary conditions  were  favourable,  and  the  Japanese  nation, 
which  had  rapidly  risen  to  a  high  stage  of  civilization, 
needed  an  extended  sphere  of  influence  to  complete  her 
development,  and  to  open  new  channels  for  her  super- 
abundant activities.  Japan,  from  her  own  point  of  view, 
was  entitled  to  claim  to  be  the  predominant  civilized  power 
in  Eastern  Asia,  and  to  repudiate  the  rivalry  of  Russia. 
The  Japanese  statesmen  were  justified  by  the  result.  The 
victorious  campaign  created  wider  conditions  of  life  for 
the  Japanese  people  and  State,  and  at  one  blow  raised  it 
to  be  a  determining  co-factor  in  international  politics,  and 
gave  it  a  political  importance  which  must  undeniably  lead 
to  great  material  advancement.  If  this  war  had  been  avoided 
from  weakness  or  philanthropic  illusions,  it  is  reasonable 
to  assume  that  matters  would  have  taken  a  very  different 
turn.  The  growing  power  of  Russia  in  the  Amur  district 
and  in  Korea  would  have  repelled  or  at  least  hindered  the 
Japanese  rival  from  rising  to  such  a  height  of  power  as 
was  attained  through  this  war,  glorious  alike  for  military 
prowess  and  political  foresight. 

The  appropriate  and  conscious  employment  of  war  as  a 
political  means  has  always  led  to  happy  results.  Even  an 
unsuccessfully  waged  war  may  sometimes  be  more  bene- 
ficial to  a  people  than  the  surrender  of  vital  interests  with- 
out a  blow.    We  find  an  example  of  this  in  the  recent  heroic 


44     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

struggle  of  the  small  Boer  States  against  the  British  Em- 
pire. In  this  struggle  they  were  inevitably  defeated.  It 
was  easy  to  foresee  that  an  armed  peasantry  could  not  per- 
manently resist  the  combined  forces  of  England  and  her 
colonies,  and  that  the  peasant  armies  generally  could  not 
bear  heavy  losses.  But  yet — if  all  indications  are  not  mis- 
leading— the  blood  shed  by  the  Boer  people  will  yield  a  free 
and  prosperous  future.  In  spite  of  much  weakness,  the 
resistance  was  heroic;  men  like  President  Stein,  Botha,  and 
De  Wett,  with  their  gallant  followers,  performed  many 
great  military  feats.  The  whole  nation  combined  and  rose 
unanimously  to  fight  for  the  freedom  of  which  Byron  sings : 

"For  freedom's  battle  once  begun, 
Bequeathed  from  bleeding  sire  to  son, 
Though  baffled  oft,  is  ever  won." 

Inestimable  moral  gains,  which  can  never  be  lost  in 
any  later  developments,  have  been  won  by  this  struggle. 
The  Boers  have  maintained  their  place  as  a  nation;  in  a 
certain  sense  they  have  shown  themselves  superior  to  the 
English.  It  was  only  after  many  glorious  victories  that 
they  yielded  to  a  crushingly  superior  force.  They  accu- 
mulated a  store  of  fame  and  national  consciousness  which 
makes  them,  though  conquered,  a  power  to  be  reckoned 
with.  The  result  of  this  development  is  that  the  Boers 
are  now  the  foremost  people  in  South  Africa,  and  that 
England  preferred  to  grant  them  self-government  than  to 
be  faced  by  their  continual  hostility.  This  laid  the  founda- 
tion for  the  United  Free  States  of  South  Africa.*  Presi- 
dent Kruger,  who  decided  on  this  most  justifiable  war, 
and  not  Cecil  hodes,  will,  in  spite  of  the  tragic  ending  to 

*  "War  and  the  Arme  Blanche,"  by  Erskine  Childers :  "The  truth 
came  like  a  flash  .  .  .  that  all  along  we  had  been  conquering  the 
country,  not  the  race;  winning  positions,  not  battles"  (p.  215). 

"To  .  .  .  aim  at  so  cowing  the  Boer  national  spirit,  as  to  gain  a 
permanent  political  ascendancy  for  ourselves,  was  an  object  beyond 
our  power  to  achieve.  Peaceable  political  fusion  under  our  own  flag 
was  the  utmost  we  could  secure.  That  means  a  conditional  sur- 
render, or  a  promise  of  future  autonomy"  (pp.  227-228).  Lord 
Roberts  wrote  a  very  appreciative  introduction  to  this  book  without 
any  protest  against  the  opinions  expressed  in  it. 


THE  DUTY  TO  MAKE  WAR  45 

the  war  itself,  be  known  in  all  ages  as  the  great  far-sighted 
statesman  of  South  Africa,  who,  despite  the  unfavourable 
material  conditions,  knew  how  to  value  the  inestimable 
moral  qualities  according  to  their  real  importance. 

The  lessons  of, history  thus  confirm  the  view  that  wars 
which  have  been  deliberately  provoked  by  far-seeing  states- 
men have  had  the  happiest  results.  War,  nevertheless, 
must  always  be  a  violent  form  of  political  agent,  which  not 
only  contains  in  itself  the  danger  of  defeat,  but  in  every 
case  calls  for  great  sacrifices,  and  entails  incalculable  misery. 
He  who  determines  upon  war  accepts  a  great  responsibility. 

It  is  therefore  obvious  that  no  one  can  come  to  such  a 
decision  except  from  the  most  weighty  reasons,  more  espe- 
cially under  the  existing  conditions  which  have  created  na- 
tional armies.  Absolute  clearness  of  vision  is  needed  to 
decide  how  and  when  such  a  resolution  can  be  taken,  and 
what  political  aims  justify  the  use  of  armed  force. 

This  question  therefore  needs  careful  consideration,  and 
a  satisfactory  answer  can  only  be  derived  from  an  examina- 
tion of  the  essential  duty  of  the  State. 

If  this  duty  consists  in  giving  scope  to  the  highest  in- 
tellectual and  moral  development  of  the  citizens,  and  in 
co-operating  in  the  moral  education  of  the  human  race,  then 
the  State's  own  acts  must  necessarily  conform  to  the  moral 
laws.  But  the  acts  of  the  State  cannot  be  judged  by  the 
standard  of  individual  morality.  If  the  State  wished  to 
conform  to  this  standard  it  would  often  find  itself  at  vari- 
ance with  its  own  particular  duties.  The  morality  of  the 
State  must  be  developed  out  of  its  own  peculiar  essence, 
just  as  individual  morality  is  rooted  in  the  personality  of 
the  man  and  his  duties  towards  society.  The  morality  of 
the  State  must  be  judged  by  the  nature  and  raison  d'etre 
of  the  State,  and  not  of  the  individual  citizen.  But  the 
end-all  and  be-all  of  a  State  is  power,  and  "he  who  is  not 
man  enough  to  look  this  truth  in  the  face  should  not  meddle 
in  politics."* 

Machiavelli  was  the  first  to  declare  that  the  keynote  of 
every  policy  was  the  advancement  of  power.     This  term, 

*  Treitschke,  "Politik,"  i.,  §  3,  and  ii.,  5  28. 


46     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

however,  has  acquired,  since  the  German  Reformation,  a 
meaning  other  than  that   of  the   shrewd   Florentine.     To 
him  power  was  desirable  in  itself;   for  us  "the   State  is 
not  physical  power  as  an  end  in  itself,  it  is  power  to  pro- 
tect and  promote  the  higher  interests";  "power  must  justify 
itself  by  being  applied  for  the  greatest  good  of  mankind."* 
The  criterion  of  the  personal  morality  of  the  indiridual 
"rests  in  the  last  resort  on  the  question  whether  lie  has 
recognized  and  developed  his  own  nature  to  the  highest 
attainable  degree  of  perfection."^     If  the  same  star.dard  is 
applied  to  the  State,  then  "its  highest  moral  duty  is  to  in- 
crease its  power.    The  individual  must  sacrifice  himself  for 
the  higher  community  of  which  he  is  a  member;  but  the 
State  is  itself  the  highest  conception  in   the  wider  com- 
munity of  man,  and  therefore  the  duty  of  self-annihilation 
does  not  enter  into  the  case.    The  Christian  duty  of  sacri- 
fice for  something  higher  does  not  exist  for  the  State,  for 
there  is  nothing  higher  than  it  in  the  world's  history;  con- 
sequently   it    cannot    sacrifice   itself    to   something   higher. 
When  a  State  sees  its  downfall  staring  it  in  the  face,  we 
applaud  if  it  succumbs  sword  in  hand.    A  sacrifice  made  to 
an  alien  nation  not  only  is  immoral,  but  contradicts  the  idea 
of  self-preservation,  which  is  the  highest  ideal  of  a  State. "+ 
I  have  thought  it  impossible  to  explain  the  foundations 
of  political  morality  better  than  in  the  words  of  our  great 
national  historian.     But  we  can  reach  the  same  conclusions 
by  another  road.     The   individual   is   responsible  only   for 
himself.     If,  either  from  weakness  or  from  moral  reasons, 
he  neglects  his  own  advantage,  he  only  injures  himself,  the 
consequences  of  his  actions  recoil  only  on  him.     The  situa- 
tion is  quite  different  in  the  case  of  a  State.    It  represents 
the  ramifying  and  often  conflicting  interests  of  a  commu- 
nity.   Should  it  from  any  reason  neglect  the  interests,  it  not 
only  to  some  extent  prejudices  itself  as  a  legal  personality, 
but  it  injures  also  the  body  of  private  interests  which  it 
represents.    This  incalculably  far-reaching  detriment  affects 
not  merely  one   individual  responsible  merely  to  himself, 
but  a  mass  of  individuals  and  the  community.    Accordingly 

t  Ibid.  tlbid.,  I,  §  x 

*  Treitschke,  "Politik,"  i.,  §  3,  and  ii.,  §  28. 


THE  DUTY  TO  MAKE  WAR  47 

f  is  a  moral  duty  of  the  State  to  remain  loyal  to  its  own 
peculiar  function  as  guardian  and  promoter  of  all  higher 
interests.  This  duty  it  cannot  fulfil  unless  it  possesses  the 
needful  power. 

The  increase  of  this  power  is  thus  from  this  standpoint 
also  uhe  first  and  foremost  duty  of  the  State.  This  aspect 
of  the  question  supplies  a  fair  standard  by  which  the 
morality  of  the  actions  of  the  State  can  be  estimated.  The 
crucial  question  is,  How  far  has  the  State  performed  this 
duty,  and  thus  served  the  interests  of  the  community?  And 
this  not  merely  in  the  material  sense,  but  in  the  higher 
meaning  that  material  interests  are  justifiable  only  so  far 
as  they  promote  the  power  of  the  State,  and  thus  indirectly 
its  higher  aims. 

It  is  obvious,  in  view  of  the  complexity  of  social  condi- 
tions, that  numerous  private  interests  must  be  sacrificed  to 
the  interest  of  the  community,  and,  from  the  limitations  of 
human  discernment,  it  is  only  natural  that  the  view  taken 
of  interests  of  the  community  may  be  erroneous.  Never- 
theless the  advancement  of  the  power  of  the  State  must 
be  first  and  foremost  the  object  that  guides  the  statesman's 
policy.  "Among  all  political  sins,  the  sin  of  feebleness  is 
the  most  contemptible;  it  is  the  political  sin  against  the 
Holy  Ghost."*  This  argument  of  political  morality  is  open 
to  the  objection  that  it  leads  logically  to  the  Jesuitic  prin- 
ciple, that  the  end  justifies  the  means ;  that,  according  to 
it,  to  increase  the  power  of  the  State  all  measures  are 
permissible. 

A  most  difficult  problem  is  raised  by  the  question  how 
far,  for  political  objects  moral  in  themselves,  means  may 
be  employed  which  must  be  regarded  as  reprehensible  in 
the  life  of  the  individual.  So  far  as  I  know,  no  satisfactory 
solution  has  yet  been  obtained,  and  I  do  not  feel  bound  to 
attempt  one  at  this  point.  War,  with  which  I  am  dealing 
at  present,  is  no  reprehensible  means  in  itself,  but  it  may 
become  so  if  it  pursues  unmoral  or  frivolous  aims,  which 
bear  no  comparison  with  the  seriousness  of  warlike  meas- 
ures.    I  must  deviate  here  a  little  from  my  main  theme, 

*  Treitschke,  "Politik,"  i,  5  3. 


48     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

and  discuss  shortly  some  points  which  touch  the  question 
of  political  morality. 

The  gulf  between  political  and  individual  morality  is  .lot 
so  wide  as  is  generally  assumed.  The  power  of  the  S:ate 
does  not  rest  exclusively  on  the  factors  that  make  up 
material  power — territory,  population,  wealth,  and  a  large 
army  and  navy :  it  rests  to  a  high  degree  on  moral  elenents, 
which  are  reciprocally  related  to  the  material.  The  energy 
with  which  a  State  promotes  its  own  interests  ana  repre- 
sents the  rights  of  its  citizens  in  foreign  States,  the  de- 
termination which  it  displays  to  support  them  on  occasion 
by  force  of  arms,  constitute  a  real  factor  of  strength,  as 
compared  with  all  such  countries  as  cannot  bring  themselves 
to  let  things  come  to  a  crisis  in  a  like  case.  Similarly  a 
reliable  and  honorable  policy  forms  an  element  of  strength 
in  dealings  with  allies  as  well  as  with  foes.  A  statesman 
is  thus  under  no  obligation  to  deceive  deliberately.  He 
can  from  the  political  standpoint  avoid  all  negotiations  which 
compromise  his  personal  integrity,  and  he  will  thereby  serve 
the  reputation  and  power  of  his  State  no  less  than  when 
he  holds  aloof  from  political  menaces,  to  which  no  acts 
correspond,  and  renounces  all  political  formulas  and 
phrases. 

In  antiquity  the  murder  of  a  tyrant  was  thought  a  moral 
action,  and  the  Jesuits  have  tried  to  justify  regicide.*  At 
the  present  day  political  murder  is  universally  condemned 
from  the  standpoint  of  political  morality.  The  same  holds 
good  of  preconcerted  political  deception.  A  State  which 
employed  deceitful  methods  would  soon  sink  into  disrepute. 
The  man  who  pursues  moral  ends  with  unmoral  means  is 
involved  in  a  contradiction  of  motives,  and  nullifies  the 
object  at  which  he  aims,  since  he  denies  it  by  his  actions. 
It  is  not,  of  course,  necessary  that  a  man  communicate  all 
his  intentions  and  ultimate  objects  to  an  opponent;  the  latter 
can  be  left  to  form  his  own  opinion  on  this  point.  But  it 
is  not  necessary  to  lie  deliberately  or  to  practise  crafty  de- 
ceptions. A  fine  frankness  has  everywhere  been  the  char- 
acteristic of  great  statesmen.  Subterfuges  and  duplicity 
mark  the  petty  spirit  of  diplomacy. 

*  Mariana,  "De  rege  et  regis  institutione."    Toledo,  1598. 


THE  DUTY  TO  MAKE  WAR  49 

Finally,  the  relations  between  two  States  must  often  be 
termed  a  latent  war,  which  is  provisionally  being  waged 
in  peaceful  rivalry.  Such  a  position  justifies  the  employ- 
ment of  hostile  methods,  cunning,  and  deception,  just  as 
war  itself  does,  since  in  such  a  case  both  parties  are  deter- 
mined to  employ  them.  I  believe  after  all  that  a  conflict 
between  personal  and  political  morality  may  be  avoided  by 
wise  and  prudent  diplomacy,  if  there  is  no  concealment  of 
the  desired  end,  and  it  is  recognized  that  the  means  em- 
ployed must  correspond  to  the  ultimately  moral  nature  of 
that  end. 

Recognized  rights  are,  of  course,  often  violated  by  politi- 
cal action.  But  these,  as  we  have  already  shown,  are  never 
absolute  rights;  they  are  of  human  origin,  and  therefore 
imperfect  and  variable.  There  are  conditions  under  which 
they  do  not  correspond  to  the  actual  truth  of  things;  in 
this  case  the  summum  jus  summa  injuria  holds  good,  and  the 
infringement  of  the  right  appears  morally  justified.  York's 
decision  to  conclude  the  convention  of  Tauroggen  was  in- 
disputably a  violation  of  right,  but  it  was  a  moral  act,  for 
the  Franco-Prussian  alliance  was  made  under  compulsion, 
and  was  antagonistic  to  all  the  vital  interests  of  the  Prus- 
sian State ;  it  was  essentially  untrue  and  immoral.  Now  it 
is  always  justifiable  to  terminate  an  immoral  situation. 

As  regards  the  employment  of  war  as  a  political  means, 
our  argument  shows  that  it  becomes  the  duty  of  a  State  to 
make  use  of  the  ultima  ratio  not  only  when  it  is  attacked, 
but  when  by  the  policy  of  other  States  the  power  of  the 
particular  State  is  threatened,  and  peaceful  methods  are 
insufficient  to  secure  its  integrity.  This  power,  as  we  saw, 
rests  on  a  material  basis,  but  finds  expression  in  ethical 
values.  War  therefore  seems  imperative  when,  although 
the  material  basis  of  power  is  not  threatened,  the  moral 
influence  of  the  State  (and  this  is  the  ultimate  point  at 
issue)  seems  to  be  prejudiced.  Thus  apparently  trifling 
causes  may  under  certain  circumstances  constitute  a  fully 
justifiable  casus  belli  if  the  honour  of  the  State,  and  conse- 
quently its  moral  prestige,  are  endangered.  This  prestige 
is  an  essential  part  of  its  power.    An  antagonist  must  never 

4 


50     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

be  allowed  to  believe  that  there  is  any  lack  of  determination 
to  assert  this  prestige,  even  if  the  sword  must  be  drawn  to 
do  so. 

In  deciding  for  war  or  peace,  the  next  important  con- 
sideration is  whether  the  question  under  discussion  is  suffi- 
ciently vital  for  the  power  of  the  State  to  justify  the  de- 
termination to  fight;  whether  the  inevitable  dangers  and 
miseries  of  a  war  do  not  threaten  to  inflict  greater  injury 
on  the  interests  of  the  State  than  the  disadvantages  which, 
according  to  human  calculation,  must  result  if  war  is  not 
declared.  A  further  point  to  be  considered  is  whether  the 
general  position  of  affairs  affords  some  reasonable  prospect 
of  military  success.  With  these  considerations  of  expedi- 
ency certain  other  weighty  aspects  of  the  question  must 
also  be  faced. 

It  must  always  be  kept  in  mind  that  a  State  is  not  justi- 
fied in  looking  only  to  the  present,  and  merely  consulting 
the  immediate  advantage  of  the  existing  generation.  Such 
policy  Would  be  opposed  to  all  that  constitutes  the  essential 
nature  of  the  State.  Its  conduct  must  be  guided  by  the 
moral  duties  incumbent  on  it,  which,  as  one  step  is  gained, 
point  to  the  next  higher,  and  prepare  the  present  for  the 
future.  "The  true  greatness  of  the  State  is  that  it  links 
the  past  with  the  present  and  the  future;  consequently  the 
individual  has  no  right  to  regard  the  State  as  a  means  for 
attaining  his  own  ambitions  in  life."* 

The  law  of  development  thus  becomes  a  leading  factor 
in  politics,  and  in  the  decision  for  war  this  consideration 
must  weigh  more  heavily  than  the  sacrifices  necessarily  to 
be  borne  in  the  present.  "I  cannot  conceive,"  Zelter  once 
wrote  to  Goethe,  "how  any  right  deed  can  be  performed 
without  sacrifice ;  all  worthless  actions  must  lead  to  the 
very  opposite  of  what  is  desirable." 

A  second  point  of  view  which  must  not  be  neglected  is 
precisely  that  which  Zelter  rightly  emphasizes.  A  great 
end  cannot  be  attained  except  by  staking  large  intellectual 
and  material  resources,  and  no  certainty  of  success  can 
ever  be  anticipated.     Every  undertaking  implies  a  greater 

*  Trcitschke,  "Politik,"  i.,  5  2. 


THE  DUTY  TO  MAKE  WAR  51 

or  less  venture.  The  daily  intercourse  of  civic  life  teaches 
us  this  lesson;  and  it  cannot  be  otherwise  in  politics  where 
account  must  be  taken  of  most  powerful  antgonists  whose 
strength  can  only  be  vaguely  estimated.  In  questions  of 
comparatively  trifling  importance  much  may  be  done  by 
agreements  and  compromises,  and  mutual  concessions 
may  produce  a  satisfactory  status.  The  solution  of  such 
problems  is  the  sphere  of  diplomatic  activity.  The  state 
of  things  is  quite  different  when  vital  questions  are  at  nssue, 
or  when  the  opponent  demands  concessions,  but  will 
guarantee  none,  and  is  clearly  bent  on  humiliating  the 
other  party.  Then  is  the  time  for  diplomatists  to  be  silent 
and  for  great  statesmen  to  act.  Men  must  be  resolved  to 
stake  everything,  and  cannot  shun  the  solemn  decision 
of  war.  In  such  questions  any  reluctance  to  face  the  op- 
ponent, every  abandonment  of  important  interests,  and 
every  attempt  at  a  temporizing  settlement,  means  not  only 
a  momentary  loss  of  political  prestige,  and  frequently  of 
real  power,  which  may  possibly  be  made  good  in  another 
place,  but  permanent  injury  to  the  interests  of  the  State, 
the  full  gravity  of  which  is  only  felt  by  future  genreations. 

Not  that  a  rupture  of  pacific  relations  must  always  result 
in  such  case.  The  mere  threat  of  war  and  the  clearly 
proclaimed  intention  to  wage  it,  if  necessary,  will  often 
cause  the  opponent  to  give  way.  This  intention  must,  how- 
ever, be  made  perfectly  plain,  for  "negotiations  without 
arms  are  like  music-books  without  instruments/'  as  Fred- 
erick the  Great  said.  It  is  ultimately  the  actual  strength 
of  a  nation  to  which  the  opponent's  purpose  yields.  When, 
therefore,  the  threat  of  war  is  insufficient  to  call  attention 
to  its  own  claims  the  concert  must  begin;  the  obligation  is 
unconditional,  and  the  right  to  fight  becomes  the  duty  to 
make,  war,  incumbent  on  the  nation  and  statesman  alike. 

Finally,  there  is  a  third  point  to  be  considered.  Cases 
may  occur  where  war  must  be  made  simply  as  a  point  of 
honor,  although  there  is  no  prospect  of  success.  The 
responsibility  of  this  has  also  to  be  borne.  So  at  least 
Frederick  the  Great  thought.  His  brother  Henry,  after 
the  battle  of  Kolin,  had  advised  him  to  throw  himself  at 
the  feet  of  the  Marquise  de  Pompadour  in  order  to  purchase 


52     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

a  peace  with  France.  Again,  after  the  battle  of  Kunersdorf 
his  position  seemed  quite  hopeless,  but  the  King  absolutely 
refused  to  abandon  the  struggle.  He  knew  better  what 
suited  the  honour  and  the  moral  value  of  his  country,  and 
preierred  to  die  sword  in  hand  than  to  conclude  a  degrad- 
ing peace.  President  Roosevelt,  in  his  message  to  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  of  America  on  December 
4>  I9°6*  gave  expression  to  a  similar  thought.  "It  must 
ever  be  kept  in  mind,"  so  the  manly  and  inspiriting  words 
ran,  "that  war  is  not  merely  justifiable,  but  imperative, 
upon  honourable  men  and  upon  an  honourable  nation  when 
peace  is  only  to  be  obtained  by  the  sacrifice  of  conscientious 
conviction  or  of  national  welfare.  A  just  war  is  in  the  long- 
run  far  better  for  a  nation's  soul  than  the  most  prosperous 
peace  obtained  by  an  acquiescence  in  wrong  or  injustice. 
...  It  must  be  remembered  that  even  to  be  defeated  in 
war  may  be  better  than  not  to  have  fought  at  all." 

To  sum  up  these  various  views,  we  may  say  that  ex- 
pediency in  the  higher  sense  must  be  conclusive  in  deciding 
whether  to  undertake  a  war  in  itself  morally  justifiable. 
Such  decision  is  rendered  more  easy  by  the  consideration 
that  the  prospects  of  success  are  always  the  greatest  when 
the  moment  for  declaring  war  can  be  settled  to  suit  the 
political  and  military  situation. 

It  must  further  be  remembered  that  every  success  in 
foreign  policy,  especially  if  obtained  by  a  demonstration 
of  military  strength,  not  only  heightens  the  power  of  the 
State  in  foreign  affairs,  but  adds  to  the  reputation  of  the 
Government  at  home,  and  thus  enables  it  better  to  fulfil 
its  moral  aims  and  civilizing  duties. 

No  one  will  thus  dispute  the  assumption  that,  under 
certain  circumstances,  it  is  the  moral  and  political  duty  of 
the  State  to  employ  war  as  a  political  means.  So  long  as 
all  human  progress  and  all  natural  development  are  based 
on  the  law  of  conflict,  it  is  necessary  to  engage  in  such 
conflict  under  the  most  favourable  conditions  possible. 

When  a  State  is  confronted  by  the  material  impossibility 
of  supporting  any  longer  the  warlike  preparations  which 
the  power  of  its  enemies  has  forced  upon  it,  when  it  is 
clear  that  the   rival    States   must  gradually   acquire    from 


THE  DUTY  TO  MAKE  WAR  53 

natural  reasons  a  lead  that  cannot  be  won  back,  when  there 
are  indications  of  an  offensive  alliance  of  stronger  enemies 
who  only  await  the  favourable  moment  to  strike — the  moral 
duty  of  the  State  towards  its  citizens  is  to  begin  the  strug- 
gle while  the  prospects  of  success  and  the  political  circum- 
stances are  still  tolerably  favourable.  When,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  hostile  States  are  weakened  or  hampered  by 
affairs  at  home  and  abroad,  but  its  own  warlike  strength 
shows  elements  of  superiority,  it  is  impeartive  to  use  the 
favourable  circumstances  to  promote  its  own  political  aims. 
The  danger  of  a  war  may  be  faced  the  more  readily  if 
there  is  good  prospect  that  great  results  may  be  obtained 
with  comparatively  small  sacrifices. 

These  obligations  can  only  be  met  by  a  vigorous,  resolute, 
active  policy,  which  follows  definite  ideas,  and  understands 
how  to  arouse  and  concentrate  all  the  living  forces  of  the 
State,  conscious  of  the  truth  of  Schiller's  lines : 

"The  chance  that  once  thou  hast  refused 
Will  never  through  the  centuries  recur." 

The  verdict  of  history  will  condemn  the  statesman  who 
was  unable  to  take  the  responsibility  of  a  bold  decision,  and 
sacrificed  the  hopes  of  the  future  to  the  present  need  of 
peace. 

It '  is  obvious  that  under  these  circumstances  it  is  ex- 
tremely difficult  to  answer  the  question  whether  in  any 
special  case  conditions  exist  which  justify  the  determination 
to  make  war.  The  difficulty  is  all  the  greater  because  the 
historical  significance  of  the  act  must  be  considered,  and 
the  immediate  result  is  not  the  final  criterion  of  its  justifi- 
cation. 

War  is  not  always  the  final  judgment  of  Heaven.  There 
are  successes  which  are  transitory  while  the  national  life 
is  reckoned  by  centuries.  The  ultimate  verdict  can  only 
be  obtained  by  the  survey  of  long  epochs.* 

The  man  whose  high  and  responsible  lot  is  to  steer  the 
fortunes  of  a  great  State  must  be  able  to  disregard  the 

♦Treitschke,  "Politik,"  i.,   §  2. 


54     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

verdict  of  his  contemporaries ;  but  he  must  be  all  the  clearer 
as  to  the  motives  of  his  own  policy,  and  keep  before  his 
eyes,  with  the  full  weight  of  the  categorical  imperative, 
the  teaching  of  Kant:  "Act  so  that  the  maxim  of  thy 
will  can  at  the  same  time  hold  good  as  a  principle  of 
universal  legislation. "* 

He  must  have  a  clear  conception  of  the  nature  and 
purpose  of  the  State,  and  grasp  this  from  the  highest  moral 
standpoint.  He  can  in  no  other  way  settle  the  rules  of 
his  policy  and  recognize  clearly  the  laws  of  political 
morality. 

He  must  also  form  a  clear  conception  of  the  special 
duties  to  be  fulfilled  by  the  nation,  the  guidance  of  whose 
fortunes  rests  in  his  hands.  He  must  clearly  and  definitely 
formulate  these  duties  as  the  fixed  goal  of  statesmanship. 
When  he  is  absolutely  clear  upon  this  point  he  can  judge 
in  each  particular  case  what  corresponds  to  the  true  in- 
terests of  the  State;  then  only  can  he  act  systematically  in 
the  definite  prospect  of  smoothing  the  paths  of  politics,  and 
securing  favourable  conditions  for  the  inevitable  conflicts; 
then  only,  when  the  hour  for  combat  strikes  and  the  de- 
cision to  fight  faces  him,  can  he  rise  with  a  free  spirit  and 
a  calm  breast  to  that  standpoint  which  Luther  once  described 
in  blunt,  bold  language:  "It  is  very  true  that  men  write 
and  say  often  what  a  curse  war  is.  But  they  ought  to  con- 
sider how  much  greater  is  that  curse  which  is  averted  by 
war.  Briefly,  in  the  business  of  war  men  must  not  regard 
the  massacres,  the  burnings,  the  battles,  and  the  marches, 
etc. — that  is  what  the  petty  and  simple  do  who  only  look 
with  the  eyes  of  children  at  the  surgeon,  how  he  cuts  off 
the  hand  or  saws  off  the  leg,  but  do  not  see  or  notice  that 
he  does  it  in  order  to  save  the  whole  body.  Thus  we  must 
look  at  the  business  of  war  or  the  sword  with  the  eyes  of 
men,  asking,  Why  these  murders  and  horrors?  It  will  be 
shown  that  it  is  a  business,  divine  in  itself,  and  as  needful 
and  necessary  to  the  world  as  eating  or  drinking,  or  any 
other  work."* 

*  Kant,  "Kritik  der  praktischen  Vernunft,"  p.  30. 
♦Luther,  "Whether  soldiers  can  be  in  a  state  of  salvation." 


THE  DUTY  TO  MAKE  WAR  55 

Thus  in  order  to  decide  what  paths  German  policy  must 
take  in  order  to  further  the  interests  of  the  German  people, 
and  what  possibilities  of  war  are  involved,  we  must  first 
try  to  estimate  the  problems  of  State  and  of  civilization 
which  are  to  be  solved,  and  discover  what  political  pur- 
poses correspond  to  these  problems. 


CHAPTER   III 

A  BRIEF  SURVEY  OF  GERMANY'S  HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 

The  life  of  the  individual  citizen  is  valuable  only  when  it 
is  consciously  and  actively  employed  for  the  attainment  of 
great  ends.  The  same  holds  good  of  nations  and  States. 
They  are,  as  it  were,  personalities  in  the  framework  of 
collective  humanity,  infinitely  various  in  their  endowments 
and  their  characteristic  qualities,  capable  of  the  most  dif- 
ferent achievements,  and  serving  the  most  multifarious 
purposes  in  the  great  evolution  of  human  existence. 

Such  a  theory  will  not  be  accepted  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  materialistic  philosophy  which  prevails  among  wide 
circles  of  our  nation  to-day. 

According  to  it,  all  that  happens  in  the  world  is  a  neces- 
sary consequence  of  given  conditions;  free  will  is  only 
necessity  become  conscious.  It  denies  the  difference  be- 
tween the  empiric  and  the  intelligible  Ego,  which  is  the 
basis  of  the  notion  of  moral  freedom. 

This  philosophy  cannot  stand  before  scientific  criticism. 
It  seems  everywhere  arbitrarily  restricted  by  the  narrow 
limits  of  the  insufficient  human  intelligence.  The  exist- 
ence of  the  universe  is  opposed  to  the  law  of  a  sufficient 
cause;  infinity  and  eternity  are  incomprehensible  to  our 
conceptions,  which  are  confined  to  space  and  time. 

The  essential  nature  of  force  and  volition  remains  in- 
explicable. We  recognize  only  a  subjectively  qualified 
phenomenon  in  the  world ;  the  impelling  forces  and  the  real 
nature  of  things  are  withdrawn  from  our  understanding.  A 
systematic  explanation  of  the  universe  is  quite  impossible 
from  the  human  standpoint.  So  much  seems  clear — although 
no  demonstrable  certainty  attaches  to  this  theory — that 
spiritual  laws  beyond  the  comprehension  of  us  men  govern 

56 


GERMANY'S  DEVELOPMENT  57 

the  world  according  to  a  conscious  plan  of  development  in 
the  revolving  cycles  of  a  perpetual  change.  Even  the  grad- 
ual evolution  of  mankind  seems  ruled  by  a  hidden  moral 
law.  At  any  rate  we  recognize  in  the  growing  spread  of 
civilization  and  common  moral  ideas  a  gradual  progress 
towards  purer  and  higher  forms  of  life. 

It  is  indeed  impossible  for  us  to  prove  design  and  pur- 
pose in  every  individual  case,  because  our  attitude  to  the 
universal  whole  is  too  limited  and  anomalous.  But  within 
the  limitations  of  our  knowledge  of  things  and  of  the  inner 
necessity  of  events  we  can  at  least  try  to  understand  in  broad 
outlines  the  ways  of  Providence,  which  we  may  also  term 
the  principles  of  development.  We  shall  thus  obtain  useful 
guidance  for  our  further  investigation  and  procedure. 

The  agency  and  will  of  Providence  are  most  clearly  seen 
in  the  history  of  the  growth  of  species  and  races,  of  peoples 
and  States.  "What  is  true,"  Goethe  once  said  in  a  letter 
to  Zelter,  "can  but  be  raised  and  supported  by  its  history; 
what  is  false  only  lowered  and  dissipated  by  its  history." 

The  formation  of  peoples  and  races,  the  rise  and  fall  of 
States,  the  laws  which  govern  the  common  life,  teach  us 
to  recognize  which  forces  have  a  creative,  sustaining,  and 
beneficent  influence,  and  which  work  towards  disintegra- 
tion, and  thus  produce  inevitable  downfall.  We  are  here 
following  the  working  of  universal  laws,  but  we  must  not 
forget  that  States  are  personalities  endowed  with  very 
different  human  attributes,  with  a  peculiar  and  often  very 
marked  character,  and  that  these  subjective  qualities  are 
distinct  factors  in  the  development  of  States  as  a  whole. 
Impulses  and  influences  exercise  a  very  different  effect  on 
the  separate  national  individualities.  We  must  endeavour 
to  grasp  history  in  the  spirit  of  the  psychologist  rather 
than  of  the  naturalist.  Each  nation  must  be  judged  from 
its  own  standpoint  if  we  wish  to  learn  the  general  trend 
of  its  development.  We  must  study  the  history  of  the 
German  people  in  its  connection  with  that  of  the  other 
European  States,  and  ask  first  what  paths  its  development 
has  hitherto  followed,  and  what  guidance  the  past  gives 
for  our  future  policy.     From  the  time  of  their  first  appear- 


58     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

ance  in  history  the  Germans  showed  themselves  a  first- 
class  civilized  people. 

When  the  Roman  Empire  broke  up  before  the  onslaught 
of  the  barbarians,  there  were  two  main  elements  which 
shaped  the  future  of  the  West,  Christianity  and  the  Ger- 
mans. The  Christian  teaching  preached  equal  rights  for 
all  men  and  community  of  goods  in  an  empire  of  masters 
and  slaves,  but  formulated  the  highest  moral  code,  and 
directed  the  attention  of  a  race,  which  only  aimed  at 
luxury,  to  the  world  beyond  the  grave  as  the  true  goal  of 
existence.  It  made  the  value  of  man  as  man,  and  the 
moral  development  of  personality  according  to  the  laws 
of  the  individual  conscience,  the  starting-point  of  all  de- 
velopment. It  thus  gradually  transformed  the  philosophy 
of  the  ancient  world,  whose  morality  rested  solely  on  the 
relations  with  the  State.  Simultaneously  with  this,  hordes 
of  Germans  from  the  thickly-populated  North  poured  vic- 
toriously in  broad  streams  over  the  Roman  Empire  and  the 
decaying  nations  of  the  Ancient  World.  These  masses 
could  not  keep  their  nationality  pure  and  maintain  their 
position  as  political  powers.  The  States  which  they  founded 
were  short-lived.  Even  then  men  recognized  how  difficult 
it  is  for  a  lower  civilization  to  hold  its  own  against  a 
higher.  The  Germans  were  gradually  merged  in  the  sub- 
ject nations.  The  German  element,  however,  instilled  new 
life  into  these  nations,  and  offered  new  opportunities  of 
growth.  The  stronger  the  admixture  of  German  blood,  the 
more  vigorous  and  the  more  capable  of  civilization  did  the 
growing  nations  appear. 

In  the  meantime  powerful  opponents  sprung  up  in  this 
newly-formed  world.  The  Latin  race  grew  up  by  degrees 
out  of  the  admixture  of  the  Germans  with  the  Roman  world 
and  the  nations  subdued  by  them,  and  separated  itself 
from  the  Germans,  who  kept  themselves  pure  on  the  north 
of  the  Alps  and  in  the  districts  of  Scandinavia.  At  the 
same  time  the  idea  of  the  Universal  Empire,  which  the 
Ancient  World  had  embraced,  continued  to  flourish. 

In  the  East  the  Byzantine  Empire  lasted  until  a.d.  1453. 
In  the  West,  however,  the  last  Roman  Emperor  had  been 
deposed  by  Odoacer  in  476.    Italy  had  fallen  into  the  hands 


GERMANY'S  DEVELOPMENT  59 

of  the  East  Goths  and  Lombards  successively.  The  Visi- 
goths had  established  their  dominion  in  Spain,  and  the 
Franks  and  Burgundians  in  Gaul. 

A  new  empire  rose  from  the  latter  quarter.  Charles  the 
Great,  with  his  powerful  hand,  extended  the  Frankish  Em- 
pire far  beyond  the  boundaries  of  Gaul.  By  the  subjuga- 
tion of  the  Saxons  he  became  lord  of  the  country  between 
the  Rhine  and  the  Elbe;  he  obtained  the  sovereignty  in 
Italy  by  the  conquest  of  the  Lombards,  and  finally  sought 
to  restore  the  Western  Roman  Empire.  He  was  crowned 
Emperor  in  Rome  in  the  year  800.  His  successors  clung 
to  this  claim ;  but  the  Frankish  Empire  soon  fell  to  pieces. 
In  its  partition  the  western  half  formed  what  afterwards 
became  France,  and  the  East  Frankish  part  of  the  Empire 
became  the  later  Germany.  While  the  Germans  in  the 
West  Frankish  Empire,  in  Italy  and  Spain,  had  abandoned 
their  speech  and  customs,  and  had  gradually  amalgamated 
with  the  Romans,  the  inhabitants  of  the  East  Frankish 
Empire,  especially  the  Saxons  and  their  neighbouring  tribes, 
maintained  their  Germanic  characteristics,  language,  and 
customs.  A  powerful  German*  kingdom  arose  which  re- 
newed the  claims  of  Charles  the  Great  to  the  Western 
Roman  Empire.  Otto  the  Great  was  the  first  German 
King  who  took  this  momentous  step.  It  involved  him  and 
his  successors  in  a  quarrel  with  the  Bishops  of  Rome,  who 
wished  to  be  not  only  Heads  of  the  Church,  but  lords  of 
Italy,  and  did  not  hesitate  to  falsify  archives  in  order  to 
prove  their  pretended  title  to  that  country. 

The  Popes  made  good  this  right,  but  they  did  not  stop 
there.  Living  in  Rome,  the  sacred  seat  of  the  world- 
empire,  and  standing  at  the  head  of  a  Church  which  daimed 
universality,  they,  too,  laid  hold  in  their  own  way  of  the 
idea  of  universal  imperium.  The  notion  was  one  of  the 
boldest  creations  of  the  human  intellect — to  found  and 
maintain  a  world-sovereignty  almost  wholly  by  the  employ- 
ment of  spiritual  powers. 

i 
♦German    (Deutsch    =3    diutisk)     signifies    originally    "popular," 
opposed  to  "foreign" — e.g.,  the  Latin  Church  dialect.     It  was  first 
used  as  the  name  of  a  people  in  the  tenth  century  a.p, 


60     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

Naturally  these  Papal  pretensions  led  to  feuds  with  the 
Empire.  The  freedom  of  secular  aspirations  clashed  with 
the  claims  of  spiritual  dominion.  In  the  portentous  strug- 
gle of  the  two  Powers  for  the  supremacy,  a  struggle  which 
inflicted  heavy  losses  on  the  German  Empire,  the  Imperial 
cause  was  worsted.  It  was  unable  to  mould  the  widely 
different  and  too  independent  subdivisions  of  the  empire 
into  a  homogeneous  whole,  and  to  crush  the  selfish  par- 
ticularism of  the  estates.  The  last  Staufer  died  on  the 
scaffold  at  Naples  under  the  axe  of  Charles  of  Anjou, 
who  was  a  vassal  of  the  Church. 

The  great  days  of  the  German-Roman  Empire  were 
over.  The  German  power  lay  on  the  ground  in  fragments. 
A  peirod  of  almost  complete  anarchy  followed.  Dogmatism 
and  lack  of  patriotic  sentiment,  those  bad  characteristics 
of  the  German  people,  contributed  to  extend  this  destruc- 
tion to  the  economic  sphere.  The  intellectual  life  of  the 
German  people  deteriorated  equally.  At  the  time  when  the 
Imperial  power  was  budding  and  under  the  rule  of  the 
highly-gifted  Staufers,  German  poetry  was  passing  through 
a  first  classical  period.  Every  German  country  was  ring- 
ing with  song;  the  depth  of  German  sentiment  found  uni- 
versal expression  in  ballads  and  poems,  grave  or  gay,  and 
German  idealism  inspired  the  minnesingers.  But  with  the 
disappearance  of  the  Empire  every  string  was  silent,  and 
even  the  plastic  arts  could  not  rise  above  the  coarseness  and 
confusion  of  the  political  conditions.  The  material  pros- 
perity of  the  people  indeed  improved,  as  affairs  at  home 
were  better  regulated,  and  developed  to  an  amazing  extent ; 
the  Hanseatic  League  bore  its  flag  far  and  wide  over  the 
northern  seas,  and  the  great  trade-routes,  which  linked  the 
West  and  Orient,  led  from  Venice  and  Genoa  through 
Germany.  But  the  earlier  political  power  was  never  again 
attained. 

Nevertheless  dislike  of  spiritual  despotism  still  smoul- 
dered in  the  breasts  of  that  German  people,  which  had 
submitted  to  the  Papacy,  and  was  destined  once  more  to 
blaze  up  into  bright  flames,  and  this  time  in  the  spiritual 
domain.  As  she  grew  more  and  more  worldly,  the  Church 
had  lost  much  of  her  influence  on  men's  minds.     On  the 


GERMANY'S  DEVELOPMENT  61 

other  hand,  a  refining  movement  had  grown  up  in  human- 
ism, which,  supported  by  the  spirit  of  antiquity,  could  not 
fail  from  its  very  nature  to  become  antagonistic  to  the 
Church.  It  found  enthusiastic  response  in  Germany,  and 
was  joined  by  everyone  whose  thoughts  and  hopes  were 
centred  in  freedom.  Ulrich  von  Hutten's  battle-cry,  "I  have 
dared  the  deed,"  rang  loud  through  the  districts  of  Ger- 
many. 

Humanism  was  thus  in  a  sense  the  precursor  of  the 
Reformation,  which,  conceived  in  the  innermost  heart  of 
the  German  people,  shook  Europe  to  her  foundations. 
Once  more  it  was  the  German  people  which,  as  formerly  in 
in  the  struggle  between  the  Arian  Goths  and  the  Orthodox 
Church,  shed  its  heart's  blood  in  a  religious  war  for 
spiritual  liberty,  and  now  for  national  independence  also. 
No  struggle  more  pregnant  with  consequences  for  the  de- 
velopment of  humanity  had  been  fought  out  since  the 
Persian  wars.  In  this  cause  the  German  people  nearly  dis- 
appeared, and  lost  all  political  importance.  Large  sections 
of  the  Empire  were  abandoned  to  foreign  States.  Germany 
became  a  desert.  But  this  time  the  Church  did  not  remain 
victorious  as  she  did  against  the  Arian  Goths  and  the 
Staufers.  It  is  true  she  was  not  laid  prostrate;  she  still 
remained  a  mighty  force,  and  drew  new  strength  from 
the  struggle  itself.  Politically  the  Catholic  States,  under 
Spanish  leadership,  won  undisputed  supremacy.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  right  to  spiritual  freedom  was  estab- 
lished. This  most  important  element  of  civilization  was 
retained  for  humanity  in  the  reformed  Churches,  and  has 
become  ever  since  the  palladium  of  all  progress,  though  even 
after  the  Peace  of  Westphalia  protracted  struggles  were 
required  to  assert  religious  liberty. 

The  States  of  Latin  race  on  their  side  now  put  forward 
strong  claims  to  the  universal  imperium  in  order  to  suppress 
the  German  ideas  of  freedom.  Spain  first,  then  France: 
the  two  soon  quarrelled  among  themselves  about  the  pre- 
dominance. At  the  same  time,  in  Germanized  England  a 
first-class  Protestant  power  was  being  developed,  and  the 
age  of  discoveries,  which  coincided  roughly  with  the  era 
of  the  Reformation  and  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  opened 


62     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

new  and  unsuspected  paths  to  human  intellect  and  human 
energy.  Political  life  also  acquired  a  fresh  stimulus.  Grad- 
ually a  broad  stream  of  immigrants  poured  into  the  newly- 
discovered  districts  of  America,  the  northern  part  of  which 
fell  to  the  lot  of  the  Germanic,  and  the  southern  part  to 
that  of  the  Latin  race.  Thus  was  laid  the  foundation  of  the 
great  colonial  Empires,  and,  consequently,  of  world-politics. 
Germany  remained  excluded  from  this  great  movement, 
since  she  wasted  her  forces  in  ecclesiastical  disputes  and 
religious  wars.  On  the  other  hand,  in  combination  with 
England,  the  Low  Countries  and  Austria,  which  latter  had 
at  the  same  time  to  repel  the  inroad  of  Turks  from  the 
East,  she  successfully  curbed  the  French  ambition  for 
sovereignty  in  a  long  succession  of  wars.  England  by 
these  wars  grew  to  be  the  first  colonial  and  maritime  power 
in  the  world.  Germany  forfeited  large  tracts  of  territory, 
and  lost  still  more  in  political  power.  She  broke  up  into 
numerous  feeble  separate  States,  which  were  entirely  void 
of  any  oommon  sympathy  with  the  German  cause.  But 
this  very  disintegration  lent  her  fresh  strength.  A  centre 
of  Protestant  power  was  established  in  the  North — i.  e., 
Prussia. 

After  centuries  of  struggle  the  Germans  had  succeeded 
in  driving  back  the  Slavs,  who  poured  in  from  the  East,  in 
wresting  large  tracts  from  them,  and  in  completely  Ger- 
manizing them.  This  struggle,  like  that  with  the  niggard 
soil,  produced  a  sturdy  race,  conscious  of  its  strength,  which 
extended  its  power  to  the  coasts  of  the  Baltic,  and  suc- 
cessfully planted  Germanic  culture  in  the  far  North.  The 
German  nation  was  finally  victorious  also  against  the 
Swedes,  who  disputed  the  command  of  the  Baltic.  In  that 
war  the  Great  Elector  had  laid  the  foundations  of  a  strong 
political  power,  which,  under  his  successors,  gradually  grew 
into  an  influential  force  in  Germany.  The  headship  of 
Protestant  Germany  devolved  more  and  more  on  this 
State,  and  a  counterpoise  to  Catholic  Austria  gradually  grew 
up.  This  latter  State  had  developed  out  of  Germany  into 
an  independent  great  Power,  resting  its  supremacy  not 
only  on  a  German  population,  but  also  on  Hungarians  and 
Slavs.    In  the  Seven  Years'  War  Prussia  broke  away  from 


GERMANY'S  DEVELOPMENT  63 

Catholic  Austria  and  the  Empire,  and  confronted  France 
and  Iussia  as  an  independent  Protestant  State. 

But  yet  another  dark  hour  was  in  store  for  Germany,  as 
she  once  more  slowly  struggled  upwards.  In  France  the 
Monarchy  had  exhausted  the  resources  of  the  nation  for 
its  own  selfish  ends.  The  motto  of  the  monarchy,  Fetat 
c'est  moi,  carried  to  an  extreme,  provoked  a  tremendous 
revulsion  of  ideas,  which  culminated  in  the  stupendous 
revolution  of  1789,  and  everywhere  in  Europe,  and  more 
especially  in  Germany,  shattered  and  swept  away  the  ob- 
solete remnants  of  medievalism.  The  German  Empire  as 
such  disappeared ;  only  fragmentary  States  survived,  among 
which  Prussia  alone  showed  any  real  power.  France  once 
again  under  Napoleon  was  fired  with  the  conception  of  the 
universal  imperium,  and  bore  her  victorious  eagles  to  Italy, 
Egypt,  Syria,  Germany,  and  Spain,  and  even  to  the  inhos- 
pitable plains  of  Russia,  which  by  a  gradual  political  ab- 
sorption of  the  Slavonic  East,  and  a  slow  expansion  of 
power  in  wars  with  Poland,  Sweden,  Turkey,  and  Prussia, 
had  risen  to  an  important  place  among  the  European  na- 
tions. Austria,  which  had  become  more  and  more  a  con- 
geries of  different  nationalities,  fell  before  the  mighty  Cor- 
sican.  Prussia,  which  seemed  to  have  lost  all  vigour  in  her 
dream  of  peace,  collapsed  before  his  onslaught. 

But  the  German  spirit  emerged  with  fresh  strength  from 
the  deepest  humiliation.  The  purest  and  mightiest  storm 
of  fury  against  the  yoke  of  the  oppressor  that  ever  honoured 
an  enslaved  nation  burst  out  in  the  Protestant  North.  The 
wars  of  liberation,  with  their  glowing  enthusiasm,  won  back 
the  possibilities  of  political  existence  for  Prussia  and  for 
Germany,  and  paved  the  way  for  further  world-wide  his- 
torical developments. 

While  the  French  people  in  savage  revolt  against  spiritual 
and  secular  despotism  had  broken  their  chains  and  pro- 
claimed their  rights,  another  quite  different^revolution  was 
working  in  Prussia — the  revolution  of  duty.  The  assertion 
of  the  rights  of  the  individual  leads  ultimately  to  individual 
irresponsibility  and  to  a  repudiation  of  the  State.  Immanuel 
Kant,  the  founder  of  critical  philosophy,  taught,  in  opposi- 
tion to  this  view,  the  gospel  of  moral  duty,  and  Scharnhorst 


64     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

grasped  the  idea  of  universal  military  service.  By  calling 
upon  each  individual  to  sacrifice  property  and  life  for  the 
good  of  the  community,  he  gave  the  clearest  expression  to 
the  idea  of  the  State,  and  created  a  sound  basis  on  which 
the  claim  to  individual  rights  might  rest.  At  the  same 
time  Stein  laid  the  foundations  of  self-government  in 
Prussia. 

While  measures  of  the  most  far-reaching  historical  im- 
portance were  thus  being  adopted  in  the  State  on  which 
the  future  fate  of  Germany  was  to  depend,  and  while 
revolution  was  being  superseded  by  healthy  progress,  a 
German  Empire  of  the  first  rank,  the  Empire  of  intellect, 
grew  up  in  the  domain  of  art  and  science,  where  German 
character  and  endeavour  found  the  deepest  and  fullest  ex- 
pression. A  great  change  had  been  effected  in  this  land  of 
political  narrowness  and  social  sterility  since  the  year  1750. 
A  literature  and  a  science,  born  in  the  hearts  of  the  nation, 
and  deeply  rooted  in  the  moral  teaching  of  Protestantism, 
had  raised  their  minds  far  beyond  the  boundaries  of  prac- 
tical life  into  the  sunlit  heights  of  intellectual  liberty,  and 
manifested  the  power  and  superiority  of  the  German  spirit. 
"Thus  the  new  poetry  and  science  became  for  many  decades 
the  most  effectual  bond  of  union  for  this  dismembered  peo- 
ple, and  decided  the  victory  of  Protestantism  in  German 
life."* 

Germany  was  raised  to  be  once  more  "the  home  of 
heresy,  since  she  developed  the  root-idea  of  the  Reforma- 
tion intp  the  right  of  unrestricted  and  unprejudiced  in- 
quiry, "f  Moral  obligations,  such  as  no  nation  had  ever  yet 
made  the  standard  of  conduct,  were  laid  down  in  the  phil- 
osophy of  Kant  and  Fichte,  and  a  lofty  idealism  inspired 
the  songs  of  her  poets.  The  intense  effect  of  these  spiritual 
agencies  was  realized  in  the  outburst  of  heroic  fury  in  1813. 
"Thus  our  classical  literature,  starting  from  a  different 
point,  reached  the  same  goal  as  the  political  work  of  the 
Prussian  monarchy,"*  and  of  those  men  of  action  who 
pushed  this  work  forward  in  the  hour  of  direct  ruin. 

*Treitschke,   "Deutsche   Geschichte,"   i.,  p.   88. 
t  Ibid.,  i.,  p.  90.  tlbid. 


GERMANY'S  DEVELOPMENT  65 

The  meeting  of  Napoleon  and  Goethe,  two  mighty  con- 
querors, was  an  event  in  the  world's  history.  On  one  side 
the  scourge  of  God,  the  great  annihilator  of  all  survivals 
from  the  past,  the  gloomy  despot,  the  last  abortion  of  the 
revolution — a 

"Part  of  the  power  that  still 
Produces  Good,  while  still  devising  111"; 

on  the  other,  the  serenely  grave  Olympian  who  uttered  the 
words,  "Let  man  be  noble,  resourceful,  and  good";  who 
gave  a  new  content  to  the  religious  sentiment,  since  he 
conceived  all  existence  as  a  perpetual  change  to  higher 
conditions,  and  pointed  out  new  paths  in  science ;  who  gave 
the  clearest  expression  to  all  aspirations  of  the  human 
intellect,  and  all  movements  of  the  German  mind,  and  thus 
roused  his  people  to  consciousness ;  who  finally  by  his  writ- 
ings on  every  subject  showed  that  the  whole  realm  of 
human  knowledge  was  concentrated  in  the  German  brain; 
a  prophet  of  truth,  an  architect  of  imperishable  monuments 
which  testify  to  the  divinity  in  man. 

The  great  conqueror  of  the  century  was  met  by  the  hero 
of  intellect,  to  whom  was  to  fall  the  victory  of  the  future. 
The  mightiest  potentate  of  the  Latin  race  faced  the  great 
Germanic  who  stood  in  the  forefront  of  humanity. 

Truly  a  nation  which  in  the  hour  of  its  deepest  political 
degradation  could  give  birth  to  men  like  Fichte,  Scharnhorst, 
Stein,  Schiller,  and  Goethe,  to  say  nothing  about  the  great 
soldier-figures  of  the  wars  of  Liberation,  must  be  called  to 
a  mighty  destiny. 

We  must  admit  that  in  the  period  immediately  succeeding 
the  great  struggle  of  those  glorious  days,  the  shortsighted- 
ness, selfishness,  and  weakness  of  its  Sovereigns,  and  the 
jealousy  of  its  neighbours,  robbed  the  German  people  of  the 
full  fruits  of  its  heroism,  devotion,  and  pure  enthusiasm. 
The  deep  disappointment  of  that  generation  found  expres- 
sion in  the  revolutionary  movement  of  1848,  and  in  the 
emigration  of  thousands  to  the  free  country  of  North 
America,  where  the  Germans  took  a  prominent  part  in  the 

5 


66  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

formation  of  a  new  nationality,  but  were  lost  to  their 
mother-country.  The  Prussian  monarchy  grovelled  before 
Austria  and  Russia,  and  seemed  to  have  forgotten  its  na- 
tional duties. 

Nevertheless  in  the  centre  of  the  Prussian  State  there 
was  springing  up  from  the  blood  of  the  champions  of  free- 
dom a  new  generation  that  no  longer  wished  to  be  the  anvil, 
but  to  wield  the  hammer.  Two  men  came  to  the  front, 
King  William  I.  and  the  hero  of  the  Saxon  forest.  Reso- 
lutely they  united  the  forces  of  the  nation,  which  at  first 
opposed  them  from  ignorance,  and  broke  down  the  selfish- 
ness and  dogmatic  positivism  of  the  popular  representatives. 
A  victorious  campaign  settled  matters  with  Austria,  who 
did  not  willingly  cede  the  supremacy  in  Germany,  and  left 
the  German  Imperial  confederation  without  forfeiting  her 
place  as  a  Great  Power.  France  was  brought  to  the  ground 
with  a  mighty  blow;  the  vast  majority  of  the  German  peo- 
ples united  under  the  Imperial  crown  which  the  King  of 
Prussia  wore;  the  old  idea  of  the  German  Empire  was 
revived  in  a  federal  shape  by  the  Triple  Alliance  of  Ger- 
many, Austria,  and  Italy.  The  German  idea,  as  Bismarck 
fancied  it,  ruled  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Adriatic  and 
the  Mediterranean.  Like  a  phoenix  from  the  ashes,  the 
German  giant  rose  from  the  sluggard-bed  of  the  old  Ger- 
man Confederation,  and  stretched  his  mighty  limbs. 

It  was  an  obvious  and  inevitable  result  that  this  awaken- 
ing of  Germany  vitally  affected  the  other  nations  which  had 
hitherto  divided  the  economic  and  political  power.  Hostile 
combinations  threatened  us  on  all  sides  in  order  to  check 
the  further  expansion  of  our  power.  Hemmed  in  between 
France  and  Russia,  who  allied  themselves  against  us,  we 
failed  to  gather  the  full  fruits  of  our  victories.  The  short- 
sightedness and  party  feuds  of  the  newly-formed  Reichstag 
— the  old  hereditary  failings  of  our  nation — prevented  any 
colonial  policy  on  broad  lines.  The  intense  love  of  peace, 
which  the  nation  and  Government  felt,  made  us  fall  behind 
in  the  race  with  other  countries. 

In  the  most  recent  partition  of  the  earth,  that  of  Africa, 
victorious  Germany  came  off  badly.  France,  her  defeated 
opponent,  was  able  to   found  the  second  largest  colonial 


GERMANY'S  DEVELOPMENT  67 

Empire  in  the  world;  England  appropriated  the  most  im- 
portant portions;  even  small  and  neutral  Belgium  claimed 
a  comparatively  large  and  valuable  share;  Germany  was 
forced  to  be  content  with  some  modest  strips  of  Territory. 
In  addition  to,  and  in  connection  with,  the  political  changes, 
new  views  and  new  forces  have  come  forward. 

Under  the  influence  of  the  constitutional  ideas  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great,  and  the  crop  of  new  ideas  borne  by  the 
French  Revolution,  the  conception  of  the  State  has  com- 
pletely changed  since  the  turn  of  the  century.  The  patri- 
monial state  of  the  Middle  Ages  was  the  hereditary  posses- 
sion of  the  Sovereign.  Hence  sprung  the  modern  State, 
which  represents  the  reverse  of  this  relation,  in  which  the 
Sovereign  is  the  first  servant  of  the  State,  and  the  interest 
of  the  State,  and  not  of  the  ruler,  is  the  key  to  the  policy 
of  the  Government.  With  this  altered  conception  of  the 
State  the  principle  of  nationality  has  gradually  developed, 
of  which  the  tendency  is  as  follows :  Historical  boundaries 
are  to  be  disregarded,  and  the  nations  combined  into  a 
political  whole;  the  State  will  thus  acquire  a  uniform  na- 
tional chracter  and  common  national  interests. 

This  new  order  of  things  entirely  altered  the  basis  of 
international  relations,  and  set  new  and  unknown  duties 
before  the  statesman.  Commerce  and  trade  also  developed 
on  wholly  new  lines. 

After  181 5  the  barriers  to  every  activity — guilds  and 
trade  restrictions — were  gradually  removed.  Landed  prop- 
erty ceased  to  be  a  monopoly.  Commerce  and  industries 
flourished  conspicuously.  "England  introduced  the  univer- 
sal employment  of  coal  and  iron  and  of  machinery  into  in- 
dustries, thus  founding  immense  industrial  establishments; 
by  steamers  and  railways  she  brought  machinery  into  com- 
merce, at  the  same  time  effecting  an  industrial  revolution 
by  physical  science  and  chemistry,  and  won  the  control  of 
the  markets  of  the  world  by  cotton.  There  came,  besides, 
the  enormous  extension  of  the  command  of  credit  in  the 
widest  sense,  the  exploitation  of  India,  the  extension  of 
colonization  over  Polynesia,  etc."  England  at  the  same  time 
girdled  the  earth  with  her  cables  and  fleets.  She  thus  at- 
tained to  a  sort  of  world-sovereignty.     She  has  tried  to 


68     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

found  a  new  universal  Empire;  not,  indeed,  by  spiritual  or 
secular  weapons,  like  Pope  and  Emperor  in  bygone  days, 
but  by  the  power  of  money,  by  making  all  material  interests 
dependent  on  herself. 

Facing  her,  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans,  link- 
ing the  West  and  the  East,  the  United  States  of  North 
America  have  risen  to  be  an  industrial  and  commercial 
power  of  the  first  rank.  Supported  by  exceptionally  abun- 
dant natural  resources,  and  the  unscrupulously  pushing 
character  of  her  inhabitants,  this  mighty  Empire  aims  at  a 
suitable  recognition  of  her  power  in  the  council  of  the  na- 
tions, and  is  on  the  point  of  securing  this  by  the  building 
of  a  powerful  navy. 

Russia  has  not  only  strengthened  her  position  in  Europe, 
but  has  extended  her  power  over  the  entire  North  of  Asia, 
and  is  pressing  farther  into  the  centre  of  that  continent. 
She  has  already  crossed  swords  with  the  States  of  the  Mon- 
golian race.  This  vast  population,  which  fills  the  east  of 
the  Asiatic  continent,  has,  after  thousands  of  years  of  dor- 
mant civilization,  at  last  awakened  to  political  life.  The 
entrance  of  Japan  into  the  circle  of  the  great  World  Powers 
means  a  call  to  arms.  "Asia  for  the  Asiatics,"  is  the  phrase 
which  she  whispers  beneath  her  breath,  trusting  in  the 
strength  of  her  demand.  The  new  Great  Power  has 
emerged  victoriously  from  its  first  encounter  with  a  Euro- 
pean foe.  China,  too,  is  preparing  to  expand  her  forces 
outwardly.  A  mighty  movement  is  thrilling  Asia — the 
awakening  of  a  new  epoch. 

Dangers,  then,  which  have  already  assumed  a  profound 
importance  for  the  civilized  countries  of  Europe,  are  threat- 
ening from  Asia,  the  old  cradle  of  the  nations.  But  even 
in  the  heart  of  the  European  nations,  forces  which  have 
slumbered  hitherto  are  now  awake.  The  persisting  ideas 
of  the  French  Revolution  and  the  great  industrial  progress 
which  characterized  the  last  century,  have  roused  the 
working  classes  of  every  country  to  a  consciousness  of  their 
importance  and  their  social  power.  The  workers,  originally 
concerned  only  in  the  amelioration  of  their  material  posi- 
tion, have,  in  theory,  abandoned  the  basis  of  the  modern 
State,  and  seek  their  salvation  in  the  revolution  which  they 


GERMANY'S  DEVELOPMENT  69 

preach.  They  do  not  wish  to  obtain  what  they  can  within 
the  limitations  of  the  historically  recognized  State,  but  they 
wish  to  substitute  for  it  a  new  State,  in  which  they  them- 
selves are  the  rulers.  By  this  aspiration  they  not  only  per- 
petually menace  State  and  society,  but  endanger  in  the 
separate  countries  the  industries  from  which  they  live,  since 
they  threatn  to  destroy  the  possibility  of  competing  in  the 
international  markets  by  continuous  increase  of  wages  and 
decrease  of  work.  Even  in  Germany  this  movement  has 
affected  large  sections  of  the  population. 

Until  approximately  the  middle  of  the  last  century,  agri- 
culture and  cattle-breeding  formed  the  chief  and  most  im- 
portant part  of  German  industries.  Since  then,  under  the 
protection  of  wise  tariffs,  and  in  connection  with  the  rapid 
growth  of  the  German  merchant  navy,  trade  has  marvel- 
lously increased.  Germany  has  become  an  industrial  and 
trading  nation;  almost  the  whole  of  the  growing  increase 
of  the  population  finds  work  and  employment  in  this  sphere. 
Agriculture  has  more  and  more  lost  its  leading  position 
in  the  economic  life  of  the  people.  The  artisan  class  has 
thus  become  a  power  in  our  State.  It  is  organized  in  trade 
unions,  and  has  politically  fallen  under  the  influence  of  the 
international  social  democracy.  It  is  hostile  to  the  national 
class  distinctions,  and  strains  every  nerve  to  undermine  the 
existing  power  of  the  State. 

It  is  evident  that  the  State  cannot  tolerate  quietly  this 
dangerous  agitation,  and  that  it  must  hinder,  by  every 
means,  the  efforts  of  the  anti-constitutionalist  party  to  effect 
their  purpose.  The  law  of  self-preservation  demands  this ; 
but  it  is  clear  that,  to  a  certain  point,  the  pretensions  of 
the  working  classes  are  justified.  The  citizen  may  fairly 
claim  to  protect  himself  from  poverty  by  work,  and  to  have 
an  opportunity  of  raising  himself  in  the  social  scale,  if  he 
willingly  devotes  his  powers.  He  is  entitled  to  demand  that 
the  State  should  grant  this  claim,  and  should  be  bound  to 
protect  him  against  the  tyranny  of  capital. 

Two  means  of  attaining  such  an  object  are  open  to  the 
State:  first,  it  may  create  opportunities  of  work,  which  se- 
cure remunerative  employment  to  all  willing  hands;  sec- 
ondly, it  may  insure  the  workman  by  legislation  against 


70     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

every  diminution  in  his  capacity  to  work  owing  to  sickness, 
age,  or  accident;  may  give  him  material  assistance  when 
temporarily  out  of  work,  and  protect  him  against  compul- 
sion which  may  hinder  him  from  working. 

The  economical  prosperity  of  Germany  as  the  visible 
result  of  three  victorious  campaigns  created  a  labour  mar- 
ket sufficiently  large  for  present  purposes,  although  with- 
out the  conscious  intention  of  the  State.  German  labour, 
under  the  protection  of  the  political  power,  gained  a  mar- 
ket for  itself.  On  the  other  hand,  the  German  State  has 
intervened  with  legislation,  with  full  consciousness  of  the 
end  and  the  means.  As  Scharnhorst  once  contrasted  the 
duty  of  the  citizen  with  the  rights  of  man,  so  the  Emperor 
William  I  recognized  the  duty  of  the  State  towards  those 
who  were  badly  equipped  with  the  necessaries  of  life.  The 
position  of  the  worker  was  assured,  so  far  as  circumstances 
allowed,  by  social  legislation.  No  excuse,  therefore,  for 
revolutionary  agitation  now  existed. 

A  vigorous  opposition  to  all  the  encroachments  of  the 
social  democrats  indicated  the  only  right  way  in  which  the 
justifiable  efforts  of  the  working  class  could  be  reconciled 
with  the  continuance  of  the  existing  State  and  of  existing 
society,  the  two  pillars  of  all  civilization  and  progress. 
This  task  is  by  no  means  completed.  The  question  still  is, 
How  to  win  back  the  working  class  to  the  ideals  of  State 
and  country?  Willing  workers  must  be  still  further  pro- 
tected against  social  democratic  tyranny. 

Germany,  nevertheless,  is  in  social-political  respects  at 
the  head  of  all  progress  in  culture.  German  science  has 
held  its  place  in  the  world.  Germany  certainly  took  the 
lead  in  political  sciences  during  the  last  century,  and  in 
all  other  domains  of  intellectual  inquiry  has  won  a  promi- 
nent position  through  the  universality  of  her  philosophy 
and  her  thorough  and  unprejudiced  research  into  the  nature 
of  things. 

The  achievements  of  Germany  in  the  sphere  of  science 
and  literature  are  attested  by  the  fact  that  the  annual  ex- 
port of  German  books  to  foreign  countries  is,  according  to 
trustworthy  estimates,  twice  as  large  as  that  of  France, 
England,  and  North  America  combined.     It  is  only  in  the 


GERMANY'S  DEVELOPMENT  71 

domain  of  the  exact  sciences  that  Germany  has  often  been 
compelled  to  give  precedence  to  foreign  countries.  German 
art  also  has  failed  to  win  a  leading  position.  It  shows,  in- 
deed, sound  promise  in  many  directions,  and  has  produced 
much  that  is  really  great;  but  the  chaos  of  our  political 
conditions  is,  unfortunately,  reflected  in  it.  The  German 
Empire  has  politically  been  split  up  into  numerous  parties. 
Not  only  are  the  social  democrats  and  the  middle  class  op- 
posed, but  they,  again,  are  divided  among  themselves;  not 
only  are  industries  and  agriculture  bitter  enemies,  but  the 
national  sentiment  has  not  yet  been  able  to  vanquish  de- 
nominational antagonisms,  and  the  historical  hostility  be- 
tween North  and  South  has  prevented  the  population  from 
growing  up  into  a  completely  united  body. 

So  stands  Germany  to-day,  torn  by  internal  dissensions, 
yet  full  of  sustained  strength;  threatened  on  all  sides  by 
dangers,  compressed  into  narrow,  unnatural  limits,  she  still 
is  filled  with  high  aspirations,  in  her  nationality,  her  intel- 
lectual development,  in  her  science,  industries,  and  trade. 

And  now,  what  paths  does  this  history  indicate  to  us  for 
the  future?    What  duties  are  enforced  on  us  by  the  past? 

It  is  a  question  of  far-reaching  importance;  for  on  the 
way  in  which  the  German  State  answers  this  question,  de- 
pend not  only  our  own  further  development,  but  to  some 
extent  the  subsequent  shaping  of  the  history  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER  IV 
GERMANY'S  HISTORICAL  MISSION 

Let  us  pass  before  our  mind's  eye  the  whole  course  of 
our  historical  development,  and  let  us  picture  to  ourselves 
the  life-giving  streams  of  human  beings,  that  in  every  age 
have  poured  forth  from  the  Empire  of  Central  Europe  to 
all  parts  of  the  globe;  let  us  reflect  that  rich  seeds  of  in- 
tellectual and  moral  development  were  sown  by  the  Ger- 
man intellectual  life:  the  proud  conviction  forces  itself 
upon  us  with  irresistible  power  that  a  high,  if  not  the  high- 
est, importance  for  the  entire  development  of  the  human 
race  is  ascribable  to  this  German  people. 

This  conviction  is  based  on  the  intellectual  merits  of 
our  nation,  on  the  freedom  and  the  universality  of  the 
German  spirit,  which  have  ever  and  again  been  shown  in 
the  course  of  its  history.  There  is  no  nation  whose  thinking 
is  at  once  so  free  from  prejudice  and  so  historical  as  the 
German,  which  knows  how  to  unite  so  harmoniously  the 
freedom  of  the  intellectual  and  the  restraint  of  the  prac- 
tical life  on  the  path  of  free  and  natural  development.  The 
Germans  have  thus  always  been  the  standard-bearers  of 
free  thought,  but  at  the  same  time  a  strong  bulwark  against 
revolutionary  anarchical  outbreaks.  They  have  often  been 
worsted  in  the  struggle  for  intellectual  freedom,  and  poured 
out  their  best  heart's  blood  in  the  cause.  Intellectual  com- 
pulsion has  sometimes  ruled  the  Germans;  revolutionary 
tremors  have  shaken  the  life  of  this  people — the  great 
peasant  war  in  the  sixteenth  century,  and  the  political  at- 
tempts at  revolution  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
But  the  revolutionary  movement  has  been  checked  and 
directed  into  the  paths  of  a  healthy  natural  advancement. 
The  inevitable  need  of  a  free  intellectual  self-determina- 
tion has  again  and  again  disengaged  itself  from  the  inner 

72 


GERMANY'S  HISTORICAL  MISSION  73 

life  of  the  soul  of  the  people,  and  broadened  into  world- 
historical  importance. 

Thus  two  great  movements  were  born  from  the  German 
intellectual  life,  on  which,  henceforth,  all  the  intellectual 
and  moral  progress  of  man  must  rest :  the  Reformation  and 
the  critical  philosophy.  The  Reformation,  which  broke  the 
intellectual  yoke,  imposed  by  the  Church,  which  checked 
all  free  progress;  and  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  which 
put  a  stop  to  the  caprice  of  philosophic  speculation  by  de- 
fining for  the  human  mind  the  limitations  of  its  capacity 
for  knowledge,  and  at  the  same  time  pointed  out  in  what 
way  knowledge  is  really  possible.  On  this  sub-structure 
was  developed  the  intellectual  life  of  our  time,  whose  deep- 
est significance  consists  in  the  attempt  to  reconcile  the  re- 
sult of  free  inquiry  with  the  religious  needs  of  the  heart, 
and  to  lay  a  foundation  for  the  harmonious  organization  of 
mankind.  Torn  this  way  and  that,  between  hostile  forces, 
in  a  continuous  feud  between  faith  and  knowledge,  man- 
kind seems  to  have  lost  the  straight  road  of  progress.  Re- 
conciliation only  appears  possible  when  the  thought  of  re- 
ligious reformation  leads  to  a  permanent  explanation  of 
the  idea  of  religion,  and  science  remains  conscious  of  the 
limits  of  its  power,  and  does  not  attempt  to  explain  the 
domain  of  the  supersensual  world  from  the  results  of  nat- 
ural philosophy. 

The  German  nation  not  only  laid  the  foundations  of  this 
great  struggle  for  an  harmonious  development  of  humanity, 
but  took  the  lead  in  it.  We  are  thus  incurring  an  obliga- 
tion for  the  future,  from  which  we  cannot  shrink.  We 
must  be  prepared  to  be  the  leaders  in  this  campaign,  which 
is  being  fought  for  the  highest  stake  that  has  been  offered 
to  human  efforts.  Our  nation  is  not  only  bound  by  its  past 
history  to  take  part  in  this  struggle,  but  is  peculiarly  adapted 
to  do  so  by  its  special  qualities. 

No  nation  on  the  face  of  the  globe  is  so  able  to  grasp 
and  appropriate  all  the  elements  of  culture,  to  add  to  them 
from  the  stores  of  its  own  spiritual  endowment,  and  to 
give  back  to  mankind  richer  gifts  than  it  received.  It  has 
"enriched  the  store  of  traditional  European  culture  with 
new  and  independent  ideas  and  ideals,  and  won  a  position 


74     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

in  the  great  community  of  civilized  nations  which  none  else 
could  fill."  "Depth  of  conviction,  idealism,  universality, 
the  power  to  look  beyond  all  the  limits  of  a  finite  existence, 
to  sympathize  with  all  that  is  human,  to  traverse  the  realm 
of  ideas  in  companionship  with  the  noblest  of  all  nations 
and  ages — this  has  at  all  times  been  the  German  character- 
istic; this  has  been  extolled  as  the  prerogative  of  German 
culture."*  To  no  nation,  except  the  German,  has  it  been 
given  to  enjoy  in  its  inner  self  "that  which  is  given  to  man- 
kind as  a  whole."  We  often  see  in  other  nations  a  greater 
intensity  of  specialized  ability,  but  never  the  same  capacity 
for  generalization  and  absorption.  It  is  this  quality  which 
specially  fits  us  for  the  leadership  in  the  intellectual  world, 
and  imposes  on  us  the  obligation  to  maintain  that  position. 

There  are  numerous  other  tasks  to  be  fulfilled  if  we  are 
to  discharge  our  highest  duty.  They  form  the  necessary 
platform  from  which  we  can  mount  to  the  highest  goal. 
These  duties  lie  in  the  domains  of  science  and  politics,  and 
also  in  that  borderland  where  science  and  politics  touch, 
and  where  the  latter  is  often  directly  conditioned  by  the 
results  of  scientific  inquiry. 

First  and  foremost  it  is  German  science  which  must 
regain  its  superiority  in  unwearying  and  brilliant  research 
in  order  to  vindicate  our  birthright.  On  the  one  hand,  we 
must  extend  the  theory  of  the  perceptive  faculty;  on  the 
other,  we  must  increase  man's  dominion  over  Nature  by 
exploring  her  hidden  secrets,  and  thus  make  human  work 
more  useful  and  remunerative.  We  must  endeavour  to 
find  scientific  solutions  of  the  great  problems  which  deeply 
concern  mankind.  We  need  not  restrict  ourselves  to  the 
sphere  of  pure  theory,  but  must  try  to  benefit  civilization 
by  the  practical  results  of  research,  and  thus  create  condi- 
tions of  life  in  which  a  purer  conception  of  the  ideal  life 
can  find  its  expression. 

It  is,  broadly  speaking,  religious  and  social  controversies 
which  exercise  the  most  permanent  influence  on  human 
existence,  and  condition  not  only  our  future  development, 
but  the  higher  life  generally.  These  problems  have  occu- 
pied the  minds  of  no  people  more  deeply  and  permanently 
♦Treitschke,  "Deutsche  Geschichte,"  i.,  p.  95. 


GERMANY'S  HISTORICAL  MISSION  75 

than  our  own.  Yet  the  revolutionary  spirit,  in  spite  of  the 
empty  ravings  of  social  democratic  agitators,  finds  no  place 
in  Germany.  The  German  nature  tends  towards  a  sys- 
tematic healthy  development,  which  works  slowly  in  op- 
position to  the  different  movements.  The  Germans  thus 
seem  thoroughly  qualified  to  settle  in  their  own  country 
the  great  controversies  which  are  rending  other  nations, 
and  to  direct  them  into  the  paths  of  a  natural  progress  in 
conformity  with  the  laws  of  evolution. 

We  have  already  started  on  the  task  in  the  social  sphere, 
and  shall  no  doubt  continue  it,  so  far  as  it  is  compatible 
with  the  advantages  of  the  community  and  the  working 
class  itself.  We  must  not  spare  any  efforts  to  find  other 
means  than  those  already  adopted  to  inspire  the  working 
class  with  healthy  and  patriotic  ambitions. 

It  is  to  be  hoped,  in  any  case,  that  if  ever  a  great  and 
common  duty,  requiring  the  concentration  of  the  whole 
national  strength,  is  imposed  upon  us,  that  the  labour  classes 
will  not  withhold  their  co-operation,  and  that,  in  face  of 
a  common  danger,  our  nation  will  recover  that  unity  which 
is  lamentably  deficient  to-day. 

No  attempt  at  settlement  has  been  made  in  the  religious 
domain.  The  old  antagonists  are  still  bitterly  hostile  to 
each  other,  especially  in  Germany.  It  will  be  the  duty  of 
the  future  to  mitigate  the  religious  and  political  antagonism 
of  the  denominations,  under  guarantees  of  absolute  liberty 
of  thought  and  all  personal  convictions,  and  to  combine  the 
conflicting  views  into  a  harmonious  and  higher  system.  At 
present  there  appears  small  probability  of  attaining  this 
end.  The  dogmatism  of  Protestant  orthodoxy  and  the 
Jesuitic  tendencies  and  ultramontanism  of  the  Catholics, 
must  be  surmounted,  before  any  common  religious  move- 
ment can  be  contemplated.  But  no  German  statesman  can 
disregard  this  aspect  of  affairs,  nor  must  he  ever  forget 
that  the  greatness  of  our  nation  is  rooted  exclusively  on 
Protestantism.  Legally  and  socially  all  denominations  en- 
joy equal  rights,  but  the  German  State  must  never  renounce 
the  leadership  in  the  domain  of  free  spiritual  development. 
To  do  so  would  mean  loss  of  prestige. 

Duties  of  the  greatest  importance  for  the  whole  advance 


76     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

of  human  civilization  have  thus  been  transmitted  to  the 
German  nation,  as  heir  of  a  great  and  glorious  past.  It  is 
faced  with  problems  of  no  less  significance  in  the  sphere 
of  its  international  relations.  These  problems  are  of  spe- 
cial importance,  since  they  affect  most  deeply  the  intel- 
lectual development,  and  on  their  solution  depends  the 
position  of  Germany  in  the  world. 

The  German  Empire  has  suffered  great  losses  of  territory 
in  the  storms  and  struggles  of  the  past.  The  Germany  of 
to-day,  considered  geographically,  is  a  mutilated  torso  of 
the  old  dominions  of  the  Emperors;  it  comprises  only  a 
fraction  of  the  German  peoples.  A  large  number  of  Ger- 
man fellow-countrymen  have  been  incorporated  into  other 
States,  or  live  in  political  independence,  like  the  Dutch, 
who  have  developed  into  a  separate  nationality,  but  in  lan- 
guage and  national  customs  cannot  deny  their  German  an- 
cestry. Germany  has  been  robbed  of  her  natural  bound- 
aries; even  the  source  and  mouth  of  the  most  characteris- 
tically German  stream,  the  much  lauded  German  Rhine, 
lie  outside  the  German  territory.  On  the  eastern  frontier, 
too,  where  the  strength  of  the  modern  German  Empire 
grew  up  in  centuries  of  war  against  the  Slavs,  the  posses- 
sions of  Germany  are  menaced.  The  Slavonic  waves  are 
ever  dashing  more  furiously  against  the  coast  of  that  Ger- 
manism, which  seems  to  have  lost  its  old  victorious  strength. 

Signs  of  political  weakness  are  visible  here,  while  for 
centuries  the  overflow  of  the  strength  of  the  German  na- 
tion has  poured  into  foreign  countries,  and  been  lost  to 
our  fatherland  and  to  our  nationality;  it  is  absorbed  by 
foreign  nations  and  steeped  with  foreign  sentiments.  Even 
to-day  the  German  Empire  possesses  no  colonial  territories 
where  its  increasing  population  may  find  remunerative  work 
and  a  German  way  of  living. 

This  is  obviously  not  a  condition  which  can  satisfy  a 
powerful  nation,  or  corresponds  to  the  greatness  of  the 
German  nation  and  its  intellectual  importance. 

At  an  earlier  epoch,  to  be  sure,  when  Germans  had  in 
the  course  of  centuries  grown  accustomed  to  the  degrada- 
tion of  being  robbed  of  all  political  significance,  a  large  sec- 
tion of  our  people  did  not  feel  this  insufficiency.     Even 


GERMANY'S  HISTORICAL  MISSION  77 

during  the  age  of  our  classical  literature  the  patriotic  pride 
of  that  idealistic  generation  "was  contented  with  the  thought 
that  no  other  people  could  follow  the  bold  flights  of  Ger- 
man genius  or  soar  aloft  to  the  freedom  of  our  world 
citizenship."* 

Schiller,  in  1797,  could  write  the  lines: 

"German  majesty  and  honour 
Fall  not  with  the  princes'  crown; 
When  amid  the  flames  of  war 
German  Empire  crashes  down, 
German  greatness  stands  unscathed."t 

The  nobler  and  better  section  of  our  nation,  at  any  rate, 
holds  different  sentiments  to-day.  We  attach  a  higher  value 
to  the  influence  of  the  German  spirit  on  universal  culture 
than  was  then  possible,  since  we  must  now  take  into  con- 
sideration the  immense  development  of  Germany  in  the 
nineteenth  century,  and  can  thus  better  estimate  the  old 
importance  of  our  classical  literature.  Again,  we  have 
learnt  from  the  vicissitudes  of  our  historical  growth  to 
recognize  that  the  full  and  due  measure  of  intellectual  de- 
velopment can  only  be  achieved  by  the  political  federation 
of  our  nation.  The  dominion  of  German  thought  can  only 
be  extended  under  the  aegis  of  political  power,  and  unless 
we  act  in  conformity  to  this  idea,  we  shall  be  untrue  to  our 
great  duties  towards  the  human  race. 

Our  first  and  positive  duty  consists,  therefore,  in  zeal- 
ously guarding  the  territories  of  Germany,  as  they  now 
are,  and  in  not  surrendering  a  foot's  breadth  of  German  soil 
to  foreign  nationalities.  On  the  west  the  ambitious  schemes 
of  the  Latin  race  have  been  checked,  and  it  is  hard  to 
imagine  that  we  shall  ever  allow  this  prize  of  victory  to 
be  snatched  again  from  our  hands.  On  the  south-east  the 
Turks,  who  formerly  threatened  the  civilized  countries  of 
Europe,  have  been  completely  repulsed.  They  now  take  a 
very  different  position  in  European  politics  from  that  which 
they  filled  at  the  time  of  their  victorious  advance  west- 

*  Treitschke,  "Deutsche  Geschichte,"  i.,  p.   195. 
t  Fragment  of  a  poem  on  "German  Greatness,"  published  in  1905 
by  Bernhard  Suphan. 


78     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

wards.  Their  power  on  the  Mediterranean  is  entirely  de- 
stroyed. On  the  other  hand,  the  Slavs  have  become  a 
formidable  power.  Vast  regions  which  were  once  under 
German  influence  are  now  once  more  subject  to  Slavonic 
rule,  and  seem  permanently  lost  to  us.  The  present  Rus- 
sian Baltic  provinces  were  formerly  flourishing  seats  of 
German  culture.  The  German  element  in  Austria,  our  ally, 
is  gravely  menaced  by  the  Slavs;  Germany  herself  is  ex- 
posed to  a  perpetual  peaceful  invasion  of  Slavonic  work- 
men. Many  Poles  are  firmly  established  in  the  heart  of 
Westphalia.  Only  faint-hearted  measures  are  taken  to-day 
to  stem  this  Slavonic  flood.  And  yet  to  check  this  onrush 
of  Slavism  is  not  merely  an  obligation  inherited  from  our 
fathers,  but  a  duty  in  the  interests  of  self-preservation  and 
European  civilization.  It  cannot  yet  be  determined  whether 
we  can  keep  off  this  vast  flood  by  pacific  precautions.  It 
is  not  improbable  that  the  question  of  Germanic  or  Slavonic 
supremacy  will  be  once  more  decided  by  the  sword.  The 
probability  of  such  a  conflict  grows  stronger  as  we  become 
more  lax  in  pacific  measures  of  defence,  and  show  less  de- 
termination to  protect  the  German  soil  at  all  costs. 

The  further  duty  of  supporting  the  Germans  in  foreign 
countries  in  their  struggle  for  existence  and  of  thus  keeping 
them  loyal  to  their  nationality,  is  one  from  which,  in  our 
direct  interests,  we  cannot  withdraw.  The  isolated  groups 
of  Germans  abroad  greatly  benefit  our  trade,  since  by  pref- 
erence they  obtain  their  goods  from  Germany ;  but  they  may 
also  be  useful  to  us  politically,  as  we  discover  in  America. 
The  American-Germans  have  formed  a  political  alliance 
with  the  Irish,  and  thus  united,  constitute  a  power  in  the 
State,  with  which  the  Government  must  reckon. 

Finally,  from  the  point  of  view  of  civilization,  it  is  im- 
perative to  preserve  the  German  spirit,  and  by  so  doing  to 
establish  foci  of  universal  culture. 

Even  if  we  succeed  in  guarding  our  possessions  in  the 
East  and  West,  and  in  preserving  the  German  nationality 
in  its  present  form  throughout  the  world,  we  shall  not  be 
able  to  maintain  our  present  position,  powerful  as  it  is,  in 
the  great  competition  with  the  other  Powers,  if  we  are  con- 
tented to  restrict  ourselves  to  our  present  sphere  of  power, 


GERMANY'S  HISTORICAL  MISSION  79 

while  the  surrounding  countries  are  busily  extending  their 
dominions,  If  we  wish  to  compete  further  with  them,  a 
policy  which  our  population  and  our  civilization  both  entitle 
and  compel  us  to  adopt,  we  must  not  hold  back  in  the  hard 
struggle  for  the  sovereignty  of  the  world. 

Lord  Rosebery,  speaking  at  the  Royal  Colonial  Institute 
on  March  i,  1893,  expressed  himself  as  follows:  "It  is 
said  that  our  Empire  is  already  large  enough  and  does  not 
need  expansion.  .  .  .  We  shall  have  to  consider  not  what 
we  want  now,  but  what  we  want  in  the  future.  .  .  .  We 
have  to  remember  that  it  is  part  of  our  responsibility  and 
heritage  to  take  care  that  the  world,  so  far  as  it  can  be 
moulded  by  us,  should  receive  the  Anglo-Saxon  and  not 
another  character."* 

That  is  a  great  and  proud  thought  which  the  English- 
man then  expressed.  If  we  count  the  nations  who  speak 
English  at  the  present  day,  and  if  we  survey  the  countries 
which  acknowledge  the  rule  of  England,  we  must  admit 
that  he  is  justified  from  the  English  point  of  view.  He 
does  not  here  contemplate  an  actual  world-sovereignty,  but 
the  predominance  of  the  English  spirit  is  proclaimed  in 
plain  language. 

England  has  certainly  done  a  great  work  of  civilization, 
especially  from  the  material  aspect;  but  her  work  is  one- 
sided. All  the  colonies  which  are  directly  subject  to  Eng- 
lish rule  are  primarily  exploited  in  the  interest  of  English 
industries  and  English  capital.  The  work  of  civilization, 
which  England  undeniably  has  carried  out  among  them,  has 
always  been  subordinated  to  this  idea ;  she  has  never  justi- 
fied her  sovereignty  by  training  up  a  free  and  independent 
population,  and  by  transmitting  to  the  subject  peoples  the 
blessings  of  an  independent  culture  of  their  own.  With 
regard  to  those  colonies  which  enjoy  self-government,  and 
are  therefore  more  or  less  free  republics,  as  Canada,  Aus- 
tralia, South  Africa,  it  is  very  questionable  whether  they 
will  permanently  retain  any  trace  of  the  English  spirit. 
They  are  not  only  growing  States,  but  growing  nations,  and 
it  seems  uncertain  at  the  present  time  whether  England 

*  This  passage  is  quoted  in  the  book  of  the  French  ex-Minister 
Hanotaux,  "Fashoda  et  le  partage  de  l'Afrique." 


80     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

will  be  able  to  include  them  permanently  in  the  Empire,  to 
make  them  serviceable  to  English  industries,  or  even  to 
secure  that  the  national  character  is  English.  Neverthe- 
less, it  is  a  great  and  proud  ambition  that  is  expressed  in 
Lord  Rosebery's  words,  and  it  testifies  to  a  supreme  na- 
tional self-confidence. 

The  French  regard  with  no  less  justifiable  satisfaction 
the  work  done  by  them  in  the  last  forty  years.  In  1909  the 
former  French  Minister,  Hanotaux,  gave  expression  to 
this  pride  in  the  following  words :  "Ten  years  ago  the  work 
of  founding  our  colonial  Empire  was  finished.  France  has 
claimed  her  rank  among  the  four  great  Powers.  She  is 
at  home  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe.  French  is  spoken, 
and  will  continue  to  be  spoken,  in  Africa,  Asia,  America, 
Oceania.  Seeds  of  sovereignty  are  sown  in  all  parts  of 
the  world.  They  will  prosper  under  the  protection  of 
Heaven."* 

The  same  statesman  criticized,  with  ill-concealed  hatred, 
the  German  policy:  "It  will  be  for  history  to  decide  what 
has  been  the  leading  thought  of  Germany  and  her  Govern- 
ment during  the  complicated  disputes  under  wrych  the  par- 
tition of  Africa  and  the  last  phase  of  French  colonial  policy 
were  ended.  We  may  assume  that  at  first  the  adherents 
to  Bismarck's  policy  saw  with  satisfaction  how  France  em- 
barked on  distant  and  difficult  undertakings,  which  would 
fully  occupy  the  attention  of  the  country  and  its  Govern- 
ment for  long  years  to  come.  Nevertheless,  it  is  not  certain 
that  this  calculation  has  proved  right  in  the  long-run,  since 
Germany  ultimately  trod  the  same  road,  and,  somewhat 
late,  indeed,  tried  to  make  up  for  lost  time.  If  that  country 
deliberately  abandoned  colonial  enterprise  to  others,  it  can- 
not be  surprised  if  these  have  obtained  the  best  shares." 

This  French  criticism  is  not  altogether  unfair.  It  must 
be  admitted  with  mortification  and  envy  that  the  nation 
vanquished  in  1870,  whose  vital  powers  seemed  exhausted, 
which  possessed  no  qualification  for  colonization  from  want 
of  men  to  colonize,  as  is  best  seen  in  Algeria,  has  yet  created 
the  second  largest  colonial  Empire  in  the  world,  and  prides 

♦Hanotaux,  "Fashoda  et  le  partage  de  l'Afrique." 


GERMANY'S  HISTORICAL  MISSION  81 

herself  on  being  a  World  Power,  while  the  conqueror  of 
Gravelotte  and  Sedan  in  this  respect  lags  far  behind  her, 
and  only  recently,  in  the  Morocco  controversy,  yielded  to 
the  unjustifiable  pretensions  of  France  in  a  way  which,  ac- 
cording to  universal  popular  sentiment,  was  unworthy  alike 
of  the  dignity  and  the  interests  of  Germany. 

The  openly  declared  claims  of  England  and  France  are 
the  more  worthy  of  attention  since  an  etente  prevails  be- 
tween the  two  countries.  In  the  face  of  these  claims  the 
German  nation,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  importance  to 
civilization,  is  fully  entitled  not  only  to  demand  a  place  in 
the  sun,  as  Prince  Biilow  used  modestly  to  express  it,  but 
to  aspire  to  an  adequate  share  in  the  sovereignty  of  the 
world  far  beyond  the  limits  of  its  present  sphere  of  in- 
fluence. But  we  can  only  reach  this  goal,  by  so  amply 
securing  our  position  in  Europe,  that  it  can  never  again 
be  questioned.  Then  only  we  need  no  longer  fear  that 
we  shall  be  opposed  by  stronger  opponents  whenever  we 
take  part  in  international  politics.  We  shall  then  be  able 
to  exercise  our  forces  freely  in  fair  rivalry  with  the  other 
World  Powers,  and  secure  to  German  nationality  and  Ger- 
man spirit  throughout  the  globe  that  high  esteem  which  is 
due  to  them. 

Such  an  expansion  of  power,  befitting  our  importance, 
is  not  merely  a  fanciful  scheme — it  will  soon  appear  as  a 
political  necessity. 

The  fact  has  already  been  mentioned  that,  owing  to 
political  union  and  improved  economic  conditions  during 
the  last  forty  years,  an  era  of  great  prosperity  has  set  in, 
and  that  German  industries  have  been  widely  extended  and 
German  trade  has  kept  pace  with  them.  The  extraordinary 
capacity  of  the  German  nation  for  trade  and  navigation 
has  once  more  brilliantly  asserted  itself.  The  days  of  the 
Hanseatic  League  have  returned.  The  labour  resources 
of  our  nation  increase  continuously.  The  increase  of  the 
population  in  the  German  Empire  alone  amounts  yearly 
to  a  million  souls,  and  these  have,  to  a  large  extent,  found 
remunerative  industrial  occupation. 

There  is,  however,  a  reverse  side  to  this  picture  of  splen- 
did development.    We  are  absolutely  dependent  on  foreign 


&2  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

countries  for  the  import  of  raw  materials,  and  to  a  con- 
siderable extent  also  for  the  sale  of  our  own  manufactures. 
We  even  obtain  a  part  of  our  necessaries  of  life  from 
abroad.  Then,  again,  we  have  not  the  assured  markets 
which  England  possesses  in  her  colonies.  Our  own  colonies 
are  unable  to  take  much  of  our  products,  and  the  great 
foreign  economic  spheres  try  to  close  their  doors  to  out- 
siders, especially  Germans,  in  order  to  encourage  their 
own  industries,  and  to  make  themselves  independent  of 
other  countries.  The  livelihood  of  our  working  classes 
directly  depends  on  the  maintenance  and  expansion  of  our 
export  trade.  It  is  a  question  of  life  and  death  for  us  to 
keep  open  our  oversea  commerce.  We  shall  very  soon 
see  ourselves  compelled  to  find  for  our  growing  population 
means  of  life  other  than  industrial  employment.  It  is  out 
of  the  question  that  this  latter  can  keep  pace  permanently 
with  the  increase  of  population.  Agriculture  will  employ 
a  small  part  of  this  increase,  and  home  settlements  may 
afford  some  relief.  But  no  remunerative  occupation  will 
ever  be  found  within  the  borders  of  the  existing  German 
Empire  for  the  whole  population,  however  favourable  our 
international  relations.  We  shall  soon,  therefore,  be  faced 
by  the  question,  whether  we  wish  to  surrender  the  coming 
generations  to  foreign  countries,  as  formerly  in  the  hour  of 
our  decline,  or  whether  we  wish  to  take  steps  to  find  them 
a  home  in  our  own  German  colonies,  and  so  retain  them 
for  the  fatherland.  There  is  no  possible  doubt  how  this 
question  must  be  answered.  If  the  unfortunate  course  of 
our  history  has  hitherto  prevented  us  from  building  a  col- 
onial Empire,  it  is  our  duty  to  make  up  for  lost  time,  and 
at  once  to  construct  a  fleet  which,  in  defiance  of  all  hostile 
Powers,  may  keep  our  sea  communications  open. 

We  have  long  underestimated  the  importance  of  colonies. 
Colonial  possessions  which  merely  serve  the  purpose  of  ac- 
quiring wealth,  and  are  only  used  for  economic  ends,  while 
the  owner- State  does  not  think  of  colonizing  in  any  form 
or  raising  the  position  of  the  aboriginal  population  in  the 
economic  or  social  scale,  are  unjustifiable  and  immoral,  and 
can  never  be  held  permanently.  "But  that  colonization 
which  retains  a  uniform  nationality  has  become  a  factor 


GERMANY'S  HISTORICAL  MISSION  83 

of  immense  importance  for  the  future  of  the  world.  It  will 
determine  the  degree  in  which  each  nation  shares  in  the 
government  of  the  world  by  the  white  race.  It  is  quite 
imaginable  that  a  country  which  owns  no  colonies  will  no 
longer  count  among  the  European  Great  Powers,  however 
powerful  it  may  otherwise  be."* 

We  are  already  suffering  severely  from  the  want  of 
colonies  to  meet  our  requirements.  They  would  not  merely 
guarantee  a  livelihood  to  our  growing  working  population, 
but  would  supply  raw  material  and  food-stuffs,  would  buy 
goods,  and  open  a  field  of  activity  to  that  immense  capital 
of  intellectual  labour  forces  which  is  to-day  lying  unpro- 
ductive in  Germany,  or  is  in  the  service  of  foreign  interests. 
We  find  throughout  the  countries  of  the  world  German 
merchants,  engineers,  and  men  of  every  profession,  em- 
ployed actively  in  the  service  of  foreign  masters,  because 
German  colonies,  when  they  might  be  profitably  engaged, 
do  not  exist.  In  the  future,  however,  the  importance  of 
Germany  will  depend  on  two  points:  firstly,  how  many 
millions  of  men  in  the  world  speak  German?  secondly,  how 
many  of  them  are  politically  members  of  the  German  Em- 
pire? 

These  are  heavy  and  complicated  duties,  which  have  de- 
volved on  us  from  the  entire  past  development  of  our  na- 
tion, and  are  determined  by  its  present  condition  as  regards 
the  future.  We  must  be  quite  clear  on  this  point,  that  no 
nation  has  had  to  reckon  with  the  same  difficulties  and 
hostility  as  ours.  This  is  due  to  the  many  restrictions  of 
our  political  relations,  to  our  unfavourable  geographical 
position,  and  to  the  course  of  our  history.  It  was  chiefly 
our  own  fault  that  we  were  condemned  to  political  paralysis 
at  the  time  when  the  great  European  States  built  them- 
selves up,  and  sometimes  expanded  into  World  Powers. 
We  did  not  enter  the  circle  of  the  Powers,  whose  decision 
carried  weight  in  politics,  until  late,  when  the  partition  of 
the  globe  was  long  concluded.  All  which  other  nations 
attained  in  centuries  of  natural  development — political 
union,  colonial  possessions,  naval  power,  international  trade 
— was  denied  to  our  nation  until  quite  recently.  What  we 
*  Treitschke,  "Politik,"  i.,  §  8. 


84     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

now  wish  to  attain  must  be  fought  for,  and  won,  against 
a  superior  force  of  hostile  interests  and  Powers. 

It  is  all  the  more  emphatically  our  duty  plainly  to  per- 
ceive what  paths  we  wish  to  take,  and  what  our  goals  are, 
so  as  not  to  split  up  our  forces  in  false  directions,  and  in- 
voluntarily to  diverge  from  the  straight  road  of  our  in- 
tended development. 

The  difficulty  of  our  political  position  is  in  a  certain 
sense  an  advantage.  By  keeping  us  in  a  continually  in- 
creasing state  of  tension,  it  has  at  least  protected  us  so  far 
from  the  lethargy  which  so  often  follows  a  long  period  of 
peace  and  growing  wealth.  It  has  forced  us  to  stake  all 
our  spiritual  and  material  forces  in  order  to  rise  to  every 
occasion,  and  has  thus  discovered  and  strengthened  re- 
sources which  will  be  of  great  value  whenever  we  shall  be 
called  upon  to  draw  the  sword. 


CHAPTER  V 

WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL 

In  discussing  the  duties  which  fall  to  the  German  nation 
from  its  history  and  its  general  as  well  as  particular  endow- 
ments, we  attempted  to  prove  that  a  consolidation  and  ex- 
pansion of  our  position  among  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe, 
and  an  extension  of  our  colonial  possessions,  must  be  the 
basis  of  our  future  development. 

The  political  questions  thus  raised  intimately  concern  all 
international  relations,  and  should  be  thoroughly  weighed. 
We  must  not  aim  at  the  impossible.  A  reckless  policy  would 
be  foreign  to  our  national  character  and  our  high  aims  and 
duties.  But  we  must  aspire  to  the  possible,  even  at  the 
risk  of  war.  This  policy  we  have  seen  to  be  both  our  right 
and  our  duty.  The  longer  we  look  at  things  with  folded 
hands,  the  harder  it  will  be  to  make  up  the  start  which  the 
other  Powers  have  gained  on  us. 

"The  mn  of  sense  will  by  the  forelock  clutch 
Whatever  lies  within  his  power, 
Stick  fast  to  it,  and  neither  shirk, 
Nor  from  his  enterprise  be  thrust, 
But,  having  once  begun  to  work, 
Go  working  on  because  he  must." 

Faust 
(translated  by  Sir  Theodore  Martin). 

The  sphere  in  which  we  can  realize  our  ambition  is  cir- 
cumscribed by  the  hostile  intentions  of  the  other  World 
Powers,  by  the  existing  territorial  conditions,  and  by  the 
armed  force  which  is  at  the  back  of  both.  Our  policy  must 
necessarily  be  determined  by  the  consideration  of  these 
conditions.  We  must  accurately,  and  without  bias  or  timid- 
ity, examine  the  circumstances  which  turn  the  scale  when 

85 


86     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

the  forces  which  concern  us  are  weighed  one  against  the 
other. 

These  considerations  fall  partly  within  the  military,  but 
belong  mainly  to  the  political  sphere,  in  so  far  as  the  politi- 
cal grouping  of  the  States  allows  a  survey  of  the  military 
resources  of  the  parties.  We  must  try  to  realize  this  group- 
ing. The  shifting  aims  of  the  politics  of  the  day  need  not 
be  our  standard;  they  are  often  coloured  by  considerations 
of  present  expediency,  and  offer  no  firm  basis  for  forming 
an  opinion.  We  must  rather  endeavour  to  recognize  the 
political  views  and  intentions  of  the  individual  States,  which 
are  based  on  the  nature  of  things,  and  therefore  will  con- 
tinually make  their  importance  felt.  The  broad  lines  of 
policy  are  ultimately  laid  down  by  the  permanent  interests 
of  a  country,  although  they  may  often  be  mistaken  from 
short-sightedness  or  timidity,  and  although  policy  some- 
times takes  a  course  which  does  not  seem  warranted  from 
the  standpoint  of  lasting  national  benefits.  Policy  is  not 
an  exact  science,  following  necessary  laws,  but  is  made  by 
men  who  impress  on  it  the  stamp  of  their  strength  or  their 
weakness,  and  often  divert  it  from  the  path  of  true  national 
interests.  Such  digressions  must  not  be  ignored.  The 
statesman  who  seizes  his  opportunity  will  often  profit  by 
these  political  fluctuations.  But  the  student  who  considers 
matters  from  the  standpoint  of  history  must  keep  his  eyes 
mainly  fixed  on  those  interests  which  seem  permanent.  We 
must  therefore  try  to  make  the  international  situation  in 
this  latter  sense  clear,  so  far  as  it  concerns  Germany's 
power  and  ambitions. 

We  see  the  European  Great  Powers  divided  into  two 
great  camps. 

On  the  one  side  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy  have  con- 
cluded a  defensive  alliance,  whose  sole  object  is  to  guard 
against  hostile  aggression.  In  this  alliance  the  two  first- 
named  States  form  the  solid,  probably  unbreakable,  core, 
since  by  the  nature  of  things  they  are  intimately  connected. 
The  geographical  conditions  force  this  result.  The  two 
States  combined  form  a  compact  series  of  territories  from 
the  Adriatic  to  the  North  Sea  and  the  Baltic.  Their  close 
union  is  due  also  to  historical,  national  and  political  condi- 


WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL  87 

tions.  Austrians  have  fought  shoulder  to  shoulder  with 
Prussians  and  Germans  of  the  Empire  on  a  hundred  battle- 
fields; Germans  are  the  backbone  of  the  Austrian  domin- 
ions, the  bond  of  union  that  holds  together  the  different 
nationalities  of  the  Empire.  Austria,  more  than  Germany, 
must  guard  against  the  inroads  of  Slavism,  since  numer- 
ous Slavonic  races  are  comprised  in  her  territories.  There 
has  been  no  conflict  of  interests  between  the  two  States 
since  the  struggle  for  the  supremacy  in  Germany  was  de- 
cided. The  maritime  and  commercial  interests  of  the  one 
point  to  the  south  and  south-east,  those  of  the  other  to 
the  north.  Any  feebleness  in  the  one  must  react  detrimen- 
tally on  the  political  relations  of  the  other.  A  quarrel  be- 
tween Germany  and  Austria  would  leave  both  States  at 
the  mercy  of  overwhelmingly  powerful  enemies.  The  pos- 
sibility of  each  maintaining  its  political  position  depends 
on  their  standing  by  each  other.  It  may  be  assumed  that 
the  relations  uniting  the  two  States  will  be  permanent  so 
long  as  Germans  and  Magyars  are  the  leading  nationalities 
in  the  Danubian  monarchy.  It  was  one  of  the  master- 
strokes of  Bismarck's  policy  to  have  recognized  the  com- 
munity of  Austro-German  interests  even  during  the  war 
of  1866,  and  boldly  to  have  concluded  a  peace  which  ren- 
dered such  an  alliance  possible. 

The  weakness  of  the  Austrian  Empire  lies  in  the  strong 
admixture  of  Slavonic  elements,  which  are  hostile  to  the 
German  population,  and  show  many  signs  of  Pan- Slavism. 
It  is  not  at  present,  however,  strong  enough  to  influence 
the  political  position  of  the  Empire. 

Italy,  also,  is  bound  to  the  Triple  Alliance  by  her  true 
interests.  The  antagonism  to  Austria,  which  has  run 
through  Italian  history,  will  diminish  when  the  needs  of 
expansion  in  other  spheres,  and  of  creating  a  natural  chan- 
nel for  the  increasing  population,  are  fully  recognized  by 
Italy.  Neither  condition  is  impossible.  Irredentism  will 
then  lose  its  political  significance,  for  the  position,  which 
belongs  to  Italy  from  her  geographical  situation  and  her 
past  history,  and  will  promote  her  true  interests  if  attained, 
cannot  be  won  in  a  war  with  Austria.  It  is  the  position 
of  a  leading  political  and  commercial  Mediterranean  Power. 


88     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

That  is  the  natural  heritage  which  she  can  claim.  Neither 
Germany  nor  Austria  is  a  rival  in  this  claim,  but  France, 
since  she  has  taken  up  a  permanent  position  on  the  coast 
of  North  Africa,  and  especially  in  Tunis,  has  appropriated 
a  country  which  would  have  been  the  most  natural  colony 
for  Italy,  and  has,  in  point  of  fact,  been  largely  colonized 
by  Italians,  It  would,  in  my  opinion,  have  been  politically 
right  for  us,  even  at  the  risk  of  a  war  with  France,  to 
protest  against  this  annexation,  and  to  preserve  the  terri- 
tory of  Carthage  for  Italy.  We  should  have  considerably 
strengthened  Italy's  position  on  the  Mediterranean,  and 
created  a  cause  of  contention  between  Italy  and  France 
that  would  have  added  to  the  security  of  the  Triple  Al- 
liance. 

The  weakness  of  this  alliance  consists  in  its  purely  de- 
fensive character.  It  offers  a  certain  security  against  hos- 
tile aggression,  but  does  not  consider  the  necessary  de- 
velopment of  events,  and  does  not  guarantee  to  any  of  its 
members  help  in  the  prosecution  of  its  essential  interests. 
It  is  based  on  a  status  quo,  which  was  fully  justified  in 
its  day,  but  has  been  left  far  behind  by  the  march  of  politi- 
cal events.  Prince  Bismarck,  in  his  "Thoughts  and  Remi- 
niscences," pointed  out  that  this  alliance  would  not  always 
correspond  to  the  requirements  of  the  future.  Since  Italy 
found  the  Triple  Alliance  did  not  aid  her  Mediterranean 
policy,  she  tried  to  effect  a  pacific  agreement  with  England 
and  France,  and  accordingly  retired  from  the  Triple  Al- 
liance. The  results  of  this  policy  are  manifest  to-day.  Italy, 
under  an  undisguised  arrangement  with  England  and 
France,  but  in  direct  opposition  to  the  interests  of  the 
Triple  Alliance,  attacked  Turkey,  in  order  to  conquer,  in 
Tripoli,  the  required  colonial  territory.  This  undertaking 
brought  her  to  the  brink  of  a  war  with  Austria,  which,  as 
the  supreme  Power  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  can  never 
tolerate  the  encroachment  of  Italy  into  those  regions. 

The  Triple  Alliance,  which  in  itself  represents  a  natural 
league,  has  suffered  a  rude  shock.  The  ultimate  reason 
for  this  result  is  found  in  the  fact  that  the  parties  con- 
cerned with  a  narrow,  short-sighted  policy  look  only  to  their 
immediate  private  interests,  and  pay  no  regard  to  the  vital 


WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL  89 

needs  of  the  members  of  the  league.  The  alliance  will  not 
regain  its  original  strength  until,  under  the  protection  of 
the  allied  armies,  each  of  the  three  States  can  satisfy  its 
political  needs.  We  must  therefore  be  solicitous  to  pro- 
mote Austria's  position  in  the  Balkans,  and  Italy's  interests 
on  the  Mediterranean.  Only  then  can  we  calculate  on  find- 
ing in  our  allies  assistance  towards  realizing  our  own  politi- 
cal endeavours.  Since,  however,  it  is  against  all  our  in- 
terests to  strengthen  Italy  at  the  cost  of  Turkey,  which  is, 
as  we  shall  see,  an  essential  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
we  must  repair  the  errors  of  the  past,  and  in  the  next  great 
war  win  back  Tunis  for  Italy.  Only  then  will  Bismarck's 
great  conception  of  the  Triple  Alliance  reveal  its  real  mean- 
ing. But  the  Triple  Alliance,  so  long  as  it  only  aims  at 
negative  results,  and  leaves  it  to  the  individual  allies  to 
pursue  their  vital  interests  exclusively  by  their  own  re- 
sources, will  be  smitten  with  sterility.  On  the  surface, 
Italy's  Mediterranean  interests  do  not  concern  us  closely. 
But  their  real  importance  for  us  is  shown  by  the  considera- 
tion that  the  withdrawal  of  Italy  from  the  Triple  Alliance, 
or,  indeed,  its  secession  to  an  Anglo-Franco-Russian  entente, 
would  probably  be  the  signal  for  a  great  European  war 
against  us  and  Austria.  Such  a  development  would  gravely 
prejudice  the  lasting  interests  of  Italy,  for  she  would  for- 
feit her  political  independence  by  so  doing,  and  incur  the 
risk  of  sinking  to  a  sort  of  vassal  state  of  France.  Such  a 
contingency  is  not  unthinkable,  for,  in  judging  the  policy 
of  Italy,  we  must  not  disregard  her  relations  with  England 
as  well  as  with  France. 

England  is  clearly  a  hindrance  in  the  way  of  Italy's 
justifiable  efforts  to  win  a  prominent  position  in  the  Medi- 
terranean. She  possesses  in  Gibraltar,  Malta,  Cyprus, 
Egypt,  and  Aden  a  chain  of  strong  bases,  which  secure  the 
sea-route  to  India,  and  she  has  an  unqualified  interest  in 
commanding  this  great  road  through  the  Mediterranean. 
England's  Mediterranean  fleet  is  correspondingly  strong  and 
would — especially  in  combination  with  the  French  Mediter- 
ranean squadron — seriously  menace  the  coasts  of  Italy, 
should  that  country  be  entangled  in  a  war  against  England 
and   France.      Italy   is   therefore   obviously   concerned    in 


90     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

avoiding  such  a  war,  as  long  as  the  balance  of  maritime 
power  is  unchanged.  She  is  thus  in  an  extremely  difficult 
double  position;  herself  a  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
she  is  in  a  situation  which  compels  her  to  make  overtures 
to  the  opponents  of  that  alliance,  so  long  as  her  own  allies 
can  afford  no  trustworthy  assistance  to  her  policy  of  de- 
velopment. It  is  our  interest  to  reconcile  Italy  and  Turkey 
so  far  as  we  can. 

France  and  Russia  have  united  in  opposition  to  the  Cen- 
tral European  Triple  Alliance.  France's  European  policy 
is  overshadowed  by  the  idea  of  revanche.  For  that  she 
makes  the  most  painful  sacrifices ;  for  that  she  has  forgotten 
the  hundred  years'  enmity  against  England  and  the  humilia- 
tion of  Fashoda.  She  wishes  first  to  take  vengeance  for 
the  defeats  of  1870-71,  which  wounded  her  national  pride 
to  the  quick;  she  wishes  to  raise  her  political  prestige  by 
a  victory  over  Germany,  and,  if  possible,  to  regain  that 
former  supremacy  on  the  continent  of  Europe  which  she 
so  long  and  brilliantly  maintained;  she  wishes,  if  fortune 
smiles  on  her  arms,  to  reconquer  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  But 
she  feels  too  weak  for  an  attack  on  Germany.  Her  whole 
foreign  policy,  in  spite  of  all  protestations  of  peace,  fol- 
lows the  single  aim  of  gaining  allies  for  this  attack.  Her 
alliance  with  Russia,  her  entente  with  England,  are  inspired 
with  this  spirit;  her  present  intimate  relations  with  this 
latter  nation  are  traceable  to  the  fact  that  the  French  policy 
hoped,  and  with  good  reason,  for  more  active  help  from 
England's  hostility  to  Germany  than  from  Russia. 

The  colonial  policy  of  France  pursues  primarily  the  ob- 
ject of  acquiring  a  material,  and,  if  possible,  military  su- 
periority over  Germany.  The  establishment  of  a  native 
African  army,  the  contemplated  introduction  of  a  modified 
system  of  conscription  in  Algeria,  and  the  political  annexa- 
tion of  Morocco,  which  offers  excellent  raw  material  for 
soldiers,  so  clearly  exhibit  this  intention,  that  there  can  be 
no  possible  illusion  as  to  its  extent  and  meaning. 

Since  France  has  succeeded  in  bringing  her  military 
strength  to  approximately  the  same  level  as  Germany,  since 
she  has  acquired  in  her  North  African  Empire  the  possi- 
bility of  considerably  increasing  that  strength,  since  she  has 


WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL  91 

completely  outstripped  Germany  in  the  sphere  of  colonial 
policy,  and  has  not  only  kept  up,  but  also  revived,  the 
French  sympathies  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  the  conclusion 
is  obvious:  France  will  not  abandon  the  paths  of  an  anti- 
German  policy,  but  will  do  her  best  to  excite  hostility  against 
us,  and  to  thwart  German  interests  in  every  quarter  of 
the  globe.  When  she  came  to  an  understanding  with  the 
Italians,  that  she  should  be  given  a  free  hand  in  Morocco 
if  she  allowed  them  to  occupy  Tripoli,  a  wedge  was  driven 
into  the  Triple  Alliance  which  threatens  to  split  it.  It  may 
be  regarded  as  highly  improbable  that  she  will  maintain 
honourably  and  with  no  arriere-pensee  the  obligations  un- 
dertaken in  the  interests  of  German  commerce  in  Morocco. 
The  suppression  of  these  interests  was,  in  fact,  a  marked 
feature  of  the  French  Morocco  policy,  which  was  conspicu- 
ously anti-German.  The  French  policy  was  so  successful 
that  we  shall  have  to  reckon  more  than  ever  on  the  hos- 
tility of  France  in  the  future.  It  must  be  regarded  as  a 
quite  unthinkable  proposition  that  an  agreement  between 
France  and  Germany  can  be  negotiated  before  the  question 
between  them  has  been  once  more  decided  by  arms.  Such 
an  agreement  is  the  less  likely  now  that  France  sides  with 
England,  to  whose  interest  it  is  to  repress  Germany  but 
strengthen  France.  Another  picture  meets  our  eyes  if  we 
turn  to  the  East,  where  the  giant  Russian  Empire  towers 
above  all  others. 

The  Empire  of  the  Czar,  in  consequence  of  its  defeat 
in  Manchuria,  and  of  the  revolution  which  was  precipi- 
tated by  the  disastrous  war,  is  following  apparently  a  policy 
of  recuperation.  It  has  tried  to  come  to  an  understanding 
with  Japan  in  the  Far  East,  and  with  England  in  Central 
Asia;  in  the  Balkans  its  policy  aims  at  the  maintenance  of 
the  status  quo.  So  far  it  does  not  seem  to  have  entertained 
any  idea  of  war  with  Germany.  The  Potsdam  agreement, 
whose  importance  cannot  be  over-estimated,  shows  that  we 
need  not  anticipate  at  present  any  aggressive  policy  on 
Russia's  part.  The  ministry  of  Kokowzew  seems  likely 
to  wish  to  continue  this  policy  of  recuperation,  and  has 
the  more  reason  for  doing  so,  as  the  murder  of  Stolypin 
with  its  accompanying  events  showed,  as  it  were  by  a  flash 


92     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

of  lightning,  a  dreadful  picture  of  internal  disorder  and 
revolutionary  intrigue.  It  is  improbable,  therefore,  that 
Russia  would  now  be  inclined  to  make  armed  intervention 
in  favour  of  France.  The  Russo-French  alliance  is  not, 
indeed,  swept  away,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  Russia 
would,  if  the  necessity  arose,  meet  her  obligations;  but  the 
tension  has  been  temporarily  relaxed,  and  an  improvement 
in  the  Russo-German  relations  has  been  effected,  although 
this  state  of  things  was  sufficiently  well  paid  for  by  the 
concessions  of  Germany  in  North  Persia. 

It  is  quite  obvious  that  this  policy  of  marking  time,  which 
Russia  is  adopting  for  the  moment,  can  only  be  transitory. 
The  requirements  of  the  mighty  Empire  irresistibly  compel 
an  expansion  towards  the  sea,  whether  in  the  Far  East, 
where  it  hopes  to  gain  ice- free  harbours,  or  in  the  direction 
of  the  Mediterranean,  where  the  Crescent  still  glitters  on 
the  dome  of  St.  Sophia.  After  a  successful  war,  Russia 
would  hardly  hesitate  to  seize  the  mouth  of  the  Vistula, 
at  the  possession  of  which  she  has  long  aimed,  and  thus  to 
strengthen  appreciably  her  position  in  the  Baltic. 

Supremacy  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  free  entrance  into 
the  Mediterranean,  and  a  strong  position  on  the  Baltic, 
are  the  goals  to  which  the  European  policy  of  Russia  has 
naturally  long  been  directed.  She  feels  herself,  also,  the 
leading  power  of  the  Slavonic  races,  and  has  for  many 
years  been  busy  in  encouraging  and  extending  the  spread 
of  this  element  into  Central  Europe. 

Pan-Slavism  is  still  hard  at  work. 

It  is  hard  to  foresee  how  soon  Russia  will  come  out  from 
her  retirement  and  again  tread  the  natural  paths  of  her  in- 
ternational policy.  Her  present  political  attitude  depends 
considerably  on  the  person  of  the  present  Emperor,  who 
believes  in  the  need  of  leaning  upon  a  strong  monarehial 
State,  such  as  Germany  is,  and  also  on  the  character  of  the 
internal  development  of  the  mighty  Empire.  The  whole 
body  of  the  nation  is  so  tainted  with  revolutionary  and 
moral  infection,  and  the  peasantry  is  plunged  in  such 
economic  disorder,  that  it  is  difficult  to  see  from  what 
elements  a  vivifying  force  mav  spring  up  capable  of  re- 
storing a  healthy  condition.     Even  the  agrarian  policy  of 


WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL  93 

the  present  Government  has  not  produced  any  favourable 
results,  and  has  so  far  disappointed  expectations.  The  pos- 
sibility thus  has  always  existed  that,  under  the  stress  of 
internal  affairs,  the  foreign  policy  may  be  reversed  and  an 
attempt  made  to  surmount  the  difficulties  at  home  by  suc- 
cesses abroad.  Time  and  events  will  decide  whether  these 
successes  will  be  sought  in  the  Far  East  or  in  the  West. 
On  the  one  side  Japan,  and  possibly  China,  must  be  en- 
countered; on  the  other,  Germany,  Austria,  and,  possibly, 
Turkey. 

Doubtless  these  conditions  must  exercise  a  decisive  in- 
fluence on  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance.  The  interests  of 
the  two  allies  are  not  radical.  While  France  aims  solely 
at  crushing  Germany  by  an  aggressive  war,  Russia  from 
the  first  has  more  defensive  schemes  in  view.  She  wished 
to  secure  herself  against  any  interference  by  the  Powers 
of  Central  Europe  in  the  execution  of  her  political  plans 
in  the  South  and  East,  and  at  the  same  time,  at  the  price 
of  an  alliance,  to  raise,  on  advantageous  terms  in  France, 
the  loans  which  were  so  much  needed.  Russia  at  present 
has  no  inducement  to  seek  an  aggressive  war  with  Ger- 
many or  to  take  part  in  one.  Of  course,  every  further  in- 
crease of  the  German  power  militates  against  the  Russian 
interests.  We  shall  therefore  always  find  her  on  the  side 
of  those  who  try  to  cross  our  political  paths. 

England  has  recently  associated  herself  with  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance.  She  has  made  an  arrangement  in  Asia 
with  Russia  by  which  the  spheres  of  influence  of  the  two 
parties  are  delimited,  while  with  France  she  has  come  to 
terms  in  the  clear  intention  of  suppressing  Germany  under 
all  circumstances,  if  necessary  by  force  of  arms. 

The  actually  existing  conflict  of  Russian  and  English 
interests  in  the  heart  of  Asia  can  obviously  not  be  termin- 
ated by  such  agreements.  So,  also  no  natural  community 
of  interests  exists  between  England  and  France.  A  strong 
French  fleet  may  be  as  great  a  menace  to  England  as  to 
any  other  Power.  For  the  present,  however,  we  may 
reckon  on  an  Anglo-French  entente.  This  union  is  ce- 
mented by  the  common  hostility  to  Germany.  No  other 
reason  for  the  political  combination  of  the  two  States  is 


94     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

forthcoming.  There  is  not  even  a  credible  pretext,  which 
might  mask  the  real  objects. 

This  policy  of  England  is,  on  superficial  examination, 
not  very  comprehensible.  Of  course,  German  industries 
and  trade  have  lately  made  astounding  progress,  and  the 
German  navy  is  growing  to  a  strength  which  commands 
respect.  We  are  certainly  a  hindrance  to  the  plans  which 
England  is  prosecuting  in  Asiatic  Turkey  and  Central 
Africa.  This  may  well  be  distasteful  to  the  English  from 
economic  as  well  as  political  and  military  aspects.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  American  competition  in  the  domain 
of  commercial  politics  is  far  keener  than  the  German.  The 
American  navy  is  at  the  present  moment  stronger  than 
the  German,  and  will  henceforth  maintain  this  precedence. 
Even  the  French  are  on  the  point  of  building  a  formidable 
fleet,  and  their  colonial  Empire,  so  far  as  territory  is  con 
cerned,  is  immensely  superior  to  ours.  Yet,  in  spite  of  all 
these  considerations,  the  hostility  of  the  English  is  pri- 
marily directed  against  us.  It  is  necessary  to  adopt  the 
English  standpoint  in  order  to  understand  the  line  of 
thought  which  guides  the  English  politicians.  I  believe 
that  the  solution  of  the  problem  is  to  be  found  in  the  wide 
ramifications  of  English  interests  in  every  part  of  the  world. 

Since  England  committed  the  unpardonable  blunder, 
from  her  point  of  view,  of  not  supporting  the  Southern 
States  in  the  American  War  of  Secession,  a  rival  to  Eng- 
land's world-wide  Empire  has  appeared  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Atlantic  in  the  form  of  the  United  States  of  North 
America,  which  are  a  grave  menace  to  England's  fortunes. 
The  keenest  competition  conceivable  now  exists  between 
the  two  countries.  The  annexation  of  the  Philippines  by 
America,  and  England's  treaty  with  Japan,  have  accentu- 
ated the  conflict  of  interests  between  the  two  nations.  The 
trade  and  industries  of  America  can  no  longer  be  checked, 
and  the  absolutely  inexhaustible  and  ever-growing  resources 
of  the  Union  are  so  prodigious  that  a  naval  war  with 
America,  in  view  of  the  vast  distances  and  wide  extent  of 
the  enemies'  coasts,  would  prove  a  very  bold,  and  certainly 
very  difficult,  undertaking.  England  accordingly  has  al- 
ways diplomatically  conceded  the  claims  of  America,  as 


WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL  95 

quite  recently  in  the  negotiations  about  fortifying  the 
Panama  Canal;  the  object  clearly  is  to  avoid  any  collision 
with  the  United  States,  from  fearing  the  consequences  of 
such  collision.  The  American  competition  in  trade  and 
industries,  and  the  growth  of  the  American  navy,  are 
tolerated  as  inevitable,  and  the  community  of  race  is  borne 
in  mind.  In  this  sense,  according  to  the  English  point  of 
view,  must  be  understood  the  treaty  by  which  a  Court  of 
Arbitration  between  the  two  countries  was  established. 

England  wishes,  in  any  case,  to  avert  the  danger  of  a 
war  with  America.  The  natural  opposition  of  the  two 
rival  States  may,  however,  in  the  further  development  of 
things,  be  so  accentuated  that  England  will  be  forced  to 
assert  her  position  by  arms,  or  at  least  to  maintain  an  un- 
disputed naval  supremacy,  in  order  to  emphasize  her  diplo- 
matic action.  The  relations  of  the  two  countries  to  Canada 
may  easily  become  strained  to  a  dangerous  point,  and  the 
temporary  failure  of  the  Arbitration  Treaty  casts  a  strong 
light  on  the  fact  that  the  American  people  does  not  con- 
sider that  the  present  political  relations  of  the  two  nations 
are  permanent. 

There  is  another  danger  which  concerns  England  more 
closely  and  directly  threatens  her  vitality.  This  is  due  to 
the  nationalist  movement  in  India  and  Egypt,  to  the  grow- 
ing power  of  Islam,  to  the  agitation  for  independence  in 
the  great  colonies,  as  well  as  to  the  supremacy  of  the  Low- 
German  element  in  South  Africa. 

Turkey  is  the  only  State  which  might  seriously  threaten 
the  English  position  in  Egypt  by  land.  This  contingency 
gives  to  the  national  movement  in  Egypt  an  importance 
which  it  would  not  otherwise  possess ;  it  clearly  shows  that 
England  intensely  fears  every  Pan-Islamitic  movement. 
She  is  trying  with  all  the  resources  of  political  intrigue  to 
undermine  the  growing  power  of  Turkey,  which  she  offi- 
cially pretends  to  support,  and  is  endeavouring  to  create 
in  Arabi  a  new  religious  centre  in  opposition  to  the 
Caliphate. 

The  same  views  are  partially  responsible  for  the  policy 
in  India,  where  some  seventy  millions  of  Moslems  live 
under  the  English  rule.     England,  so  far,  in  accordance 


96     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

with  the  principle  of  divide  et  impera,  has  attempted  to 
play  off  the  Mohammedan  against  the  Hindu  population. 
But  now  that  a  pronounced  revolutionary  and  nationalist 
tendency  shows  itself  among  these  latter,  the  danger  is 
imminent  that  Pan-Islamism,  thoroughly  roused,  should 
unite  with  the  revolutionary  elements  of  Bengal.  The  co- 
operation of  these  elements  might  create  a  very  grave 
danger,  capable  of  shaking  the  foundations  of  England's 
high  position  in  the  world. 

While  so  many  dangers,  in  the  future  at  least,  threaten 
both  at  home  and  abroad,  English  imperialism  has  failed 
to  link  the  vast  Empire  together,  either  for  purposes  of 
commerce  or  defence,  more  closely  than  hitherto.  Mr. 
Chamberlain's  dream  of  the  British  Imperial  Customs  Union 
has  definitely  been  abandoned.  No  attempt  was  made  at 
the  Imperial  Conference  in  191 1  to  go  back  to  it.  "A 
centrifugal  policy  predominated.  .  .  .  When  the  ques- 
tion of  imperial  defence  came  up,  the  policy  was  rejected 
which  wished  to  assure  to  Great  Britain  the  help  of  the 
oversea  dominions  in  every  imaginable  eventuality."  The 
great  self-ruled  colonies  represent  allies,  who  will  stand 
by  England  in  the  hour  of  need,  but  "allies  with  the  reser- 
vation that  they  are  not  to  be  employed  wrongfully  for 
objects  which  they  cannot  ascertain  or  do  not  approve."* 
There  are  clear  indications  that  the  policy  of  the  dominions, 
though  not  yet  planning  a  separation  from  England,  is 
contemplating  the  future  prospect  of  doing  so.  Canada, 
South  Africa,  and  Australia  are  developing,  as  mentioned 
in  Chapter  IV.,  into  independent  nations  and  States,  and 
will,  when  their  time  comes,  claim  formal  independence. 

All  these  circumstances  constitute  a  grave  menace  to 
the  stability  of  England's  Empire,  and  these  dangers  largely 
influence  England's  attitude  towards  Germany. 

England  may  have  to  tolerate  the  rivalry  of  North 
America  in  her  imperial  and  commercial  ambitions,  but 
the  competition  of  Germany  must  be  stopped.  If  England 
is  forced  to  fight  America,  the  German  fleet  must  not  be 

*Th.  Schiemann  in  the  Kreusaeitung  of  July  5,  1911. 


WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL  97 

in  a  position  to  help  the  Americans.  Therefore  it  must 
be  destroyed. 

A  similar  line  of  thought  is  suggested  by  the  eventuality 
of  a  great  English  colonial  war,  which  would  engage 
England's  fleets  in  far  distant  parts  of  the  world.  England 
knows  the  German  needs  and  capabilities  of  expansion,  and 
may  well  fear  that  a  German  Empire  with  a  strong  fleet 
might  use  such  an  opportunity  for  obtaining  that  increase 
of  territory  which  England  grudges.  We  may  thus  explain 
the  apparent  indifference  of  England  to  the  French  schemes 
of  aggrandizement.  France's  capability  of  expansion  is 
exhausted  from  insufficient  increase  of  population.  She 
can  no  longer  be  dangerous  to  England  as  a  nation,  and 
would  soon  fall  a  victim  to  English  lust  of  Empire,  if  only 
Germany  were  conquered. 

The  wish  to  get  rid  of  the  dangers  presumably  threaten- 
ing from  the  German  quarter  is  all  the  more  real  since 
geographical  conditions  offer  a  prospect  of  crippling  the 
German  oversea  commerce  without  any  excessive  efforts. 
The  comparative  weakness  of  the  German  fleet,  contrasted 
with  the  vast  superiority  of  the  English  navy,  allows  a 
correspondingly  easy  victory  to  be  anticipated,  especially 
if  the  French  fleet  co-operates.  The  possibility,  therefore, 
of  quickly  and  completely  getting  rid  of  one  rival,  in  order 
to  have  a  free  hand  for  all  other  contingencies,  looms  very 
near,  and  undoubtedly  presents  a  practicable  means  of 
placing  the  naval  power  of  England  on  a  firm  footing  for 
years  to  come,  of  annihilating  German  commerce,  and  of 
checking  the  importance  of  German  interests  in  Africa 
and  Northern  Asia. 

The  hostility  to  Germany  is  also  sufficiently  evident  in 
other  matters.  It  has  always  been  England's  object  to 
maintain  a  certain  balance  of  power  between  the  continental 
nations  of  Europe,  and  to  prevent  any  one  of  them  attaining 
a  pronounced  supremacy.  While  these  States  crippled  and 
hindered  each  other  from  playing  any  active  part  on  the 
world's  stage,  England  acquired  an  opportunity  of  follow- 
ing out  her  own  purposes  undisturbed,  and  of  founding  that 
world  Empire  which  she  now  holds.     This  policy  she  still 

7 


98     GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

continues,  for  so  long  as  the  Powers  of  Europe  tie  each 
other's  hands,  her  own  supremacy  is  uncontested.  It  fol- 
lows directly  from  this  that  England's  aim  must  be  to 
repress  Germany,  but  strengthen  France;  for  Germany  at 
the  present  moment  is  the  only  European  State  which 
threatens  to  win  a  commanding  position;  but  France  is  her 
born  rival,  and  cannot  keep  on  level  terms  with  her  stronger 
neighbour  on  the  East,  unless  she  adds  to  her  forces  and 
is  helped  by  her  allies.  Thus  the  hostility  to  Germany, 
from  this  aspect  also,  is  based  on  England's  most  important 
interests,  and  we  must  treat  it  as  axiomatic  and  self-evident. 

The  argument  is  often  adduced  that  England  by  a  war 
with  Germany  would  chiefly  injure  herself,  since  she  would 
lose  the  German  market,  which  is  the  best  purchaser  of 
her  industrial  products,  and  would  be  deprived  of  the  very 
considerable  German  import  trade.  I  fear  that  from  the 
English  point  of  view  these  conditions  would  be  an  addi- 
tional incentive  to  war.  England  would  hope  to  acquire, 
in  place  of  the  lost  German  market,  a  large  part  of  those 
markets  which  had  been  supplied  by  Germany  before  the 
war,  and  the  want  of  German  imports  would  be  a  great 
stimulus,  and  to  some  extent  a  great  benefit,  to  English 
industries. 

After  all,  it  is  from  the  English  aspect  of  the  question 
quite  comprehensible  that  the  English  Government  strains 
every  nerve  to  check  the  growing  power  of  Germany,  and 
that  a  passionate  desire  prevails  in  large  circles  of  the 
English  nation  to  destroy  the  German  fleet  which  is  build- 
ing, and  attack  the  objectionable  neighbour. 

English  policy  might,  however,  strike  out  a  different  line, 
and  attempt  to  come  to  terms  with  Germany  instead  of 
fighting.  This  would  be  the  most  desirable  course  for  us. 
A  Triple  Alliance — Germany,  England,  and  America — has 
been  suggested.*  But  for  such  a  union  with  Germany  to 
be  possible,  England  must  have  resolved  to  give  a  free 
course  to  German  development  side  by  side  with  her  own, 
to  allow  the  enlargement  of  our  colonial  power,  and  to 
offer   no   political  hindrances  to  our   commercial   and   in- 

*"The  United  States  and  the  War  Cloud  in  Europe,"  by  Th. 
Schiemann,  McClure's  Magazine,  June,  1910. 


WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL  99 

dustrial  competition.  She  must,  therefore,  have  renounced 
her  traditional  policy,  and  contemplate  an  entirely  new 
grouping  of  the  Great  Powers  in  the  world. 

It  cannot  be  assumed  that  English  pride  and  self-interest 
will  consent  to  that.  The  continuous  agitation  against  Ger- 
many, under  the  tacit  approval  of  the  Government,  which 
is  kept  up  not  only  by  the  majority  of  the  Press,  but  by  a 
strong  party  in  the  country,  the  latest  statements  of  Eng- 
lish politicians,  the  military  preparations  in  the  North  Sea, 
and  the  feverish  acceleration  of  naval  construction,  are 
unmistakable  indications  that  England  intends  to  persist  in 
her  anti-German  policy.  The  uncompromising  hostility  of 
England  and  her  efforts  to  hinder  every  expansion  of  Ger- 
many's power  were  openly  shown  in  the  very  recent 
Morocco  question.  Those  who  think  themselves  capable 
of  impressing  on  the  world  the  stamp  of  their  spirit,  do 
not  resign  the  headship  without  a  struggle,  when  they  think 
victory  is  in  their  grasp. 

A  pacific  agreement  with  England  is,  after  all,  a  will- 
o'-the-wisp  which  no  serious  German  statesman  would 
trouble  to  follow.  We  must  always  keep  the  possibility  of 
war  with  England  before  our  eyes,  and  arrange  our  political 
and  military  plans  accordingly.  We  need  not  concern  our- 
selves with  any  pacific  protestations  of  English  politicians, 
publicists,  and  Utopians,  which,  prompted  by  the  exigen- 
cies of  the  moment,  cannot  alter  the  real  basis  of  affairs. 
When  the  Unionists,  with  their  greater  fixity  of  purpose, 
replace  the  Liberals  at  the  helm,  we  must  be  prepared  for 
a  vigorous  assertion  of  power  by  the  island  Empire. 

On  the  other  hand,  America,  which  indisputably  plays 
a  decisive  part  in  English  policy,  is  a  land  of  limitless 
possibilities.  While,  on  the  one  side,  she  insists  on  the 
Monroe  doctrine,  on  the  other  she  stretches  out  her  own 
arms  towards  Asia  and  Africa,  in  order  to  find  bases  for 
her  fleets.  The  United  States  aim  at  the  economic  and, 
where  possible,  the  political  command  of  the  American 
continent,  and  at  the  naval  supremacy  in  the  Pacific.  Their 
interests,  both  economic  and  political,  notwithstanding  all 
commercial  and  other  treaties,  clash  emphatically  with  those 


too    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

of  Japan  and  England.  No  arbitration  treaties  could  alter 
this. 

No  similar  opposition  to  Germany,  based  on  the  nature 
of  things,  has  at  present  arisen  from  the  ambitions  of  the 
two  nations;  certainly  not  in  the  sphere  of  politics.  So 
far  as  can  be  seen,  an  understanding  with  Germany  ought 
to  further  the  interests  of  America.  It  is  unlikely  that 
the  Americans  would  welcome  any  considerable  addition 
to  the  power  of  England.  But  such  would  be  the  case  if 
Great  Britain  succeeded  in  inflicting  a  political  and  military 
defeat  on  Germany. 

For  a  time  it  seemed  as  if  the  Anglo-American  negotia- 
tions about  Arbitration  Courts  would  definitely  end  in  an 
alliance  against  Germany.  There  has,  at  any  rate,  been  a 
great  and  widespread  agitation  against  us  in  the  United 
States.  The  Americans  of  German  and  Irish  stock  reso- 
lutely opposed  it,  and  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the 
anti-German  movement  in  the  United  States  was  a  passing 
phase,  with  no  real  foundation  in  the  nature  of  things.  In 
the  field  of  commerce  there  is,  no  doubt,  keen  competition 
between  the  two  countries,  especially  in  South  America ; 
there  is,  however,  no  reason  to  assume  that  this  will  lead 
to  political  complications. 

Japan  has,  for  the  time  being,  a  direct  political  interest 
for  us  only  in  her  influence  on  the  affairs  of  Russia, 
America,  England,  and  China.  In  the  Far  East,  since  Japan 
has  formed  an  alliance  with  England,  and  seems  recently 
to  have  effected  an  arrangement  with  Russia,  we  have  to 
count  more  on  Japanese  hostility  than  Japanese  friendship. 
Her  attitude  to  China  may  prove  exceptionally  important 
to  our  colonial  possessions  in  East  Asia.  If  the  two  nations 
joined  hands — a  hardly  probable  eventuality  at  present — it 
would  become  difficult  for  us  to  maintain  an  independent 
position  between  them.  The  political  rivalry  between  the 
two  nations  of  yellow  race  must  therefore  be  kept  alive. 
If  they  are  antagonistic,  they  will  both  probably  look  for 
help  against  each  other  in  their  relations  with  Europe,  and 
thus  enable  the  European  Powers  to  retain  their  possessions 
in  Asia. 

While  the  aspiring  Great  Powers  of  the  Far  East  cannot 


World  power  or  downfall       toi 

at  present  directly  influence  our  policy,  Turkey — the  pre- 
dominant Power  of  the  Near  East — is  of  paramount 
importance  to  us.  She  is  our  natural  ally ;  it  is  emphatically 
our  interest  to  keep  in  close  touch  with  her.  The  wisest 
course  would  have  been  to  have  made  her  earlier  a  member 
of  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  so  to  have  prevented  the  Turco- 
Italian  War,  which  threatens  to  change  the  whole  political 
situation,  to  our  disadvantage.  Turkey  would  gain  in  two 
ways:  she  assures  her  position  both  against  Russia  and 
against  England — the  two  States,  that  is,  with  whose  hos- 
tility we  have  to  reckon.  Turkey,  also,  is  the  only  Power 
which  can  threaten  England's  position  in  Egypt,  and  thus 
menace  the  short  sea-route  and  the  land  communications  to 
India.  We  ought  to  spare  no  sacrifices  to  secure  this  coun- 
try as  an  ally  for  the  eventuality  of  a  war  with  England 
or  Russia.  Turkey's  interests  are  ours.  It  is  also  to  the 
obvious  advantage  of  Italy  that  Turkey  maintain  her  com- 
manding position  on  the  Bosphorus  and  at  the  Dardanelles, 
that  this  important  key  should  not  be  transferred  to  the 
keeping  of  foreigners,  and  belong  to  Russia  or  England. 

If  Russia  gained  the  access  to  the  Mediterranean,  to 
which  she  has  so  long  aspired,  she  would  soon  become  a 
prominent  Power  in  its  eastern  basin,  and  thus  greatly 
damage  the  Italian  projects  in  those  waters.  Since  the 
English  interests,  also,  would  be  prejudiced  by  such  a 
development,  the  English  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  would 
certainly  be  strengthened.  Between  England,  France,  and 
Russia  it  would  be  quite  impossible  for  Italy  to  attain  an 
independent  or  commanding  position,  while  the  opposition 
of  Russia  and  Turkey  leaves  the  field  open  to  her.  From 
this  view  of  the  question,  therefore,  it  is  advisable  to  end 
the  Turco-Italian  conflict,  and  to  try  and  satisfy  the  justi- 
fiable wishes  of  Italy  at  the  cost  of  France,  after  the  next 
war,  it  may  be. 

Spain  alone  of  the  remaining  European  Powers  has  any 
independent  importance.  She  has  developed  a  certain  an- 
tagonism to  France  by  her  Morocco  policy,  and  may,  there- 
fore, become  eventually  a  factor  in  German  policy.  The 
petty  States,  on  the  contrary,  form  no  independent  centres 
of  gravity,  but  may,  in  event  of  war,  prove  to  possess  a  by 


102         GERMANY  ANt)  THE  NEXT  WAR 

no  means  negligible  importance:  the  small  Balkan  States 
for  Austria  and  Turkey;  Denmark,  Holland,  Belgium,  and 
Switzerland,  and  eventually  Sweden,  for  Germany. 

Switzerland  and  Belgium  count  as  neutral.  The  former 
was  declared  neutral  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  on  Novem- 
ber 20,  181 5,  under  the  collective  guarantee*  of  the  signa- 
tory Powers;  Belgium,  in  the  Treaties  of  London  of 
November  15,  183 1,  and  of  April  19,  1839,  on  the  part  of 
the  five  Great  Powers,  the  Netherlands,  and  Belgium  itself. 

If  we  look  at  these  conditions  as  a  whole,  it  appears 
that  on  the  continent  of  Europe  the  power  of  the  Central 
European  Triple  Alliance  and  that  of  the  States  united 
against  it  by  alliance  and  agreement  balance  each  other, 
provided  that  Italy  belongs  to  the  league.  If  we  take  into 
calculation  the  imponderabilia^  whose  weight  can  only  be 
guessed  at,  the  scale  is  inclined  slightly  in  favour  of  the 
Triple  Alliance.  On  the  other  hand,  England  indisputably 
rules  the  sea.  In  consequence  of  her  crushing  naval 
superiority  when  allied  with  France,  and  of  the  geograph- 
ical conditions,  she  may  cause  the  greatest  damage  to  Ger- 
many by  cutting  off  her  maritime  trade.  There  is  also  a 
not  inconsiderable  army  available  for  a  continental  war. 
When  all  considerations  are  taken  into  account,  our  op- 
ponents have  a  political  superiority  not  to  be  underestimated. 
If  France  succeeds  in  strengthening  her  army  by  large 
colonial  levies  and  a  strong  English  landing-force,  this 
superiority  would  be  asserted  on  land  also.  If  Italy  really 
withdraws  from  the  Triple  Alliance,  very  distinctly  superior 
forces  will  be  united  against  Germany  and  Austria. 

Under  these  conditions  the  position  of  Germany  is 
extraordinarily  difficult.  We  not  only  require  for  the  full 
material  development  of  our  nation,  on  a  scale  correspond- 
ing to  its  intellectual  importance,  an  extended  political  basis, 
but,  as  explained  in  the  previous  chapter,  we  are  compelled 
to  obtain  space  for  our  increasing  population  and  markets 
for  our  growing  industries.     But  at  every  step  which  we 

*  By  a  collective  guarantee  is  understood  the  duty  of  the  con- 
tracting Powers  to  take  steps  to  protect  this  neutrality  when  all  agree 
that  it  is  menaced.    Each  individual  Power  has  the  right  to  interfere 
if  it  considers  the  neutrality  menaced. 


WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL  103 

take  in  this  direction  England  will  resolutely  oppose  us. 
English  policy  may  not  yet  have  made  the  definite  decision 
to  attack  us ;  but  it  doubtless  wishes,  by  all  and  every  means, 
even  the  most  extreme,  to  hinder  every  further  expansion 
of  German  international  influence  and  of  German  maritime 
power.  The  recognized  political  aims  of  England  and  the 
attitude  of  the  English  Government  leave  no  doubt  on  this 
point.  But  if  we  were  involved  in  a  struggle  with  Eng- 
land, we  can  be  quite  sure  that  France  would  not  neglect 
the  opportunity  of  atacking  our  flank.  Italy,  with  her  ex- 
tensive coast-line,  even  if  still  a  member  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  will  have  to  devote  large  forces  to  the  defence 
of  the  coast  to  keep  off  the  attacks  of  the  Anglo-French 
Mediterranean  Fleet,  and  would  thus  be  only  able  to  employ 
weaker  forces  against  France.  Austria  would  be  paralyzed 
by  Russia ;  against  the  latter  we  should  have  to  leave  forces 
in  the  East.  We  should  thus  have  to  fight  out  the  strug- 
gle against  France  and  England  practically  alone  with  a  part 
of  our  army,  perhaps  with  some  support  from  Italy.  It 
is  in  this  double  menace  by  sea  and  on  the  mainland  of 
Europe  that  the  grave  danger  to  our  political  position  lies, 
since  all  freedom  of  action  is  taken  from  us  and  all  expan- 
sion barred. 

Since  the  struggle  is,  as  appears  on  a  thorough  investi- 
gation of  the  international  question,  necessary  and  inevit- 
able, we  must  fight  it  out,  cost  what  it  may.  Indeed,  we 
are  carrying  it  on  at  the  present  moment,  though  not  with 
drawn  swords,  and  only  by  peaceful  means  so  far.  On 
the  one  hand  it  is  being  waged  by  the  competition  in  trade, 
industries  and  warlike  preparations;  on  the  other  hand,  by 
diplomatic  methods  with  which  the  rival  States  are  fighting 
each  other  in  every  region  where  their  interests  clash. 

With  these  methods  it  has  been  possible  to  maintain 
peace  hitherto,  but  not  without  considerable  loss  of  power 
and  prestige.  This  apparently  peaceful  state  of  things  must 
not  deceive  us;  we  are  facing  a  hidden,  but  none  the  less 
formidable,  crisis — perhaps  the  most  momentous  crisis  in 
the  history  of  the  German  nation. 

We  have  fought  in  the  last  great  wars  for  our  national 
union  and  our  position  among  the  Powers  of  Europe;  we 


104    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

now  must  decide  whether  we  wish  to  develop  into  and  main- 
tain a  World  Empire,  and  procure  for  German  spirit  and 
German  ideas  that  fit  recognition  which  has  been  hitherto 
withheld  from  them. 

Have  we  the  energy  to  aspire  to  that  great  goal?  Are 
we  prepared  to  make  the  sacrifices  which  such  an  effort 
will  doubtless  cost  us?  or  are  we  willing  to  recoil  before 
the  hostile  forces,  and  sink  step  by  step  lower  in  our 
economic,  political,  and  national  importance?  That  is  what 
is  involved  in  our  decision. 

"To  be,  or  not  to  be,"  is  the  question  which  is  put  to 
us  to-day,  disguised,  indeed,  by  the  apparent  equilibrium 
of  the  opposing  interests  and  forces,  by  the  deceitful  shifts 
of  diplomacy,  and  the  official  peace-aspirations  of  all  the 
States;  but  by  the  logic  of  history  inexorably  demanding 
an  answer,  if  we  look  with  clear  gaze  beyond  the  narrow 
horizon  of  the  day  and  the  mere  surface  of  things  into  the 
region  of  realities. 

There  is  no  standing  still  in  the  world's  history.  All  is 
growth  and  development.  It  is  obviously  impossible  to 
keep  things  in  the  status  quo,  as  diplomacy  has  so  often 
attempted.  No  true  statesman  will  ever  seriously  count 
on  such  a  possibility:  he  will  only  make  the  outward  and 
temporary  maintenance  of  existing  conditions  a  duty  when 
he  wishes  to  gain  time  and  deceive  an  opponent,  or  when 
he  cannot  see  what  is  the  trend  of  events.  He  will  use 
such  diplomatic  means  only  as  inferior  tools;  in  reality 
he  will  only  reckon  with  actual  forces  and  with  the  powers 
of  a  continuous  development. 

We  must  make  it  quite  clear  to  ourselves  that  there  can 
be  no  standing  still,  no  being  satisfied  for  us,  but  only 
progress  or  retrogression,  and  that  it  is  tantamount  to 
retrogression  when  we  are  contented  with  our  present  place 
among  the  nations  of  Europe,  while  all  our  rivals  are 
straining  with  desperate  energy,  even  at  the  cost  of  our 
rights,  to  extend  their  power.  The  process  of  our  decay 
would  set  in  gradually  and  advance  slowly  so  long  as  the 
struggle  against  us  was  waged  with  peaceful  weapons; 
the  living  generation  would,  perhaps,  be  able  to  continue 
to  exist  in  peace  and  comfort.    But  should  a  war  be  forced 


WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL  105 

upon  us  by  stronger  enemies  under  conditions  unfavorable 
to  us,  then,  if  our  arms  met  with  disaster  our  political 
downfall  would  not  be  delayed,  and  we  should  rapidly 
sink  down.  The  future  of  German  nationality  would  be 
sacrificed,  an  independent  German  civilization  would  not 
long  exist,  and  the  blessings  for  which  German  blood  has 
flowed  in  streams — spiritual  and  moral  liberty,  and  the 
profound  and  lofty  aspirations  of  German  thought — would 
for  long  ages  be  lost  to  mankind. 

If,  as  is  right,  we  do  not  wish  to  assume  the  responsi- 
bility for  such  a  catastrophy,  we  must  have  the  courage 
to  strive  with  every  means  to  attain  that  increase  of  power 
which  we  are  entitled  to  claim,  even  at  the  risk  of  a  war 
with  numerically  superior  foes. 

Under  present  conditions  it  is  out  of  the  question  to 
attempt  this  by  acquiring  territory  in  Europe.  The  region 
in  the  East,  where  German  colonists  once  settled,  is  lost  to 
us,  and  could  only  be  recovered  from  Russia  by  a  long 
and  victorious  war,  and  would  then  be  a  perpetual  incite- 
ment to  renewed  wars.  So,  again,  the  reannexation  of  the 
former  South  Prussia,  which  was  united  to  Prussia  on  the 
second  partition  of  Poland,  would  be  a  serious  undertaking, 
on  account  of  the  Polish  population. 

Under  these  circumstances  we  must  clearly  try  to 
strengthen  our  political  power  in  other  ways. 

In  the  first  place,  our  political  position  would  be  con- 
siderably consolidated  if  we  could  finally  get  rid  of  the 
standing  danger  that  France  will  attack  us  on  a  favour- 
able occasion,  so  soon  as  we  find  ourselves  involved  in 
complications  elsewhere.  In  one  way  or  another  we  must 
square  our  account  with  France  if  we  wish  for  a  free  hand 
in  our  international  policy.  This  is  the  first  and  foremost 
condition  of  a  sound  German  policy,  and  since  the  hostility 
of  France  once  for  all  cannot  be  removed  by  peaceful  over- 
tures, the  matter  must  be  settled  by  force  of  arms.  France 
must  be  so  completely  crushed  that  she  can  never  again 
come  across  our  path. 

Further,  we  must  contrive  every  means  of  strengthening 
the  political  power  of  our  allies.  We  have  already  fol- 
lowed such  a  policy  in  the  case  of  Austria  when  we  declared 


106    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

our  readiness  to  protect,  if  necessary  with  armed  inter- 
vention, the  final  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
by  our  ally  on  the  Danube.  Our  policy  towards  Italy  must 
follow  the  same  lines,  especially  if  in  any  Franco-German 
war  an  opportunity  should  be  presented  of  doing  her  a 
really  valuable  service.  It  is  equally  good  policy  in  every 
way  to  support  Turkey,  whose  importance  for  Germany 
and  the  Triple  Alliance  has  already  been  discussed. 

Our  political  duties,  therefore,  are  complicated,  and  dur- 
ing the  Turco-Italian  War  all  that  we  can  do  at  first  is  to 
use  our  influence  as  mediators,  and  to  prevent  a  transference 
of  hostilities  to  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  It  cannot  be  decided 
at  this  moment  whether  further  intervention  will  be  neces- 
sary. Finally,  as  regards  our  own  position  in  Europe,  we 
can  only  effect  an  extension  of  our  own  political  influence, 
in  my  opinion,  by  awakening  in  our  weaker  neighbours, 
through  the  integrity  and  firmness  of  our  policy,  the  convic- 
tion that  their  independence  and  their  interests  are  bound 
up  with  Germany,  and  are  best  secured  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  German  arms.  This  conviction  might  eventually 
lead  to  an  enlargement  of  the  Triple  Alliance  into  a  Central 
European  Federation.  Our  military  strength  in  Central 
Europe  would  by  this  means  be  considerably  increased,  and 
the  extraordinary  unfavourable  geographical  configuration 
of  our  dominions  would  be  essentially  improved  in  case 
of  war.  Such  a  federation  would  be  the  expression  of  a 
natural  community  of  interests,  which  is  founded  on  the 
geographical  and  natural  conditions,  and  would  insure  the 
durability  of  the  political  community  based  on  it. 

We  must  employ  other  means  also  for  the  widening  of 
our  colonial  territory,  so  that  it  may  be  able  to  receive  the 
overflow  of  our  population.  Very  recent  events  have  shown 
that,  under  certain  circumstances,  it  is  possible  to  obtain 
districts  in  Equatorial  Africa  by  pacific  negotiations.  A 
financial  or  political  crash  in  Portugal  might  give  us  the 
opportunity  to  take  possession  of  a  portion  of  the  Portu- 
guese colonies.  We  may  assume  that  some  understanding 
exists  between  England  and  Germany  which  contemplates 
a  division  of  the  Portuguese  colonial  possessions,  but  as 
never  become  publici  ]uris.     It  cannot,  indeed,  be  certain 


WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL  107 

that  England,  if  the  contingency  arrives,  would  be  prepared 
honestly  to  carry  out  such  a  treaty,  if  it  actually  exists. 
She  might  find  ways  and  means  to  invalidate  it.  It  has 
even  been  often  said,  although  disputed  in  other  quar- 
ters, that  Great  Britain,  after  coming  to  an  agreement  with 
Germany  about  the  partition  of  the  Portuguese  colonies, 
had,  by  a  special  convention,  guaranteed  Portugal  the  pos- 
session of  all  her  colonies. 

Other  possible  schemes  may  be  imagined,  by  which  some 
extension  of  our  African  territory  would  be  possible. 
These  need  not  be  discussed  here  more  particularly.  If 
necessary,  they  must  be  obtained  as  the  result  of  a  success- 
ful European  war.  In  all  these  possible  acquisitions  of 
territory  the  point  must  be  strictly  borne  in  mind  that  we 
require  countries  which  are  climatically  suited  to  German 
settlers.  Now,  there  are  even  in  Central  Africa  large 
regions  which  are  adapted  to  the  settlement  of  German 
farmers  and  stock-breeders,  and  part  of  our  overflow  popu- 
lation might  be  diverted  to  those  parts.  But,  generally 
speaking,  we  can  only  obtain  in  tropical  colonies  markets 
for  our  industrial  products  and  wide  stretches  of  culti- 
vated ground  for  the  growth  of  the  raw  materials  which 
our  industries  require.  This  represents  in  itself  a  consid- 
erable advantage,  but  does  not  release  us  from  the  obliga- 
tion to  acquire  land  for  actual  colonization. 

A  part  of  our  surplus  population,  indeed — so  far  as  pres- 
ent conditions  point — will  always  be  driven  to  seek  a  live- 
lihood outside  the  borders  of  the  German  Empire.  Meas- 
ures must  be  taken  to  the  extent  at  least  of  providing  that 
the  German  element  is  not  split  up  in  the  world,  but  remains 
united  in  compact  blocks,  and  thus  forms,  even  in  foreign 
countries,  political  centres  of  gravity  in  our  favour,  markets 
for  our  exports,  and  centres  for  the  diffusion  of  German 
culture. 

An  intensive  colonial  policy  is  for  us  especially  an 
absolute  necessity.  It  has  often  been  asserted  that  a  "policy 
of  the  open  door"  can  replace  the  want  of  colonies  of  our 
own,  and  must  constitute  our  programme  for  the  future, 
just  because  we  do  not  possess  sufficient  colonies.  This 
notion  is  only  justified  in  a  certain  sense,    In  the  first  place, 


108    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

such  a  policy  does  not  offer  the  possibility  of  finding  homes 
for  the  overflow  population  in  a  territory  of  our  own ;  next, 
it  does  not  guaarntee  the  certainty  of  an  open  and  un- 
restricted trade  competition.  It  secures  to  all  trading 
nations  equal  tariffs,  but  this  does  not  imply  by  any  means 
competition  under  equal  conditions.  On  the  contrary,  the 
political  power  which  is  exercised  in  such  a  country  is  the 
determining  factor  in  the  economic  relations.  The  principle 
of  the  open  door  prevails  everywhere — in  Egypt,  Man- 
churia, in  the  Congo  State,  in  Morocco — and  everywhere 
the  politically  dominant  Power  controls  the  commerce:  in 
Manchuria  Japan,  in  Egypt  England,  in  the  Congo  State 
Belgium,  and  in  Morocco  France.  The  reason  is  plain.  All 
State  concessions  fall  naturally  to  that  State  which  is 
practically  dominant ;  its  products  are  bought  by  all  the  con- 
sumers who  are  any  way  dependent  on  the  power  of  the 
State,  quite  apart  from  the  fact  that  by  reduced  tariffs  and 
similar  advantages  for  the  favoured  wares  the  concession 
of  the  open  door  can  be  evaded  in  various  ways.  A  "policy 
of  the  open  door"  must  at  best  be  regarded  as  a  makeshift, 
and  as  a  complement  of  vigorous  colonial  policy.  The 
essential  point  is  for  a  country  to  have  colonies  of  its  own 
and  a  predominant  political  influence  in  the  spheres  where 
its  markets  lie.  Our  German  world  policy  must  be  guided 
by  these  considerations. 

The  execution  of  such  political  schemes  would  certainly 
clash  with  many  old-fashioned  notions  and  vested  rights  of 
the  traditional  European  policy.  In  the  first  place,  the 
principle  of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe,  which  has, 
since  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  led  an  almost  sacrosanct  but 
entirely  unjustifiable  existence,  must  be  entirely  dis- 
regarded. 

The  idea  of  a  balance  of  power  was  gradually  developed 
from  the  feeling  that  States  do  not  exist  to  thwart  each 
other,  but  to  work  together  for  the  advancement  of  culture. 
Christianity,  which  leads  man  beyond  the  limits  of  the  State 
to  a  world  citizenship  of  the  noblest  kind,  and  lays  the  foun- 
dation of  all  international  law,  has  exercised  a  wide  influence 
in  this  respect.  Practical  interests,  too,  have  strengthened 
the  theory  of  balance  of  power.    When  it  was  understood 


WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL  109 

that  ihe  State  was  a  power,  and  that,  by  its  nature,  it 
must  strive  to  extend  that  power,  a  certain  guarantee  of 
peace  was  supposed  to  exist  in  the  balance  of  forces.  The 
conviction  was  thus  gradually  established  that  every  State 
had  a  cbse  community  of  interests  with  the  other  States, 
with  which  it  entered  into  political  and  economic  relations, 
and  was  bound  to  establish  some  sort  of  understanding 
with  them.  Thus  the  idea  grew  up  in  Europe  of  a  State- 
system,  which  was  formed  after  the  fall  of  Napoleon  by 
the  five  Great  Powers-^England,  France,  Russia,  Austria, 
and  Prussia,  which  latter  had  gained  a  place  in  the  first 
rank  by  force  of  arms;  in  1866  Italy  joined  it  as  the  sixth 
Great  Power. 

"Such  a  system  cannot  be  supported  with  an  approximate 
equilibrium  among  the  nations."  "All  theory  must  rest  on 
the  basis  of  practice,  and  a  real  equilibrium — i.e.,  an  actual 
equality  of  power — is  postulated."*  This  condition  does 
not  exist  between  the  European  nations.  England  by  her- 
self rules  the  sea,  and  the  65,000,000  of  Germans  cannot 
allow  themselves  to  sink  to  the  same  level  of  power  as  the 
40,000,000  of  French.  An  attempt  has  been  made  to  pro- 
duce a  real  equilibrium  by  special  alliances.  One  result  only 
has  been  obtained — the  hindrance  of  the  free  development 
of  the  nations  in  general,  and  of  Germany  in  particular. 
This  is  an  unsound  condition.  A  European  balance  of 
power  can  no  longer  be  termed  a  condition  which  corre- 
sponds to  the  existing  state  of  things;  it  can  only  have  the 
disastrous  consequences  of  rendering  the  forces  of  the 
continental  European  States  mutually  ineffective,  and  of 
thus  favouring  the  plans  of  the  political  powers  which  stand 
outside  that  charmed  circles.  It  has  always  been  England's 
policy  to  stir  up  enmity  between  the  respective  continental 
States,  and  to  keep  them  at  approximately  the  same  stand- 
ard of  power,  in  order  herself  undisturbed  to  conquer  at 
once  the  sovereignty  of  the  seas  and  the  sovereignty  of 
the  world. 

We  must  put  aside  all  such  notions  of  equilibrium.  In 
its  present  distorted  form  it  is  opposed  to  our  weightiest 

♦Trcitschkc. 


no    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

interests.  The  idea  of  a  State  system  which  has  common 
interests  in  civilization  must  not,  of  course,  be  abandoned; 
but  it  must  be  expanded  on  a  new  and  more  just  basis.  It 
is  now  not  a  question  of  a  European  State  system  but  of 
one  embracing  all  the  States  in  the  world,  in  which  the 
equilibrium  is  established  on  real  factors  of  power.  We 
must  endeavour  to  obtain  in  this  system  our  merited  position 
at  the  head  of  a  federation  of  Central  European  States,  and 
thus  reduce  the  imaginary  European  equilibrium,  in  one 
way  or  the  other,  to  its  true  value,  and  correspondingly  to 
increase  our  own  power. 

A  further  question,  suggested  by  the  present  political 
position,  is  whether  all  the  political  treaties  which  were 
concluded  at  the  beginning  of  the  last  century  under  quite 
other  conditions — in  fact,  under  a  different  conception  of 
what  constitutes  a  State — can,  or  ought  to  be,  permanently 
observed.  When  Belgium  was  proclaimed  neutral,  no  one 
contemplated  that  she  would  lay  claim  to  a  large  and 
valuable  region  of  Africa.  It  may  well  be  asked  whether 
the  acquision  of  such  territory  is  not  ipso  facto  a  breach  of 
neutrality,  for  a  State  from  which — theoretically  at  least — 
all  danger  of  war  has  been  removed,  has  no  right  to  enter 
into  political  competition  with  the  other  States.  This 
argument  is  the  more  justifiable  because  it  may  safely  be 
assumed  that,  in  event  of  a  war  of  Germany  against  France 
and  England,  the  two  last-mentioned  States  would  try  to 
unite  their  forces  in  Belgium.  Lastly,  the  neutrality  of 
the  Congo  State*  must  be  termed  more  than  problematic, 
since  Belgium  claims  the  right  to  cede  or  sell  it  to  a  non- 
neutral  country.  The  conception  of  permanent  neutrality 
is  entirely  contrary  to  the  essential  nature  of  the  State, 
which  can  only  attain  its  highest  moral  aims  in  competition 
with  other  States.  Its  complete  development  presupposes 
such  competition. 

Again,  the  principle  that  no  State  can  ever  interfere  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  another  State  is  repugnant  to  the 
highest  rights  of  the  State.     This  principle  is,  of  course, 

*  The  Congo  State  was  proclaimed  neutral,  but  without  guarantees, 
by  Acts  of  February  26,  1885. 


WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL  in 

very  variously  interpreted,  and  powerful  States  have  never 
refrained  from  a  high-handed  interference  in  the  internal 
affairs  cf  smaller  ones.  We  daily  witness  instances 
of  such  conduct.  Indeed,  England  quite  lately  at- 
tempted tc  interfere  in  the  private  affairs  of  Germany,  not 
formally  o:  by  diplomatic  methods,  but  none  the  less  in 
point  of  fact,  on  the  subject  of  our  naval  preparations.  It 
is,  however,  accepted  as  a  principle  of  international  inter- 
course that  between  the  States  of  one  and  the  same  political 
system  a  stric\  non-interference  in  home  affairs  should  be 
observed.  The  unqualified  recognition  of  this  principle 
and  its  application  to  political  intercourse  under  all  con- 
ditions involves  serious  difficulties.  It  is  the  doctrine  of 
the  Liberals,  which  was  first  preached  in  France  in  1830, 
and  of  which  the  English  Ministry  of  Lord  Palmerston 
availed  themselves  for  their  own  purposes.  Equally  false 
is  the  doctrine  of  unrestricted  intervention,  as  promulgated 
by  the  States  of  the  Holy  Alliance  at  Troppau  in  1820. 
No  fixed  principles  for  international  politics  can  be  laid 
down. 

After  all,  the  relation  of  States  to  each  other  is  that  of 
individuals;  and  as  the  individual  can  decline  the  interfer- 
ence of  others  in  his  affairs,  so,  naturally,  the  same  right 
belongs  to  the  State.  Above  the  individual,  however,  stands 
the  authority  of  the  State,  which  regulates  the  relations  of 
the  citizens  to  each  other.  But  no  one  stands  above  the 
State;  it  is  sovereign,  and  must  itself  decide  whether  the 
internal  conditions  or  measures  of  another  State  menace 
its  own  existence  or  interests.  In  no  case,  therefore,  may 
a  sovereign  State  renounce  the  right  of  interfering  in  the 
affairs  of  other  States,  should  circumstances  demand.  Cases 
may  occur  at  any  time,  when  the  party  disputes  or  the  pre- 
parations of  the  neighbouring  country  become  a  threat  to 
the  existence  of  a  State.  "It  can  only  be  asserted  that  every 
State  acts  at  its  own  risk  when  it  interferes  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  another  State,  and  that  experience  shows  how 
very  dangerous  such  an  interference  may  become."  On 
the  other  hand,  is  must  be  remembered  that  the  dangers 
which  may  arise  from  non-intervention  are  occasionally 
still  graver,  and  that  the  whole  discussion  turns,  not  on  an 


112    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

international  right,  but  simply  and  solely  on  power  and  ex- 
pediency. 

I  have  gone  closely  into  these  questions  of  international 
policy  because,  under  conditions  which  are  net  remote, 
they  may  greatly  influence  the  realization  of  ou;  necessary 
political  aspirations,  and  may  give  rise  to  hos:ile  compli- 
cations. Then  it  becomes  essential  that  we  do  not  allow 
ourselves  to  be  cramped  in  our  freedom  of  action  by  con- 
siderations, devoid  of  any  inherent  political  necessity,  which 
only  depend  on  political  expediency,  and  are  not  binding 
on  us.  We  must  remain  conscious  in  all  such  eventualities 
that  we  cannot,  under  any  circumstances,  avoid  fighting 
for  our  position  in  the  world,  and  that  the  all-important 
point  is,  not  to  postpone  that  war  as  long  as  possible,  but 
to  bring  it  on  under  the  most  favourable  conditions  possible. 
"No  man,"  so  wrote  Frederick  the  Great  to  Pitt  on  July  3, 
1 761,  "if  he  has  a  grain  of  sense,  will  leave  his  enemies 
leisure  to  make  all  preparations  in  order  to  destroy  him ;  he 
will  rather  take  advantage  of  his  start  to  put  himself  in  a 
favourable  position." 

If  we  wish  to  act  in  this  spirit  of  prompt  and  effective 
policy  which  guided  the  great  heroes  of  our  past,  we  must 
learn  to  concentrate  our  forces,  and  not  to  dissipate  them 
in  centrifugal  efforts. 

The  political  and  national  development  of  the  German 
people  has  always,  so  far  back  as  German  history  extends, 
been  hampered  and  hindered  by  the  hereditary  defects  of 
its  character — that  is,  by  the  particularism  of  the  individual 
races  and  States,  the  theoretic  dogmatism  of  the  parties, 
the  incapacity  to  sacrifice  personal  interests  for  great 
national  objects  from  want  of  patriotism  and  of  political 
common  sense,  often,  also,  by  the  pettiness  of  the  prevail- 
ing ideas.  Even  to-day  it  is  painful  to  see  how  the  forces 
of  the  German  nation,  which  are  so  restricted  and  confined 
in  their  activities  abroad,  are  wasted  in  fruitless  quarrels 
among  themselves. 

Our  primary  and  most  obvious  moral  and  political  duty 
is  to  overcome  these  hereditary  failings,  and  to  lay  a  secure 
foundation  for  a  healthy,  consistent  development  of  our 
power. 


WORLD  POWER  OR  DOWNFALL  113 

It  must  not  be  denied  that  the  variety  of  forms  of  intel- 
lectual and  social  life  arising  from  the  like  variety  of  the 
German  nationality  and  political  system  offers  valuable 
advantages.  It  presents  countless  centres  for  the  advance- 
ment of  science,  art,  technical  skill,  and  high  spiritual  and 
material  way  of  life  steadily  increasing  development.  But 
we  must  resist  the  converse  of  these  conditions,  the  trans- 
ference of  this  richness  in  variety  and  contrasts  into  the 
domain  of  politics. 

Above  all  must  we  endeavour  to  confirm  and  consolidate 
the  institutions  which  are  calculated  to  counteract  and  con- 
centrate the  centrifugal  forces  of  the  German  nature — the 
common  system  of  defence  of  our  country  by  land  and  sea, 
in  which  all  party  feeling  is  merged,  and  a  strong  national 
empire. 

No  people  is  so  little  qualified  as  the  German  to  direct 
its  own  destinies,  whether  in  a  parliamentarian  or  republican 
constitution;  to  no  people  is  the  customary  liberal  pattern 
so  inappropriate  as  to  us.  A  glance  at  the  Reichstag  will 
show  how  completely  this  conviction,  which  is  forced  on  us 
by  a  study  of  German  history,  holds  good  to-day. 

The  German  people  has  always  been  incapable  of  great 
acts  for  the  common  interest  except  under  the  irresistible 
pressure  of  external  conditions,  as  in  the  rising  of  1813, 
or  under  the  leadership  of  powerful  personalities,  who 
knew  how  to  arouse  the  enthusiasm  of  the  masses,  to  stir 
the  German  spirit  to  its  depths,  to  vivify  the  idea  of 
nationality,  and  force  conflicting  aspirations  into  concen- 
tration and  union. 

We  must  therefore  take  care  that  such  men  are  assured 
the  possibility  of  acting  with  a  confident  and  free  hand  in 
order  to  accomplish  great  ends  through  and  for  our  people. 

Within  these  limits,  it  is  in  harmony  with  the  national 
German  character  to  allow  personality  to  have  a  free  course 
for  the  fullest  development  of  all  individual  forces  and 
capacities,  of  all  spiritual,  scientific,  and  artistic  aims. 
"Every  extension  of  the  activities  of  the  State  is  beneficial 
and  wise,  if  it  arouses,  promotes,  and  purifies  the  independ- 
ence of  free  and  reasoning  men ;  it  is  evil  when  it  kills  and 

8 


H4    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

stunts  the  independence  of  free  men."*  This  independence 
of  the  individual,  within  the  limits  marked  out  by  the  in- 
terests of  the  State,  forms  the  necessary  complement  of 
the  wide  expansion  of  the  central  power,  and  assures  an 
ample  scope  to  a  liberal  development  of  all  our  social  con- 
ditions. 

We  must  rouse  in  our  people  the  unanimous  wish  for 
power  in  this  sense,  together  with  the  determination  to 
sacrifice  on  the  altar  of  patriotism,  not  only  life  and  prop- 
erty, but  also  private  views  and  preferences  in  the  interests 
of  the  common  welfare.  Then  alone  shall  we  discharge 
our  great  duties  of  the  future,  grow  into  a  World  Power, 
and  stamp  a  great  part  of  humanity  with  the  impress  of 
the  German  spirit.  If,  on  the  contrary,  we  persist  in  that 
dissipation  of  energy  which  now  marks  our  political  life, 
there  is  imminent  fear  that  in  the  great  contest  of  the  na- 
tions, which  we  must  inevitably  face,  we  shall  be  dishonour- 
ably beaten;  that  days  of  disaster  await  us  in  the  future, 
and  that  once  again,  as  in  the  days  of  our  former  degrada- 
tion, the  poet's  lament  will  be  heard : 

"O  Germany,  thy  oaks  still  stand, 
But  thou  art  fallen,  glorious  land !" 

Korner. 


*  Treitschke,  "Politik,"  i.,  §  2. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  SOCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  SIGNIFICANCE  OF 
ARMING  FOR  WAR 

Germany  has  great  national  and  historical  duties  of  policy 
and  culture  to  fulfil,  and  her  path  towards  further  progress 
is  threatened  by  formidable  enmities.  If  we  realize  this, 
we  shall  see  that  it  will  be  impossible  to  maintain  our 
present  position  and  secure  our  future  without  an  appeal 
to  arms. 

Knowing  this^as  every  man  must  who  impartially  con- 
siders the  political  situation,  we  are  called  upon  to  prepare 
ourselves  as  well  as  possible  for  this  war.  The  times  are 
passed  when  a  stamp  of  the  foot  raised  an  army,  or  when 
it  was  sufficient  to  levy  the  masses  and  lead  them  to  battle. 
The  armaments  of  the  present  day  must  be  prepared  in 
peace-time  down  to  the  smallest  detail,  if  they  are  to  be 
effective  in  time  of  need. 

Although  this  fact  is  known,  the  sacrifices  which  are 
required  for  warlike  preparations  are  no  longer  so  willingly 
made  as  the  gravity  of  the  situation  demands.  Every 
military  proposal  is  bitterly  contested  in  the  Reichstag,  fre- 
quently in  a  very  petty  spirit,  and  no  one  seems  to  under- 
stand that  an  unsuccessful  war  would  involve  our  nation 
in  economic  misery,  with  which  the  most  burdensome 
charges  for  the  army  (and  these  for  the  most  part  come 
back  again  into  the  coffers  of  the  country)  cannot  for  an 
instant  be  compared.  A  victorious  war,  on  the  other  hand, 
brings  countless  advantages  to  the  conqueror,  and,  as  our 
last  great  wars  showed,  forms  a  new  departure  in  economic 
progress.  The  fact  is  often  forgotten  that  military  service 
and  the  observance  of  the  national  duty  of  bearing  arms 
are  in  themselves  a  high  moral  gain  for  our  people,  and 

115 


ti6    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

improve  the  strength  and  capacity  for  work.  Nor  can  it  be 
ignored  that  a  nation  has  other  than  merely  economic  duties 
to  discharge.  I  propose  to  discuss  the  question,  what  kind 
and  degree  of  preparation  for  war  the  great  historical 
crisis  through  which  we  are  passing  demands  from  us.  First, 
however,  it  will  be  profitable  to  consider  the  importance  of 
preparations  for  war  generally,  and  not  so  much  from  the 
purely  military  as  from  the  social  and  political  aspect;  we 
shall  thus  strengthen  the  conviction  that  we  cannot  serve 
the  true  interests  of  the  country  better  than  by  improving 
its  military  capabilities. 

Preparation  for  war  has  a  double  task  to  discharge. 
Firstly,  it  must  maintain  and  raise  the  military  capabilities 
of  the  nation  as  a  national  asset;  and,  secondly,  it  must 
make  arrangements  for  the  conduct  of  the  war  and  supply 
the  requisite  means. 

This  capability  of  national  defence  has  a  pronounced 
educative  value  in  national  development. 

As  in  the  social  competition  the  persons  able  to  protect 
themselves  hold  the  field — the  persons,  that  is,  who,  well 
equipped  intellectually,  not  shirk  the  contest,  but  fight  it 
out  with  confidence  anad  certainty  of  victory — so  in  the 
rivalry  of  nations  and  States  victory  rests  with  the  people 
able  to  defend  itself,  which  boldly  enters  the  lists,  and  is 
capable  of  wielding  the  sword  with  success. 

Military  service  not  only  educates  nations  in  warlike  ca- 
pacity, but  it  develops  the  intellectual  and  moral  qualities 
generally  for  the  occupations  of  peace.  It  educates  a  man 
to  the  full  masterv  of  his  body,  to  the  exercise  and  improve- 
ment of  his  muscles ;  it  develops  his  mental  powers,  his  self- 
reliance  and  readiness  of  decision ;  it  accustoms  him  to  order 
and  subordination  for  a  common  end;  it  elevates  his  self- 
respect  and  courage,  and  thus  his  capacity  for  every  kind 
of  work. 

It  is  a  quite  perverted  view  that  the  time  devoted  to 
military  service  deprives  economic  life  of  forces  which  could 
have  been  more  appropriately  and  more  profitably  em- 
ployed elsewhere.  These  forces  are  not  withdrawn  from 
economic  life,  but  are  trained  for  economic  life.  ^  Military 
training  produces  intellectual  and  moral  forces  which  richly 


THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  ARMING  117 

repay  the  time  spent,  and  have  their  real  value  in  subse- 
quent life.  It  is  therefore  the  moral  duty  of  the  State  to 
train  as  many  of  its  countrymen  as  possible  in  the  use  of 
arms,  not  only  with  the  prospect  of  war,  but  that  they  may 
share  in  the  benefits  of  military  service  and  improve  their 
physical  and  moral  capacities  of  defence.  The  sums  which 
the  State  applies  to  the  military  training  of  the  nation  are 
distinctly  an  outlay  for  social  purposes ;  the  money  so  spent 
serves  social  and  educative  ends,  and  raises  the  nation 
spiritually  and  morally;  it  thus  promotes  the  highest  aims 
of  civilization  more  directly  than  achievements  of  me- 
chanics, industries,  trades,  and  commerce,  which  certainly 
discharge  the  material  duties  of  culture  by  improving  the 
national  livelihood  and  increasing  national  wealth,  but  bring 
with  them  a  number  of  dangers,  such  as  craving  for  pleas- 
ure and  tendency  to  luxury,  thus  slackening  the  moral  and 
productive  fibres  of  the  nations.  Military  service  as  an 
educational  instrument  stands  on  the  same  level  as  the 
school,  and,  as  will  be  shown  in  a  later  section,  each  must 
complete  and  assist  the  other.  But  a  people  which  does 
not  willingly  bear  the  duties  and  sacrifices  entailed  by 
school  and  military  service  renounces  its  will  to  live,  and 
sacrifices  objects  which  are  noble  and  assure  the  future  for 
the  sake  of  material  advantages  which  are  one-sided  and 
evanescent. 

It  is  the  duty,  therefore,  of  every  State,  conscious  of  its 
obligations  towards  civilization  and  society,  remorselessly 
to  put  an  end  to  all  tendencies  inimical  to  the  full  develop- 
ment of  the  power  of  defence.  The  method  by  which  the 
maintenance  and  promotion  of  this  defensive  power  can  be 
practically  carried  out  admits  of  great  variety.  It  depends 
largely  on  the  conditions  of  national  life,  on  the  geograph- 
ical and  political  circumstances,  as  well  as  on  past  history, 
and  consequently  ranges  between  very  wide  extremes. 

In  the  Boer  States,  as  among  most  uncivilized  peoples, 
the  military  training  was  almost  exclusively  left  to  the 
individual.  That  was  sufficient  to  a  certain  point,  since 
their  method  of  life  in  itself  made  them  familiar  with 
carrying  arms  and  with  riding,  and  inured  them  to  hard 
bodily  exertions.    The  higher  requirements  of  combination, 


n8    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

subordination,  and  campaigning,  could  not  be  met  by  such 
a  military  system,  and  the  consequences  of  this  were  felt 
disastrously  in  the  conduct  of  the  war.  In  Switzerland  and 
other  States  an  attempt  is  made  to  secure  national  defence 
by  a  system  of  militia,  and  to  take  account  of  political  pos- 
sibilities. The  great  European  States  maintain  standing 
armies  in  which  all  able-bodied  citizens  have  to  pass  a 
longer  or  shorter  period  of  military  training.  England  alone 
keeps  up  a  mercenary  army,  and  by  the  side  of  it  a  terri- 
torial army,  whose  ranks  are  filled  by  volunteers. 

In  these  various  ways  different  degrees  of  military  ef- 
ficiency are  obtained,  but,  generally,  experience  shows  that 
the  more  thorough  and  intelligent  this  training  in  arms,  the 
greater  the  development  of  the  requisite  military  qualities 
in  the  units;  and  the  more  these  qualities  become  a  second 
nature,  the  more  complete  will  be  their  warlike  efficiency. 

When  criticizing  the  different  military  systems,  we  must 
remember  that  with  growing  civilization  the  requisite  mili- 
tary capacities  are  always  changing.  The  duties  expected 
from  the  Roman  legionary  or  the  soldiers  who  fought  in 
line  under  Frederick  the  Great  were  quite  different  from 
those  of  the  rifleman  and  cavalryman  of  to-day.  Not  merely 
have  the  physical  functions  of  military  service  altered,  but 
the  moral  qualities  expected  from  the  fighting  man  are  al- 
tered .  This  applies  to  the  individual  soldier  as  much  as  to 
the  whole  army.  The  character  of  warfare  has  continually 
been  changing.  To  fight  in  the  Middle  Ages  or  in  the 
eighteenth  century  with  comparatively  small  forces  was  one 
thing;  it  is  quite  another  to  handle  the  colossal  armies  of 
to-day.  The  preparations  for  war,  therefore,  in  the  social 
as  well  as  military  sense,  must  be  quite  different  in  a  highly 
developed  modern  civilized  State  from  those  in  countries, 
standing  on  a  lower  level  of  civilization,  where  ordinary 
life  is  full  of  military  elements,  and  war  is  fought  under 
relatively  simple  conditions. 

The  crushing  superiority  of  civilized  States  over  people 
with  a  less  developed  civilization  and  military  system  is 
due  to  this  altered  form  of  military  efficiency.  It  was  thus 
that  Japan  succeeded  in  raising  herself  in  a  brief  space  to 
the  supremacy  in  Eastern  Asia.     She  now  reaps  in  the 


THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  ARMING  119 

advancement  of  her  culture  what  she  sowed  on  the  battle- 
field, and  proves  once  again  the  immeasurable  importance, 
in  its  social  and  educational  aspects,  of  military  efficiency. 
Our  own  country,  by  employing  its  military  powers,  has 
attained  a  degree  of  culture  which  it  never  could  have 
reached  by  the  methods  of  peaceful  development. 

When  we  regard  the  change  in  the  nature  of  military 
efficiency,  we  find  ourselves  on  ground  where  the  social 
duty  of  maintaining  the  physical  and  moral  power  of  the 
nation  to  defend  itself  comes  into  direct  contact  with  the 
political  duty  of  preparing  for  warfare  itself. 

A  great  variety  of  procedure  is  possible,  and  actually 
exists,  in  regard  to  the  immediate  preparations  for  war. 
This  is  primarily  expressed  in  the  choice  of  the  military 
system,  but  it  is  manifested  in  various  other  ways.  We  see 
the  individual  States — according  to  their  geographical  posi- 
tion, their  relations  to  other  States  and  the  military  strength 
of  their  neighbours,  according  to  their  historic  claims 
and  their  greater  or  less  importance  in  the  political  system 
of  the  world — making  their  military  preparations  with  more 
or  less  energy,  earnestness,  and  expenditure.  When  we 
consider  the  complex  movements  of  the  life  of  civilized 
nations,  the  variety  of  its  aims  and  the  multiplicity  of  its 
emotions,  we  must  agree  that  the  growth  or  decrease  of 
armaments  is  everywhere  affected  by  these  considerations. 
War  is  only  a  means  of  attaining  political  ends  and  of  sup- 
porting moral  strength. 

Thus,  if  England  attaches  most  weight  to  her  navy,  her 
insular  position  and  the  wide  oversea  interests  which  she 
must  protect  thoroughly  justify  her  policy.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  England  develops  her  land  forces  only  with 
the  objects  of  safeguarding  the  command  of  her  colonies, 
repelling  a  very  improbable  hostile  invasion,  and  helping 
an  allied  Power  in  a  continental  war,  the  general  political 
situation  explains  the  reason.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  England 
can  never  be  involved  in  a  great  continental  European  war 
against  her  will. 

So  Switzerland,  which  has  been  declared  neutral  by  po- 
litical treaties,  and  can  therefore  only  take  the  field  if  she 
is  attacked,  rightly  lays  most  stress  on  the  social  impor- 


120    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

tance  of  military  service,  and  tries  to  develop  a  scheme  of 
defence  which  consists  mainly  in  increasing  the  security 
afforded  by  her  own  mountains.  The  United  States  of 
America,  again,  are  justified  in  keeping  their  land  forces 
within  very  modest  limits,  while  devoting  their  energies  to 
the  increase  of  their  naval  power.  No  enemy  equal  to 
them  in  strength  can  ever  spring  up  on  the  continent  of 
America;  they  need  not  fear  the  invasion  of  any  consider- 
able forces.  On  the  other  hand,  they  are  threatened  by 
oversea  conflicts,  of  epoch-making  importance,  with  the 
yellow  race,  which  has  acquired  formidable  strength  op- 
posite their  western  coast,  and  possibly  with  their  great 
trade  rival  England,  which  has,  indeed,  often  made  con- 
cessions, but  may  eventually  see  herself  compelled  to  fight 
for  her  position  in  the  world. 

While  in  some  States  a  restriction  of  armaments  is  na- 
tural and  justifiable,  it  is  easily  understood  that  France 
must  strain  every  nerve  to  secure  her  full  recognition  among 
the  great  military  nations  of  Europe.  Her  glorious  past 
history  has  fostered  in  her  great  political  pretensions  which 
she  will  not  abandon  without  a  struggle,  although  they  are 
no  longer  justified  by  the  size  of  her  population  and  her 
international  importance.  France  affords  a  conspicuous  ex- 
ample of  self-devotion  to  ideals  and  of  a  noble  conception 
of  political  and  moral  duties. 

In  the  other  European  States,  as  in  France,  external  poli- 
tical conditions  and  claims,  in  combination  with  internal 
politics,  regulate  the  method  and  extent  of  warlike  prep- 
arations, and  their  attitude,  which  necessity  forces  upon 
them,  must  be  admitted  to  carry  its  own  justification. 

A  State  may  represent  a  compact  unity,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  nationality  and  civilization;  it  may  have  great 
duties  to  discharge  in  the  development  of  human  culture, 
and  may  possess  the  national  strength  to  safeguard  its  in- 
dependence, to  protect  its  own  interests,  and,  under  certain 
circumstances,  to  persist  in  its  civilizing  mission  and  poli- 
tical schemes  in  defiance  of  other  nations.  Another  State 
may  be  deficient  in  the  conditions  of  individual  national 
life  and  in  elements  of  culture;  it  may  lack  the  resources 
necessary  for  the  defence  and  maintenance  of  its  political 


THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  ARMING  121 

existence  single-handed  in  the  teeth  of  all  opposition.  There 
is  a  vast  difference  between  these  two  cases. 

A  State  like  the  latter  is  always  more  or  less  dependent 
on  the  friendliness  of  stronger  neighbours,  whether  it  ranks 
in  public  law  as  fully  independent  or  has  been  proclaimed 
neutral  by  international  conventions.  If  it  is  attacked  on 
one  side,  it  must  count  on  support  from  the  other.  Whether 
it  shall  continue  to  exist  a  State  and  under  what  conditions 
must  depend  on  the  result  of  the  ensuing  war  and  the  con- 
sequent political  position — factors  that  lie  wholly  outside 
its  own  sphere  of  power. 

This  being  the  case,  the  question  may  well  be  put  whether 
such  a  State  is  politically  justified  in  requiring  from  its 
citizens  in  time  of  peace  the  greatest  military  efforts  and 
correspondingly  large  pecuniary  expenditure.  It  will  cer- 
tainly have  to  share  the  contest  in  which  it  is  itself,  perhaps, 
the  prize,  and  theoretically  will  do  best  to  have  the  largest 
possible  military  force  at  its  disposal.  But  there  is  another 
aspect  of  the  question  which  is  at  least  arguable.  The  fight- 
ing power  of  such  a  State  may  be  so  small  that  it  counts 
for  nothing  in  comparison  with  the  millions  of  a  modern 
army.  On  the  other  hand,  where  appreciable  military 
strength  exists,  it  may  be  best  not  to  organize  the  army  with 
a  view  to  decisive  campaigning,  but  to  put  the  social  objects 
of  military  preparation  into  the  foreground,  and  to  adopt 
in  actual  warfare  a  defensive  policy  calculated  to  gain  time, 
with  a  view  to  the  subsequent  interference  of  the  prospec- 
tive allies  with  whom  the  ultimate  decision  will  rest.  Such 
an  army  must,  if  it  is  to  attain  its  object,  represent  a  real 
factor  of  strength.  It  must  give  the  probable  allies  that 
effective  addition  of  strength  which  may  insure  a  superiority 
over  the  antagonist.  The  ally  must  then  be  forced  to  con- 
sider the  interests  of  such  secondary  State.  The  forces  of 
the  possible  allies  will  thus  exercise  a  certain  influence  on 
the  armament  of  the  State,  in  combination  with  the  local 
conditions,  the  geographical  position,  and  the  natural  con- 
figuration of  the  country. 

It  is  only  to  be  expected  that,  since  such  various  con- 
ditions exist,  the  utmost  variety  should  also  prevail  among 
the  military  systems;  and  such  is,  in  fact,  the  case. 


122    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

In  the  mountain  stronghold  of  Switzerland,  which  has 
to  reckon  with  the  political  and  military  circumstances  of 
Germany,  France,  and  Italy,  preparations  for  war  take  a 
different  shape  from  those  of  Holland,  situated  on  the 
coast  and  secured  by  numerous  waterways,  whose  political 
independence  is  chiefly  affected  by  the  land  forces  of  Ger- 
many and  the  navy  of  England. 

The  conditions  are  quite  otherwise  for  a  country  which 
relies  wholly  on  its  own  power. 

The  power  of  the  probable  antagonists  and  of  the  pre- 
sumable allies  will  have  a  certain  importance  for  it,  and  its 
Government  will  in  its  plans  and  military  preparations  pay 
attention  to  their  grouping  and  attitudes;  but  these  prep- 
arations must  never  be  motived  by  such  considerations 
alone.  The  necessity  for  a  strong  military  force  is  per- 
manent and  unqualified ;  the  political  permutations  and  com- 
binations are  endless,  and  the  assistance  of  possible  allies 
is  always  an  uncertain  and  shifting  factor,  on  which  no 
reliance  can  be  reposed. 

The  military  power  of  an  independent  State  in  the  true 
sense  must  guarantee  the  maintenance  of  a  force  sufficient 
to  protect  the  interests  of  a  great  civilized  nation  and  to 
secure  to  it  the  necessary  freedom  of  development.  If  from 
the  social  standpoint  no  sacrifice  can  be  considered  too  great 
which  promotes  the  maintenance  of  national  military  effici- 
ency, the  increase  in  these  sacrifices  due  to  political  condi- 
tions must  be  willingly  and  cheerfully  borne,  in  considera- 
tion of  the  object  thereby  to  be  gained.  This  object — of 
which  each  individual  must  be  conscious — if  conceived  in 
the  true  spirit  of  statesmanship,  comprises  the  conditions 
which  are  decisive  for  the  political  and  moral  future  of  the 
State  as  well  as  for  the  livelihood  of  each  individual  citizen. 

A  civilization  which  has  a  value  of  its  own,  and  thus 
forms  a  vital  factor  in  the  development  of  mankind,  can 
only  flourish  where  all  the  healthy  and  stimulating  capa- 
cities of  a  nation  find  ample  scope  in  international  competi- 
tion. This  is  also  an  essential  condition  for  the  unhindered 
and  vigorous  exercise  of  individual  activities.  Where  the 
natural  capacity  for  growth  is  permanently  checked  by  ex- 


f  HE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  ARMING         t4$ 

ternal  circumstances,  nation  and  State  are  stunted  and  in- 
dividual growth  is  set  back. 

Increasing  political  power  and  the  consequent  multipli- 
cation of  possibilities  of  action  constitute  the  only  healthy 
soil  for  the  intellectual  and  moral  strength  of  a  vigorous 
nation,  as  is  shown  by  every  phase  of  history. 

The  wish  for  culture  must  therefore  in  a  healthy  nation 
express  itself  first  in  terms  of  the  wish  for  political  power, 
and  the  foremost  duty  of  statesmanship  is  to  attain,  safe- 
guard, and  promote  this  power,  by  force  of  arms  in  the 
last  resort.  Thus  the  first  and  most  essential  duty  of  every 
great  civilized  people  is  to  prepare  for  war  on  a  scale  com- 
mensurate with  its  political  needs.  Even  the  superiority  of 
the  enemy  cannot  absolve  from  the  performance  of  this  re- 
quirement. On  the  contrary,  it  must  stimulate  to  the  utmost 
military  efforts  and  the  most  strenuous  political  action  in 
order  to  secure  favourable  conditions  for  the  eventuality  of 
a  decisive  campaign.  Mere  numbers  count  for  less  than 
ever  in  modern  fighting,  although  they  always  constitute  a 
very  important  factor  of  the  total  strength.  But,  within 
certain  limits,  which  are  laid  down  by  the  law  of  numbers, 
the  true  elements  of  superiority  under  the  present  system  of 
gigantic  armies  are  seen  to  be  spiritual  and  moral  strength, 
and  larger  masses  will  be  beaten  by  a  small,  well-led  and 
self-devoting  army.  The  Russo-Japanese  War  has  proved 
this  once  more. 

Granted  that  the  development  of  military  strength  is  the 
first  duty  of  every  State,  since  all  else  depends  upon  the 
possibility  to  assert  power,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  State 
must  spend  the  total  of  its  personal  and  financial  resources 
solely  on  military  strength  in  the  narrower  sense  of  army 
and  navy.  That  is  neither  feasible  nor  profitable.  The 
military  power  of  a  people  is  not  exclusively  determined  by 
these  external  resources ;  it  consists,  rather,  in  a  harmonious 
development  of  physical,  spiritual,  moral,  financial,  and  mili- 
tary elements  of  strength.  The  highest  and  most  effective 
military  system  cannot  be  developed  except  by  the  co-opera- 
tion of  all  these  factors.  It  needs  a  broad  and  well-con- 
structed basis  in  order  to  be  effective.  In  the  Manchurian 
War  at  the  critical  moment,  when  the  Japanese  attacking 


iM        GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAS 

strength  seemed  spent,  the  Russian  military  system  broke 
down,  because  its  foundation  was  unstable;  the  State  had 
fallen  into  political  and  moral  ruin,  and  the  very  army  was 
tainted  with  revolutionary  ideas. 

The  social  requirement  of  maintaining  military  efficiency, 
and  the  political  necessity  for  so  doing,  determine  the  na- 
ture and  degree  of  warlike  preparations;  but  it  must  be 
remembered  that  this  standard  may  be  very  variously  esti- 
mated, according  to  the  notion  of  what  the  State's  duties 
are.  Thus,  in  Germany  the  most  violent  disputes  burst  out 
whenever  the  question  of  the  organization  of  the  military 
forces  is  brought  up,  since  widely  different  opinions  prevail 
about  the  duties  of  the  State  and  of  the  army. 

It  is,  indeed,  impossible  so  to  formulate  and  fix  the  po- 
litical duties  of  the  State  that  they  cannot  be  looked  at  from 
another  standpoint.  The  social  democrat,  to  whom  agita- 
tion is  an  end  in  itself,  will  see  the  duty  of  the  State  in  a 
quite  different  light  from  the  political  dilettante,  who  lives 
from  hand  to  mouth,  without  making  the  bearing  of  things 
clear  to  himself,  or  from  the  sober  statesman  who  looks  to 
the  welfare  of  the  community  and  keeps  his  eyes  fixed  on 
the  distant  beacons  on  the  horizon  of  the  future. 

Certain  points  of  view,  however,  may  be  laid  down,  which, 
based  on  the  nature  of  things,  check  to  some  degree  any 
arbitrary  decision  on  these  momentous  questions,  and  are 
well  adapted  to  persuade  calm  and  experienced  thinkers. 

First,  it  must  be  observed  that  military  power  cannot 
be  improvised  in  the  present  political  world,  even  though 
all  the  elements  for  it  are  present. 

Although  the  German  Empire  contains  65,000,000  in- 
habitants, compared  to  40,000,000  of  French,  this  excess  in 
population  represents  merely  so  much  dead  capital,  unless 
a  corresponding  majority  of  recruits  are  annually  enlisted, 
and  unless  in  peace-time  the  necessary  machinery  is  set  up 
for  their  organization.  The  assumption  that  these  masses 
would  be  available  for  the  army  in  the  moment  of  need 
is  a  delusion.  It  would  not  mean  a  strengthening,  but  a 
distinct  weakening,  of  the  army,  not  to  say  a  danger,  if 
these  untrained  masses  were  at  a  crisis  suddenly  sent  on 
active  service.     Bourbaki's  campaign  shows  what  is  to  be 


THS  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  ARMING       MJ 

expected  from  such  measures.  Owing  to  the  complexity 
of  all  modern  affairs,  the  continuous  advance  in  technical 
skill  and  in  the  character  of  warlike  weapons,  as  also  in  the 
increased  requirements  expected  from  the  individual,  long 
and  minute  preparations  are  necessary  to  procure  the  high- 
est military  values.  Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  this 
at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter.  It  takes  a  year  to  com- 
plete a  30-centimetre  cannon.  If  it  is  to  be  ready  for  use 
at  a  given  time,  it  must  have  been  ordered  long  beforehand. 
Years  will  pass  before  the  full  effect  of  the  strengthening 
of  the  army,  which  is  now  being  decided  on,  appears  in 
the  rolls  of  the  Reserve  and  the  Landwehr.  The  recruit 
who  begins  his  service  to-day  requires  a  year's  training  to 
become  a  useful  soldier.  With  the  hasty  training  of  sub- 
stitute reservists  and  such  expedients,  we  merely  deceive 
ourselves  as  to  the  necessity  of  serious  preparations.  We 
must  not  regard  the  present  only,  but  provide  for  the  future. 

The  same  argument  applies  to  the  political  conditions. 
The  man  who  makes  the  bulk  of  the  preparations  for  war 
dependent  on  the  shifting  changes  of  the  politics  of  the  day, 
who  wishes  to  slacken  off  in  the  work  of  arming  because 
no  clouds  in  the  political  horizon  suggest  the  necessity  of 
greater  efforts,  acts  contrary  to  all  real  statesmanship,  and 
is  sinning  against  his  country. 

The  moment  does  not  decide;  the  great  political  aspira- 
tions, oppositions,  and  tensions,  which  are  based  on  the  na- 
ture of  things — these  turn  the  scale. 

When  King  William  at  the  beginning  of  the  sixties  of 
the  last  century  undertook  the  reorganization  of  the  Prus- 
sian army,  no  political  tension  existed.  The  crisis  of  1859 
had  just  subsided.  But  the  King  had  perceived  that  the 
Prussian  armament  was  insufficient  to  meet  the  requirements 
of  the  future.  After  a  bitter  struggle  he  extorted  from 
his  people  a  reorganization  of  the  army,  and  this  laid  the 
foundations  without  which  the  glorious  progress  of  our 
State  would  never  have  begun.  In  the  same  true  spirit  of 
statesmanship  the  Emperor  William  II.  has  powerfully 
aided  and  extended  the  evolution  of  our  fleet,  without  being 
under  the  stress  of  any  political  necessity;  he  has  enjoyed 
the  cheerful  co-operation  of  his  people,  since  the  reform  at 


126    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

which  he  aimed  was  universally  recognized  as  an  indisput- 
able need  of  the  future,  and  accorded  with  traditional  Ger- 
man sentiment. 

While  the  preparation  for  war  must  be  completed  irre- 
spectively of  the  political  influences  of  the  day,  the  military 
power  of  the  probable  opponents  marks  a  limit  below  which 
the  State  cannot  sink  without  jeopardizing  the  national 
safety. 

Further,  the  State  is  bound  to  enlist  in  its  service  all  the 
discoveries  of  modern  science,  so  far  as  they  can  be  applied 
to  warfare,  since  all  these  methods  and  engines  of  war, 
should  they  be  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  would 
secure  him  a  distinct  superiority.  It  is  an  obvious  neces- 
sity to  keep  the  forces  which  can  be  put  into  the  field  as 
up-to-date  as  possible,  and  to  facilitate  their  military  opera- 
tions by  every  means  which  science  and  mechanical  skill 
supply.  Further,  the  army  must  be  large  enough  to  con- 
stitute a  school  for  the  whole  nation,  in  which  a  thorough- 
going and  no  mere  superficial  military  efficiency  may  be 
attained. 

Finally,  the  nature  of  the  preparation  for  war  is  to  some 
degree  regulated  by  the  political  position  of  the  State.  If 
the  State  has  satisfied  its  political  ambitious  and  is  chiefly 
concerned  with  keeping  its  place,  the  military  policy  will 
assume  a  more  or  less  defensive  character.  States,  on  the 
other  hand,  which  are  still  desirous  of  expansion,  or  such 
as  are  exposed  to  attacks  on  different  sides,  must  adopt  a 
predominantly  offensive  military  system. 

Preparations  for  war  in  this  way  follow  definite  lines, 
which  are  dictated  by  necessity  and  circumstances;  but  it 
is  evident  that  a  wide  scope  is  still  left  for  varieties  of 
personal  opinion,  especially  where  the  discussion  includes 
the  positive  duties  of  the  State,  which  may  lead  to  an  ener- 
getic foreign  policy,  and  thus  possibly  to  an  offensive  war, 
and  where  very  divergent  views  exist  as  to  the  preparation 
for  war.  In  this  case  the  statesman's  only  resource  is  to 
use  persuasion,  and  to  so  clearly  expound  and  support  his 
conceptions  of  the  necessary  policy  that  the  majority  of  the 
nation  accept  his  view.  There  are  always  and  everywhere 
conditions  which  have  a  persuasive  character  of  their  own, 


THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  ARMING  127 

and  appeal  to  the  intellects  and  the  feelings  of  the  masses. 

Every  Englishman  is  convinced  of  the  necessity  to  main- 
tain the  command  of  the  sea,  since  he  realizes  that  not  only 
the  present  powerful  position  of  the  country,  but  also  the 
possibility  of  feeding  the  population  in  case  of  war,  depend 
on  it.  No  sacrifice  for  the  fleet  is  too  great,  and  every 
increase  of  foreign  navies  instantly  disquiets  public  opinion. 
The  whole  of  France,  except  a  few  anti-military  circles, 
feels  the  necessity  of  strengthening  the  position  of  the  State, 
which  was  shaken  by  the  defeats  of  1870-71,  through  re- 
doubled exertions  in  the  military  sphere,  and  this  object  is 
being  pursued  with  exemplary  unanimity. 

Even  in  neutral  Switzerland  the  feeling  that  political  in- 
dependence rests  less  on  international  treaties  than  on  the 
possibility  of  self-defence  is  so  strong  and  widespread  that 
the  nation  willingly  supports  heavy  taxation  for  its  military 
equipment.  In  Germany,  also,  it  should  be  possible  to 
arouse  a  universal  appreciation  of  the  great  duties  of  the 
State,  if  only  our  politicians,  without  any  diplomatic  eva- 
sion, which  deceives  no  one  abroad  and  is  harmful  to  the 
people  at  home,  disclosed  the  true  political  situation  and 
the  necessary  objects  of  our  policy. 

To  be  sure,  they  must  be  ready  to  face  a  struggle  with 
public  opinion,  as  King  William  I.  did:  for  when  public 
opinion  does  not  stand  under  the  control  of  a  master  will 
or  a  compelling  necessity,  it  can  be  led  astray  too  easily  by 
the  most  varied  influences.  This  danger  is  particularly  great 
in  a  country  so  torn  asunder  internally  and  externally  as 
Germany.  He  who  in  such  a  case  listens  to  public  opinion 
runs  a  danger  of  inflicting  immense  harm  on  the  interests  of 
State  and  people. 

One  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  true  statesmanship 
is  that  permanent  interests  should  never  be  abandoned  or 
prejudiced  for  the  sake  of  momentary  advantages,  such  as 
the  lightening  of  the  burdens  of  the  taxpayer,  the  temporary 
maintenance  of  peace,  or  suchlike  specious  benefits,  which, 
in  the  course  of  events,  often  prove  distinct  disadvantages. 

The  statesman,  therefore,  led  astray  neither  by  popular 
opinion  nor  by  the  material  difficulties  which  have  to  be 
surmounted,  nor  by  the  sacrifices  required  of  his  country- 


128    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

men,  must  keep  these  objects  carefully  in  view.  So  long 
as  it  seems  practicable  he  will  try  to  reconcile  the  conflicting 
interests  and  bring  them  into  harmony  with  his  own.  But 
where  great  fundamental  questions  await  decision,  such  as 
the  actual  enforcement  of  universal  service  or  of  the  re- 
quirements on  which  readiness  for  war  depends,  he  must 
not  shrink  from  strong  measures  in  order  to  create  the 
forces  which  the  State  needs,  or  will  need,  in  order  to  main- 
tain its  vitality. 

One  of  the  most  essential  political  duties  is  to  initiate 
and  sanction  preparations  for  war  on  a  scale  commensurate 
with  the  existing  conditions;  to  organize  them  efficiently  is 
the  duty  of  the  military  authorities — a  duty  which  belongs 
in  a  sense  to  the  sphere  of  strategy,  since  it  supplies  the 
machinery  with  which  commanders  have  to  reckon.  Policy 
and  strategy  touch  in  this  sphere.  Policy  has  a  strategic 
duty  to  perform,  since  it  sanctions  preparations  for  war  and 
defines  their  limit. 

It  would,  therefore,  be  a  fatal  and  foolish  act  of  political 
weakness  to  disregard  the  military  and  strategic  standpoint, 
and  to  make  the  bulk  of  the  preparations  for  war  dependent 
on  the  financial  means  momentarily  available.  "No  ex- 
penditure without  security,"  runs  the  formula  in  which  this 
policy  clothes  itself.  It  is  justified  only  when  the  security 
is  fixed  by  the  expenditure.  In  a  great  civilized  State  it 
is  the  duties  which  must  be  fulfilled — sa  Treitschke,  our 
great  historian  and  national  politician,  tells  us — that  de- 
termine the  expenditure,  and  the  great  Finance  Minister 
is  not  the  man  who  balances  the  national  accounts  by  spar- 
ing the  national  forces,  while  renouncing  the  politically  in- 
dispensable outlay,  but  he  who  stimulates  all  the  live  forces 
of  the  nation  to  cheerful  activity,  and  so  employs  them  for 
national  ends  that  the  State  revenue  suffices  to  meet  the 
admitted  political  demands.  He  can  only  attain  this  pur- 
pose if  he  works  in  harmony  with  the  Ministers  for  Com- 
merce, Agriculture,  Industries,  and  Colonies,  in  order  to 
break  down  the  restrictions  which  cramp  the  enterprise  and 
energy  of  the  individual,  to  make  all  dead  values  remune- 
rative, and  to  create  favorable  conditions  for  profitable  busi- 
ness.   A  great  impulse  must  thrill  the  whole  productive  and 


THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  ARMING  129 

financial  circles  of  the  State,  if  the  duties  of  the  present 
and  the  future  are  to  be  fulfilled. 

Thus  the  preparation  for  war,  which,  under  modern  con- 
ditions, calls  for  very  considerable  expenditure,  exercises 
a  marked  influence  on  the  entire  social  and  political  life  of 
the  people  and  on  the  financial  policy  of  the  State. 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  NEXT  WAR 

The  social  necessity  of  maintaining  the  power  of  the  na- 
tion to  defend  itself,  the  political  claims  which  the  State 
puts  forward,  the  strength  of  the  probable  hostile  com- 
binations, are  the  chief  factors  which  determine  the  condi- 
tions of  preparation  for  war. 

I  have  already  tried  to  explain  and  formulate  the  duties 
in  the  spheres  of  policy  and  progress  which  our  history 
and  our  national  character  impose  on  us.  My  next  task  is 
to  observe  the  possible  military  combinations  which  we  must 
be  prepared  to  face. 

In  this  way  only  can  we  estimate  the  dangers  which 
threaten  us,  and  can  judge  whether,  and  to  what  degree, 
we  can  carry  out  our  political  intentions.  A  thorough  un- 
derstanding of  these  hostile  counter-movements  will  give 
us  a  clear  insight  into  the  character  of  the  next  war;  and 
this  war  will  decide  our  future. 

It  is  not  sufficient  to  know  the  military  fighting  forces 
of  our  probable  antagonists,  although  this  knowledge  con- 
stitutes the  necessary  basis  for  further  inquiry ;  but  we  must 
picture  to  ourselves  the  intensity  of  the  hostility  with  which 
we  have  to  reckon  and  the  probable  efficiency  of  our 
enemies.  The  hostility  which  we  must  anticipate  is  deter- 
mined by  the  extent  to  which  mutual  political  schemes  and 
ambitions  clash,  and  by  the  opposition  in  national  character. 
Our  opinion  as  to  the  military  efficiency  of  our  rivals  must 
be  based  on  the  latest  data  available. 

If  we  begin  by  looking  at  the  forces  of  the  individual 
States  and  groups  of  States  which  may  be  hostile  to  us, 
we  have  the  following  results: 

According  to  the  recent  communications  of  the  French 

130 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  NEXT  WAR  131 

Finance  Minister  Glotz  (in  a  speech  made  at  the  unveiling 
of  a  war  memorial  in  Issoudun),  the  strength  of  the  French 
army  on  a  peace  footing  in  the  year  1910  amounted  in 
round  figures  to  580,000  men.  This  included  the  "Colonial 
Corps,"  stationed  in  France  itself,  which,  in  case  of  war, 
belongs  to  the  field  army  in  the  European  theatre  of  war, 
and  the  "Service  auxiliaire" — that  is,  some  30,000  non- 
efficients,  who  are  drafted  in  for  service  without  arms. 
The  entire  war  establishment,  according  to  the  informa- 
tion of  the  same  Minister,  included  field  army  and  reserves, 
consists  of  2,800,000  men  available  on  mobilization.  A  re- 
duction from  this  number  must  be  made  in  event  of  mo- 
bilization, which  French  sources  put  down  at  20  per  cent. 
The  whole  strength  of  the  French  field  army  and  reserves 
may  therefore  be  reckoned  at  some  2,300,000. 

To  this  must  be  added,  as  I  gather  from  the  same  source, 
1,700,000  Territorials,  with  their  "reserve,"  from  which  a 
reduction  of  25  per  cent.,  or  roughly  450,000  men,  must  be 
made. 

If  it  is  assumed  that,  in  case  of  war,  the  distribution  of 
the  arms  will  correspond  to  that  in  peace,  the  result  is,  on 
the  basis  of  the  strength  of  separate  arms,  which  the  Budget 
of  191 1  anticipates,  that  out  of  the  2,300,000  field  and  re- 
serve troops  there  must  be  assigned — to  the  infantry,  about 
1,530,000;  to  the  cavalry,  about  230,000  (since  a  consider- 
able part  of  the  reservists  of  these  arms  are  employed  in 
the  transport  service) ;  to  the  artillery,  about  3810,000;  to 
the  pioneers,  70,000;  to  train  and  administration  services 
(trains,  columns,  medical  service,  etc.),  90,000. 

No  further  increase  in  these  figures  is  possible,  since  in 
France  90  per  cent,  of  all  those  liable  to  serve  have  been 
called  up,  and  the  birth-rate  is  steadily  sinking.  While  in 
1870  it  reached  940,000  yearly,  it  has  sunk  in  1908  to 
790,000.  Recourse  already  has  been  had  to  the  expedient 
of  requiring  smaller  qualifications  than  before,  and  of  filling 
the  numerous  subsidiary  posts  (clerks,  waiters,  etc.)  with 
less  efficient  men,  in  order  to  relieve  the  troops  themselves. 

Under  these  conditions,  it  was  necessary  to  tap  new 
sources,  and  the  plan  has  been  formed  of  increasing  the 
troops  with  native-born  Algerians  and  Tunisians,  in  order 


i32    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

to  be  able  to  strengthen  the  European  army  with  them  in 
event  of  war.  At  the  same  time  negroes,  who  are  excellent 
and  trustworthy  material,  are  to  be  enrolled  in  West  Africa. 
A  limited  conscription,  such  as  exists  in  Tunis,  is  to  be 
introduced  into  Algeria.  The  black  army  is  at  first  to  be 
completed  by  volunteers,  and  conscription  will  only  be  en- 
forced at  a  crisis.  These  black  troops  are  in  the  first  place 
to  garrison  Algeria  and  Tunis,  to  release  the  troops  sta- 
tioned there  for  service  in  Europe,  and  to  protect  the  white 
settlers  against  the  natives.  Since  the  negroes  raised  for 
military  service  are  heathen,  it  is  thought  that  they  will  be 
a  counterpoise  to  the  Mohammedan  natives.  It  has  been 
proved  that  negro  troops  stand  the  climate  of  North  Africa 
excellently,  and  form  very  serviceable  troops.  The  two 
black  battalions  stationed  in  the  Schauja,  who  took  part  in 
the  march  to  Fez,  bore  the  climate  well,  and  thoroughly 
proved  their  value.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  this  plan 
will  be  vigorously  prosecuted,  with  every  prospect  of  suc- 
cess. It  is  so  far  in  an  early  stage.  Legislative  proposals 
on  the  use  of  the  military  resources  offered  by  the  native 
Algerians  and  the  West  African  negroes  have  not  yet  been 
laid  before  Parliament  by  the  Government.  It  cannot  yet 
be  seen  to  what  extent  the  native  and  black  troops  will  be 
increased.  The  former  Minister  of  War,  Messimy,  had 
advocated  a  partial  conscription  of  the  native  Algerians. 
An  annual  muster  is  made  of  the  Algerian  males  of  eighteen 
years  of  age  available  for  military  service.  The  Commis- 
sion appointed  for  the  purpose  reported  in  191 1  that,  after 
the  introduction  of  the  limited  service  in  the  army  and  the 
reserve,  there  would  be  in  Algeria  and  Tunisia  combined 
some  100,000  to  120,000  native  soldiers  available  in  war- 
time. They  could  also  be  employed  in  Europe,  and  are 
thus  intended  to  strengthen  the  Rhine  army  by  three  strong 
army  corps  of  first-class  troops,  who,  in  the  course  of  years, 
may  probably  be  considerably  increased  by  the  formation  of 
reserves. 

As  regards  the  black  troops,  the  matter  is  different. 
France,  in  her  West  African  possessions  combined,  has 
some  16,000  negro  troops  available.     As  the  black  popula- 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  NEXT  WAR  133 

tion  number  10,000,000  to  12,000,000,  these  figures  may  be 
considerably  raised. 

Since  May,  1910,  there  has  been  an  experimental  bat- 
talion of  Senegalese  sharp-shooters  in  Southern  Algeria, 
and  in  the  draft  War  Budget  for  1912  a  proposal  was  made 
to  transfer  a  second  battalion  of  Senegalese  to  Algeria. 
The  conclusion  is  forced  upon  us  that  the  plan  of  sending 
black  troops  in  larger  numbers  to  Algeria  will  be  vigor- 
ously prosecuted.  There  is,  however,  no  early  probability 
of  masses  of  black  troops  being  transported  to  North  Af- 
rica, since  there  are  not  at  present  a  sufficient  number  of 
trained  men  available.  The  Senegalese  Regiments  1,  2  and 
3,  stationed  in  Senegambia,  are  hardly  enough  to  replace 
and  complete  the  Senegalese  troops  quartered  in  the  other 
African  colonies  of  France.  Although  there  is  no  doubt 
that  France  is  in  a  position  to  raise  a  strong  black  army, 
the  probability  that  black  divisions  will  be  available  for  a 
European  war  is  still  remote.  But  it  cannot  be  questioned 
that  they  will  be  so  some  day. 

Still  less  is  any  immediate  employment  of  native  Moroc- 
can troops  in  Europe  contemplated.  Morocco  possesses 
very  good  native  warriors,  but  the  Sultan  exerts  effective 
sovereignty  only  over  a  part  of  the  territory  termed  "Mo- 
rocco." There  cannot  be,  therefore,  for  years  to  come  any 
question  of  employing  this  fighting  material  on  a  large 
scale.  The  French  and  Moroccan  Governments  are  for 
the  moment  occupied  in  organizing  a  serviceable  Sultan's 
army  of  20,000  men  to  secure  the  command  of  the  country 
and  to  release  the  French  troops  in  Morocco. 

The  annexation  of  Morocco  may  for  the  time  being  mean 
no  great  addition  to  military  strength;  but,  as  order  is 
gradually  established,  the  country  will  prove  to  be  an  excel- 
lent recruiting  depot,  and  France  will  certainly  use  this 
source  of  power  with  all  her  accustomed  energy  in  military 
matters. 

For  the  immediate  future  we  have,  therefore,  only  to 
reckon  with  the  reinforcements  of  the  French  European 
army  which  can  be  obtained  from  Algeria  and  Tunisia,  as 
soon  as  the  limited  system  of  conscription  is  universally 
adopted  there.    This  will  supply  a  minimum  of  120,000  men, 


134    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

and  the  tactical  value  of  these  troops  is  known  to  any  who 
have  witnessed  their  exploits  on  the  battlefield  of  Weissen- 
burg  and  Woorth.  At  least  one  strong  division  of  Turcos 
is  already  available. 

Next  to  the  French  army,  we  are  chiefly  concerned  with 
the  military  power  of  Russia.  Since  the  peace  and  war 
establishments  are  not  published,  it  is  hard  to  obtain  ac- 
curate statistics;  no  information  is  forthcoming  as  to  the 
strength  of  the  various  branches  of  the  service,  but  the 
totals  of  the  army  may  be  calculated  approximately.  Ac- 
cording to  the  recruiting  records  of  the  last  three  years, 
the  strength  of  the  Russian  army  on  a  peace  footing  amounts 
to  1,346,000  men,  inclusive  of  Cossacks  and  Frontier 
Guards.  Infantry  and  sharp-shooters  are  formed  into  37 
army  corps  (1  Guards,  1  Grenadiers,  and  25  army  corps 
in  Europe;  3  Caucasian,  2  Turkistanian,  and  5  Siberian 
corps).  The  cavalry  is  divided  into  divisions,  independ- 
ent brigades,  and  separate  independent  regiments. 

In  war,  each  army  corps  consists  of  2  divisions,  and  is 
in  round  figures  42,000  strong;  each  infantry  division  con- 
tains 2  brigades,  at  a  strength  of  20,000.  Each  sharp- 
shooter brigade  is  about  9,000  strong,  the  cavalry  divisions 
about  4,500  strong.  On  the  basis  of  these  numbers,  we 
arrive  at  a  grand  total  of  1,800,000  for  all  the  army  corps, 
divisions,  sharp-shooter  brigades,  and  cavalry  divisions.  To 
this  must  be  added  unattached  troops  and  troops  on  frontier 
or  garrison  duty,  so  that  the  war  strength  of  the  standing 
army  can  be  reckoned  at  some  2,000,000. 

This  grand  total  is  not  all  available  in  a  European  theatre 
of  war.  The  Siberian  and  Turkistanian  army  corps  must 
be  deducted,  as  they  would  certainly  be  left  in  the  interior 
and  on  the  eastern  frontier.  For  the  maintenance  of  order 
in  the  interior,  it  would  probably  be  necessary  to  leave  the 
troops  in  Finland,  the  Guards  at  St.  Petersburg,  at  least 
one  division  at  Moscow,  and  the  Caucasian  army  corps  in 
the  Caucasus.  This  would  mean  a  deduction  of  thirteen 
army  corps,  or  546,000  men ;  so  that  we  have  to  reckon  with 
a  field  army,  made  up  of  the  standing  army,  1,454,000  men 
strong.  To  this  must  be  added  about  100  regiments  of  Cos- 
sacks of  the  Second  and  Third  Ban,  which  may  be  placed 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  NEXT  WAR  135 

at  50,000  men,  and  the  reserve  and  Empire-defence  forma- 
tions to  be  set  on  foot  in  case  of  war.  For  the  formation 
of  reserves,  there  are  sufficient  trained  men  available  to 
constitute  a  reserve  division  of  the  first  and  second  rank 
for  each  corps  respectively.  These  troops,  if  each  division 
is  assumed  to  contain  20,000  men,  would  be  1,480,000  men 
strong.  Of  course,  a  certain  reduction  must  be  made  in 
these  figures.  Also  it  is  not  known  which  of  these  forma- 
tions would  be  really  raised  in  event  of  mobilization.  In 
any  case,  there  will  be  an  enormous  army  ready  to  be  put 
into  movement  for  a  great  war.  After  deducting  all  the 
forces  which  must  be  left  behind  in  the  interior,  a  field 
army  of  2,000,000  men  could  easily  be  organized  in  Europe. 
It  cannot  be  stated  for  certain  whether  arms,  equipment, 
and  ammunition  for  such  a  host  can  be  supplied  in  suf- 
ficient quantity.  But  it  will  be  best  not  to  undervalue  an 
Empire  like  Russia  in  this  respect. 

Quite  another  picture  is  presented  to  us  when  we  turn 
our  attention  to  England,  the  third  member  of  the  Triple 
Entente. 

The  British  Empire  is  divided  from  the  military  point  of 
view  into  two  divisions:  into  the  United  Kingdom  itself 
with  the  Colonies  governed  by  the  English  Cabinet,  and  the 
self-governing  Colonies.  These  latter  have  at  their  dis- 
posal a  militia,  which  is  sometimes  only  in  process  of  for- 
mation. They  can  be  completely  ignored  so  far  as  con- 
cerns any  European  theatre  of  war. 

The  army  of  the  parts  of  the  Empire  administered  by 
the  English  Cabinet  divides  into  the  regular  army,  which 
is  filled  up  by  enlistment,  the  native  troops,  commanded  by 
English  officers,  and  the  Territorial  army,  a  militia  made 
up  of  volunteers  which  has  not  reached  the  intended  total 
of  300,000.  It  is  now  270,000  strong,  and  is  destined  ex- 
clusively for  home  defence.  Its  military  value  cannot  at 
present  be  ranked  very  highly.  For  a  Continental  European 
war  it  may  be  left  out  of  account.  We  have  in  that  case 
only  to  deal  with  a  part  of  the  regular  English  army.  This 
is  some  250,000  strong.  The  men  serve  twelve  years,  of 
which  seven  are  with  the  colors  and  five  in  the  reserve. 
The  annual  supply  of  recruits  is  35,000.     The  regular  re- 


136    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

serve  is  now  136,000  strong.  There  is  also  a  special  reserve, 
with  a  militia-like  training,  which  is  enlisted  for  special 
purposes,  so  that  the  grand  total  of  the  reserve  reaches  the 
figure  of  200,000. 

Of  the  regular  English  army,  134  men  are  stationed  in 
England,  74,500  in  India  (where,  in  combination  with  159,- 
000  native  troops,  they  form  the  Anglo-Indian  army),  and 
about  39,000  in  different  stations — Gibraltar,  Malta,  Egypt, 
Aden,  South  Africa,  and  the  other  Colonies  and  Protecto- 
rates. In  this  connection  the  conditions  in  Egypt  are  the 
most  interesting:  6,000  English  are  stationed  there,  while 
in  the  native  Egyptian  army  (17,000  strong;  in  war-time, 
29,000  strong)  one-fifth  of  the  officers  are  Englishmen.  It 
may  be  supposed  that,  in  view  of  the  great  excitement  in 
the  Moslem  world,  the  position  of  the  English  is  precarious. 
The  11,000  troops  now  stationed  in  South  Africa  are  to  be 
transferred  as  soon  as  possible  to  Mediterranean  garrisons. 
In  event  of  war,  a  special  division  will,  on  emergency,  be 
organized  there. 

For  a  war  in  Continental  Europe,  we  have  only  to  take 
into  account  the  regular  army  stationed  in  England.  When 
mobilized,  it  forms  the  "regular  field  army"  of  6  infantry 
divisions,  1  cavalry  division,  2  mounted  brigades  and  army 
troops,  and  numbers  130,000  men,  without  columns  and 
trains.  The  regular  troops  in  the  United  Kingdom  which 
do  not  form  part  of  the  regular  field  army  are  some  100,000 
strong.  They  consist  of  a  very  small  number  of  mobile 
units,  foot  artillery,  and  engineers  for  coast  defence,  as  well 
as  the  reserve  formations.  These  troops,  with  some  13,000 
militia  artillery  and  militia  engineers,  constitute  the  Home 
Army,  under  whose  protection  the  Territorial  field  army  is 
completing  its  organization.  Months  must  certain  elapse 
before  portions  of  this  army  can  strengthen  the  regular 
army.  At  the  most  150,000  men  may  be  reckoned  upon  for 
an  English  expeditionary  force.  These  troops  compose  at 
the  same  time  the  reserve  of  the  troops  stationed  in  the 
Colonies,  which  require  reinforcements  at  grave  crises.  This 
constitutes  the  weak  point  in  the  British  armament.  Eng- 
land can  employ  her  regular  army  in  a  Continental  war  so 
long  as  all  is  quiet  in  the  Colonies.    This  fact  brings  into 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  NEXT  WAR  137 

prominence  how  important  it  will  be,  should  war  break  out, 
to  threaten  England  in  her  colonial  possessions,  and  es- 
pecially in  Egypt. 

Against  the  powerful  hosts  which  the  Powers  of  the 
Triple  Entente  can  put  into  the  field,  Germany  can  com- 
mand an  active  army  of  589,705  men  (on  peace  establish- 
ment, including  non-commissioned  officers)  and  about  25,500 
officers ;  while  Austria  has  an  army  which  on  a  peace  foot- 
ing is  361,553  men  and  about  20,000  officers  strong.  The 
combined  war  strength  of  the  two  States  may  be  estimated 
as  follows: 

In  Germany  there  were  drafted  into  the  army,  including 
volunteers  and  non-combatants,  in  1892,  194,664  men;  in 
1909,  267,283  men;  or  on  an  average  for  seventeen  years, 
230,975  men  annually.  This  gives  a  total  of  3,926,575  men. 
If  we  estimate  the  natural  decrease  at  25  per  cent.,  we 
have  2,944,931  trained  men  left.  By  adding  the  peace  es- 
tablishment to  it,  we  arrive  at  an  estimated  strength  of 
3,534,636,  which  the  French  can  match  with  about  the  same 
figures. 

The  annual  enlistment  in  Austria  amounts  to  some  135,- 
000.  Liability  to  serve  lasts  twelve  years,  leaving  out  of 
account  service  in  the  Landsturm.  Deducting  the  three 
years  of  active  service,  this  gives  a  total  of  1,215,000,  or, 
after  the  natural  decrease  by  25  per  cent.,  911,250  men. 
To  this  must  be  added  the  nine  yearly  batches  of  trained 
Landsturm,  which,  after  the  same  deductions,  will  come 
likewise  to  911,250.  The  addition  of  the  peace  strength  of 
the  army  will  produce  a  grand  total  of  2,184,053  men  on 
a  war  footing;  approximately  as  many  as  Russia,  after  all 
deductions,  can  bring  into  the  field  in  Europe. 

In  what  numbers  the  existing  soldiers  would  in  case  of 
war  be  available  for  field  formations  in  Germany  and 
Austria  is  not  known,  and  it  would  be  undesirable  to  state. 
It  depends  partly  on  the  forces  available,  partly  on  other 
circumstances  which  are  not  open  to  public  discussion.  How- 
ever high  our  estimate  of  the  new  formations  may  be,  we 
shall  never  reach  the  figures  which  the  combined  forces  of 
France  and  Russia  present.  We  must  rather  try  to  nullify 
the  numerical  superiority  of  the  enemy  by  the  increased 


138    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

tactical  value  of  the  troops,  by  intelligent  generalship,  and 
a  prompt  use  of  opportunity  and  locality.  Even  the  addi- 
tion of  the  Italian  army  to  the  forces  of  Germany  and 
Austria  would  not,  so  far  as  I  know,  restore  numerical 
equality  in  the  field. 

In  France  it  has  been  thought  hitherto  that  two  or  three 
army  corps  must  be  left  on  the  Italian  frontier.  Modern 
French  writers*  are  already  reckoning  so  confidently  on 

*  Colonel  Boucher,  "L'offensive  contre  l'Allemagne." 
the  withdrawal  of  Italy  from  the  Triple  Alliance  that  they 
no  longer  think  it  necessary  to  put  an  army  in  the  field 
against  Italy,  but  consider  that  the  entire  forces  of  France 
are  available  against  Germny. 

The  peace  establishment  of  the  Italian  army  amounts,  in 
fact,  to  250,000  men,  and  is  divided  into  12  army  corps 
and  25  divisions.  The  infantry,  in  96  regiments,  numbers 
140,000;  there  are  besides  12  regiments  of  Bersaglieri,  with 
which  are  12  cyclist  battalions  and  8  Alpine  regiments  in 
78  companies.  The  cavalry  consists  of  29  regiments,  12 
of  which  are  united  in  3  cavalry  divisions.  The  artillery 
has  a  strength  of  24  field  artillery  regiments  and  1  mounted 
regiment  of  artillery,  and  numbes  193  field  and  8  mounted 
batteries.  Besides  this  there  are  27  mountain  batteries  and 
10  regiments  of  garrison  artillery  in  98  companies.  Lastly, 
there  are  6  engineer  regiments,  including  a  telegraph  regi- 
ment and  an  airship  battalion.  The  Gendarmerie  contains 
28,000  men. 

On  a  war  footing  the  strength  of  the  field  army  is  775,000. 
Some  70,000  men  are  enrolled  in  other  formations  of  the 
first  and  second  line.  The  militia  is  some  390,000  strong. 
The  strength  of  the  reserves  who  might  be  mobilized  is 
not  known.  The  field  army  is  divided  into  3  armies  of 
9  army  corps  in  all,  to  which  are  added  8  to  12  divisions 
of  the  Territorial  army  and  4  cavalry  divisions. 

As  to  colonial  troops,  Italy  can  command  in  Benadir  the 
services  of  48  officers  and  16  non-commissioned  officers 
of  Italian  birth,  and  3,500  native  soldiers ;  in  Eritrea  there 
are  131  officers,  644  non-commissioned  officers  and  privates 
of  Italian  birth,  and  3,800  natives. 

Italy  thus  can  put  a  considerable  army  into  the  field ;  but 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  NEXT  WAR  139 

it  is  questionable  whether  the  South  Italian  troops  have 
much  tactical  value.  It  is  possible  that  large  forces  would 
be  required  for  coast-defence,  while  the  protection  of  Tri- 
poli, by  no  means  an  easy  task,  would  claim  a  power  army 
if  it  is  to  be  held  against  France. 

The  Turkish  military  forces  would  be  of  great  impor- 
tance if  they  joined  the  coalition  of  Central  European 
Powers  or  its  opponents. 

The  regular  peace  establishment  of  the  Turkish  army 
amounts  to  275,000  men.  In  the  year  1910  there  were  three 
divisions  of  it: 

1.  The  Active  Army  (Nizam)  : 


Tnfantry 

133,000 

Cavalry 

26,000 

Artillery 

43,ooo 

Pioneers 

4,500 

Special  troops 

7,500 

Train  formations 

3,000 

Mechanics    . . . 

3,000 

A  total,  that  is,  of  220,000  men. 

2.  The  Redif  (militia)  cadres,  composed  of  infantry, 
25,000  men.  Within  this  limit,  according  to  the  Redif 
law,  men  are  enlisted  in  turns  for  short  trainings. 

3.  Officers  in  the  Nizam  and  Redif  troops,  military  em- 
ployes, officials,  and  others,  more  than  30,000. 

The  entire  war  strength  of  the  Turkish  army  amounts 
to  700,000  men.  We  need  only  to  take  into  consideration 
the  troops  from  Europe,  Anatolia,  Armenia,  and  Syria. 
All  these  troops  even  are  not  available  in  a  European  the- 
atre of  war.  On  the  other  hand,  the  "Mustafiz"  may  be 
regarded  as  an  "extraordinary  reinforcement";  this  is 
usually  raised  for  local  protection  or  the  maintenance  of 
quiet  and  order  in  the  interior.  To  raise  30,000  or  40,000 
men  of  this  militia  in  Europe  is  the  simplest  process.  From 
the  high  military  qualities  of  the  Turkish  soldiers,  the 
Turkish  army  must  be  regarded  as  a  very  important  actor. 

The  smaller  Balkan  States  are  also  able  to  put  consider- 
able armies  into  the  field. 

Montenegro  can  put  40,000  to  45,000  men  into  the  field, 


140    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

with  104  cannons  and  44  machine  guns,  besides  11  weak 
reserve  battalions  for  frontier  and  home  duties. 

Servia  is  supposed  to  have  an  army  28,000  strong  01  a 
peace  footing;  this  figure  is  seldom  reached,  and  sinks  in 
winter  to  10,000  men.  The  war  establishment  consists  of 
250,000  men,  comprising  about  165,000  rifles,  5,500  sabres, 
432  field  and  mountain  guns  (108  batteries  of  4  guns); 
besides  this  there  are  6  heavy  batteries  of  4  to  6  cannons 
and  228  machine  guns  available.  Lastly  come  the  reserve 
formation  (third  line),  so  that  in  all  some  305,000  men  can 
be  raised,  exclusive  of  the  militia,  an  uncertain  quantity. 

The  Bulgarian  army  has  a  peace  establishment  of  59,820 
men.  It  is  not  known  how  they  are  distributed  among  the 
various  branches  of  the  service.  On  a  war  footing  an 
army  of  330,000  is  raised,  including  infantry  at  a  strength 
of  230,000  rifles,  with  884  cannons,  232  machine  guns,  and 
6,500  sabres.  The  entire  army,  inclusive  of  the  reserves 
and  national  militia,  which  latter  is  only  available  for  home 
service  and  comprises  men  from  forty-one  to  forty-six 
years  of  age,  is  said  to  be  400,000  strong-. 

Rumania,  which  occupies  a  peculiar  position  politically, 
form  a  power  in  herself.  There  is  in  Rumania,  besides  the 
troops  who  according  to  their  time  of  service  are  per- 
manently with  the  colors,  a  militia  cavalry  called  "Calarashi" 
(intelligent  young  yeomen  on  good  horses  of  their  own), 
whose  units  serve  intermittently  for  short  periods. 

In  peace  the  army  is  composed  of  5,000  officers  and  90,000 
men  of  the  permanent  establishment,  and  some  12,000  serv- 
ing intermittently.  The  infantry  numbers  some  2,500  of- 
ficers and  57,000  men,  the  permanent  cavalry  (Rosiori) 
some  8,000  men  with  600  officers,  and  the  artillery  14,000 
men  with  700  officers. 

For  war  a  field  army  can  be  raised  of  some  6,000  officers 
and  274,000  men,  with  550  cannons.  Of  these  215,000  men 
belong  to  the  infantry,  7,000  to  the  cavalry,  and  20,000  to 
the  artillery.  The  cavalry  is  therefore  weaker  than  on  the 
peace  footing,  since,  as  it  seems,  a  part  of  the  Calarashi 
is  not  to  be  employed  as  cavalry.  Inclusive  of  reserves 
and  militia,  the  whole  army  will  be  430,000  strong.  There 
are  650,000  trained  men  available  for  service. 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  NEXT  WAR     141 

Although  the  Balkan  States,  from  a  military  point  of 
yiew,  chiefly  concern  Austria,  Turkey,  and  Russia,  and  only 
indirectly  come  into  relations  with  Germany,  yet  the  armies 
o^  the  smaller  Central  European  States  may  under  some 
circumstances  be  of  direct  importance  to  us,  if  they  are 
forced  or  induced  to  take  part  with  us  or  against  us  in  a 
European  war. 

Of  our  western  neighbours,  Switzerland  and  Holland 
come  first  under  consideration,  and  then  Belgium. 

Switzerland  can  command,  in  case  of  war,  a  combined 
army  of  263,000  men.  The  expeditionary  force,  which  is 
of  first  importance  for  an  offensive  war,  consists  of  96,000 
infantry  and  5,500  cavalry,  with  288  field  guns  and  48  field 
howitzers  (the  howitzer  batteries  are  in  formation),  a 
total  of  141,000  men. 

The  Landwehr  consists  of  50,000  infantry  and  4,000 
cavalry,  with  36  12-centimetre  cannons  belonging  to  foot 
artillery.  It  has  a  total  strength  of  69,000  men.  The  Land- 
sturm  finally  has  a  strength  of  53,000  men. 

The  Dutch  army  has  a  peace  establishment  averaging 
30,000  men,  which  varies  much  owing  to  the  short  period 
of  service.  There  are  generally  available  13,000  infantry, 
3,000  cavalry,  5,000  field  artillery,  3,400  garrison  artillery, 
and  1,400  engineers,  pontonniers,  and  transport  troops. 
The  field  army  in  war  is  80,000  strong,  and  is  made  up  of 
64,000  infantry,  cyclist,  and  machine-gun  sections,  2,600 
cavalry,  4,400  artillery,  and  900  engineers.  It  is  formed 
into  4  army  divisions  each  of  15  battalions,  4  squadrons,  6 
batteries,  and  1  section  engineers.  There  is,  further,  a  gar- 
rison army  of  80,000  men,  which  consists  of  12  active  and 
48  Landwehr  infantry  battalions,  44  active  and  44  Land- 
wehr foot  artillery  companies,  and  10  companies  engineers 
and  pontonniers,  including  Landwehr.  The  Dutch  coast 
also  is  fortified.  At  Helder,  Ymuiden,  Hook  of  Holland, 
at  Volkerack  and  Haringvliet  there  are  various  outworks, 
while  the  fortifications  at  Flushing  are  at  present  unimpor- 
tant. Amsterdam  is  also  a  fortress  with  outlying  fortifica- 
tions in  the  new  Dutch  water-line  (Fort  Holland). 

Holland  is  thus  well  adapted  to  cause  serious  difficulties 
to  an  English  landing,  if  her  coast  batteries  are  armed  with 


142    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

effective  cannons.  It  would  easily  yield  to  a  German  in- 
vasion, if  it  sided  against  us. 

Belgium  in  peace  has  42,800  troops  available,  distributed 
as  follows:  26,000  infantry,  5.400  cavalry,  4,650  field  ar- 
tillery, 3.400  garrison  artillery,  1,550  engineers  and  trans- 
port service. 

On  a  war  footing  the  field  army  will  be  100,000  strong, 
comprising  74,000  infantry,  7,250  cavalry,  10,000  field  ar- 
tillery, 1,900  engineers  and  transport  service,  and  is  formed 
into  4  army  divisions  and  2  cavalry  divisions.  The  latter 
are  each  20  squadrons  and  2  batteries  strong;  each  of  the 
army  divisions  consists  nominally  of  17  battalions  infantry, 
1  squadron,  12  batteries,  and  I  section  engineers.  In  addi- 
tion there  is  a  garrison  army  of  80,000,  which  can  be 
strengthened  by  the  garde  civique.  Antwerp  form  the  chief 
military  base,  and  may  be  regarded  as  a  very  strong  fort- 
ress. Besides  this,  on  the  line  of  the  Maas,  there  are  forti- 
fied towns  of  Liege,  Huy,  and  Namur.  There  are  no  coast 
fortifications. 

Denmark,  as  commanding  the  approaches  to  the  Baltic, 
is  of  great  military  importance  to  us.  Copenhagen,  the 
capital,  is  a  strong  fortress.  The  army,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  not  an  important  factor  of  strength,  as  the  training  of 
the  units  is  limited  to  a  few  months.  This  State  maintains 
on  a  peace  footing  some  10,000  infantry,  800  cavalry,  2,300 
artillery,  and  1,100  special  arms,  a  total  of  14,200  men ;  but 
the  strength  varies  between  7,500  and  26,000.  In  war-time 
an  army  of  62,000  men  and  10,000  reserves  can  be  put 
into  the  field,  composed  numerically  of  58,000  infantry, 
3,000  cavalry,  9,000  artillery,  and  2,000  special  arms. 

Sweden  can  command  eight  classes  of  the  First  Ban, 
which  comprises  units  from  twenty-one  to  twenty-eight 
years  of  age,  and  is  200,000  strong,  as  well  as  four  classes 
of  the  Second  Ban,  with  a  strength  of  90,000,  which  is 
made  up  of  units  from  twenty-eight  to  thirty-two  years  of 
age.  There  are  also  available  30,000  trained  volunteers, 
students  and  ex-students  from  twenty-one  to  thirty-two 
years  of  age. 

The  eight  classes  of  the  Landsturm  are  165,000  men 
strong.     It  can,  accordingly,  be  roughly  calculated  what 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  NEXT  WAR  143 

feld  army  can  be  raised  in  case  of  war.  The  entire  First 
Bin  certainly  comes  under  this  head. 

[n  Greece,  which  does  not  signify  much  of  a  European 
war,  but  might  in  combination  with  the  small  Balkan  States 
prove  very  troublesome  to  Turkey,  and  is  therefore  impor- 
tant for  us,  an  active  army  of  146,000  men  can  be  put  into 
the  5eld;  there  are  besides  this  83,000  men  in  the  Land- 
wehr  and  63,000  men  in  the  Landsturm. 

Spain  has  a  peace  army  of  116,232  men,  of  whom  34,000 
are  permanently  stationed  in  Africa.  In  war  she  can  raise 
327,000  men  (140  active  army,  154,000  garrison  troops, 
33,000  gendarmerie).  The  mobilization  is  so  badly  or- 
ganized that  at  the  end  of  a  month  70,000  to  80,000  men 
could  at  most  be  put  into  the  field. 

As  regard  the  naval  forces  of  the  States  which  concern 
us  to-day,  the  accompanying  table,  which  is  taken  from 
the  Nauticus  of  191 1,  affords  a  comparative  epitome,  which 
applies  to  May,  191 1.  It  shows  that,  numerically,  the 
English  fleet  is  more  than  double  as  strong  as  ours.  This 
superiority  is  increased  if  the  displacements  and  the  num- 
ber of  really  modern  ships  are  compared.  In  May  we 
possessed  only  four  battleships  and  one  armed  cruiser  of 
the  latest  type;  the  English  have  ten  ships-of-the-line  and 
four  armed  cruisers  which  could  be  reckoned  battleships. 
The  new  ships  do  not  materially  alter  this  proportion.  The 
comparative  number  of  the  ships-of-the-line  is  becoming 
more  favourable,  that  of  the  armoured  cruisers  will  be  less 
so  than  it  now  is.  It  may  be  noticed  that  among  our  cruisers 
are  a  number  of  vessels  which  really  have  no  fighting  value, 
and  that  the  coast-defence  ironclads  cannot  be  counted  as 
battleships.  France,  too,  was  a  little  ahead  of  us  in  the 
number  of  battleships  in  May,  191 1,  but  from  all  that  is 
hitherto  known  about  the  French  fleet,  it  cannot  be  com- 
pared with  the  German  in  respect  of  good  material  and 
trained  crews.  It  would,  however,  be  an  important  factor  if 
allied  with  the  English. 

Let  us  assume  that  in  event  of  war  England  as  well  as 
France  must  leave  a  certain  naval  force  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean, which  need  not  be  stronger  than  the  combined  Italian 
and  Austrian  fleets,  but  might  be  smaller,  in  event  of  a 


144 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 


Germany: 

Ready 

Voted  or  building 
England : 

Ready 

Voted  or  building 
France : 

Ready 

Voted  or  building 
Italy : 

Ready 

Voted  or  building 
Austria-Hungary  : 

Ready 

Voted  er  building 
Russia  : 

Baltic  Fleet :  Ready  . . 
Voted  or  building  . . 

Black  Sea  Fleet:  Ready 
Voted  or  btfilding  . 

Siberian  Fleet 

United  States  : 
Ready 
Voted  or  building 

Japan: 

Ready 

Voted  or  building 

f 

M                  CO              I                                               M                                         K>            M  Cn             H    t0 
Co  Co          ^O            14*    O004W          Cm   w          4*    CO         *    $0          tOO           10  Cn 

K 

5T      BJ 

M            M  4*                                                          *                                     CO            K)  vj                 U) 

«p         VOW                    -4        0\       \o  O          00^        <o  M          00>O              CO 

|   •£            O*             ||»|U          4-    to           4-    C>         CO  4>            Cs  CO             .     (0 

*    §1       f  %   II   §1   S?   II     s 

i»    i*    1 1 1  i  i    ii    it    ii    ii    \m 

55 
o 

Armoured 
Coast  Defence 
Vessels  from 
3,ooo  Tons  to 

5,000  Tons. 

1 1    1 1    1 1  i  1 1    ii    ii    ii    ii    1 1 

If 

II                II               1      II      |H             ||               ||               ||               |      }               M 

55 
p 

ifrl 

M               1      "               I      II      1   |            II               II               II               ||              (I 

B  F 

sill? 
Icy! 

iff 

4>  CO            |  £                            1    as          1  co           lo           1(0          ON  00        4>   8 

55 
p 

M    M                        M                                                                                                                            K>               M  4*                       M 
0  C*>                   00                                    0\                 M                 VJ                  m          4>    00                 M 
<4<5              1     m                    III4*             I00            1    *°             I   "**           Ux  *"             1    ■*" 

gf  'I  ""I  'f  'i  't  ii  i 

if 

H 

co   to            1    «h         to    1    to    |  4*         CO  -P.         CO  -f»           1    o          O   ^       silo 

55 

p 

o| 

MW                   M 
h4>                  O                      m         to                 mmm                Cn           O  Cn                 to 
Cn  vO             |Cn          ^P     1  V*     |   "^            1    O           Op            i    O           **"  V**            I   j* 
O  *«             '    »           m     1    ON  >    »            I  Cn           NO            '  vj         Co  Cn            1    "U 

83        |     o°    8    "3        ^8-0        8=81        S 

if 

cn          m  4*          K  mm        o»             m         no\         mvj        cn  »         mm 
KivO          4*   •          O  +  MmO          O\O0        4"»  Cn         COM          MOO         4>vj 

ni 

m 
It* 

\  t         '  I       v,   1  S  '  S        1  g       &$        1  j        1 «       1  ^ 

ptfl 

MtO            O  vO         CO  v)  J>   MCO            1   vi          co  v)          \OM          Sw            IS 

Number  of 

Submarines. 

THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  NEXT  WAR  145 

change  in  the  grouping  of  the  States ;  let  us  further  assume 
that  numerous  cruisers  will  be  detained  at  the  extra-Eu- 
ropean stations — the  fact,  however,  remains  that  England 
and  France  together  can  collect  against  Germany  in  the 
North  Sea  a  fleet  of  battleships  alone  three  times  as  strong 
as  that  of  Germany,  and  will  be  supported  by  a  vastly 
superior  force  of  torpedo- vessels  and  submarines.  If  Rus- 
sia joins  the  alliance  of  these  Powers,  that  would  signify 
another  addition  to  the  forces  of  our  opponents  which  must 
not  be  underestimated,  since  the  Baltic  Fleet  in  the  spring 
of  191 1  contained  two  large  battleships,  and  the  Baltic  fleet 
of  cruisers  is  always  in  a  position  to  threaten  our  coasts 
and  to  check  the  free  access  to  the  Baltic.  In  one  way  or 
the  other  we  must  get  even  with  that  fleet.  The  auxiliary 
cruiser  fleet  of  the  allies,  to  which  England  can  send  a  large 
contingent,  would  also  be  superior  to  us. 

As  regards  materiel  and  training,  it  may  be  assumed  that 
our  fleet  is  distinctly  superior  to  the  French  and  Russian, 
but  that  England  is  our  equal  in  that  respect.  Our  ships' 
cannons  will  probably  show  a  superiority  over  the  English, 
and  our  torpedo  fleet,  by  its  reckless  energy,  excellent  train- 
ing, and  daring  spirit  of  adventure,  will  make  up  some  of 
the  numerical  disadvantage.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether 
these  advantages  will  have  much  weight  against  the  over- 
whelming superiority  of  an  experienced  and  celebrated 
fleet  like  the  English. 

Reflection  shows  that  the  superiority  by  sea,  with  which 
we  must  under  certain  circumstances  reckon,  is  very  great, 
and  that  our  position  in  this  respect  is  growing  worse,  since 
the  States  of  the  Triple  Entente  can  build  and  man  far 
more  ships  than  we  can  in  the  same  time. 

If  we  consider  from  the  political  standpoint  the  probable 
attitude  of  the  separate  States  which  may  take  part  in  the 
next  war  against  Germany,  we  may  assume  that  the  in- 
tensity of  the  struggle  will  not  be  the  same  in  every  case, 
since  the  political  object  of  our  possible  antagonists  are  very 
different. 

If  we  look  at  France  first,  we  are  entitled  to  assume 
that  single-handed  she  is  not  a  match  for  us,  but  can  only 

10 


146    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

be  dangerous  to  us  as  a  member  of  a  coalition.  The  tactical 
value  of  the  French  troops  is,  of  course,  very  high;  nu- 
merically the  army  of  our  neighbour  on  the  west  is  almost 
equal,  and  in  some  directions  there  may  be  a  superiority 
in  organization  and  equipment ;  in  other  directions  we  have 
a  distinct  advantage.  The  French  army  lacks  the  sub- 
ordination under  a  single  commander,  the  united  spirit 
which  characterizes  the  German  army,  the  tenacious  strength 
of  the  German  race,  and  the  esprit  de  corps  of  the  officers. 
France,  too,  has  not  those  national  reserves  available  which 
would  allow  us  almost  to  double  our  forces.  These  are 
the  conditions  now  existing.  But  if  the  French  succeed 
in  making  a  large  African  army  available  for  a  European 
theatre,  the  estimate  of  strength  of  the  French  army  as 
compared  with  ours  will  be  quite  different.  This  possibil- 
ity must  be  borne  in  mind,  for,  according  to  the  whole 
previous  development  of  affairs,  we  may  safely  assume 
that  France  will  leave  no  stone  unturned  to  acquire,  if  only 
for  a  time,  a  military  superiority  over  Germany.  She 
knows  well  that  she  cannot  reach  her  political  goal  except 
by  a  complete  defeat  of  her  eastern  neighbour,  and  that 
such  a  result  can  only  be  obtained  by  the  exercise  of  ex- 
traordinary efforts. 

It  is  certain  that  France  will  not  only  try  to  develop  her 
own  military  power  with  the  utmost  energy,  but  that  she 
will  defend  herself  desperately  if  attacked  by  Germany; 
on  the  other  hand,  she  will  probably  not  act  on  the  offen- 
sive against  Germany  unless  she  has  increased  her  own 
efficiency  to  the  utmost  limit,  and  believes  that  she  has 
secured  the  military  supremacy  by  the  help  of  active  allies. 
The  stakes  are  too  high  to  play  under  unfavourable  con- 
ditions. But  if  France  thinks  she  has  all  the  trumps  in 
her  hands,  she  will  not  shrink  from  an  offensive  war,  and 
will  stake  everything  in  order  to  strike  us  a  mortal  blow. 
We  must  expect  the  most  bitter  hostility  from  this 
antagonist.  Should  the  Triple  Alliance  break  up — as  seems 
probable  now — this  hour  will  soon  have  struck.*  If  the 
war  then  declared  be  waged  against  us  in  combination  with 
England,  it  may  be  assumed  that  the  allied  Great  Powers 
♦Written  in  October,  191 1. 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  NEXT  WAR     147 

would  attempt  to  turn  our  strategical  right  flank  through 
Belgium  and  Holland,  and  penetrate  into  the  heart  of  Ger- 
many through  the  great  gap  in  the  fortresses  between 
Wesel  and  Flushing.  This  operation  would  have  the  con- 
siderable advantage  of  avoiding  the  strong  line  of  the 
Rhine  and  threatening  our  naval  bases  from  the  land  side. 
From  the  superiority  of  the  combined  Anglo-French  fleet, 
the  army  of  invasion  could  without  difficulty  have  its  base 
on  our  coasts.  Such  an  operation  would  enormously  facili- 
tate the  frontal  attack  on  our  west  frontier,  and  would 
enable  the  French  to  push  a  victorious  advance  onward  to 
the  Rhine,  after  investing  Metz  and  Diedenhofen. 

England,  with  whose  hostility,  as  well  with  that  of  the 
French,  we  must  reckon,  could  only  undertake  a  land  war 
against  us  with  the  support  of  an  ally  who  would  lead  the 
main  attack.  England's  troops  would  only  serve  as  rein- 
forcements; they  are  too  weak  for  an  independent  cam- 
paign. English  interests  also  lie  in  a  quite  different  field, 
and  are  not  coincident  with  those  of  France. 

The  main  issue  for  England  is  to  annihilate  our  navy 
and  oversea  commerce,  in  order  to  prevent,  from  reasons 
already  explained,  any  further  expansion  of  our  power. 
But  it  is  not  her  interest  to  destroy  our  position  as  a  Con- 
tinental Power,  or  to  help  France  to  attain  the  supremacy 
in  Europe.  English  interests  demand  a  certain  equilibrium 
between  the  Continental  States.  England  only  wishes  to 
use  France  in  order,  with  her  help,  to  attain  her  own  special 
ends,  but  she  will  never  impose  on  herself  sacrifices  which 
are  not  absolutely  necessary,  for  the  private  advantage  of 
her  ally.  These  principles  will  characterize  her  plan  of 
campaign,  if  she  sees  herself  compelled  by  the  political 
position  and  the  interests  of  her  naval  supremacy  to  take 
part  in  a  war  against  us. 

If  England,  as  must  be  regarded  probable,  determines 
sooner  or  later  on  this  step,  it  is  clearly  to  her  advantage 
to  win  a  rapid  victory.  In  the  first  place,  her  own  trade 
will  not  be  injured  longer  than  necessary  by  the  war;  in 
the  second  place,  the  centrifugal  forces  of  her  loosely 
compacted  World  Empire  might  be  set  in  movement,  and 
the   Colonies   might  consult  their  own   separate  interests, 


148    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

should  England  have  her  hands  tied  by  a  great  war.  It 
is  not  unlikely  that  revolutions  might  break  out  in  India 
and  Egypt,  if  England's  forces  were  long  occupied  with  a 
European  war.  Again,  the  States  not  originally  taking 
part  in  the  war  might  interfere  in  our  favour,  if  the  decision 
were  much  delayed.  It  was  important  for  us  in  1870-71 
to  take  Paris  quickly,  in  order  to  forestall  any  interference 
of  neutrals.  Similar  conditions  might  arise  in  the  case  of 
England.  We  must  therefore  make  up  our  minds  that 
the  attack  by  sea  will  be  made  with  the  greatest  and  most 
persistent  vigour,  with  the  firm  resolve  to  destroy  com- 
pletely our  fleet  and  our  great  commercial  centres.  It  is 
also  not  only  possible,  but  probable,  that  England  will 
throw  troops  on  the  Continent,  in  order  to  secure  the 
co-operation  of  her  allies,  who  might  demand  this  guaran- 
tee of  the  sincerity  of  English  policy,  and  also  to  support 
the  naval  attack  on  the  coast.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
land  war  will  display  the  same  kind  of  desperate  energy 
only  so  far  as  it  pursues  the  object  of  conquering  and  de- 
stroying our  naval  bases.  The  English  would  be  the  less 
disposed  to  do  more  than  this  because  the  German  auxil- 
iaries, who  have  so  often  fought  England's  battles,  would 
not  be  forthcoming.  The  greatest  exertions  of  the  nation 
will  be  limited  to  the  naval  war.  The  land  war  will  be 
waged  with  a  deflnitelv  restricted  obiect,  on  which  its  char- 
acter will  depend.  Tt  is  verv  nuestionable  whether  the 
English  armv  is  capable  of  effectivelv  acting  on  the  offen- 
sive against  Continental  European  trooos.  Tn  South  Africa 
the  English  regiments  for  the  most  part  fought  verv  bnwelv 
and  stood  great  losses :  on  the  other  hand,  thev  comnletelv 
failed  in  the  offensive,  in  tactics  as  in  operations,  and  with 
few  exceptions  the  generalship  was  enuallv  deficient.  The 
last  manoeuvres  on  a  large  scale,  held  in  Ireland,  under  the 
direction  of  General  French,  did  not,  according'  to  avail- 
able information,  show  the  English  army  in  a  favourable 
light  so  far  as  strategical  ability  went. 

If  we  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  East,  in  order  to 
forecast  Russia's  probable  behaviour,  we  must  begin  by 
admitting  that,  from  a  Russian  standpoint,  a  war  in  the 
West  holds  out  better  prospects  of  success  than  a  renewed 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  NEXT  WAR  149 

war  with  Japan,  and  possibly  with  China.  The  Empire 
of  the  Czar  finds  in  the  West  powerful  allies,  who  are  im- 
patiently waiting  to  join  in  an  attack  on  Germany.  The 
geographical  conditions  and  means  of  communication  there 
allow  a  far  more  rapid  and  systematic  development  of 
power  than  in  Manchuria.  Public  opinion,  in  which  hatred 
of  Germany  is  as  persistent  as  ever,  would  be  in  favour  of 
such  a  war,  and  a  victory  over  Germany  and  Austria  would 
not  only  open  the  road  to  Constantinople,  but  would  greatly 
improve  the  political  and  economic  influence  of  Russia  in 
Western  Europe.  Such  a  success  would  afford  a  splendid 
compensation  for  the  defeats  in  Asia,  and  would  offer  ad- 
vantages such  as  never  could  be  expected  on  the  far-distant 
Eastern  frontiers  of  the  Empire. 

Should  Russia,  then,  after  weighing  these  chances, 
launch  out  into  an  offensive  war  in  the  West,  the  struggle 
would  probably  assume  a  quite  different  character  from 
that,  for  example,  of  a  Franco-German  war.  Russia,  owing 
to  her  vast  extent,  is  in  the  first  place  secure  against  com- 
plete subjugation.  In  case  of  defeat  her  centre  of  gravity 
is  not  shifted.  A  Russian  war  can  hardly  ever,  therefore, 
become  a  struggle  for  political  existence,  and  cause  that 
straining  of  every  nerve  which  such  a  struggle  entails.  The 
inhabitants  will  hardly  ever  show  self-devotion  in  wars 
whose  objects  cannot  be  clear  to  them.  Throughout  the 
vast  Empire  the  social  and  also  political  education,  especially 
among  the  peasants,  is  so  poor,  that  any  grasp  of  the 
problems  of  a  foreign  policy  seems  quite  out  of  the  question. 
The  sections  of  the  people  who  have  acquired  a  little  super- 
ficial learning  in  the  defective  Russian  schools  have  sworn 
to  the  revolutionary  colours,  or  follow  a  blind  anti-pro- 
gressive policy  which  seems  to  them  best  to  meet  their  in- 
terests. The  former,  at  least,  would  only  make  use  of  a 
war  to  promote  their  own  revolutionary  schemes,  as  they 
did  in  the  crisis  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  Under  the 
circumstances,  there  can  be  little  idea  of  a  united  outburst 
of  the  national  spirit  which  would  enable  an  offensive  war 
to  be  carried  on  with  persistent  vigour.  There  has  been 
an  extraordinary  change  in  the  conditions  since  18 12,  when 
the  people  showed  some  unanimity  in  repelling  the  invasion. 


150    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

Should  Russia  to-day  be  involved  in  a  Western  war  *  *h 
Germany  and  Austria,  she  could  never  bring  her  wL  ,e 
forces  into  play.  In  the  first  place,  the  revolutionary  ele- 
ments in  the  heart  of  the  State  would  avail  themselves  f 
every  weakening  of  the  national  sources  of  power  to  eftcct 
a  revolution  in  internal  politics,  without  any  regard  for  ue 
interests  of  the  community.  Secondly,  in  the  Far  East, 
Japan  or  China  would  seize  the  moment  when  Russia's 
forces  in  the  West  were  fully  occupied  to  carry  out  their 
political  intentions  towards  the  Empire  of  the  Czar  *)y 
force  of  arms.  Forces  must  always  be  kept  in  reserve  for 
this  eventuality,  as  we  have  already  mentioned. 

Although  Russia,  under  the  present  conditions,  cannot 
bring  her  whole  power  to  bear  against  Germany  and 
Austria,  and  must  also  always  leave  a  certain  force  on  her 
European  Southern  frontier,  she  is  less  affected  by  de- 
feats than  other  States.  Neither  the  Crimean  War  nor 
the  greater  exertions  and  sacrifices  exacted  by  her  hard- 
won  victory  over  the  Turks,  nor  the  heavy  defeats  by  the 
Japanese,  have  seriously  shaken  Russia's  political  prestige. 
Beaten  in  the  East  or  South,  she  turns  to  another  sphere  of 
enterprise,  and  endeavours  to  recoup  herself  there  for  her 
losses  on  another  frontier. 

Such  conditions  must  obviously  affect  the  character  of 
the  war.  Russia  will  certainly  put  huge  armies  into  the 
field  against  us.  In  the  wars  against  Turkey  and  Japan  the 
internal  affairs  of  the  Empire  prevented  the  employment 
of  its  full  strength;  in  the  latter  campaign  revolutionary 
agitation  in  the  army  itself  influenced  the  operations  and 
battles,  and  in  a  European  war  the  same  conditions  would, 
in  all  probability,  make  themselves  emphatically  felt, 
especially  if  defeats  favoured  or  encouraged  revolutionary 
propaganda.  In  a  war  against  Russia,  more  than  in  any 
other  war,  c'est  le  premier  pas  qui  coute. 

If  the  first  operations  are  unsuccessful,  their  effect  on 
the  whole  position  will  be  wider  than  in  any  other  war, 
since  they  will  excite  in  the  country  itself  not  sympathetic 
feelings  only,  but  also  hostile  forces  which  would  cripple 
the  conduct  of  the  war. 

So  far  as  the  efficiency  of  the  Russian  army  goes,  the 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  NEXT  WAR  151 

R;a^io-Japanese  War  proved  that  the  troops  fight  with 
gr&tt  stubbornness.  The  struggle  showed  numerous  in- 
st?*?ces  of  heroic  self-devotion,  and  the  heaviest  losses 
w&£  often  borne  with  courage.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Russian  army  quite  failed  on  the  offensive,  in  a  certain 
serine  tactically,  but  essentially  owing  to  the  inadequacy 
of  the  commanders  and  the  failure  of  the  individuals.  The 
method  of  conducting  the  war  was  quite  wrong;  indecision 
an<j  irresolution  characterized  the  Russian  officers  of  every 
graMe,  and  no  personality  came  forward  who  ever  at- 
tempted to  rise  above  mediocrity.  It  can  hardly  be  pre- 
sumed that  the  spirit  of  Russian  generalship  has  completely 
changed  since  the  defeats  in  Manchuria,  and  that  striking 
personalities  have  come  on  the  stage.  This  army  must 
therefore  always  be  met  with  a  bold  policy  of  attack. 

When  we  contrast  these  conditions  with  the  position  of 
Germany,  we  cannot  blink  the  fact  that  we  have  to  deal 
with  immense  military  difficulties,  if  we  are  to  attain  our 
own  political  ends  or  repel  successfully  the  attack  of  our 
opponents. 

In  the  first  place,  the  geographical  configuration  and 
position  of  our  country  are  very  unfavourable.  Our  open 
eastern  frontier  offers  no  opportunity  for  continued  de- 
fence, and  Berlin,  the  centre  of  the  government  and  ad- 
ministration, lies  in  dangerous  proximity  to  it.  Our  west- 
ern frontier,  in  itself  strong,  can  be  easily  turned  on  the 
north  through  Belgium  and  Holland.  No  natural  obstacle, 
no  strong  fortress,  is  there  to  oppose  a  hostile  invasion,  and 
neutrality  is  only  a  paper  bulwark.  So  in  the  south,  the 
barrier  of  the  Rhine  can  easily  be  turned  through  Switzer- 
land. There,  of  course,  the  character  of  the  country  offers 
considerable  difficulties,  and  if  the  Swiss  defend  themselves 
resolutely,  it  might  not  be  easy  to  break  down  their  re- 
sistance. Their  army  is  no  despicable  factor  of  strength, 
and  if  they  were  attacked  in  their  mountains  they  would 
fight  as  they  did  at  Sempach  and  Murten. 

The  natural  approaches  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Baltic, 
the  Sound  and  the  Great  Belt,  are  commanded  by  foreign 
guns,  and  can  easily  fall  a  prey  to  our  enemies. 

The  narrow  coast  with  which  we  face  to  the  North  Sea 


152    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

forms  in  itself  a  strong  front,  but  can  easily  be  taken  in 
the  rear  through  Holland.  England  is  planted  before  our 
coasts  in  such  a  manner  that  our  entire  oversea  commerce 
can  be  easily  blocked.  In  the  south  and  south-east  alone 
are  we  secured  by  Austria  from  direct  invasion.  Other- 
wise we  are  encircled  by  our  enemies.  We  may  have  to 
face  attacks  on  three  sides.  This  circumstance  compels 
us  to  fight  on  the  inner  lines,  and  so  presents  certain  ad- 
vantages; but  it  is  also  fraught  with  dangers,  if  our  op- 
ponents understand  how  to  act  on  a  correct  and  consistent 
plan. 

If  we  look  at  our  general  political  position,  we  cannot 
conceal  the  fact  that  we  stand  isolated,  and  cannot  expect 
support  from  anyone  in  carrying  out  our  positive  political 
plans.  England,  France,  and  Russia  have  a  common  in- 
terest in  breaking  down  our  power.  This  interest  will 
sooner  or  later  be  asserted  by  arms.  It  is  not  therefore 
the  interest  of  any  nation  to  increase  Germany's  power. 
If  we  wish  to  attain  an  extension  of  our  power,  as  is 
natural  in  our  position,  we  must  win  it  by  the  sword  against 
vastly  superior  foes.  Our  alliances  are  defensive,  not 
merely  in  form,  but  essentially  so.  I  have  already  shown 
that  this  is  a  cause  of  their  weakness.  Neither  Austria 
nor  Italy  are  in  any  way  bound  to  support  by  armed  force 
a  German  policy  directed  towards  an  increase  of  power. 
We  are  not  even  sure  of  their  diplomatic  help,  as  the  con- 
duct of  Italy  at  the  conference  of  Algeciras  sufficiently 
demonstrated.  It  even  seems  questionable  at  the  present 
moment  whether  we  can  always  reckon  on  the  support  of 
the  members  of  the  Triple  Alliance  in  a  defensive  war. 
The  recent  rapprochement  of  Italy  with  France  and  Eng- 
land goes  far  beyond  the  idea  of  an  "extra  turn."  If  we 
consider  how  difficult  Italy  would  find  it  to  make  her  forces 
fit  to  cope  with  France,  and  to  protect  her  coasts  against 
hostile  attacks,  and  if  we  think  how  the  annexation  of 
Tripoli  has  created  a  new  possession,  which  is  not  easily 
defended  against  France  and  England,  we  may  fairly  doubt 
whether  Italy  would  take  part  in  a  war  in  which  England 
and  France  were  allied  against  us.  Austria  is  undoubtedly 
a  loyal  ally.    Her  interests  are  closely  connected  with  our 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  OUR  NEXT  WAR     153 

own,  and  her  policy  is  dominated  by  the  same  spirit  of 
loyalty  and  integrity  as  ours  towards  Austria.  Neverthe- 
less, there  is  cause  for  anxiety,  because  in  a  conglomerate 
State  like  Austria,  which  contains  numerous  Slavonic  ele- 
ments, patriotism  may  not  be  strong  enough  to  allow  the 
Government  to  fight  to  the  death  with  Russia,  were  the 
latter  to  defeat  us.  The  occurrence  of  such  an  event  is  not 
improbable;  When  enumerating  the  possibilities  that  might 
affect  our  policy,  we  cannot  leave  this  one  out  of  consid- 
eration. 

We  shall  therefore  some  day,  perhaps,  be  faced  with 
the  necessity  of  standing  isolated  in  a  great  war  of  the 
nations,  as  once  Frederick  the  Great  stood,  when  he  was 
basely  deserted  by  England  in  the  middle  of  the  struggle, 
and  shall  have  to  trust  to  our  own  strength  and  our  own 
resolution  for  victory. 

Such  a  war — for  us  more  than  for  any  other  nation — 
must  be  a  war  for  our  political  and  national  existence. 
This  must  be  so,  for  our  opponents  can  only  attain  their 
political  aims  by  almost  annihilating  us  by  land  and  by 
sea.  If  the  victory  is  only  half  won,  they  would  have  to 
expect  continuous  renewals  of  the  contest,  which  would 
be  contrary  to  their  interests.  They  know  that  well 
enough,  and  therefore  avoid  the  contest,  since  we  shall 
certainly  defend  ourselves  with  the  utmost  bitterness  and 
obstinacy.  If,  notwithstanding,  circumstances  make  the 
war  inevitable,  then  the  intention  of  our  enemies  to  crush 
us  to  the  ground,  and  our  own  resolve  to  maintain  our 
position  victoriously,  will  make  it  a  war  of  desperation. 
A  war  fought  and  lost  under  such  circumstances  would 
destroy  our  laboriously  gained  political  importance,  would 
jeopardize  the  whole  future  of  our  nation,  would  throw  us 
back  for  centuries,  would  shake  the  influence  of  German 
thought  in  the  civilized  world,  and  thus  check  the  general 
progress  of  mankind  in  its  healthy  development,  for  which 
a  flourishing  Germany  is  the  essential  condition.  Our 
next  war  will  be  fought  for  the  highest  interests  of  our 
country  and  of  mankind.  This  will  invest  it  with  im- 
portance in  the  world's  history.  "World  power  or  down- 
fall !"  will  be  our  rallying  cry. 


154    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

Keeping  this  idea  before  us,  we  must  prepare  for  war 
with  the  confident  intention  of  conquering,  and  with  the 
iron  resolve  to  persevere  to  the  end,  come  what  may. 

We  must  therefore  prepare  not  only  for  a  short  war, 
but  for  a  protracted  campaign.  We  must  be  armed  in 
order  to  complete  the  overthrow  of  our  enemies,  should 
the  victory  be  ours;  and,  if  worsted,  to  continue  to  defend 
ourselves  in  the  very  heart  of  our  country  until  success  at 
last  is  won. 

It  is  therefore  by  no  means  enough  to  maintain  a  certain 
numerical  equality  with  our  opponents.  On  the  contrary, 
we  must  strive  to  call  up  the  entire  forces  of  the  nation, 
and  prepare  and  arm  for  the  great  decision  which  impends. 
We  must  try  also  to  gain  a  certain  superiority  over  our 
opponents  in  the  crucial  points,  so  that  we  may  hold  some 
winning  trumps  in  our  hand  in  a  contest  unequal  from  the 
very  first.  We  must  bear  these  two  points  in  mind  when 
preparing  for  war.  Only  by  continually  realizing  the  duties 
thus  laid  on  us  can  we  carry  out  our  preparations  to  the 
fullest,  and  satisfy  the  demands  which  the  future  makes  on 
us.  A  nation  of  65,000,000  which  stakes  all  her  forces  on 
winning  herself  a  position,  and  on  keeping  that  position, 
cannot  be  conquered.  But  it  is  an  evil  day  for  her  if  she 
relies  on  the  semblance  of  power,  or,  miscalculating  her 
enemies'  strength,  is  content  with  half-measures,  and  looks 
to  luck  or  chance  for  that  which  can  only  be  attained  by 
the  exertion  and  development  of  all  her  powers. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
THE  NEXT  NAVAL  WAR 

In  the  next  European  land  war  we  shall  probably  face  our 
foes  with  Austria  at  our  side,  and  thus  will  be  in  a  position 
to  win  the  day  against  any  opposing  forces.  In  a  naval 
war  we  shall  be  thrown  on  our  own  resources,  and  must 
protect  ourselves  single-handed  against  the  superior  forces 
which  will  certainly  press  us  hard. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  this  war  will  be  waged  with 
England,  for,  although  we  cannot  contemplate  attacking 
England,  as  such  an  attack  would  be  hopeless,  the  country 
itself  has  a  lively  interest  in  checking  our  political  power. 
It  will  therefore,  under  certain  conditions,  attack  us,  in 
order  to  annihilate  our  fleet  and  aid  France.  The  English 
have,  besides,  taken  good  care  that  the  prospect  of  a  war 
with  them  should  always  be  held  before  our  eyes.  They 
talk  so  much  of  a  possible  German  attack  that  it  cannot 
surprise  them  if  the  light  thrown  on  the  question  is  from 
the  opposite  point  of  view.  Again,  the  preparations  which 
they  are  making  in  the  North  Sea  show  clearly  that  they 
certainly  have  contemplated  an  attack  on  Germany.  These 
preparations  are  like  a  strategic  march,  and  the  natural 
extension  of  their  naval  bases  leaves  no  doubt  as  to  their 
meaning.  The  great  military  harbour  of  Rosyth  is  admit- 
tedly built  for  the  eventuality  of  a  war  with  Germany,  and 
can  mean  nothing  else.  Harwich  has  also  been  recently 
made  into  an  especially  strong  naval  base,  and,  further,  the 
roadstead  of  Scapa  Flow  in  the  Orkney  Isles  has  been  en- 
larged into  a  cruiser  station.  These  are  measures  so  di- 
rectly and  obviously  directed  against  us  that  they  demand 
an  inquiry  into  the  military  position  thus  created. 

The  English  have  only  considered  the  possibility  of  a 

155 


156    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

German  war  since  1902.  Before  that  year  there  was  no 
idea  of  any  such  contingency,  and  it  is  therefore  not  un- 
natural that  they  are  eager  to  make  up  for  lost  time.  This 
fact  does  not  alter  the  hostile  character  of  the  measures 
and  the  circumstance  that  the  English  preparations  for 
war  are  exclusively  directed  against  Germany. 

We  must  therefore — as  the  general  position  of  the  world 
leads  us  to  believe — reckon  on  the  probability  of  a  naval 
war  with  England,  and  shall  then  have  to  fight  against 
an  overwhelming  superiority.  It  will  be  so  great  that  we 
cannot  hope  for  a  long  time  to  be  able  to  take  the  offensive 
against  the  English  fleet.  But  we  must  contemplate  the 
possibility  of  becoming  its  master  in  one  way  or  another, 
and  of  winning  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  if  England  attacks 
us.  We  shall  now  discuss  this  possibility.  On  this  matter 
I  am  expressing  my  personal  views  only,  which  are  not  con- 
fused by  any  technical  naval  knowledge,  and  rest  exclu- 
sively on  general  military  considerations,  in  which  our  pre- 
supposed antagonists  can,  and  will,  indulge  quite  as  well 
as  myself.  I  shall  not  betray  any  secrets  of  the  Admiralty, 
since  I  do  not  know  any.  But  I  consider  it  expedient  that 
the  German  people  should  clearly  understand  what  dangers 
threaten  from  England,  and  how  they  can  be  met. 

In  the  view  of  these  dangers  and  the  circumstance  that 
we  are  not  strong  enough  to  entertain  any  idea  of  provok- 
ing a  battle,  the  question  remains,  What  are  the  means  of 
defensive  naval  strategy  to  secure  protection  from  a  su- 
perior and  well-prepared  enemy,  and  gradually  to  become 
its  master? 

The  plan  might  be  formed  of  anticipating  the  enemy 
by  a  sudden  attack,  instead  of  waiting  passively  for  him 
to  attack  first,  and  of  opening  the  war  as  the  Japanese 
did  before  Port  Arthur.  In  this  way  the  English  fleet 
might  be  badly  damaged  at  the  outset  of  the  real  hostili- 
ties, its  superiority  might  be  lessened,  and  the  beginning  of 
the  effective  blockade  delayed  at  least  for  a  short  time. 
It  is  not  unthinkable  that  such  an  attempt  will  be  made. 
Such  an  undertaking,  however,  does  not  seem  to  me  to 
promise  any  great  success. 

The  English  have  secured  themselves  against  such  at- 


THE  NEXT  NAVAL  WAR  157 

tacks  by  comprehensive  works  of  defence  in  their  exposed 
harbours.  It  seems  dangerous  to  risk  our  torpedo-boats 
and  submarines,  which  we  shall  urgently  need  in  the  later 
course  of  the  war,  in  such  bold  undertakings.  Even  the 
war  against  the  English  commerce  holds  out  less  prospects 
than  formerly.  As  soon  as  a  state  of  political  tension  sets 
in,  the  English  merchantmen  will  be  convoyed  by  their 
numerous  cruisers.  Under  such  circumstances  our  aux- 
iliary cruisers  could  do  little ;  while  our  foreign  service  ships 
would  soon  have  to  set  about  attacking  the  enemy's  war- 
ships, before  coal  ran  short,  for  to  fill  up  the  coal-bunkers 
of  these  ships  will  certainly  be  a  difficult  task. 

The  war  against  the  English  commerce  must  none  the 
less  be  boldly  and  energetically  prosecuted,  and  should 
start  unexpectedly.  The  prizes  which  fall  into  our  hands 
must  be  remorselessly  destroyed,  since  it  will  usually  be 
impossible,  owing  to  the  great  English  superiority  and  the 
few  bases  we  have  abroad,  to  bring  them  back  in  safety 
without  exposing  our  vessels  to  great  risks.  The  sharpest 
measures  must  be  taken  against  neutral  ships  laden  with 
contraband.  Nevertheless,  no  very  valuable  results  can 
be  expected  from  a  war  against  England's  trade.  On  the 
contrary,  England,  with  the  numerous  cruisers  and  aux- 
iliary cruisers  at  her  disposal,  would  be  able  to  cripple  our 
oversea  commerce.  We  must  be  ready  for  a  sudden  at- 
tack, even  in  peace-time.  It  is  not  England's  custom  to 
let  ideal  considerations  fetter  her  action  if  her  interests  are 
at  stake. 

Under  these  circumstances,  nothing  would  be  left  for  us 
but  to  retire  with  our  war-fleet  under  the  guns  of  the 
coast  fortifications,  and  by  the  use  of  mines  to  protect 
own  own  shores  and  make  them  dangerous  to  English 
vessels.  Mines  are  only  an  effective  hindrance  to  attack 
if  they  can  be  defended.  But  they  can  cause  considerable 
damage  if  the  enemy  has  no  knowledge  of  their  existence. 

It  would  be  necessary  to  take  further  steps  to  secure 
the  importation  from  abroad  of  supplies  necessary  to  us, 
since  our  own  communications  will  be  completely  cut  off  by 
the  English.  The  simplest  and  cheapest  way  would  be  if  we 
obtained  foreign  goods  through  Holland  or  perhaps  neutral 


158    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

Belgium;  and  could  export  some  part  of  our  own  products 
through  the  great  Dutch  and  Flemish  harbours.  New  com- 
mercial routes  might  be  discovered  through  Denmark.  Our 
own  oversea  commerce  would  remain  suspended,  but  such 
measures  would  prevent  an  absolute  stagnation  of  trade. 

It  is,  however,  very  unlikely  that  England  would  tolerate 
such  communications  through  neutral  territory,  since  in 
that  way  the  effect  of  her  war  on  our  trade  would  be  much 
reduced.  The  attempt  to  block  these  trade  routes  would 
approximate  to  a  breach  of  neutrality,  and  the  States  in 
question  would  have  to  face  the  momentous  question, 
whether  they  would  conform  to  England's  will,  and  thus 
incur  Germany's  enmity,  or  would  prefer  that  adhesion  to 
the  German  Empire  which  geography  dictates.  They 
would  have  the  choice  between  a  naval  war  with  England 
and  a  Continental  war  with  their  German  neighbours — two 
possibilities,  each  of  which  contains  great  dangers.  That 
England  would  pay  much  attention  to  the  neutrality  of 
weaker  neighbours  when  such  a  stake  was  at  issue  is  hardly 
credible. 

The  ultimate  decision  of  the  individual  neutral  States 
cannot  be  foreseen.  It  would  probably  depend  on  the  gen- 
eral political  position  and  the  attitude  of  the  other  World 
Powers  to  the  Anglo-German  contest.  The  policy  adopted 
by  France  and  Russia  would  be  an  important  factor.  One 
can  easily  understand  under  these  circumstances  that  the 
Dutch  are  seriously  proposing  to  fortify  strongly  the  most 
important  points  on  their  coast,  in  order  to  be  able  to 
maintain  their  neutrality  on  the  sea  side.  They  are  also 
anxious  about  their  eastern  frontier,  which  obviously  would 
be  threatened  by  a  German  attack  so  soon  as  they  sided 
with  our  enemies. 

I  shall  not  enter  further  into  the  political  and  military 
possibilities  which  might  arise  if  Holland,  Belgium,  and 
Denmark  were  driven  to  a  sympathetic  understanding  by 
the  war.  I  will  only  point  out  how  widespread  an  effect 
the  naval  war  can,  or  rather  must,  exerices  on  the  Con- 
tinental war  and  on  the  political  relations  generally.  The 
attitude  of  Denmark  would  be  very  important,  since  the 
passage  to  and  from  the  Baltic  must  mainly  depend  on  her. 


THE  NEXT  NAVAL  WAR  159 

It  is  vital  to  us  that  these  communications  be  kept  open, 
and  measures  must  be  taken  to  insure  this.  The  open  door 
through  the  Belt  and  the  Sound  can  become  highly  im- 
portant for  the  conduct  of  the  war.  Free  commerce  with 
Sweden  is  essential  for  us,  since  our  industries  will  depend 
more  and  more  on  the  Swedish  iron-ore  as  imports  from 
other  countries  become  interrupted. 

It  will  rest  with  the  general  state  of  affairs  and  the 
policy  of  the  interested  nations  whether  this  sea  route  can 
be  safeguarded  by  diplomatic  negotiations,  or  must  be  kept 
open  by  military  action.  We  cannot  allow  a  hostile  power 
to  occupy  the  Danish  islands. 

Complicated  and  grave  questions,  military  as  well  as 
political,  are  thus  raised  by  an  Anglo-German  war.  Our 
trade  would  in  any  case  suffer  greatly,  for  sea  communica- 
tions could  be  cut  off  on  every  side.  Let  us  assume  that 
France  and  Russia  seal  our  land  frontiers,  then  the  only 
trade  route  left  open  to  us  is  through  Switzerland  and 
Austria — a  condition  of  affairs  which  would  aggravate 
difficulties  at  home,  and  should  stimulate  us  to  carry  on 
the  war  with  increased  vigour.  In  any  case,  when  war 
threatens  we  must  lose  no  time  in  preparing  a  road  on 
which  we  can  import  the  most  essential  foodstuffs  and 
raw  materials,  and  also  export,  if  only  in  small  quantities, 
the  surplus  of  our  industrial  products.  Such  measures 
cannot  be  made  on  the  spur  of  the  moment.  They  must 
be  elaborated  in  peace-time,  and  a  definite  department  of 
the  Government  must  be  responsible  for  these  prepara- 
tions. The  Ministry  of  Commerce  would  obviously  be  the 
appropriate  department,  and  should,  in  collaboration  with 
the  great  commercial  houses,  prepare  the  routes  which  our 
commerce  must  follow  in  case  of  war.  There  must  be  a 
sort  of  commercial  mobilization. 

These  suggestions  indicate  the  preliminary  measures  to 
be  adopted  by  us  in  the  eventuality  of  a  war  with  England. 
We  should  at  first  carry  on  a  defensive  war,  and  would 
therefore  have  to  reckon  on  a  blockade  of  our  coasts,  if 
we  succeed  in  repelling  the  probable  English  attack. 

Such  a  blockade  can  be  carried  out  in  two  ways.  Eng- 
land can  blockade  closely  our  North  Sea  coast,  and  at  the 


160    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

same  time  bar  the  Danish  straits,  so  as  to  cut  off  com- 
munications with  our  Baltic  ports;  or  she  can  seal  up  on 
the  one  side  the  Channel  between  England  and  the  Con- 
tinent, on  the  other  side  the  open  sea  between  the  North 
of  Scotland  and  Norway,  on  the  Peterhead-Ekersund  line, 
and  thus  cripple  our  oversea  commerce  and  also  control 
the  Belgo-Dutch,  Danish,  and  Swedish  shipping. 

A  close  blockade  in  the  first  case  would  greatly  tax  the 
resources  of  the  English  fleet.  According  to  the  view  of 
English  experts,  if  a  blockade  is  to  be  maintained  perma- 
nently, the  distance  between  the  base  and  the  blockading 
line  must  not  exceed  200  nautical  miles.  Since  all  the 
English  naval  ports  are  considerably  farther  than  this 
from  our  coast,  the  difficulties  of  carrying  on  the  blockade 
will  be  enormously  increased.  That  appears  to  be  the 
reason  why  the  estuary  at  Harwich  has  recently  been  trans- 
formed into  a  strong  naval  harbour.  It  is  considered 
the  best  harbourage  on  the  English  coast,  and  is  hardly 
300  nautical  miles  from  the  German  coast.  It  offers  good 
possibilities  of  fortification,  and  safe  ingress  and  egress  in 
time  of  war.  The  distance  from  the  German  ports  is  not, 
however,  very  material  for  purposes  of  blockade.  The 
English,  if  they  planned  such  a  blockade,  would  doubtless 
count  on  acquiring  bases  on  our  own  coast,  perhaps  also 
on  the  Dutch  coast.  Our  task  therefore  is  to  prevent  such 
attempts  by  every  means.  Not  only  must  every  point 
which  is  suitable  for  a  base,  such  as  Heligoland,  Borkum, 
and  Sylt,  be  fortified  in  time  of  peace,  but  all  attempts  at 
landing  must  be  hindered  and  complicated  by  our  fleet. 
This  task  can  only  be  fulfilled  by  the  fleet  in  daytime  by 
submarines;  by  night  torpedo-boats  may  co-operate,  if  the 
landing  forces  are  still  on  board. 

Such  close  blockade  offers  various  possibilities  of  dam- 
aging the  enemy,  if  the  coast  fortifications  are  so  con- 
structed with  a  view  to  the  offensive  that  the  fleet  may 
rally  under  their  protection,  and  thus  gain  an  opportunity 
of  advancing  from  their  stations  for  offensive  operations. 
Such  possibilities  exist  on  our  north  coast,  and  our  efforts 
must  be  turned  towards  making  the  most  varied  use  of 
them.     We  must  endeavour  by  renewed  and  unexpected 


THE  NEXT  NAVAL  WAR  161 

attacks,  especially  by  night,  partly  with  submarines  and 
torpedo-boats,  partly  with  battleships,  to  give  the  block- 
ading fleet  no  breathing-time,  and  to  cause  it  as  much 
loss  as  possible.  We  must  not  engage  in  a  battle  with 
superior  hostile  forces,  for  it  is  hardly  possible  at  sea  to 
discontinue  a  fight,  because  there  is  no  place  whither  the 
loser  can  withdraw  from  the  effect  of  the  enemy's  guns. 
An  engagement,  once  begun,  must  be  fought  out  to  the 
end.  And  appreciable  damage  can  be  inflicted  on  the 
enemy  only  if  a  bold  attack  on  him  is  made.  It  is  only 
possible  under  exceptionally  favourable  circumstances — 
such,  for  example,  as  the  proximity  of  the  fortified  base — 
to  abandon  a  fight  once  begun  without  very  heavy  losses. 
It  might  certainly  be  practicable,  by  successful  recon- 
noitring, to  attack  the  enemy  repeatedly  at  times  when 
he  is  weakened  in  one  place  or  another.  Blockade  demands 
naturally  a  certain  division  of  forces,  and  the  battle-fleet 
of  the  attacking  party,  which  is  supposed  to  lie  behind  the 
farthest  lines  of  blockade  and  observation,  cannot  always 
hold  the  high  seas  in  full  strength.  The  forces  of  the  de- 
fending party,  however,  lie  in  safe  anchorages,  ready  to 
sally  out  and  fight. 

Such  a  blockade  might,  after  all,  be  very  costly  to  the 
attacking  party.  We  may  therefore  fairly  assume  that 
the  English  would  decide  in  favour  of  the  second  kind. 
At  all  events,  the  harbour  constructions,  partly  building, 
partly  projected,  at  Rosyth  and  Scapa  Flow,  were  chosen 
with  an  eye  to  this  line  of  blockade.  It  would  entail  in 
the  north  the  barring  of  a  line  about  300  nautical  miles 
long1,  a  scheme  quite  feasible  from  the  military  aspect. 
Only  a  small  force  is  required  to  seal  up  the  Channel,  as 
the  navigation  route  is  very  narrow.  In  addition  to  all 
this,  the  great  English  naval  depots — Dover,  Portsmouth, 
Portland,  and  Plymouth — are  situated  either  on  the  line 
of  blockade  or  immediately  behind  it.  Besides,  every  ad- 
vance against  this  line  from  the  north  is  flanked  by  Sheer- 
ness  and  Harwich,  so  that  a  retreat  to  the  German  coast 
might  be  barred.  The  conditions  for  the  northern  line  of 
blockade  will  be  no  less  favourable  when  the  projected 
harbour  works  are  finished.     The  blockading  fleet  finds, 


162    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

therefore,  a  base  in  the  great  harbour  of  Rosyth,  while  a 
cruiser  squadron  might  lie  in  support  off  the  Orkney  Isles. 
Every  attacking  fleet  from  the  German  north  coast  will  be 
unhesitatingly  attacked  on  the  flank  from  Rosyth  and 
Sheerness,  and  cut  off  from  its  line  of  retreat.  It  is  thus 
almost  impossible,  owing  to  the  English  superiority,  to 
inflict  any  serious  damage  on  the  blockading  fleet  on  this 
line,  and  the  only  course  left  is  to  advance  from  the  Baltic 
against  the  north-eastern  part  of  the  blockading  line.  Here 
we  should  have  a  tolerably  secure  retreat.  This  accentuates 
once  more  the  supreme  importance  to  us  of  keeping  open,  at 
all  costs,  the  passage  through  the  Sound  and  the  Great 
Belt.  The  command  of  these  straits  will  not  only  secure 
the  Baltic  basin  for  us,  but  also  keep  open  the  sally-ports 
for  our  offensive  operations  against  the  English  blockading 
fleet. 

In  spite  of  all  the  advantages  which  the  extended  system 
of  blockade  offers  to  the  English,  there  are  two  objections 
against  it  which  are  well  worth  considering  from  the  Eng- 
lish point  of  view.  Firstly,  it  prejudices  the  interests  of  a 
number  of  nations  whose  coasts  are  washed  by  the  North 
Sea  and  the  Baltic,  since  they  are  included  in  the  blockade ; 
secondly,  it  compels  England  to  break  up  her  fleet  into  two 
or  three  divisions. 

As  to  the  first  objection,  we  have  hinted  that  England 
will  scarcely  let  herself  be  hindered  in  the  pursuit  of  her 
own  advantage  by  the  interests  of  weaker  third  parties. 
It  is  also  conceivable  that  some  satisfactory  arrangement 
as  to  the  blockade  can  be  made  with  the  States  affected. 
As  regards  the  splitting  up  of  the  fleet,  no  especially  dis- 
advantageous conditions  are  thereby  produced.  It  is  easy 
to  reunite  the  temporarily  divided  parts,  and  the  strength 
of  the  combined  fleet  guarantees  the  superiority  of  the 
separate  divisions  over  the  German  forces  at  sea.  Never- 
theless, this  division  of  the  attacking  fleet  gives  the  de- 
fending party  the  chance  of  attacking  some  detached 
portions  before  junction  with  the  main  body,  and  of  in- 
flicting loss  on  them,  if  the  enemy  can  be  deceived  and 
surprised  by  prompt  action.  The  demonstrations  which 
are  the  ordinary  tactics  in  war  on  land  under  such  con- 


THE  NEXT  NAVAL  WAR  163 

ditions  cannot  be  employed,  owing  to  the  facility  with  which 
the  sea  can  be  patrolled. 

This  blockade  would  ultimately  weaken  and  weary  the 
attacking  party.  But  it  must  be  recognized  that  it  is  a 
far  easirer  plan  to  carry  out  than  the  close  blockade,  and 
that  it  would  tax  the  offensive  powers  of  our  fleet  more 
severely.  We  should  not  only  have  to  venture  on  attacks 
in  far-distant  waters,  but  must  be  strong  enough  to  protect 
efficiently  the  threatened  flank  of  our  attacking  fleet. 

After  all,  it  is  improbable  that  the  English  would  have 
recourse  to  a  mere  blockade.  The  reasons  which  would 
prompt  them  to  a  rapid  decision  of  the  war  have  been  al- 
ready explained.  It  was  shown  that,  in  the  event  of  their 
fighting  in  alliance  with  France,  they  would  probably  at- 
tempt to  land  troops  in  order  to  support  their  fleet  from 
the  land  side.  They  could  not  obtain  a  decisive  result  un- 
less they  attempted  to  capture  our  naval  bases — Wilhelms- 
haven,  Heligoland,  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe,  and  Kiel — and 
to  annihilate  our  fleet  in  its  attempt  to  protect  these  places, 
and  thus  render  it  impossible  for  us  to  continue  the  war 
by  sea. 

It  is  equally  certain  that  our  land  forces  would  actively 
operate  against  the  English  attempts  at  landing,  and  that 
they  would  afford  extraordinarily  important  assistance  to 
the  defence  of  the  coast,  by  protecting  it  against  attacks 
from  the  rear,  and  by  keeping  open  the  communications 
with  the  hinterland.  The  success  of  the  English  attack 
will  much  depend  on  the  strength  and  armament  of  the 
coast  fortifications.  Such  a  war  will  clearly  show  their 
value  both  as  purely  defensive  and  as  offensive  works.  Our 
whole  future  history  may  turn  upon  the  impregnability  of 
the  fortifications  which,  in  combination  with  the  fleet,  are 
intended  to  guard  our  coasts  and  naval  bases,  and  should 
inflict  such  heavy  losses  on  the  enemy  that  the  difference 
of  strength  between  the  two  fleets  would  be  gradually 
equalized.  Our  ships,  it  must  be  remembered,  can  only 
act  effectively  so  long  as  our  coast  fortifications  hold  out. 

No  proof  is  required  that  a  good  Intelligence  system  is 
essential  to  a  defensive  which  is  based  on  the  policy  of  strik- 
ing unexpected  blows.    Such  a  system  alone  can  guarantee 


164    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

the  right  choice  of  favourable  moments  for  attack,  and  can 
give  us  such  early  information  of  the  operative  movements 
of  the  hostile  fleet  that  we  can  take  the  requisite  measures 
for  defence,  and  always  retreat  before  an  attack  in  superior 
numbers.  The  numerical  superiority  of  the  English  cruisers 
is  so  great  that  we  shall  probably  only  be  able  to  guarantee 
rapid  and  trustworthy  "scouting"  by  the  help  of  the  air- 
fleet.  The  importance  of  the  air-fleet  must  not  therefore 
be  under- valued ;  and  steps  must  be  taken  to  repel  the 
enemy's  airships,  either  by  employing  specially  contrived 
cannons,  or  by  attacking  them  directly. 

If  it  is  possible  to  employ  airships  for  offensive  purposes 
also,  they  would  support  our  own  fleet  in  their  contest  with 
the  superior  English  force  by  dropping  explosives  on  the 
enemy's  ships,  and  might  thus  contribute  towards  gradually 
restoring  the  equilibrium  of  the  opposing  forces.  These 
possibilities  are,  however,  vague.  The  ships  are  protected 
to  some  extent  by  their  armour  against  such  explosives  as 
could  be  dropped  from  airships,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  aim 
correctly  from  a  balloon.  But  the  possibility  of  such 
methods  of  attack  must  be  kept  in  mind. 

So  far  as  aviation  goes,  the  defending  party  has  the  ad- 
vantage, for,  starting  from  the  German  coast,  our  airships 
and  flying-machines  would  be  able  to  operate  against  the 
English  attacking  fleet  more  successfully  than  the  English 
airships  against  our  forts  and  vessels,  since  they  would  have 
as  a  base  either  the  fleet  itself  or  the  distant  English  coast. 

Such  possibilities  of  superiority  must  be  carefully 
watched  for,  and  nothing  must  be  neglected  which  could 
injure  the  enemy;  while  the  boldest  spirit  of  attack  and 
the  most  reckless  audacity  must  go  hand  in  hand  with  the 
employment  of  every  means  which  mechanical  skill  and  the 
science  of  naval  construction  and  fortification  can  supply. 
This  is  the  only  way  by  which  we  may  hope  so  to  weaken 
our  proud  opponent,  that  we  may  in  the  end  challenge  him 
to  a  decisive  engagement  on  the  open  sea. 

In  this  war  we  must  conquer,  or,  at  any  rate,  not  allow 
ourselves  to  be  defeated,  for  it  will  decide  whether  we  can 
attain  a  position  as  a  World  Power  by  the  side  of,  and  in 
spite  of,  England. 


THE  NEXT  NAVAL  WAR  165 

This  victory  will  not  be  gained  merely  in  the  exclusive 
interests  of  Germany.  We  shall  in  this  struggle,  as  so  often 
before,  represent  the  common  interests  of  the  world,  for  it 
will  be  fought  not  only  to  win  recognition  for  ourselves, 
but  for  the  freedom  of  the  seas.  "This  was  the  great  aim 
of  Russia  under  the  Empress  Catherine  II.,  of  France 
under  Napoleon  I.,  and  spasmodically  down  to  1904  in  the 
last  pages  of  her  history;  and  the  great  Republic  of  the 
United  States  of  North  America  strives  for  it  with  intense 
energy.  It  is  the  development  of  the  right  of  nations  for 
which  every  people  craves."* 

In  such  a  contest  we  should  not  stand  spiritually  alone, 
but  all  on  this  vast  globe  whose  feelings  and  thoughts 
are  proud  and  free  will  join  us  in  this  campaign  against 
the  overweening  ambitions  of  one  nation,  which,  in  spite 
of  all  her  pretence  of  a  liberal  and  a  philanthropic  policy, 
has  never  sought  any  other  object  than  personal  advan- 
tage and  the  unscrupulous  suppression  of  her  rivals. 

If  the  French  fleet — as  we  may  expect — combines  with 
the  English  and  takes  part  in  the  war,  it  will  be  much 
more  difficult  for  us  to  wage  than  a  war  with  England 
alone.  France's  blue-water  fleet  would  hold  our  allies  in 
the  Mediterranean  in  check,  and  England  could  bring  all 
her  forces  to  bear  upon  us.  It  would  be  possible  that 
combined  fleets  of  the  two  Powers  might  appear  both  in 
the  Mediterranean  and  in  the  North  Sea,  since  England 
could  hardly  leave  the  protection  of  her  Mediterranean 
interests  to  France  alone.  The  prospect  of  any  ultimately 
successful  issue  would  thus  shrink  into  the  background. 
But  we  need  not  even  then  despair.  On  the  contrary,  we 
must  fight  the  French  fleet,  so  to  speak,  on  land — i.e.,  we 
must  defeat  France  so  decisively  that  she  would  be  com- 
pelled to  renounce  her  alliance  with  England  and  with- 
draw her  fleet  to  save  herself  from  total  destruction. 
Just  as  in  1870-71  we  marched  to  the  shores  of  the  Atlantic, 
so  this  time  again  we  must  resolve  on  an  absolute  con- 
quest, in  order  to  capture  the  French  naval  ports  and 
destroy  the  French  naval  depots.     It  would  be  a  war  to 


*  Schiemann. 


i<56         GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

the  knife  with  France,  one  which  would,  if  victorious, 
annihilate  once  for  all  the  French  position  as  a  Great 
Power.  If  France,  with  her  falling  birth-rate,  determines 
on  such  a  war,  it  is  at  the  risk  of  losing  her  place  in  the 
first  rank  of  European  nations,  and  sinking  into  permanent 
political  subservience.     Those  are  the  stakes. 

The  participation  of  Russia  in  the  naval  war  must  also 
be  comtemplated.  That  is  the  less  dangerous,  since  the 
Russian  Baltic  fleet  is  at  present  still  weak,  and  cannot 
combine  so  easily  as  the  English  with  the  French.  We 
could  operate  against  it  on  the  inner  line — i.e.,  we  could 
use  the  opportunity  of  uniting  rapidly  our  vessels  in  the 
Baltic  by  means  of  the  Kaiser- Wilhelm  Canal;  we  could 
attack  the  Russian  ships  in  vastly  superior  force,  and,  hav- 
ing struck  our  blow,  we  could  return  to  the  North  Sea. 
For  these  operations  it  is  of  the  first  importance  that  the 
Danish  straits  should  not  be  occupied  by  the  enemy.  If 
they  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  English,  all  free  operations 
in  the  Baltic  would  be  almost  impossible,  and  our  Baltic 
coast  would  then  be  abandoned  to  the  passive  protection 
of  our  coast  batteries. 


CHAPTER  IX 
THE  CRUCIAL  QUESTION 

I  have  examined  the  probable  conditions  of  the  next  naval 
war  in  some  detail,  because  I  thought  that  our  general 
political  and  military  position  can  only  be  properly  esti- 
mated by  considering  the  various  phases  of  the  war  by  sea 
and  by  land,  and  by  realizing  the  possibilities  and  dangers 
arising  from  the  combined  action  of  the  hostile  forces  on 
our  coasts  and  land  frontiers.  In  this  way  only  can  the 
direction  be  decided  in  which  our  preparations  for  war 
ought  to  move. 

The  considerations,  then,  to  which  the  discussion  about 
the  naval  war  with  England  and  her  probable  allies  gave 
rise  have  shown  that  we  shall  need  to  make  very  great 
exertions  to  protect  ourselves  successfully  from  a  hostile 
attack  by  sea.  They  also  proved  that  we  cannot  count  on 
an  ultimate  victory  at  sea  unless  we  are  victorious  on  land. 
If  an  Anglo-French  army  invaded  North  Germany  through 
Holland,  and  threatened  our  coast  defences  in  the  rear,  it 
would  soon  paralyze  our  defence  by  sea.  The  same  argu- 
ment applies  to  the  eastern  theatre.  If  Russian  armies 
advance  victoriously  along  the  Baltic  and  co-operate  with  a 
combined  fleet  of  our  opponents,  any  continuation  of  the 
naval  war  would  be  rendered  futile  by  the  operations  of  the 
enemy  on  land. 

We  know  also  that  it  is  of  primary  importance  to  organize 
our  forces  on  land  so  thoroughly  that  they  guarantee  the 
possibility,  under  all  circumstances,  of  our  victoriously 
maintaining  our  position  on  the  Continent  of  Europe.  This 
position  must  be  made  absolutely  safe  before  we  can  suc- 
cessfully carry  on  a  war  by  sea,  and  follow  an  imperial 
policy  based  on  naval  power.  So  long  as  Rome  was 
threatened  by  Hannibal  in  Italy  there  could  be  no  possible 

167 


i<58  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

idea  of  empire.  She  did  not  begin  her  triumphal  progress 
in  history  until  she  was  thoroughly  secure  in  her  own 
country. 

But  our  discussion  shows  also  that  success  on  land  can 
be  influenced  by  the  naval  war.  If  the  enemy  succeeds  in 
destroying  our  fleet  and  landing  with  strong  detachments 
on  the  North  Sea  coast,  large  forces  of  the  land  army 
would  be  required  to  repel  them,  a  circumstance  widely 
affecting  the  progress  of  the  war  on  the  land  frontiers.  It 
is  therefore  vitally  necessary  to  prepare  the  defence  of  our 
own  coasts  so  well  that  every  attack,  even  by  superior  num- 
bers, may  be  victoriously  repelled. 

At  the  same  time  the  consideration  of  the  political  posi- 
tion presses  the  conviction  home  that  in  our  preparations 
for  war  there  must  be  no  talk  of  a  gradual  development  of 
our  forces  by  sea  and  land  such  as  may  lay  the  lightest 
possible  burden  on  the  national  finances,  and  leave  ample 
scope  for  activity  in  the  sphere  of  culture.  The  crucial 
point  is  to  put  aside  all  other  considerations,  and  to  prepare 
ourselves  with  the  utmost  energy  for  a  war  which  appears 
to  be  imminent,  and  will  decide  the  whole  future  of  our 
politics  and  our  civilization.  The  consideration  of  the  broad 
lines  of  the  world  policy  and  of  the  political  aspirations  of 
the  individual  States  snowed  that  the  position  of  affairs 
everywhere  is  critical  for  us,  that  we  live  at  an  epoch  which 
will  decide  our  place  as  a  World  Power  or  our  downfall. 
The  internal  disruption  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  as  shown 
clearly  by  the  action  of  Italy  towards  Turkey,  threatens  to 
bring  the  crisis  quickly  to  a  head.  The  period  which  destiny 
has  allotted  us  for  concentrating  our  forces  and  preparing 
ourselves  for  the  deadly  struggle  may  soon  be  passed.  We 
must  use  it,  if  we  wish  to  be  mindful  of  the  warning  of 
the  Great  Elector,  that  we  are  Germans.  This  is  the  point 
of  view  from  which  we  must  carry  out  our  preparations 
for  war  by  sea  and  land.  Thus  only  can  we  be  true  to  our 
national  duty. 

I  do  not  mean  that  we  should  adopt  precipitately  meas- 
ures calculated  merely  for  the  exigencies  of  the  moment. 
All  that  we  undertake  in  the  cause  of  military  efficiency 
must  meet  two  requirements:  it  must  answer  the  pressing 


THE  CRUCIAL  QUESTION  169 

questions  of  the  present,  and  aid  the  development  of  the 
future.  But  we  must  find  the  danger  of  our  position  a 
stimulus  to  desperate  exertions,  so  that  we  may  regain  at 
the  eleventh  hour  something  of  what  we  have  lost  in  the 
last  years. 

Since  the  crucial  point  is  to  safeguard  our  much-threat- 
ened position  on  the  continent  of  Europe,  we  must  first  of 
all  face  the  serious  problem  of  the  land  war — by  what  means 
we  can  hope  to  overcome  the  great  numerical  superiority  of 
our  enemies.  Such  superiority  will  certainly  exist  if  Italy 
ceases  to  be  an  active  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
Whether  nominally  belonging  to  it,  or  politically  going  over 
to  Irredentism.  The  preparations  for  the  naval  war  are 
of  secondary  importance. 

The  first  essential  requirement,  in  case  of  a  war  by  land, 
is  to  make  the  total  fighting  strength  of  the  nation  available 
for  war,  to  educate  the  entire  youth  of  the  country  in  the 
use  of  arms,  and  to  make  universal  service  an  existing  fact. 

The  system  of  universal  service,  born  in  the  hour  of 
need,  has  by  a  splendid  development  of  strength  liberated 
us  from  a  foreign  yoke,  has  in  long  years  of  peace  educated 
a  powerful  and  well-armed  people,  and  has  brought  us  vic- 
tory upon  victory  in  the  German  wars  of  unification.  Its 
importance  for  the  social  evolution  of  the  nation  has  been 
discussed  in  a  separate  chapter.  The  German  Empire 
would  to-day  have  a  mighty  political  importance  if  we  had 
been  loyal  to  the  principle  on  which  our  greatness  was 
founded. 

France  has  at  the  present  day  a  population  of  some 
40,000,000;  Russia  in  Europe,  with  Poland  and  the  Cau- 
casus, has  a  population  of  140,000,000.  Contrasted  with 
this,  Germany  has  only  65,000,000  inhabitants.  But  since 
the  Russian  military  forces  are,  to  a  great  extent,  ham- 
pered by  very  various  causes  and  cannot  be  employed  at 
any  one  time  or  place,  and  are  also  deficient  in  military 
value,  a  German  army  which  corresponded  to  the  popula- 
tion would  be  certainly  in  a  position  to  defend  itself  suc- 
cessfully against  its  two  enemies,  if  it  operated  resolutely 
on  the  inner  line,  even  though  England  took  part  in  the  war. 

Disastrously  for  ourselves,  we  have  become  disloyal  to 


170    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

the  idea  of  universal  military  service,  and  have  apparently 
definitely  discontinued  to  carry  it  out  effectively.  The 
country  where  universal  service  exists  is  now  France.  With 
us,  indeed,  it  is  still  talked  about,  but  it  is  only  kept  up 
in  pretence,  for  in  reality  50  per  cent.,  perhaps,  of  the  able- 
bodied  are  called  up  for  training.  In  particular,  very  little 
use  has  been  made  of  the  larger  towns  as  recruiting- 
grounds  for  the  army. 

In  this  direction  some  reorganization  is  required  which 
will  energetically  combine  the  forces  of  the  nation  and 
create  a  real  army,  such  as  we  have  not  at  the  present  time. 
Unless  we  satisfy  this  demand,  we  shall  not  long  be  able 
to  hold  our  own  against  the  hostile  Powers. 

Although  we  recognize  this  necessity  as  a  national  duty, 
we  must  not  shut  our  eyes  to  the  fact  that  it  is  impossible 
in  a  short  time  to  make  up  our  deficiencies.  Our  peace 
army  cannot  be  suddenly  increased  by  150,000  men.  The 
necessary  training  staff  and  equipment  would  not  be  forth- 
coming, and  on  the  financial  side  the  required  expenditure 
could  not  all  at  once  be  incurred.  The  full  effectiveness  of 
an  increased  army  only  begins  to  be  gradually  felt  when 
the  number  of  reservists  and  Landwehr  is  correspondingly 
raised.  We  can  therefore  only  slowly  recur  to  the  re- 
inforcement of  universal  service.  The  note  struck  by  the 
new  Five  Years  Act  cannot  be  justified  on  any  grounds. 
But  although  we  wish  to  increase  our  army  on  a  more 
extensive  scale,  we  must  admit  that,  even  if  we  strain  our 
resources,  the  process  can  only  work  slowly,  and  that  wj 
cannot  hope  for  a  long  time  to  equalize  even  approximately 
the  superior  forces  of  our  opponents. 

We  must  not,  therefore,  be  content  merely  to  strengthen 
our  army;  we  must  devise  other  means  of  gaining  the 
upper  hand  of  our  enemies.  These  means  can  only  be 
found  in  the  spiritual  domain. 

History  teaches  us  by  countless  examples  that  numbers 
in  themselves  have  only  been  the  decisive  factor  in  war 
when  the  opponents  have  been  equally  matched  otherwise, 
or  when  the  superiority  of  the  one  party  exceeds  the  pro- 
portion required  by  th*  numerical  law.*  In  most  cases 
*Cf.  v.  Bernhardi,  "Vom  heuUgen  Kriege,"  vol.  i.,  chap.  ii. 


THE  CRUCIAL  QUESTION  171 

it  was  a  special  advantage  possessed  by  the  one  party — 
better  equipment,  greater  efficiency  of  troops,  brilliant 
leadership,  or  more  able  strategy — which  led  to  victory 
over  the  numerically  superior.  Rome  conquered  the  world 
with  inferior  forces;  Frederick  the  Great  with  inferior 
forces  withstood  the  allied  armies  of  Europe.  Recent  his- 
tory shows  us  the  victory  of  the  numerically  weaker 
Japanese  army  over  a  cru  shingly  superior  opponent.  We 
cannot  count  on  seeing  a  great  commander  at  our  head; 
a  second  Frederick  the  Great  will  hardly  appear.  Nor 
can  we  know  beforehand  whether  our  troops  will  prove 
superior  to  the  hostile  force*.  But  we  can  try  to  learn  what 
will  be  the  decisive  factors  in  the  future  war  which  will 
turn  the  scale  in  favour  of  victory  or  defeat.  If  we  know 
this,  and  prepare  for  war  with  a  set  purpose,  and  keep  the 
essential  points  of  view  always  before  us,  we  might  create 
a  real  source  of  superiority,  and  gain  a  start  on  our  oppo- 
nents which  would  be  hard  for  them  to  make  up  in  the 
course  of  the  war.  Should  we  then  in  the  war  itself 
follow  one  dominating  principle  of  the  policy  which  results 
from  the  special  nature  of  present-day  war,  it  must  be 
possible  to  gain  a  positive  advantage  which  may  even 
equalize  a  considerable  numerical  superiority. 

The  essential  point  is  not  to  match  battalion  with  bat- 
talion, battery  with  battery,  or  to  command  a  number  of 
cannons,  machine  guns,  airships,  and  other  mechanical  con- 
trivances equal  to  that  of  the  probable  opponent;  it  is 
foolish  initiative  to  strain  every  nerve  to  be  abreast  with 
the  enemy  in  all  material  domains.  This  idea  leads  to  a 
certain  spiritual  servility  and  inferiority. 

Rather  must  an  effort  be  made  to  win  superiority  in  the 
factors  on  which  the  ultimate  decision  turns.  The  duty  of 
our  War  Department  is  to  prepare  these  decisive  elements 
of  strength  while  still  at  peace,  and  to  apply  them  in  war 
according  to  a  clearly  recognized  principle  of  superiority. 
This  must  secure  for  us  the  spiritual  and  so  the  material 
advantage  over  our  enemies.  Otherwise  we  run  the  danger 
of  being  crushed  by  their  weight  of  numbers. 

We  cannot  reach  this  goal  on  the  beaten  roads  of  tradition 
and  habit  by  uninspired  rivalry  in  arming.    We  must  tract 


172    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

out  with  clear  insight  the  probable  course  of  the  future  war, 
and  must  not  be  afraid  to  tread  new  paths,  if  needs  be, 
which  are  not  consecrated  by  experience  and  use.  New 
goals  can  only  be  reached  by  new  roads,  and  our  military 
history  teaches  us  by  numerous  instances  how  the  source 
of  superiority  lies  in  progress,  in  conscious  innovations 
based  on  convincing  arguments.  The  spiritual  capacity  to 
know  where,  under  altered  conditions,  the  decision  must 
be  sought,  and  the  spiritual  courage  to  resolve  on  this  new 
line  of  action,  are  the  soil  in  which  great  successes  ripen. 

It  would  be  too  long  a  task  in  this  place  to  examine  more 
closely  the  nature  of  the  future  war,  in  order  to  develop 
systematically  the  ideas  which  will  prove  decisive  iiv  it. 
These  questions  have  been  thoroughly  ventilated  in  a  book 
recently  published  by  me,  "Vom  heutigen  Kriege"  ("The 
War  of  To-day").  In  this  place  I  will  only  condense  the 
results  of  my  inquiry,  in  order  to  form  a  foundation  for 
the  further  consideration  of  the  essential  questions  of  the 
future. 

In  a  future  European  war  "masses"  will  be  employed  to 
an  extent  unprecedented  in  any  previous  one.  Weapons 
will  be  used  whose  deadliness  will  exceed  all  previous 
experience.  More  effective  and  varied  means  of  communi- 
cation will  be  available  than  were  known  in  earlier  wars. 
These  three  momentous  factors  will  mark  the  war  of  the 
future. 

"Masses"  signify  in  themselves  an  increase  of  strength, 
but  they  contain  elements  of  weakness  as  well.  The  larger 
they  are  and  the  less  they  can  be  commanded  by  profes- 
sional soldiers,  the  more  their  tactical  efficiency  diminishes. 
The  less  they  are  able  to  live  on  the  country  during  war- 
time, especially  when  concentrated,  and  the  more  they  are 
therefore  dependent  on  the  daily  renewal  of  food-supplies, 
the  slower  and  less  mobile  they  become.  Owing  to  the 
great  space  which  they  require  for  their  deployment,  it  is 
extraordinarily  difficult  to  bring  them  into  effective  action 
simultaneously.  They  are  also  far  more  accessible  to 
morally  depressing  influences  than  compacter  bodies  of 
troops,  and  may  prove  dangerous  to  the  strategy  of  their 
own  leaders,  if  supplies  run  short,  if  discipline  breaks  down. 


THE  CRUCIAL  QUESTION  173 

and  the  commander  loses  his  authority    over    the    masses 
which  he  can  only  rule  under  regulated  conditions. 

The  increased  effectiveness  of  weapons  does  not  merely 
imply  a  longer  range,  but  a  greater  deadliness,  and  therefore 
makes  more  exacting  claims  on  the  morale  of  the  soldier. 
The  danger  zone  begins  sooner  than  formerly;  the  space 
which  must  be  crossed  in  an  attack  has  become  far  wider; 
it  must  be  passed  by  the  attacking  party  creeping  or  run- 
ning. The  soldier  must  often  use  the  spade  in  defensive 
operations,  during  which  he  is  exposed  to  a  far  hotter  fire 
than  formerly;  while  under  all  circumstances  he  must  shoot 
more  than  in  bygone  days.  The  quick  firing  which  the  troop 
encounters  increases  the  losses  at  every  incautious  move- 
ment. All  branches  of  arms  have  to  suffer  under  these 
circumstances.  Shelter  and  supplies  will  be  more  scanty 
than  ever  before.  In  short,  while  the  troops  on  the  average 
have  diminished  in  value,  the  demands  made  on  them  have 
become  considerably  greater. 

Improved  means  of  communication,  finally,  facilitate  the 
handling  and  feeding  of  large  masses,  but  tie  them  down 
to  railway  systems  and  main  roads,  and  must,  if  they  fail 
or  break  down  in  the  course  of  a  campaign,  aggravate  the 
difficulties,  because  the  troops  were  accustomed  to  their  use, 
and  the  commanders  counted  upon  them. 

The  direct  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  these  reflec- 
tions is  that  a  great  superiority  must  rest  with  the  troops 
whose  fighting  capabilities  and  tactical  efficiency  are  greater 
than  those  of  their  antagor:sts. 

The  commander  who  can  carry  out  all  operations  quicker 
than  the  enemy,  and  can  concentrate  and  employ  greater 
masses  in  a  narrow  space  than  they  can,  will  always  be  in 
a  position  to  collect  a  numerically  superior  force  in  the 
decisive  direction;  if  he  controls  the  more  effective  troops, 
he  will  gain  decisive  successes  against  one  part  of  the  hostile 
army,  and  will  be  able  to  exploit  them  against  other  divi- 
sions of  it  before  the  enemy  can  gain  equivalent  advantages 
in  other  parts  of  the  field. 

Since  the  tactical  efficiency  and  the  morale  of  the  troops 
are  chiefly  shown  in  the  offensive,  and  are  then  most  need- 


174    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

ful,  the  necessary  conclusion  is  that  safety  only  lies  in  of- 
fensive warfare. 

In  an  attack,  the  advantage,  apart  from  the  elements  of 
moral  strength  which  it  brings  into  play,  depends  chiefly 
on  rapidity  of  action.  Inasmuch  as  the  attacking  party  de- 
termines the  direction  of  the  attack  to  suit  his  own  plans, 
he  is  able  at  the  selected  spot  to  collect  a  superior  force 
against  his  surprised  opponent.  The  initiative,  which  is 
the  privilege  of  the  attacking  party,  gives  a  start  in  time 
and  place  which  is  very  profitable  in  operations  and  tactics. 
The  attacked  party  can  only  equalize  this  advantage  if  he 
has  early  intimation  of  the  intentions  of  the  assailant,  and 
has  time  to  take  measures  which  hold  out  promise  of  suc- 
cess. The  more  rapidly,  therefore,  the  attacking  General 
strikes  his  blow  and  gains  his  success,  and  the  more  capable 
his  troops,  the  greater  is  the  superiority  which  the  attack 
in  its  nature  guarantees. 

This  superiority  increases  with  the  size  of  the  masses.  If 
the  advancing  armies  are  large  and  unwieldy,  and  the  dis- 
tances to  be  covered  great,  it  will  be  a  difficult  and  tedious 
task  for  the  defending  commander  to  take  proper  measures 
against  a  surprise  attack.  On  the  other  hand,  the  prospects 
of  success  of  the  attacking  General  will  be  very  favourable, 
especially  if  he  is  in  the  fortunate  position  of  having  better 
troops  at  his  disposal. 

Finally,  the  initiative  secures  to  the  numerically  weaker  a 
possibility  of  gaining  the  victory,  even  when  other  condi- 
tions are  equal,  and  all  the  more  so  the  greater  the  masses 
engaged.  In  most  cases  it  is  impossible  to  bring  the  entire 
mass  of  a  modern  army  simultaneously  and  completely 
into  action.  A  victory,  therefore,  in  the  decisive  direction 
— the  direction,  that  is,  which  directly  cuts  the  arteries  of 
the  opponent — is  usually  conclusive  for  the  whole  course 
of  the  war,  and  its  effect  is  felt  in  the  most  distant  parts 
of  the  field  of  operations.  If  the  assailant,  therefore,  can 
advance  in  this  direction  with  superior  numbers,  and  can 
win  the  day,  because  the  enemy  cannot  utilize  his  numerical 
superiority,  there  is  a  possibility  of  an  ultimate  victory  over 
the  arithmetically  stronger  army.  In  conformity  to  this  law. 
Frederick  the  Great,   through   superior   tactical   capability 


THE  CRUCIAL  QUESTION  175 

and  striking  strength,  had  always  the  upper  hand  of  an 
enemy  far  more  powerful  in  mere  numbers. 

No  further  proof  is  required  that  the  superiority  of  the 
attack  increases  in  proportion  to  the  rapidity  with  which 
it  is  delivered,  and  to  the  lack  of  mobility  of  the  hostile 
forces.  Hence  the  possibility  of  concealing  one's  own 
movements  and  damaging  the  effective  tactics  of  the  enemy 
secures  an  advantage  which,  though  indirect,  is  yet  very 
appreciable. 

We  arrive,  then,  at  the  conclusion  that,  in  order  to  secure 
the  superiority  in  a  war  of  the  future  under  otherwise  equal 
conditions,  it  is  incumbent  on  us :  First,  during  the  period  of 
preparation  to  raise  the  tactical  value  and  capabilities  of  the 
troops  as  much  as  possible,  and  especially  to  develop  the 
means  of  concealing  the  attacking  movements  and  damaging 
the  enemy's  tactical  powers;  secondly,  in  the  war  itself  to 
act  on  the  offensive  and  strike  the  first  blow,  and  to  exploit 
the  manoeuvring  capacity  of  the  troops  as  much  as  possible, 
in  order  to  be  superior  in  the  decisive  directions.  Above 
all,  a  State  which  has  objects  to  attain  that  cannot  be  re- 
linquished, and  is  exposed  to  attacks  by  enemies  more  pow- 
erful than  itself,  is  bound  to  act  in  this  sense.  It  must, 
before  all  things,  develop  the  attacking  powers  of  its  army, 
since  a  strategic  defensive  must  often  adopt  offensive 
methods. 

This  principle  holds  good  pre-eminently  for  Germany. 
The  points  which  I  have  tried  to  emphasize  must  never  be 
lost  sight  of,  if  we  wish  to  face  the  future  with  confidence. 
All  our  measures  must  be  calculated  to  raise  the  efficiency 
of  the  army,  especially  in  attack;  to  this  end  all  else  must 
<*ive  way.  We  shall  thus  have  a  central  point  on  which  all 
our  measures  can  be  focussed.  We  can  make  them  all  serve 
one  purpose,  and  thus  we  shall  be  kept  from  going  astray 
on  the  bypaths  which  we  all  too  easily  take  if  we  regard 
matters  separately,  and  not  as  forming  parts  of  a  collective 
whole.  Much  of  our  previous  omissions  and  commissions 
would  have  borne  a  quite  different  complexion  had  we  ob- 
served this  unifying  principle. 

The  requirements  which  I  have  described  as  the  most 
essential  are  somewhat  opposed  to  the  trend  of  our  present 


176    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

efforts,  and  necessitate  a  resolute  resistance  to  the  control- 
ling forces  of  our  age. 

The  larger  the  armies  by  which  one  State  tries  to  outbid 
another,  the  smaller  will  be  the  efficiency  and  tactical  worth 
of  the  troops;  and  not  merely  the  average  worth,  but  the 
worth  of  each  separate  detachment  as  such.  Huge  armies 
are  even  a  danger  to  their  own  cause.  "They  will  be  suffo- 
cated by  their  own  fat,"  said  General  v.  Brandenstein,  the 
great  organizer  of  the  advance  of  1870,  when  speaking  of 
the  mass- formation  of  the  French.  The  complete  neglect 
of  cavalry  in  their  proportion  to  the  whole  bulk  of  the  army 
has  deprived  the  commander  of  the  means  to  injure  the 
tactical  capabilities  of  the  enemy,  and  to  screen  effectually 
his  own  movements.  The  necessary  attention  has  never 
been  paid  in  the  course  of  military  training  to  this  latter 
duty.  Finally,  the  tactical  efficiency  of  troops  has  never 
been  regarded  as  so  essential  as  it  certainly  will  prove  in  the 
wars  of  the  future. 

A  mechanical  notion  of  warfare  and  weak  concessions  to 
the  pressure  of  public  opinion,  and  often  a  defective  grasp 
of  the  actual  needs,  have  conduced  to  measures  which  in- 
evitably result  in  an  essential  contradiction  between  the 
needs  of  the  army  and  the  actual  end  attained,  and  cannot 
be  justified  from  the  purely  military  point  of  view.  It 
would  be  illogical  and  irrelevant  to  continue  in  these  paths 
so  soon  as  it  is  recognized  that  the  desired  superiority  over 
the  enemy  cannot  be  reached  on  them. 

This  essential  contradiction  between  what  is  necessary 
and  what  is  attained  appears  in  the  enforcement  of  the  law 
of  universal  military  service.  Opinion  oscillates  between 
the  wish  to  enforce  it  more  or  less,  and  the  disinclination  to 
make  the  required  outlay,  and  recourse  is  had  to  all  sorts 
of  subterfuges  which  may  save  appearances  without  giving 
a  good  trial  to  the  system.  One  of  these  methods  is  the 
Ersatzreserve,  which  is  once  more  being  frequently  pro- 
posed. But  the  situation  is  by  no  means  helped  by  the  very 
brief  training  which  these  units  at  best  receive.  This  system 
only  creates  a  military  mob,  which  has  no  capacity  for 
serious  military  operations.  Such  an  institution  would  be 
a  heavy  strain  on  the  existing  teaching  personnel  in  the 


THE  CRUCIAL  QUESTION  177 

army,  and  would  be  indirectly  detrimental  to  it  as  well. 
Nor  would  any  strengthening  of  the  field  army  be  possible 
under  this  scheme,  since  the  cadres  to  contain  the  mass  of 
these  special  reservists  are  not  ready  to  hand.  This  mass 
would  therefore  only  fill  up  the  recruiting  depots,  and  facili- 
tate to  some  degree  the  task  of  making  good  the  losses. 

A  similar  contradiction  is  often  shown  in  the  employ- 
ment of  the  troops.  Every  army  at  the  present  time  is 
divided  into  regular  troops,  who  are  already  organized  in 
time  of  peace  and  are  merely  brought  to  full  strength  in 
war-time,  and  new  formations,  which  are  only  organized 
on  mobilization.  The  tactical  value  of  these  latter  varies 
much  according  to  their  composition  and  the  age  of  the 
units,  but  is  always  much  inferior  to  that  of  the  regular 
troops.  The  Landwehr  formations,  which  were  employed 
in  the  field  in  1870-71,  were  an  example  of  this,  notwith- 
standing the  excellent  services  which  they  rendered,  and 
the  new  French  formations  in  that  campaign  were  totally 
ineffective.  The  sphere  of  activity  of  such  troops  is  the 
second  line.  In  an  offensive  war  their  duty  is  to  secure 
the  railroads  and  bases,  to  garrison  the  conquered  territory, 
and  partly  also  to  besiege  the  enemies'  fortresses.  In  fact, 
they  must  discharge  all  the  duties  which  would  otherwise 
weaken  the  field  army.  In  a  defensive  war  they  will  have 
to  undertake  the  local  and  mainly  passive  defence,  and  the 
support  of  the  national  war.  By  acting  at  first  in  this 
limited  sphere,  such  new  formations  will  gradually  become 
fitted  for  the  duties  of  the  war,  and  will  acquire  a  degree 
of  offensive  strength  which  certainly  cannot  be  reckoned 
upon  at  the  outset  of  the  war ;  and  the  less  adequately  such 
bodies  of  troops  are  supplied  with  columns,  trains,  and 
cavalry,  the  less  their  value  will  be. 

Nevertheless,  it  appears  to  be  assumed  by  us  that,  in 
event  of  war,  such  troops  will  be  partly  available  in  the 
first  line,  and  that  decisive  operations  may  be  entrusted 
to  them.  Reserves  and  regulars  are  treated  as  equivalent 
pieces  on  the  board,  and  no  one  seems  to  suppose  that  some 
are  less  effective  than  others.  A  great  danger  lies  in  this 
mechanical  conception. 

For  operations  in  the  field  we  must  employ,  wherever 


178    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

possible,  regulars  only,  and  rather  limit  our  numbers  than 
assign  to  inferior  troops  tasks  for  which  they  are  inade- 
quate. We  must  have  the  courage  to  attack,  if  necessary, 
with  troops  numerically  inferior  but  tactjically  superior 
and  more  efficient;  we  must  attack  in  the  consciousness 
that  tactical  striking  power  and  efficiency  outweigh  the 
advantages  of  greater  numbers,  and  that  with  the  immense 
modern  armies  a  victory  in  the  decisive  direction  has  more 
bearing  on  the  ultimate  issue  than  ever  before. 

The  decision  depends  on  the  regular  troos,  not  on  the 
masses  which  are  placed  at  their  side  on  mobilization. 
The  commander  who  acts  on  this  principle,  and  so  far 
restricts  himself  in  the  employment  of  masses  that  he  pre- 
serves the  complete  mobility  of  the  armies,  will  win  a 
strong  advantage  over  the  one  whose  leader  is  burdened 
with  inferior  troops  and  therefore  is  handicapped  generally, 
and  has  paid  for  the  size  of  his  army  by  want  of  efficiency. 
The  mass  of  reserves  must,  therefore,  be  employed  as  sub- 
sidiary to  the  regular  troops,  whom  they  must  relieve  as 
much  as  possible  from  all  minor  duties.  Thus  used,  a 
superiority  in  the  numbers  of  national  reserves  will  secure 
an  undoubted  superiority  in  the  actual  war. 

It  follows  directly  from  this  argument  that  we  must  do 
our  best  to  render  the  regular  army  strong  and  efficient, 
and  that  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  weaken  them  unneces- 
sarily by  excessive  drafts  upon  their  personnel  with  the 
object  of  making  the  reserves  tactically  equal  to  them. 
This  aim  may  sometimes  be  realized ;  but  the  general  level 
of  efficiency  throughout  the  troops  would  be  lowered. 

Our  one  object  must  therefore  be  to  strengthen  our 
regular  army  An  increase  of  the  peace  footing  of  the 
standing  army  is  worth  far  more  than  a  far  greater  number 
of  badly  trained  special  reservists.  It  is  supremely  im- 
portant to  increase  the  strength  of  the  officers  on  the 
establishment.  The  stronger  each  unit  is  in  peace,  the 
more  efficient  will  it  become  for  war,  hence  the  vital  im- 
portance of  aiming  at  quality,  not  quantity.  Concentra- 
tion, not  dilution,  will  be  our  safeguard.  If  we  wish  to 
encourage  the  enforcement  of  universal  service  by  strength- 
ening the  army,  we  must  organize  new  peace  formations, 


THE  CRUCIAL  QUESTION  179 

since  the  number  of  professional  officers  and  sub-officers 
will  be  thus  increased.  This  step  is  the  more  necessary 
because  the  present  available  cadres  are  insufficient  to 
receive  the  mass  of  able-bodied  recruits  and  to  provide 
for  their  thorough  training. 

The  gradual  enforcement  of  universal  military  service 
hand  in  hand  with  an  increase  of  the  regular  army  is  the 
first  practical  requirement.  We  shall  now  consider  how 
far  the  tactical  value  of  the  troops,  the  efficiency  of  the 
army,  the  cavalry,  and  the  screening  service  can  be  im- 
proved by  organization,  equipment,  and  training. 

I  must  first  point  out  a  factor  which  lies  in  a  different 
sphere  to  the  questions  already  discussed,  but  has  great 
importance  in  every  branch  of  military  activity,  especially 
in  the  offensive,  which  requires  prompt  original  action — I 
mean  the  importance  of  personality. 

From  the  Commander-in-Chief,  who  puts  into  execution 
the  conceptions  of  his  own  brain  under  the  pressure  of 
responsibility  and  shifting  fortune,  and  the  Brigadier,  who 
must  act  independently  according  to  a  given  general 
scheme;  to  the  dispatch  rider,  surrounded  with  dangers, 
and  left  to  his  own  resources  in  the  enemy's  country,  and 
the  youngest  private  in  the  field  fighting  for  his  own  hand, 
and  striving  for  victory  in  the  face  of  death;  every- 
where in  the  wars  of  to-day,  more  than  in  any  other  age, 
personality  dominates  all  else.  The  effect  of  mass  tactics 
has  abolished  all  close  formations  of  infantry,  and  the 
individual  is  left  to  himself.  The  direct  influence  of  the 
superior  has  lessened.  In  the  strategic  duties  of  the 
cavalry,  which  represent  the  chief  activity  of  that  arm, 
the  patrol  riders  and  orderlies  are  separated  more  than 
before  from  their  troop  and  are  left  to  their  own  responsi- 
bility. Even  in  the  artillery  the  importance  of  independent 
action  will  be  more  clearly  emphasized  than  previously. 
The  battlefields  and  area  of  operations  have  increased 
with  the  masses  employed.  The  Commander-in-Chief  is 
far  less  able  than  ever  before  to  superintend  operations 
in  various  parts  of  the  field ;  he  is  forced  to  allow  a 
greater  latitude  to  his  subordinates.  These  conditions  are 
very  prominent  in  attacking  operations. 


180    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

When  on  the  defensive  the  duty  of  the  individual  is 
mainly  to  hold  his  ground,  while  the  commander's  princi- 
pal business  is  to  utilize  the  reserves.  On  the  offensive, 
however,  the  conditions  change  from  moment  to  moment, 
according  to  the  counter-movements  of  the  enemy,  which 
cannot  be  anticipated,  and  the  success  or  failure  of  the 
attacking  troops.  Even  the  individual  soldier,  as  the  fight 
fluctuates,  must  now  push  on,  now  wait  patiently  until  the 
reinforcements  have  come  up ;  he  will  often  have  to  choose 
for  himself  the  objects  at  which  to  fire,  while  never  losing 
touch  with  the  main  body.  The  offensive  makes  very 
varied  calls  on  the  commander's  qualities.  Ruse  and 
strategy,  boldness  and  unsparing  energy,  deliberate  judg- 
ment and  rapid  decision,  are  alternately  demanded  from 
him.  He  must  be  competent  to  perform  the  most  opposite 
duties.    All  this  puts  a  heavy  strain  on  personality. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  the  army  which  contains  the 
greatest  number  of  self-reliant  and  independent  personali- 
ties must  have  a  distinct  advantage.  This  object,  there- 
fore, we  must  strive  with  every  nerve  to  attain:  to  be  su- 
perior in  this  respect  to  all  our  enemies.  And  this  object 
can  be  attained.  Personality  can  be  developed,  especially 
in  the  sphere  of  spiritual  activity.  The  reflective  and  criti- 
cal powers  can  be  improved  by  continuous  exercise;  but 
the  man  who  can  estimate  the  conditions  under  which  he 
has  to  act,  who  is  master  of  the  element  in  which  he  has 
to  work,  will  certainly  make  up  his  mind  more  rapidly  and 
more  easily  than  a  man  who  faces  a  situation  which  he  does 
not  grasp.  Self-reliance,  boldness,  and  imperturbability  in 
the  hour  of  misfortune  are  produced  by  knowledge.  This 
is  shown  everywhere.  We  see  the  awkward  and  shy  recruit 
ripen  into  a  clear-headed  smart  sergeant;  and  the  same 
process  is  often  traced  among  the  higher  commands.  But 
where  the  mental  development  is  insufficient  for  the  prob- 
lems which  are  to  be  solved,  the  personality  fails  at  the 
moment  of  action.  The  elegant  guardsman  Bourbaki  col- 
lapsed when  he  saw  himself  confronted  with  the  task  of 
leading  an  army  whose  conditions  he  did  not  thoroughly 
grasp.  General  Chanzy,  on  the  other  hand,  retained  his 
clear  judgment  and  resolute  determination  in  the  midtf  of 


THE  CRUCIAL  QUESTION  181 

defeat.  Thus  one  of  the  essential  tasks  of  the  preparations 
for  war  is  to  raise  the  spiritual  level  of  the  army  and  thus 
indirectly  to  mould  and  elevate  character.  Especially  is  it 
essential  to  develop  the  self-reliance  and  resourcefulness 
of  those  in  high  command.  In  a  long  military  life  ideas 
all  too  early  grow  stereotyped  and  the  old  soldier  follows 
traditional  trains  of  thought  and  can  no  longer  form  an  un- 
prejudiced opinion.  The  danger  of  such  development  can- 
not be  shut  out.  The  stiff  and  uniform  composition  of  the 
army  which  doubles  its  moral  powers  has  this  defect:  it 
often  leads  to  a  one-sided  development,  quite  at  variance 
with  the  many-sidedness  of  actual  realities,  and  arrests  the 
growth  of  personality.  Something  akin  to  this  was  seen 
in  Germany  in  the  tentative  scheme  of  an  attack  en  masse. 
United  will  and  action  are  essential  to  give  force  its  greatest 
value.  They  must  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  greatest  spiri- 
tual independence  and  resourcefulness,  capable  of  meeting 
any  emergency  and  solving  new  problems  by  original 
methods. 

It  has  often  been  said  that  one  man  is  as  good  as  another; 
that  personality  is  nothing,  the  type  is  everything;  but  this 
assertion  is  erroneous.  In  time  of  peace,  when  sham  repu- 
tations flourish  and  no  real  struggle  winnows  the  chaff 
from  the  corn,  mediocrity  in  performance  is  enough.  But 
in  war,  personality  turns  the  scale.  Responsibility  and 
danger  bring  out  personality,  and  show  its  real  worth,  as 
surely  as  a  chemical  test  separates  the  pure  metal  from 
the  dross. 

That  army  is  fortunate  which  has  placed  men  of  this 
kind  in  the  important  posts  during  peace-time  and  has 
kept  them  there.  This  is  the  only  way  to  avoid  the  dangers 
which  a  one-sided  routine  produces,  and  to  break  down  that 
red-tapism  which  is  so  prejudicial  to  progress  and  success. 
It  redounds  to  the  lasting  credit  of  William  I.  that  for  the 
highest  and  most  resonsible  posts,  at  any  rate,  he  had 
already  in  time  of  peace  made  his  selection  from  among  all 
the  apparently  great  men  around  him;  and  that  he  chose 
and  upheld  in  the  teeth  of  all  opposition  those  who  showed 
themselves  heroes  and  men  of  action  in  the  hour  of  need, 
and  had  the  courage  to  keep  to  their  own   self -selected 


182    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

paths.  This  is  no  slight  title  to  fame,  for,  as  a  rule,  the 
unusual  rouses  envy  and  distrust,  but  the  cheap,  average 
wisdom,  which  never  prompted  action,  appears  as  a  refined 
superiority,  and  it  is  only  under  the  pressure  of  the  stern 
reality  of  war  that  the  truth  of  Goethe's  lines  is  proved: 

"Folk    and   thrall   and   victor   can 
Witness  bear   in   every  zone: 
Fortune's  greatest  gift  to  man 
Is  personality  alone." 


CHAPTER   X 
ARMY  ORGANIZATION 

I  now  turn  to  the  discussion  of  some  questions  of  organiza- 
tion, but  it  is  not  my  intention  to  ventilate  all  the  needs 
and  aims  connected  with  this  subject  that  occupy  our  mili- 
tary circles  at  the  present  time.  I  shall  rather  endeavour 
to  work  out  the  general  considerations  which,  in  my  opinion, 
must  determine  the  further  development  of  our  army,  if 
we  wish,  by  consistent  energy,  to  attain  a  superiority  in  the 
directions  which  will  certainly  prove  to  be  all-important  in 
the  next  war.  It  will  be  necessary  to  go  into  details  only 
on  points  which  are  especially  noteworthy  or  require  some 
explanation.  I  shall  obviously  come  into  opposition  with 
the  existing  state  of  things,  but  nothing  is  further  from  my 
purpose  than  to  criticize  them.  My  views  are  based  on 
theoretical  requirements,  while  our  army,  from  certain 
definitely  presented  beginnings,  and  under  the  influence  of 
most  different  men  and  of  changing  views,  in  the  midst  of 
financial  difficulties  and  political  disputes,  has,  by  fits  and 
starts,  grown  up  into  what  it  now  is.  It  is,  in  a  certain 
sense,  outside  criticism ;  it  must  be  taken  as  something 
already  existing,  whose  origin  is  only  a  subject  for  a  sub- 
sequent historical  verdict.  But  the  further  expansion  of 
our  army  belongs  to  the  future,  and  its  course  can  be 
directed.  It  can  follow  well-defined  lines,  in  order  to  be- 
come efficient,  and  it  is  politically  most  important  that  this 
object  should  be  realized.  Therefore  I  shall  not  look  back 
critically  on  the  past,  but  shall  try  to  serve  the  future. 

The  guiding  principle  of  our  preparations  for  war  must 
be,  as  I  have  already  said,  the  development  of  the  greatest 
fighting  strength  and  the  greatest  tactical  efficiency,  in  order 
through  them  to  be  in  a  position  to  carry  on  an  offensive 
war  successfully.    What  follows  will,  therefore,  fall  natur- 

183 


184    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

ally  under  these  two  heads.  Fighting  strength  rests  partly, 
as  already  said,  on  the  training  (which  will  be  discussed 
later),  the  arming,  and  the  personnel,  partly  on  the  com- 
position of  the  troops,  and,  therefore,  in  the  case  of  line 
regiments,  with  which  we  chiefly  have  to  deal,  since  they 
are  the  real  field  troops,  on  the  strength  of  their  peace 
establishment.  It  was  shown  in  the  previous  chapter  how 
essential  it  is  to  have  in  the  standing  army  not  only  the 
necessary  cadres  ready  for  the  new  formations,  but  to  make 
the  separate  branches  so  strong  that  they  can  easily  be 
brought  up  to  full  strength  in  war-time. 

The  efficiency  and  character  of  the  superiors,  the  officers 
and  the  non-commissioned  officers,  are  equally  weighty 
factors  in  the  value  of  the  troops.  They  are  the  profes- 
sional supporters  of  discipline,  decision,  and  initiative,  and, 
since  they  are  the  teachers  of  the  troops,  they  determine 
their  intellectual  standard.  The  number  of  permanent  offi- 
cers on  the  establishment  in  peace  is  exceedingly  small  in 
proportion  to  their  duties  in  the  training  of  the  troops  and 
to  the  demands  made  of  them  on  mobilization.  If  we  reflect 
how  many  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  from  the 
standing  army  must  be  transferred  to  the  new  formations 
in  order  to  vitalize  them,  and  how  the  modern  tactical  forms 
make  it  difficult  for  the  superior  officer  to  assert  his  influ- 
ence in  battle,  the  numerical  inadequacy  of  the  existing 
personnel  is  clearly  demonstrated.  This  applies  mainly  to 
the  infantry,  and  in  their  case,  since  they  are  the  decisive 
arm,  a  sufficient  number  of  efficient  officers  is  essential. 
All  the  more  important  is  it,  on  the  one  hand,  to  keep  the 
establishment  of  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  in 
the  infantry  at  full  strength,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
raise  the  efficiency  of  the  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers  on  leave  or  in  the  reserve.  This  latter  is  a  ques- 
tion of  training,  and  does  not  come  into  the  present  dis- 
cussion. 

The  task  of  keeping  the  establishments  at  adequate 
strength  is,  in  a  sense,  a  financial  question.  The  amount 
of  the  pay  and  the  prospects  which  the  profession  holds  out 
for  subsequent  civil  posts  greatly  affect  the  body  of  non- 
commissioned officers,  and  therefore  it  is  important  to  keep 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION  185 

step  with  the  general  increase  in  prices  by  improved  pecu- 
niary advantages.  Even  for  the  building  up  of  the  corps 
of  officers,  the  financial  question  is  all-important.  The 
career  of  the  officer  offers  to-day  so  little  prospect  of  suc- 
cess and  exacts  such  efficiency  and  self-devotion  from  the 
individual,  that  he  will  not  long  remain  in  the  service,  attrac- 
tive as  it  is,  if  the  financial  sacrifices  are  so  high  as  they 
now  are.  The  infantry  officer  especially  must  have  a  better 
position.  Granted  that  the  cavalry  and  mounted  artillery 
officers  incur  greater  expenses  for  the  keep  of  their  horses 
than  the  infantry  officer  has  to  pay,  the  miiltary  duties  of 
the  latter  are  by  far  the  most  strenuous  and  require  a  very 
considerable  outlay  on  clothing.  It  would  be,  in  my  opinion, 
expedient  to  give  the  infantry  officer  more  pay  than  the 
cavalry  and  artillery  officers,  in  order  to  make  service  in 
that  arm  more  attractive.  There  is  a  rush  nowadays  into 
the  mounted  arm,  for  which  there  is  a  plethora  of  candi- 
dates. These  arms  will  always  be  well  supplied  with  offi- 
cers. Their  greater  attractiveness  must  be  counterbalanced 
by  special  advantages  offered  by  the  infantry  service.  By 
no  other  means  can  we  be  sure  of  having  sufficient  officers 
in  the  chief  arm. 

If  the  fighting  strength  in  each  detachment  depends  on 
its  composition  and  training,  there  are  other  elements  be- 
sides the  tactical  value  of  the  troops  which  determine  the 
effectiveness  of  their  combined  efforts  in  action;  these  are 
first  the  leadership,  which  ,however,  deepnds  on  conditions 
which  are  beyond  calculation,  and  secondly  the  numerical 
proportion  of  the  arms  to  each  other.  Disregarding  pro- 
visionally the  cavalry,  who  play  a  special  role  in  battle,  we 
must  define  the  proportion  which  artillery  must  bear  to 
infantry. 

With  regard  to  machine  guns,  the  idea  that  they  can  to 
some  extent  replace  infantry  is  quite  erroneous.  Machine 
guns  are  primarily  weapons  of  defence.  In  attack  they 
can  only  be  employed  under  very  favourable  conditions,  and 
then  strengthen  only  one  factor  of  a  successful  attack — 
the  fire-strength — while  they  may  sometimes  hinder  that 
impetuous  forward  rush  which  is  the  soul  of  every  attack. 
Hence,  this  auxiliary  weapon  should  be  given  to  the  infan- 
try in  limited  numbers,  and  employed  mainly  on  the  defen- 


186    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

sive  fronts,  and  should  be  often  massed  into  large  units. 
Machine-gun  detachments  should  not  overburden  the 
marching  columns. 

The  relation  of  infantry  to  artillery  is  of  more  importance. 

Infantry  is  the  decisive  arm.  Other  arms  are  exclusively 
there  to  smooth  their  road  to  victory,  and  support  their 
action  directly  or  indirectly.  This  relation  must  not  be 
merely  theoretical;  the  needs  of  the  infantry  must  ulti- 
mately determine  the  importance  of  all  other  fighting  instru- 
ments in  the  whole  army. 

If  we  make  this  idea  the  basis  of  our  argument,  the  fol- 
lowing is  the  result.  Infantry  has  gained  enormously  in 
defensive  power  owing  to  modern  weapons.  The  attack 
requires,  therefore,  a  far  greater  superiority  than  ever 
before.  In  addition  to  this,  the  breadth  of  front  in  action 
has  greatly  increased  in  consequence  of  the  former  close 
tactical  formations  having  been  broken  up  through  the  in- 
crease of  fire.  This  refers  only  to  the  separate  detach- 
ment, and  does  not  justify  the  conclusion  that  in  the  future 
fewer  troops  will  cover  the  same  spaces  as  before.  This 
assumption  applies  at  the  most  to  defence,  and  then  only  in 
a  limited  sense.  In  attack  the  opposite  will  probably  be 
the  case.  The  troops  must  therefore  be  placed  more  deeply 
en  echelon  than  in  the  last  wars.  Now,  the  average  breadth 
of  the  front  in  attack  must  regulate  the  allotment  of 
artillery  to  infantry.  No  definite  proportion  can  be  settled ; 
but  if  the  theoretical  calculation  be  compared  with  the 
experiences  of  the  last  wars,  conclusions  may  be  obtained 
which  will  most  probably  prove  appropriate.  No  more  than 
this  can  be  expected  in  the  domain  of  military  science. 

If  we  agree  to  the  above-mentioned  proportion  of  breadth 
and  depth  in  an  infantry  attack,  we  shall  be  driven  to  insist 
on  a  reduction  of  artillery  as  compared  with  the  past;  but 
should  we  think  that  modern  artillery  helps  the  attack,  espe- 
cially by  indirect  fire,  we  must  advocate,  from  the  stand- 
point of  offensive  warfare,  an  increase  of  the  artillery. 
Actual  war  experiences  alone  can  find  the  true  middle  path 
between  these  two  extremes. 

If  the  frontal  development  of  the  artillery  of  a  modem 
army  corps,  or,  better  still,  two  divisions,  be  regarded  from 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION  187 

the  point  of  view  that  the  guns  cannot  advance  in  con- 
nected line,  but  that  only  the  specially  adapted  parts  of  the 
field  can  be  used  for  artillery  development,  the  conclusion 
is  certain  that  by  such  frontal  extension  the  infantry  is 
reduced  to  a  covering  line  for  the  artillery.  In  forming 
this  opinion  we  must  not  assume  the  normal  strength  of 
the  infantry,  but  take  into  account  that  the  strength  of  the 
infantry  in  war  rapidly  melts  away.  If  we  estimate  the 
companies  on  the  average  at  two-thirds  of  their  proper 
strength,  we  shall  be  above  rather  than  below  the  real 
figures.  Such  infantry  strength  will,  of  course,  be  sufficient 
to  defend  the  position  taken  up  by  the  artillery,  but  it  is 
hardly  enough  to  carry  out,  in  that  section  of  the  field,  a 
decisive  attack,  which,  under  present  conditions,  requires 
greater  numbers  and  depth  than  before. 

In  this  connection  it  is  very  instructive  to  study  the  sec- 
ond part  of  the  Franco-German  War,  and  the  Boer  War,  as 
well  as  the  Manchurian  campaign. 

Some  of  the  German  infantry  had  in  the  first-named 
period  extraordinarily  diminished  in  numbers;  companies 
of  120  men  were  not  rare.  The  artilery,  on  the  contrary, 
had  remained  at  its  original  strength.  The  consequence 
naturally  was  that  the  powers  of  the  Germans  on  the  offen- 
sive grew  less  and  the  battles  and  skirmishes  were  not  so 
decisive  as  in  the  first  part  of  the  war.  This  condition 
would  have  shown  up  more  distinctly  against  an  enemy 
of  equal  class  than  in  the  contest  with  the  loosely-com- 
pacted, raw  French  levies.  In  the  former  case  the  offen- 
sive would  have  been  impracticable.  The  strong  artillery, 
under  the  existing  conditions,  no  doubt  gave  great  support 
to  the  weak  infantry;  but  an  unbiased  opinion  leads  to  the 
conclusion  that,  under  the  then  existing  proportion  of  the 
arms  to  each  other,  the  infantry  was  too  weak  to  adopt 
energetic  offensive  tactics  against  a  well-matched  enemy. 
This  is  irresistibly  proved  if  we  consider  what  masses  of 
infantry  were  needed  at  Worth  and  St.  Privat,  for  instance, 
in  spite  of  the  support  of  very  superior  artillery,  in  order 
to  defeat  a  weaker  enemy  of  equal  class. 

Again,  in  South  Africa,  the  overwhelming  superiority  of 
the  English  in  artillery  was  never  able  to  force  a  victory. 


188    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

In  Manchuria  the  state  of  things  was  very  instructive. 
Numerically  the  Russian  artillery  was  extraordinarily  su- 
perior to  the  enemy's,  and  the  range  of  the  Russian  field 
guns  was  longer  than  that  of  the  Japanese;  nevertheless, 
the  Japanese  succeeded  in  beating  an  enemy  stronger  in 
infantry  also,  because,  in  the  decisive  directions  of  attack, 
they  were  able  to  unite  superior  forces  of  infantry  and 
artillery,  while  the  Russian  artillery  was  scattered  along 
the  whole  of  their  broad  front. 

The  lesson  of  this  war  is  that,  apart  from  the  close  rela- 
tion of  the  arms  to  each  other  in  the  separate  units,  the 
co-operation  of  these  units  must  be  looked  at,  if  the  strength 
of  the  two  sister  arms  is  to  be  appropriately  determined. 

The  requirement  that  each  separate  tactical  unit  should 
be  made  equal  or  superior  in  artillery  to  the  corresponding 
hostile  unit  is  thoroughly  mechanical,  as  if  in  war  division 
always  fought  against  division  and  corps  against  corps! 
Superiority  at  the  decisive  point  is  the  crucial  test.  This 
superiority  is  atained  by  means  of  an  unexpected  concen- 
tration of  forces  for  atack;  and  there  is  no  reason  why 
the  superiority  in  artillery  should  not  also  be  brought  about 
in  this  way.  If  by  superior  tactical  skill  two  army  corps, 
each  with  96  guns,  combine  against  a  hostile  army  which 
brings  144  guns  into  action,  that  signifies  a  superiority  of 
48  guns  and  a  double  superiority  in  infantry.  If  it  is 
assumed  that  on  both  sides  the  army  corps  is  armed  with 
144  guns,  and  that  in  consequence  of  this  the  tactical  superi- 
ority has  become  so  slight  that  neither  side  can  claim  a 
superiority  in  one  direction,  then  equal  forces  meet,  and 
chance  decides  the  day.  Since  the  Japanese  were  tactically 
more  efficient  than  their  enemy  and  took  the  offensive,  they 
were  enabled  to  unite  the  superior  forces  in  the  most  de- 
cisive directions,  and  this  advantage  proved  far  greater  than 
the  numerical  superiority  of  the  Russian  army  as  a  whole. 

If  we  look  at  the  whole  matter  we  shall  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  artillery,  if  it  is  not  a  question  of  pure 
defence,  need  never  occupy  within  a  line  of  battle  so  much 
ground  that  the  concentration  of  a  considerably  superior 
force  of  infantry  for  attack  is  rendered  doubtful.  In  this 
respect    we    have,    in    our   present    organization,    already 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION  189 

exceeded  the  expedient  proportion  between  the  two  arms 
in  favour  of  the  artillery.  The  conclusion  is  that  this  latter 
arm  never  need,  within  the  separate  divisions,  be  made  so 
strong  that  the  attacking  capacities  of  the  army  are  thereby 
prejudiced.  This  is  the  decisive  point.  Any  excess  in 
artillery  can  be  kept  on  the  battlefield  in  reserve  when  space 
is  restricted;  if  the  attacking  efficiency  of  the  troops  is 
reduced,  then  artillery  becomes  a  dead  weight  on  the  army 
instead  of  an  aid  to  victory.  It  is  far  more  important  to 
be  able  to  unite  superior  forces  for  a  decisive  attack  than 
to  meet  the  enemy  with  equally  matched  forces  along  the 
whole  front.  If  we  observe  this  principle,  we  shall  often 
be  weaker  than  the  enemy  on  the  less  important  fronts; 
this  disadvantage  may  be  partly  counterbalanced  by  remain- 
ing on  the  defensive  in  such  a  position.  It  becomes  a  posi- 
tive advantage,  if,  owing  to  an  overpowering  concentration 
of  forces,  victory  is  won  at  the  decisive  point.  This  victory 
cancels  all  the  failures  which  may  have  been  recorded  else- 
where. 

The  operative  superiority  of  an  enemy  is  determined  by 
the  greater  marching  capacity  of  the  troops,  by  the  rapid 
and  systematic  working  of  the  communications  with  the 
rear,  and,  above  all,  by  the  length  of  the  columns  of  the 
operating  troops.  Under  the  modern  system  of  colossal 
armaments,  an  army,  especially  if  in  close  formation,  can- 
not possibly  live  on  the  country;  it  is  driven  to  trust  to 
daily  food-supplies  from  the  rear.  Railways  are  used  as 
far  as  possible  to  bring  up  the  supplies ;  but  from  the  rail- 
head the  communication  with  the  troops  must  be  main- 
tained by  columns  of  traction  waggons  and  draught  ani- 
mals, which  go  to  and  fro  between  the  troops,  the  rear- 
ward magazines,  and  the  railhead.  Since  traction  waggons 
are  restricted  to  made  roads,  the  direct  communication 
with  the  troops  must  be  kept  up  by  columns  of  draught 
animals,  which  can  move  independently  of  the  roads.  The 
waggons  of  provisions,  therefore,  which  follow  the  troops, 
and  are  filled  daily,  must  come  up  with  them  the  same  day, 
or  there  will  be  a  shortage  of  food.  This  is  only  possible 
if  the  troop  column  does  not  exceed  a  certain  length  and 
starts   at  early  morning,   so  that  the  transport  waggons, 


190    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

which,  at  the  end  of  the  march,  must  be  driven  from  the 
rear  to  the  head  of  the  column,  can  reach  this  before  the 
beginning  of  the  night's  rest.  The  fitness  of  an  army  for 
attack  can  only  be  maintained  if  these  supplies  are  uninter- 
rupted; there  must  also  be  a  sufficient  quantity  of  tinned 
rations  and  provisions  which  the  soldiers  can  carry  with 
them.  If  the  length  of  the  columns  exceeds  the  limit  here 
laid  down,  the  marches  must  be  proportionately  shortened. 
If  unusually  lengthy  marches  are  made,  so  that  the  pro- 
vision carts  cannot  reach  the  troops,  days  of  rest  must  be 
interposed,  to  regulate  the  supply.  Thus  the  capacity  of 
an  army  to  march  and  to  carry  out  operations  is  directly 
dependent  on  the  possibility  of  being  fed  from  the  reai. 
A  careful  calculation,  based  on  practical  experiences,  shows 
that,  in  order  to  average  20  to  22  kilometres  a  day — the 
minimum  distance  required  from  an  army — no  column  on 
a  road  ought  to  exceed  a  length  of  about  25  kilometres. 
This  consideration  determines  the  depth  of  the  army  corps 
on  the  march,  since  in  an  important  campaign  and  when 
massing  for  battle  troops  seldom  march  in  smaller  bodies 
than  a  corps. 

This  calculation,  by  which  the  conditions  of  modern  war 
are  compulsorily  affected,  makes  it  highly  necessary  that 
the  system  of  supplies  and  rations  should  be  carefully 
organized.  The  restoration  of  any  destroyed  railways,  the 
construction  of  light  railways,  the  organization  of  columns 
of  motor  transport  wagons  and  draught  animals,  must  be 
prepared  by  every  conceivable  means  in  time  of  peace,  in 
order  that  in  war-time  the  railroads  may  follow  as  closely 
as  possible  on  the  track  of  the  troops,  and  that  the  columns 
may  maintain  without  interruption  continuous  communica- 
tions between  the  troops  and  the  railhead.  In  order  to  keep 
this  machinery  permanently  in  working  order,  and  to  sur- 
mount any  crisis  in  bringing  up  supplies,  it  is  highly  advis- 
able to  have  an  ample  stock  of  tinned  rations.  This  stock 
should,  in  consideration  of  the  necessary  mass-concentra- 
tion, be  as  large  as  possible.  Care  must  be  taken,  by  the 
organization  of  trains  and  columns,  that  the  stock  of  tinned 
provisions  can  be  quickly  renewed.  This  would  be  best 
done  by  special  light  columns,  which  are  attached  to  the 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION  191 

army  corps  outside  the  organization  of  provision  and  trans- 
port columnss,  and  follow  it  at  such  a  distance,  that,  if 
necessary,  they  could  be  soon  pushed  to  the  front  by  forced 
or  night  marches.  There  is  naturally  some  reluctance  to 
increase  the  trains  of  the  army  corps,  but  this  necessity  is 
unavoidable.  It  is  further  to  be  observed  that  the  columns 
in  qustion  would  not  be  very  long,  since  they  would  mainly 
convey  condensed  foods  and  other  provisions  compressed 
into  the  smallest  space. 

An  immense  apparatus  of  train  formations,  railway  and 
telegraph  corps,  and  workmen  must  be  got  ready  to  secure 
the  efficiency  of  a  modern  army  with  its  millions.  This  is 
absolutely  necessary,  since  without  it  the  troops  in  modern 
warfare  would  be  practically  unable  to  move.  It  is  far 
more  important  to  be  ahead  of  the  enemy  in  this  respect 
than  in  any  other,  for  there  lies  the  possibility  of  massing 
a  superior  force  at  the  decisive  point,  and  of  thus  defeating 
a  stronger  opponent. 

However  careful  the  preparations,  these  advantages  can 
only  be  attained  if  the  troop  columns  do  not  exceed  the 
maximum  strength  which  can  be  fed  from  the  rear,  if  the 
necessary  forward  movement  is  carried  out.  Everything 
which  an  army  corps  requires  for  the  war  must  be  kept 
within  these  limits. 

Our  modern  army  corps  without  the  heavy  artillery  of 
the  field  army  corresponds  roughly  to  this  requirement. 
But  should  it  be  lengthened  by  a  heavy  howitzer  battalion, 
with  the  necessary  ammunition  columns,  it  will  considerably 
exceed  the  safe  marching  depth — if,  that  is,  the  necessary 
advance-guard  distance  be  included.  Since,  also,  the  infan- 
try iis  too  weak  in  proportion  to  the  soace  required  by  the 
artillery  to  deploy,  it  becomes  advisable,  in  the  interests 
both  of  powerful  attack  and  of  operative  efficiency,  within 
the  separate  troop  organizations  to  strengthen  the  numbers 
of  the  infantry  and  reduce  those  of  the  artillery. 

In  addition  to  the  length  of  the  column,  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  division  is  very  important  for  its  tactical  effi- 
ciency. This  must  be  such  as  to  permit  the  most  varied 
employment  of  the  troops  and  the  formation  of  reserves 
without  the  preliminary  necessity  of  breaking  up  all  the 


192    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

units.  This  requirement  does  not  at  all  correspond  to  our 
traditional  organization,  and  the  man  to  insist  upon  it  vigor- 
ously has  not  yet  appeared,  although  there  can  be  no  doubt 
as  to  the  inadequacy  of  the  existing  tactical  organization, 
and  suitable  schemes  have  already  been  drawn  up  by  com- 
petent officers. 

The  army  corps  is  divided  into  two  divisions,  the  division 
into  two  infantry  brigades.  All  the  brigades  consist  of  two 
regiments.  The  formation  of  a  reserve  makes  it  very  diffi- 
cult for  the  commander  to  fix  the  centre  of  gravity  of  the 
battle  according  to  circumstances  and  his  own  judgment. 
It  is  always  necessary  to  break  up  some  body  when  a  reserve 
has  to  be  formed,  and  in  most  cases  to  reduce  the  officers 
of  some  detachment  to  inactivity.  Of  course,  a  certain 
centre  of  gravity  for  the  battle  may  be  obtained  by  assign- 
ing to  one  part  of  the  troops  a  wider  and  to  the  other  a 
narrower  space  for  deployment.  But  this  procedure  in  no 
way  replaces  a  reserve,  for  it  is  not  always  possible,  even 
in  the  first  dispositions  for  the  engagement,  to  judge  where 
the  brunt  of  the  battle  will  be.  That  depends  largely  on  the 
measures  taken  by  the  enemy  and  the  course  of  the  battle. 

Napoleon's  saying,  "Je  m' engage  et  puis  je  vols"  finds 
its  application,  though  to  a  lessened  extent,  even  to-day. 
The  division  of  cavalry  brigades  into  two  regiments  is 
simply  a  traditional  institution  which  has  been  thoughtlessly 
perpetuated.  It  has  not  been  realized  that  the  duties  of 
the  cavalry  have  completely  changed,  and  that  brigades  of 
two  regiments  are,  in  addition  to  other  disadvantages,  too 
weak  to  carry  these  duties  out. 

This  bisecting  system,  by  restricting  the  freedom  of 
action,  contradicts  the  most  generally  accepted  military 
principles. 

The  most  natural  formation  is  certainly  a  tripartition  of 
the  units,  as  is  found  in  an  infantry  regiment.  This  system 
permits  the  separate  divisions  to  fight  near  each  other,  and 
leaves  room  for  the  withdrawal  of  a  reserve,  the  formation 
of  a  detachment,  or  the  employment  of  the  subdivisions 
in  lines  (Treffen),  for  the  principle  of  the  wing  attack 
must  not  be  allowed  to  remain  merely  a  scheme.  Finally, 
it  is  the  best  formation  for  the  offensive,  since  it  allows 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION  193 

the  main  body  of  the  troops  to  be  employed  at  a  single 
point  in  order  to  obtain  a  decisive  result  there. 

A  special  difficulty  in  the  free  handling  of  the  troops  is 
produced  by  the  quite  mechanical  division  of  the  artillery, 
who  bring  into  action  two  kinds  of  ordnance — cannons  and 
howitzers.  These  latter  can,  of  course,  be  used  as  cannons, 
but  have  special  functions  which  are  not  always  required. 
Their  place  in  the  organization,  however,  is  precisely  the 
same  as  that  of  the  cannons,  and  it  is  thus  very  difficult 
to  employ  them  as  their  particular  character  demands. 

The  object  in  the  whole  of  this  organization  has  been 
to  make  corps  and  divisions  equal,  and  if  possible  superior, 
to  the  corresponding  formations  of  the  enemy  by  distribut- 
ing the  batteries  proportionately  according  to  numbers 
among  the  divisions.  This  secured,  besides,  the  undeniable 
advantage  of  placing  the  artillery  directly  under  the  orders 
of  the  commanders  of  the  troops.  But,  in  return,  it  robbed 
the  commanding  General  of  the  last  means  secured  by  the 
organization  of  enforcing  his  tactical  aims.  He  is  now 
forced  to  form  a  reserve  for  himself  out  of  the  artillery 
of  the  division,  and  thus  to  deprive  one  division  at  least  of 
half  its  artillery.  If  he  has  the  natural  desire  to  withdraw 
for  himself  the  howitzer  section,  which  is  found  in  one 
division  only,  the  same  division  must  always  be  subjected 
to  this  reduction  of  its  strength,  and  it  is  more  than  prob- 
lematical whether  this  result  always  fits  in  with  the  tactical 
positnon.  It  seems  at  least  worth  while  considering 
whether,  under  these  circumstances,  it  would  not  be  a  more 
appropriate  arrangement  to  attach  a  howitzer  section  to 
each  division. 

The  distribution  of  the  heavy  field  howitzers  is  another 
momentous  question.  It  would  be  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  that  guide  the  whole  army  to  divide  them  equally 
among  the  army  corps.  This  arrangement  would  have 
much  in  its  favour,  for  every  corps  may  find  itself  in  a 
position  where  heavy  howitzer  batteries  can  be  profitably 
employed.  They  can  also,  however,  be  combined  under  the 
command  of  the  General-in-Chief,  and  attached  to  the  sec- 
ond line  of  the  army.  The  first  arrangement  offers,  as  has 
been  said,  many  advantages,  but  entails  the  great  disadvan- 


194    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

tage  that  the  line  of  march  of  the  army  corps  is  dangerously 
lengthened  by  several  kilometres,  so  that  no  course  is  left 
but  either  to  weaken  the  other  troops  of  the  corps  or  to 
sacrifice  the  indispensable  property  of  tactical  efficiency. 
Both  alternatives  are  inadmissible.  On  the  other  hand, 
since  the  employment  of  heavy  howitzers  is  by  no  means 
necessary  in  every  engagement,  but  only  when  an  attack  is 
planned  against  a  strongly-posted  enemy,  it  may  be  safely 
assumed  that  the  heavy  howitzers  could  be  brought  up  in 
time  out  of  the  second  line  by  a  night  march.  Besides,  their 
mobility  renders  it  possible  to  detach  single  batteries  or 
sections,  and  on  emergency  to  attach  them  to  an  army  corps 
temporarily. 

There  is  a  prevalent  notion  tha  the  heavy  howitzers  are 
principally  used  to  fight  the  enemy's  field  artillery,  and 
therefore  must  be  on  the  spot  in  every  engagement.  They 
have  even  been  known  to  stray  into  the  advance  guard. 
I  do  not  approve  of  this  idea.  The  enemy's  field  artillery 
will  fire  indirectly  from  previously  masked  positions,  and 
in  such  case  they  cannot  be  very  successfully  attacked  by 
heavy  howitzers.  It  seems  to  me  quite  unjustifiable,  with 
the  view  of  attaining  this  problematic  object,  to  burden 
the  marching  columns  permanently  with  long  unwieldy 
trains  of  artillery  and  ammunition,  and  thus  to  render  their 
effectiveness  doubtful. 

No  doubt  the  Japanese,  who  throughout  the  war  con- 
tinually increased  their  heavy  field  howitzers,  ultimately 
attached  artillery  of  that  sort  to  every  division.  The  ex- 
periences of  that  war  must  not,  however,  be  over-estimated 
or  generalized.  The  conditions  were  quite  sui  generis.  The 
Japanese  fought  on  their  whole  front  against  fortified  posi- 
tions strengthened  by  heavy  artillery,  and  as  they  attacked 
the  enemy's  line  in  its  whole  extension,  they  required  on 
their  side  equally  heavy  guns.  Tt  should  be  noticed  that 
they  did  not  distribute  their  very  effective  12-centimetre 
field  howitzers  along  the  whole  front,  but,  so  far  as  I  can 
gather,  assigned  them  all  to  the  army  of  General  Nogi, 
whose  duty  was  to  carry  out  the  decisive  enveloping  move- 
ment at  Mukden.  The  Japanese  thus  felt  the  need  of 
concentrating  the  effect  of  their  howitzers,  and  as  we  hope 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION  195 

we  shall  not  imitate  their  frontal  attack,  but  break  through 
the  enemy's  front,  though  in  a  different  way  from  theirs, 
the  question  of  concentration  seems  to  me  very  important 
for  us. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  will  be  most  advantageous 
to  unite  the  heavy  batteries  in  the  hand  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief.  They  thus  best  serve  his  scheme  of  offence.  He 
can  mass  them  at  the  place  which  he  wishes  to  make  the 
decisive  point  in  the  battle,  and  will  thus  attain  that  end 
most  completely,  whereas  the  distribution  of  them  among 
the  army  corps  only  dissipates  their  effectiveness.  His 
heavy  batteries  will  be  for  him  what  the  artillery  reserves 
are  for  the  divisional  General.  There,  where  their  mighty 
voice  roars  over  the  battlefield,  will  be  the  deciding  struggle 
of  the  day.  Every  man,  down  to  the  last  private,  knows 
that. 

I  will  only  mention  incidentally  that  the  present  organiza- 
tion of  the  heavy  artillery  on  a  peace  footing  is  unsatis- 
factory. The  batteries  which  in  war  are  assigned  to  the 
field  army  must  in  peace  also  be  placed  under  the  orders 
of  the  corps  commanders  (Truppenfuhrer)  if  they  are  to 
become  an  organic  part  of  the  whole.  At  present  the  heavy 
artillery  of  the  field  army  is  placed  under  the  general- 
inspection  of  the  foot  artillery,  and  attached  to  the  troops 
only  for  purposes  of  manoeuvres.  It  thus  remains  an  iso- 
lated organism  so  far  as  the  army  goes,  and  does  not  feel 
itself  an  integral  part  of  the  whole.  A  clear  distinction 
between  artillery  and  fortress  artillery  would  be  more  prac- 
tical. 

This  view  seems  at  first  sight  to  contradict  the  require- 
ment that  the  heavy  batteries  should  form  a  reserve  in  the 
hands  of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  As  the  armies  do  not 
exist  in  peace-time,  and  manoeuvres  are  seldom  carried  out 
in  army  formation,  the  result  of  the  present  organization 
is  that  the  tactical  relations  of  the  heavy  artillery  and  the 
other  troops  are  not  sufficiently  understood.  This  disad- 
vantage would  be  removed  if  heavy  artillery  were  assigned 
permanently  to  each  army  corps.  This  would  not  prevent 
it  being  united  in  war-time  in  the  hands  of  the  army  leaders. 
On  the  contrary,  they  would  be  used  in  manoeuvres  in  rela- 


196    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

tion  to  the  army  corps  in  precisely  the  same  sense  as  they 
would  be  in  war-time  in  relation  to  the  armies. 

The  operations  of  the  army  in  the  enemy's  countries  will 
be  far  more  effective  if  it  has  control  of  the  railways  and 
roads.  That  implies  not  merely  the  restoration  of  rail- 
roads that  may  have  been  destroyed,  but  the  rapid  capture 
of  the  barrier  forts  and  fortresses  which  impede  the  ad- 
vance of  the  army  by  cutting  off  the  railway  communica- 
tions. We  were  taught  the  lesson  in  1870-71  in  France 
how  far  defective  railway  communications  hindered  all  oper- 
ations. It  is,  therefore,  of  vital  importance  that  a  corps 
should  be  available,  whose  main  duty  is  the  discharge  of 
these  necessary  functions. 

Until  recently  we  had  only  one  united  corps  of  pioneers, 
which  was  organized  alike  for  operations  in  the  field  and 
for  siege  operations,  but  these  latter  have  recently  been 
so  much  developed  that  that  system  can  no  longer  supply 
an  adequate  technical  training  for  them. 

The  demands  made  by  this  department  of  warfare,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  by  the  duties  of  pioneering  in  the  field 
on  the  other,  are  so  extensive  and  so  essentially  different 
that  it  seems  quite  impracticable  to  train  adequately  one 
and  the  same  corps  in  both  branches  during  two  years' 
service.  The  chief  functions  of  the  field  pioneer  are  bridge- 
building,  fortifying  positions,  and  supporting  the  infantry 
in  the  attack  on  fortified  places.  The  most  important  part 
of  the  fortress  pioneer's  duties  consists  in  sapping,  and, 
above  all,  in  mining,  in  preparing  for  the  storming  of  per- 
manent works,  and  in  supporting  the  infantry  in  the  actual 
storm.  The  army  cannot  be  satisfied  with  a  superficial 
training  for  such  service;  it  demands  a  most  thorough- 
going previous  preparation. 

Starting  from  this  point  of  view,  General  v.  Beseler,  the 
late  Inspector-General  of  Fortresses  and  Pioneers,  who 
has  done  inestimable  service  to  his  country,  laid  the  foun- 
dations of  a  new  organization.  This  follows  the  idea  of 
the  field  pioneers  and  the  fortress  pioneers — a  rudimentary 
training  in  common,  followed  by  separate  special  training 
for  their  special  duties.    We  must  continue  on  these  lines, 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION  197 

and  develop  more  particularly  the  fortress  pioneer  branch 
of  the  service  in  better  proportion  to  its  value. 

In  connection  with  the  requirements  already  discussed, 
which  are  directly  concerned  with  securing  and  maintain- 
ing an  increase  of  tactical  efficiency,  we  must  finally  men- 
tion two  organizations  which  indirectly  serve  the  same  pur- 
pose. These  diminish  the  tactical  efficiency  of  the  enemy, 
and  so  increase  our  own;  while,  by  reconnoitring  and  by 
screening  movements,  they  help  the  attack  and  make  it 
possible  to  take  the  enemy  unawares — an  important  con- 
dition of  successful  offensive  warfare.  I  refer  to  the 
cavalry  and  the  air-fleet. 

The  cavalry's  duties  are  twofold.  On  the  one  hand, 
they  must  carry  out  reconnaissances  and  screening  move- 
ments, on  the  other  hand  they  must  operate  against  the 
enemy's  communications,  continually  interrupt  the  regular 
renewal  of  his  supplies,  and  thus  cripple  his  mobility. 

Every  military  expert  will  admit  that  our  cavalry,  in 
proportion  to  the  war-footing  of  the  army,  and  in  view  of 
the  responsible  duties  assigned  them  in  war,  is  lamentably 
weak.  This  disproportion  is  clearly  seen  if  we  look  at  the 
probable  wastage  on  the  march  and  in  action,  and  realize 
that  it  is  virtually  impossible  to  replace  these  losses  ade- 
quately, and  that  formations  of  cavalry  reserves  can  only 
possess  a  very  limited  efficiency.  Popular  opinion  considers 
cavalry  more  or  less  superfluous,  because  in  our  last  wars 
they  certainyl  achieved  comparatively  little  from  the  tac- 
tical point  of  view,  and  because  they  cost  a  great  deal. 
There  is  a  general  tendency  to  judge  cavalry  by  the  standard 
of  1866  and  1870-71.  It  cannot  be  emphasized  too  strongly 
that  this  standard  is  misleading.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
equipment  was  then  so  defective  that  it  crippled  the  powers 
of  the  mounted  man  in  the  most  important  points;  on  the 
other  hand,  the  employment  of  the  cavalry  was  conducted 
on  a  wholly  antiquated  system.  It  was,  consequently,  not 
armed  for  independent  movements.  What  they  then  did 
must  not  be  compared  with  what  will  be  required  from 
them  in  the  future.  In  wars  in  which  mounted  forces  were 
really  effective,  and  not  hampered  in  their  movements  by 
preconceived  notions  (as  in  the  American  War  of  Secession 


198    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

and  the  Boer  War),  their  employment  has  been  continu- 
ously extended,  since  the  great  value  of  their  operative 
mobility  was  convincingly  shown,  especially  in  Africa,  not- 
withstanding all  modern  weapons.  These  are  the  wars 
which  must  be  studied  in  order  to  form  a  fair  opinion. 
They  will  convince  us  that  an  increase  of  our  cavalry  is 
absolutely  imperative.  It  will,  of  course,  only  be  valuable 
when  the  divisions  of  the  army  cavalry  are  equipped  with 
columns  and  trains  in  such  a  way  that  they  can  operate  inde- 
pendently. The  effectiveness  of  the  cavalry  depends  entirely 
on  the  fulfilment  of  this  condition.  It  is  also  imperatively 
necessary,  when  the  measures  of  our  opponents  are  con- 
sidered, to  strengthen  the  fighting  force  of  the  cavalry  by 
an  adequate  addition  of  cyclist  sections.  This  is  the  more 
requisite,  as,  on  the  one  hand,  the  attack  on  the  enemy's 
communications  must  expect  vigorous  opposition,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  screening  duties,  which  are  even  more 
important  for  the  offensive  than  the  reconnaissances,  are 
likely  to  be  specially  successful  if  cavalry  and  cyclists  com- 
bine. Again,  an  increased  strength  of  cavalry  is  undeniably 
required  to  meet  the  reconnoitring  and  screening  troops 
of  the  enemy. 

Besides  the  strengthening  of  this  arm  and  the  addition 
of  cyclists,  another  organization  is  required  if  the  cavalry 
are  to  do  useful  service.  Brigades  of  two  regiments  and 
divisions  of  six  regiments  are  in  war-time,  where  all  de- 
pends on  decisive  action,  far  too  small,  as  I  have  repeatedly 
demonstrated  without  being  refuted. 

The  brigades  must  in  war  be  three  regiments  strong. 
The  strength  of  the  divisions  and  corps  may  vary  accord- 
ing to  the  requirements  of  the  time  being.  Just  because 
our  cavalry  is  so  weak,  the  organization  must  be  in  a  high 
degree  elastic.  There  can,  besides,  be  no  doubt  on  the 
point  that  the  side  which  commands  the  services  of  the 
stronger  cavalry,  led  on  modern  lines,  will  have  at  the 
outset  quite  inestimable  advantage  over  the  enemy,  which 
must  make  itself  felt  in  the  ultimate  issue. 

I  might  remark  incidentally  that  the  mounted  batteries 
which  are  atached  to  the  army  cavalry  must  be  formed 
with  four  guns  each,  so  that  the  division  with  its  three 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION  199 

parts  would  have  the  control  of  three  batteries,  and,  if 
necessary,  a  battery  could  be  assigned  to  each  brigade. 
That  is  an  old  suggestion  which  the  Emperor  William  I. 
once  made,  but  it  has  never  yet  been  considered.  It  is 
not  with  cavalry  usually  a  question  of  protracted  artillery 
engagements,  but  of  utilizing  momentary  opportunities;  the 
greatest  mobility  is  required  together  with  the  most  many- 
sided  efficiency  and  adaptability.  There  can  obviously, 
therefore,  be  no  question  of  a  systematic  combination  with 
the  artillery.  Such  a  thing  can  only  be  of  value  in  the  case 
of  cavalry  when  it  is  important  to  make  a  decisive  attack. 

The  reconnaissance  and  screening  duties  of  the  cavalry 
must  be  completed  by  the  air-fleet.  Here  we  are  dealing 
with  something  which  does  not  yet  exist,  but  we  can  foresee 
clearly  the  great  part  which  this  branch  of  military  science 
will  play  in  future  wars.*  It  is  therefore  necessary  to 
point  out  in  good  time  those  aspects  of  it  which  are  of 
special  weight  in  a  military  sense,  and  therefore  deserve 
peculiar  consideration  from  the  technical  side. 

The  first  requirement  is  that  airships,  in  addition  to  sim- 
plicity of  handling  and  independence  of  weather,  should 
possess  a  superior  fighting  strength,  for  it  is  impossible 
effectively  to  screen  the  movements  of  the  army  and  to 
open  the  road  for  reconnaissances  without  attacking  suc- 
cessfully the  hostile  flying-machines  and  air  cruisers. 

The  power  to  fight  and  destroy  the  hostile  airhsips  must 
be  the  leading  idea  in  all  constructions,  and  the  tactics  to 
be  pursued  must  be  at  once  thought  out  in  order  that  the 
airships  may  be  built  accordingly,  since  tactics  will  be  essen- 
tially dependent  on  the  construction  and  the  technical  effec- 
tiveness. These  reciprocal  relations  must  be  borne  in  mind 
from  the  first,  so  as  to  gain  a  distinct  advantage  over  our 
opponents. 

If  the  preceding  remarks  are  epitomized,  we  have,  apart 
from   the   necessity   of   enforcing  universal   service,   quite 

*  The  efficiency  and  success  of  the  Italian  aviators  in  Tripoli  are 
noteworthy,  but  must  not  be  overvalued.  There  were  no  opponents 
in  the  air. 


200    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

a  long  list  of  proposed  changes  in  organization,  the  adop- 
tion of  which  will  considerably  improve  the  efficiency  of 
our  army. 

The  whole  organization  must  be  such  that  the  column 
length  of  the  army  corps  does  not  exceed  the  size  which 
allows  a  rapid  advance,  though  the  supplies  are  exclusively 
drawn  from  magazine  depots. 

In  case  of  the  larger  formations,  and  especially  of  the 
army  corps  as  being  the  tactical  and  operative  unit,  the 
principle  of  tripartition  must  be  observed. 

The  infantry  must  be,  in  proportion  to  the  artillery,  sub- 
stantially strengthened. 

The  artillery  must  be  organized  in  such  a  way  that  it 
is  possible  to  concentrate  the  fire  of  the  howitzers  where 
required  without  breaking  up  the  units. 

The  cavalry  must  be  increased,  strengthened  by  cyclist 
sections,  and  so  organized  as  to  insure  their  efficiency  in 
war. 

The  formation  of  reinforcements,  especially  for  supplies, 
must  be  so  elaborated  that,  on  a  rapid  advance,  an  efficient 
system  of  feeding  the  troops  entirely  from  magazine  depots 
can  be  maintained. 

The  air-fleet  must  be  energetically  developed  with  the 
object  of  making  it  a  better  fighting  machine  than  that  of 
the  enemy. 

Finally,  and  this  is  the  most  important  thing,  we  must 
strain  every  nerve  to  render  our  infantry  tactically  the 
best  in  the  world,  and  to  take  care  that  none  but  thoroughly 
efficient  formations  are  employed  in  the  decisive  field  war. 

The  fulfilment  of  all  these  requirements  on  the  basis  of 
our  present  organization  offers  naturally  great  difficulties 
and  can  hardly  be  carried  out.  It  is  impossible  to  imagine 
a  German  Reichstag  which,  without  the  most  extreme  pres- 
sure of  circumstances,  could  resolve  to  make  for  the  army 
the  sacrifices  called   for  by  our  political  condition.     The 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION  201 

temptation  to  shut  the  eyes  to  existing  dangers  and  to  limit 
political  aims  in  order  to  repudiate  the  need  of  great  sacri- 
fices is  so  strong  that  men  are  sure  to  succumb  to  it,  espe- 
cially at  a  period  when  all  political  wisdom  seems  summed 
up  in  the  maintenance  of  peace.  They  comfort  themselves 
with  the  hope  that  the  worst  will  not  happen,  although  his- 
tory shows  that  the  misery  produced  by  weakness  has  often 
surpassed  all  expectations. 

But  even  if  the  nation  can  hardly  be  expected  to  under- 
stand what  is  necessary,  yet  the  War  Department  must 
be  asked  to  do  their  utmost  to  achieve  what  is  possible, 
and  not  to  stop  short  out  of  deference  to  public  opinion. 
When  the  future  of  a  great  and  noble  nation  is  at  stake 
there  is  no  room  for  cowardice  or  inaction.  Nothing  must 
be  done,  as  unhappily  has  too  often  been  the  case,  which 
runs  counter  to  the  principles  of  a  sound  military  organi- 
zation. 

The  threefold  division  of  the  larger  formations  could  be 
effected  in  various  ways.  Very  divergent  ideas  may  be 
entertained  on  this  subject,  and  the  difficulties  of  carrying 
out  the  scheme  need  extensive  consideration.  I  will  make 
a  few  proposals  just  by  way  of  illustration. 

One  way  would  be  to  split  up  the  army  corps  into  three 
divisions  of  three  infantry  regiments  each,  and  to  abolish 
the  superfluous  intermediate  system  of  brigades.  Another 
proposal  would  be  to  form  in  every  corps  one  of  the  present 
divisions  of  three  brigades,  so  that  the  extra  brigade  com- 
bined with  the  light  field  howitzers  and  the  Jager  battalion 
would  constitute  in  event  of  war  a  separate  detachment  in 
the  hands  of  the  commanding  General.  This  last  arrange- 
ment could  be  carried  out  comparatively  easily  under  our 
present  system,  but  entails  the  drawback  that  the  system 
of  twofold  division  is  still  in  force  within  the  brigades  and 
divisions.  The  most  sweeping  reform,  that  of  dividing 
the  corps  into  three  divisions,  would  have  the  advantage 


202    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

of  being  thorough  and  would  allow  the  separate  groups  to 
be  employed  in  many  more  ways. 

The  relations  between  the  infantry  and  the  artillery  can 
naturally  only  be  improved  gradually  by  the  strengthening 
of  the  infantry  through  the  enforcement  of  universal  serv- 
ice.   The  assignment  of  a  fifth  brigade  to  each  army  corps 
would  produce  better  conditions  than  exist  at  present.    But 
so  soon  as  the  strengthening  of  the  infantry  has  gone  so 
far  that  new   army  corps   must  be   created,   the   artillery 
required  for  them  can  be  taken  from  existing  formations, 
and  these  can  be  diminished  by  this  means.    It  will  conduce 
to  the  general  efficiency  of  the  army  if  the  artillery  destined 
for  each  army  corps  is  to  some  degree  limited,  without,  how- 
ever, reducing  their  total.    Care  must  be  taken  that  only  the 
quantity  of  ammunition  necessary  for  the  first  stages  of  the 
battle  should  be  habitually  carried  by  the  columns  of  the 
troops  engaged.     All  that  exceeds  this  must  be  kept  in  the 
rear  behind  the  commissariat  waggons,  and  brought  forward 
only   on   necessity — that   is   to    say,    when   a   battle   is    in 
prospect.     The  certainty  of  being  able  to  feed  the  troops 
and    thus    maintain    the    rapidity    of    the    advance    is    far 
more  important  than  the  more  or  less  theoretical  advan- 
tage of  having  a  large  quantity  of  ammunition  close  at  hand 
during  the  advance.     The  soldiers  will  be  inclined  to  be 
sparing  of  ammunition  in  the  critical  stages  of  the  fight, 
and  will  not  be  disposed  to  engage  with  an  unseen  enemy, 
who  can  only  be  attacked  by  scattered  fire;  the  full  fire 
strength  will  be  reserved  for  the  deciding  moments  of  the 
engagement.    Then,  however,  the  required  ammunition  will 
be  on  the  spot,  in  any  event,  if  it  is  brought  forward  by 
stages  in  good  time. 

A  suitable  organization  of  the  artillery  would  insure  that 
each  division  had  an  equal  number  of  batteries  at  its  dis- 
posal. The  light  field  howitzers,  however,  must  be  attached 
to  a  division  in  such  a  way  that  they  may  form  an  artillery 
corps,  without  necessarily  breaking  up  the  formations  of  the 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION  203 

division.  The  strength  of  the  artillery  must  be  regulated 
according  to  that  of  the  infantry,  in  such  a  way  that  the 
entire  marching  depth  does  not  exceed  some  25  kilometres. 
The  heavy  field  howitzers,  on  the  other  hand,  must  in  peace 
be  placed  under  the  orders  of  the  General  commanding. 
and  in  event  of  war  be  combined  as  "army"  artillery. 

It  would,  perhaps,  be  advisable  if  the  cavalry  were  com- 
pletely detached  from  the  corps  formation,  since  the  main 
body  is  absolutely  independent  in  war  as  "army"  cavalry. 
The  regiments  necessary  for  service  with  the  infantry  could 
be  called  out  in  turn  during  peace-time  for  manoeuvres  with 
mixed  arms,  in  order  to  be  trained  in  the  work  of  divisional 
cavalry,  for  which  purpose  garrison  training  can  also  be 
utilized.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is,  I  know,  often  alleged 
that  the  Truppenfuhrer  are  better  trained  and  learn  much 
if  the  cavalry  are  under  their  orders;  but  this  objection 
does  not  seem  very  pertinent. 

Another  way  to  adapt  the  organization  better  to  the 
efficiency  of  the  arm  than  at  present  would  be  that  the  four 
cavalry  regiments  belonging  to  each  army  corps  should  be 
combined  into  a  brigade  and  placed  under  the  commanding 
General.  In  event  of  mobilization,  one  regiment  would  be 
withdrawn  for  the  two  divisions,  while  the  brigade,  now 
three  regiments  strong,  would  pass  over  to  the  "army" 
cavalry.  The  regiment  intended  for  divisional  cavalry 
would,  on  mobilization,  form  itself  into  six  squadrons  and 
place  three  of  them  at  the  service  of  each  division.  If  the 
army  corps  was  formed  into  three  divisions,  each  division 
would  only  be  able  to  receive  two  squadrons. 

In  this  way,  of  course,  a  very  weak  and  inferior  divisional 
cavalry  would  be  formed ;  the  service  in  the  field  would 
suffer  heavily  under  it;  but  since  it  is  still  more  important 
to  have  at  hand  a  sufficient  army  cavalry  than  a  divisional 
cavalry,  quite  competent  for  their  difficult  task,  there  is  for 
the  time  being,  no  course  left  than  to  raise  the  one  to  its 
indispensable  strength  at  the  cost  of  the  other.  The  blame 
for  such  a  makeshift,  which  seriously  injures  the  army,  falls 
upon  those  who  did  not  advocate  an  increase  of  the  cavalry 


204    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

at  the  proper  moment.  The  whole  discussion  shows  how 
absolutely  necessary  such  an  increase  is.  If  it  were  effected, 
it  would  naturally  react  upon  the  organization  of  the  arm. 
This  would  have  to  be  adapted  to  the  new  conditions. 
There  are  various  ways  in  which  a  sound  and  suitable 
development  of  the  cavalry  can  be  guaranteed. 

The  absolutely  necessary  cyclist  sections  must  in  any 
case  be  attached  to  the  cavalry  in  peace,  in  order  that  the 
two  arms  may  be  drilled  in  co-operation,  and  that  the 
cavalry  commander  may  learn  to  make  appropriate  use  of 
this  important  arm.  Since  the  cyclists  are  restricted  to 
fairly  good  roads,  the  co-operation  presents  difficulties 
which  require  to  be  surmounted. 

The  views  which  I  have  here  tried  to  sketch  as  aspects 
of  the  organization  of  the  army  can  be  combated  from  sev- 
eral standpoints.  In  military  questions,  particularly,  dif- 
ferent estimates  of  the  individual  factors  lead  to  very  differ- 
ent results.  I  believe,  however,  that  my  opinions  result 
with  a  certain  logical  necessity  from  the  whole  aspect  of 
affairs.  It  is  most  essential,  in  preparing  for  war,  to  keep 
the  main  leading  idea  fixed  and  firm,  and  not  to  allow  it 
to  be  shaken  by  question  of  detail.  Each  special  require- 
ment must  be  regarded  as  part  of  that  general  combination 
of  things  which  only  really  comes  into  view  in  actual  war- 
fare. The  special  standpoint  of  a  particular  arm  must  be 
rejected  as  unjustified,  and  the  departmental  spirit  must  be 
silenced.  Care  must  be  taken  not  to  overestimate  the  tech- 
nical and  material  means  of  power  in  spite  of  their  un- 
doubted importance,  and  to  take  sufficient  account  of  the 
spiritual  and  moral  factors.  Our  age,  which  has  made  such 
progress  in  the  conquest  of  nature,  is  inclined  to  attach  too 
much  importance  to  this  dominion  over  natural  forces;  but 
in  the  last  resort,  the  forces  that  give  victory  are  in  the  men 
and  not  in  the  means  which  they  employ. 

A  profound  knowledge  of  generalship  and  a  self-reliant 
personality  are  essential  to  enable  the  war  preparations 
to  be  suitably  carried  out;  under  the  shifting  influence  of 
different  aims  and  ideas  the  "organizer  of  victory"  will 
often  feel  doubtful  whether  he  ought  to  decide  this  way 
©r  that.     The  only  satisfactory  solution  of  such  doubts  is 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION  205 

to  deduce  from  a  view  of  warfare  in  its  entirety  and  its 
varied  phases  and  demands  the  importance  of  the  separate 
co-operating  factors. 

"For  he  who  grasps  the  problem  as  a  whole 
Has  calmed  the  storm  that  rages  in  his  soul." 


CHAPTER   XI 
TRAINING  AND  EDUCATION 

Our  first  object,  then,  must  be  to  organize  and  transform 
the  German  army  into  the  most  effective  tool  of  German 
policy,  and  into  a  school  of  health  and  strength  for  our 
nation.  We  must  also  try  to  get  ahead  of  our  rivals  by 
superiority  of  training,  and  at  the  same  time  to  do  full 
justice  to  the  social  requirements  of  the  army  by  exerting 
all  our  efforts  towards  raising  the  spiritual  and  moral  level 
of  the  units  and  strengthening  their  loyal  German  feelings. 

Diligence  and  devotion  to  military  education  are  no 
longer  at  the  present  day  sufficient  to  make  our  troops 
superior  to  the  enemy's,  for  there  are  men  working  no 
less  devotedly  in  the  hostile  armies.  If  we  wish  to  gain 
a  start  there  is  only  one  way  to  do  it:  the  training  must 
break  with  all  that  is  antiquated  and  proceed  in  the  spirit 
of  the  war  of  the  future,  which  will  impose  fresh  require- 
ments on  the  troops  as  well  as  on  the  officers. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  go  into  the  details  about  the  train- 
ing in  the  use  of  modern  arms  and  technical  contrivance? : 
this  follows  necessarily  from  the  introduction  of  these 
means  of  war.  But  if  we  survey  the  sphere  of  training 
as  a  whole,  two  phenomena  of  modern  warfare  will  strike 
us  as  peculiarly  important  with  regard  to  it :  the  heightened 
demands  which  will  be  made  on  individual  character  and 
the  employment  of  "masses"  to  an  extent  hitherto  unknown. 

The  necessity  for  increased  individualization  in  the  case 
of  infantry  and  artillery  results  directly  from  the  character 
of  the  modern  battle;  in  the  case  of  cavalry  it  is  due  to 
the  nature  of  their  strategical  duties  and  the  need  of  some 

$06 


TRAINING  AND  EDUCATION  207 

times  fighting  on  foot  like  infantry;  in  the  case  of  leaders 
of  every  grade,  from  the  immensity  of  the  armies,  the 
vast  extent  of  the  spheres  of  operation  and  fields  of  battle, 
ard  the  difficulty,  inseparable  from  all  these  conditions  of 
gning  direct  orders.  Wherever  we  turn  our  eyes  to  the 
wide  sphere  of  modern  warfare,  we  encounter  the  necessity 
of  independent  action — by  the  private  soldier  in  the  thick 
of  the  battle,  or  the  lonely  patrol  in  the  midst  of  the  enemy's 
country,  as  much  as  by  the  leader  of  an  army,  who  handles 
huge  hosts.  In  battle,  as  well  as  in  operations,  the  requisite 
uniformity  of  action  can  only  be  attained  at  the  present 
time  by  independent  co-operation  of  all  in  accordance  with 
a  fixed  general  scheme. 

The  employment  of  "masses"  requires  an  entirely 
altered  method  of  moving  and  feeding  the  troops.  It  is 
one  thing  to  lead  100,000  or  perhaps  200,000  men  in  a 
rich  country  seamed  with  roads,  and  concentrate  them 
for  a  battle — it  is  another  to  manoeuvre  800,000  men  on  a 
scene  of  war  stripped  bare  by  the  enemy,  where  all  rail- 
roads and  bridges  have  been  destroyed  by  modern  explo- 
sives. In  the  first  case  the  military  empiric  may  be  equal 
to  the  occasion;  the  second  case  demands  imperatively  a 
scientifically  educated  General  and  a  staff  who  have  also 
studied  and  mastered  for  themselves  the  nature  of  modern 
warfare.  The  problems  of  the  future  must  be  solved  in 
advance  if  a  commander  wishes  to  be  able  to  operate  in  a 
modern  theatre  of  war  with  certainty  and  rapid  decision. 

The  necessity  of  far-reaching  individualization  then  is 
universally  recognized.  To  be  sure,  the  old  traditions  die 
slowly.  Here  and  there  an  undeserved  importance  is  still 
attached  to  the  march  past  as  a  method  of  education,  and 
drilling  in  close  formation  is  sometimes  practised  more  than 
is  justified  by  its  value.  The  cavalry  is  not  yet  completely 
awakened  from  its  slumbers,  and  performs  the  time- 
honoured  exercises  on  the  parade-grounds  with  great  strain 
on  the  horses'  strength,  oblivious  of  the  existence  of  long- 
range  quick-firing  guns,  and  as  if  they  were  still  the  old 


2o8    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

arm  which  Napoleon  or  Frederick  the  Great  commanded 
Even  the  artillery  is  still  haunted  by  some  more  or  leis 
antiquated  notions;  technical  and  stereotyped  ideas  sflll 
sometimes  restrict  the  freedom  of  operations;  in  the  prac- 
tice of  manoeuvres,  artillery  duels  are  still  in  vogue,  wnile 
sufficient  attention  is  not  given  to  concentration  of  fire  vith 
a  definite  purpose,  and  to  co-operation  with  the  infantry. 
Even  in  theory  the  necessity  of  the  artillery  duel  is  still 
asserted.  Many  conservative  notions  linger  on  in  the  heavy 
artillery.  Obsolete  ideas  have  not  yet  wholly  disappeared 
even  from  the  new  regulations  and  ordinances  where  they 
block  the  path  of  true  progress ;  but,  on  the  whole,  it  has 
been  realized  that  greater  individual  responsibility  and  self- 
reliance  must  be  encouraged.  In  this  respect  the  army  is 
on  the  right  road,  and  if  it  continues  on  it  and  continually 
resists  the  temptation  of  restricting  the  independence  of 
the  subordinate  for  the  sake  of  outward  appearance,  there 
is  room  for  hope  that  gradually  the  highest  results  will  be 
attained,  provided  that  competent  military  criticism  has 
been  equally  encouraged. 

In  this  direction  a  healthy  development  has  started,  but 
insufficient  attention  has  been  given  to  the  fact  that  the 
main  features  of  war  have  completely  changed.  Although 
in  the  next  war  men  will  have  to  be  handled  by  millions, 
the  training  of  our  officers  is  still  being  conducted  on  lines 
which  belong  to  a  past  era,  and  virtually  ignore  modern 
conditions.  Our  manoeuvres  more  especially  fullow  these 
lines.  Most  of  the  practical  training  is  carried  out  in 
manoeuvres  of  brigades  and  divisions — i.e.,  in  formations 
which  could  never  occur  in  the  great  decisive  campaigns 
of  the  future.  From  time  to  time — financial  grounds  un- 
fortunately prevent  it  being  an  annual  affair — a  corps 
manoeuvre  is  held,  which  also  cannot  be  regarded  as  train- 
ing for  the  command  of  "masses."  Sometimes,  but  rarely, 
several  army  corps  are  assembled  for  combined  training 
under  veteran  Generals,  who  soon  afterwards  leave  the 
service,  and  so  cannot  give  the  army  the  benefit  of  any 
experience  which  they  may  have  gained. 


TRAINING  AND  EDUCATION  209 

It  cannot,  of  course,  be  denied  that  present-day 
manoeuvres  are  extraordinarily  instructive  and  useful, 
especially  for  the  troops  themselves;  but  they  are  not  a 
direct  training  for  the  command  of  armies  in  modern  war- 
fare. Even  the  so-called  " Imperial  Manoeuvres"  only  cor- 
respond, to  a  very  slight  extent,  to  the  requirements  of 
modern  war,  since  they  never  take  account  of  the  commis- 
sariat arrangements,  and  seldom  of  the  arrangements  for 
sheltering,  etc.,  the  troops  which  would  be  essential  in  real 
warfare.  A  glance  at  the  Imperial  Manoeuvres  of  1909  is 
sufficient  to  show  that  many  of  the  operations  could  never 
have  been  carried  out  had  it  been  a  question  of  the  troops 
being  fed  under  the  conditions  of  war.  It  is  an  absolute 
necessity  that  our  officers  should  learn  to  pay  adequate 
attention  to  these  points,  which  are  the  rule  in  warfare  and 
appreciably  cramp  the  power  of  operations.  In  theory,  of 
course,  the  commissariat  waggons  are  always  taken  into 
account;  they  are  conscientiously  mentioned  in  all  orders, 
and  in  theory  are  posted  as  a  commissariat  reserve  between 
the  corps  and  the  divisions.  That  they  would  in  reality 
all  have  to  circulate  with  a  pendulum-like  frequency  be- 
tween the  troops  and  the  magazines,  that  the  magazines 
would  have  to  be  almost  daily  brought  forward  or  sent 
farther  back,  that  the  position  of  the  field  bakeries  is  of 
extreme  importance — these  are  all  points  which  are  incon- 
venient and  troublesome,  and  so  are  very  seldom  considered. 

In  great  strategic  war-games,  too,  even  in  a  theatre  of 
war  selected  in  Russia  which  excludes  all  living  upon  the 
country,  the  commissariat  arrangements  are  rarely  worked 
out  in  detail;  I  should  almost  doubt  whether  on  such 
occasions  the  possibility  of  exclusive  "magazine  feeding" 
has  ever  been  entertained.  Even  smaller  opportunities  of 
being  acquainted  with  these  conditions  are  given  to  the 
officer  in  ordinary  manoeuvres,  and  yet  it  is  extremely  diffi- 
cult on  purely  theoretical  lines  to  become  familiar  with  the 
machinery  for  moving  and  feeding  a  large  army  and  to 
master  the  subject  efficiently. 

The  friction  and  the  obstacles  which  occur  in  reality 
cannot  be  brought  home  to  the  student  in  theory,  and  the 


210    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

routine   in   managing  such   things  cannot   be   learnt    from 
books. 

These  conditions,  then,  are  a  great  check  on  the  freedom 
of  operations,  but  quite  apart  from  the  commissariat  ques- 
tion, the  movements  of  an  army  present  considerable  dif- 
ficulties in  themselves,  which  it  is  obviously  very  hard  for 
the  inexperienced  to  surmount.  When,  in  1870,  some 
rather  complicated  army  movements  were  contemplated, 
as  on  the  advance  to  Sedan,  it  was  at  once  seen  that  the 
chief  commanders  were  not  masters  of  the  situation,  that 
only  the  fertility  of  the  theatre  of  war  and  the  deficient 
attacking  powers  of  the  French  allowed  the  operations  to 
succeed,  although  a  man  like  Moltke  was  at  the  head  of 
the  army.  All  these  matters  have  since  been  thoroughly 
worked  out  by  our  General  Staff,  but  the  theoretical  la- 
bours of  the  General  Staff  are  by  no  means  the  common 
property  of  the  army. 

On  all  these  grounds  I  believe  that  first  and  foremost 
our  manoeuvres  must  be  placed  on  a  new  footing  cor- 
responding to  the  completely  altered  conditions,  and  that 
we  must  leave  the  beaten  paths  of  tradition.  The  troops 
must  be  trained — as  formerly — to  the  highest  practical  ef- 
ficiency, and  the  army  must  be  developed  into  the  most 
effective  machine  for  carrying  out  operations;  success  in 
modern  war  turns  on  these  two  pivots.  But  the  leaders 
must  be  definitely  educated  for  that  war  on  the  great  scale 
which  some  day  will  have  to  be  fought  to  a  finish.  The 
paths  we  have  hitherto  followed  do  not  lead  to  this  goal. 

All  methods  of  training  and  education  must  be  in  ac- 
cordance with  these  views. 

I  do  not  propose  to  go  further  into  the  battle  training  of 
infantry  and  cavalry  in  this  place,  since  I  have  already 
discussed  the  question  at  length  in  special  treatises.*  In 
the  case  of  the  artillery  alone,  some  remarks  on  the  prin- 
ciples guiding  the  technical  training  of  this  arm  seem  neces- 
sary. 

*v.  Bernhardi:  "Taktik  und  Ausbildung  der  Infanterie,"  1910. 
"Unsere  Kavallerie  im  nachsten  Krieg,"  1899;  "Reiterdienst,"  1910. 


TRAINING  AND  EDUCATION  211 

The  demands  on  the  fighting-efficiency  of  this  arm — 
as  is  partly  expressed  in  the  regulations — may  be  summed 
up  as  follows:  all  preconceived  ideas  and  theories  as  to  its 
employment  must  be  put  on  one  side,  and  its  one  guiding 
principle  must  be  to  support  the  cavalry  or  infantry  at 
the  decisive  point.  This  principle  is  universally  acknowl- 
edged in  theory,  but  it  ought  to  be  more  enforced  in  prac- 
tice. The  artillery,  therefore,  must  try  more  than  ever  to 
bring  their  tactical  duties  into  the  foreground  and  to  make 
their  special  technical  requirements  subservient  to  this  idea. 
The  ever- recurring  tendency  to  fight  chiefly  the  enemy's  ar- 
tillery must  be  emphatically  checked.  On  the  defensive  it 
will,  of  course,  often  be  necessary  to  engage  the  attack- 
ing artillery,  if  there  is  any  prospect  of  success,  since  this 
is  the  most  dreaded  enemy  of  the  infantry  on  the  de- 
fensive; but,  on  the  attack,  its  chief  duty  always  is  to 
fire  upon  the  enemy's  infantry,  where  possible,  from 
masked  positions.  The  principle  of  keeping  the  artillery 
divisions  close  together  on  the  battlefield  and  combining 
the  fire  in  one  direction,  must  not  be  carried  to  an  ex- 
treme. The  artillery  certainly  must  be  employed  on  a 
large  plan,  and  the  chief  in  command  must  see  that  there 
is  a  concentration  of  effort  at  the  decisive  points;  but  in 
particular  cases,  and  among  the  varying  incidents  of  a  battle, 
this  idea  will  be  carried  out  less  effectively  by  uniform- 
ity of  orders  than  by  explaining  the  general  scheme  to 
the  subordinate  officers,  and  leaving  to  them  the  duty 
of  carrying  it  out.  Accordingly,  it  is  important  that  the 
personal  initiative  of  the  subordinate  officer  should  be  rec- 
ognized more  fully  than  before;  for  in  a  crisis  such  inde- 
pendent action  is  indispensable.  The  great  extent  of  the 
battlefield  and  the  natural  endeavour  to  select  wooded  and 
irregular  ground  for  the  attack  will  often  force  the  ar- 
tillery to  advance  in  groups  or  in  lines  one  behind  the 
other,  and  to  attempt,  notwithstanding,  united  action  against 
the  tactically  most  important  objective.  This  result  is  hard 
to  attain  by  a  centralization  of  command,  and  is  best  realized 
by  the  independent  action  of  tactically  trained  subordinates. 
This  is  not  the  place  to  enter  into  technical  details,  and  I 


212    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

will  only  mention  some  points  which  appear  especially  im- 
portant. 

The  Bz  shell  (Granatschuss)  should  be  withdrawn  as 
unsuitable,  and  its  use  should  not  form  part  of  the  train- 
ing. It  requires,  in  order  to  attain  its  specific  effect  against 
rifle-pits,  such  accurate  aiming  as  is  very  seldom  possible 
in  actual  warfare. 

No  very  great  value  should  be  attached  to  firing  with 
shrapnel.  It  seems  to  be  retained  in  France  and  to  have 
shown  satisfactory  results  with  us;  but  care  must  be  taken 
not  to  apply  the  experiences  of  the  shooting-range  directly 
to  serious  warfare.  No  doubt  its  use,  if  successful,  prom- 
ises rapid  results,  but  it  may  easily  lead,  especially  in 
the  "mass"  battle,  to  great  errors  in  calculation.  In  any 
case,  practice  with  Az  shot  is  more  trustworthy,  and  is 
of  the  first  importance. 

The  Az  fire  must  be  reserved  principally  for  the  last 
stages  of  an  offensive  engagement,  as  was  late  laid  down 
in  the  regulations. 

Care  must  be  taken  generally  not  to  go  too  far  in  refine- 
ments and  complications  of  strategy  and  devices.  Only 
the  simplest  methods  can  be  successfully  applied  in  battle; 
this  fact  must  never  be  forgotten. 

The  important  point  in  the  general  training  of  the  ar- 
tillery is  that  text-book  pedantries — for  example,  in  the  re- 
ports on  shooting — should  be  relegated  more  than  hitherto 
to  the  background,  and  that  tactics  should  be  given  a  more 
prominent  position.  In  this  way  only  can  the  artillery  do 
really  good  service  in  action;  but  the  technique  of  shoot- 
ing must  not  be  neglected  in  the  reports.  That  would 
mean  rejecting  the  good  and  the  evil  together,  and  tend- 
ency to  abolish  such  reports  as  inconvenient  must  be  dis- 
tinctly opposed. 

Under  this  head,  attention  must  be  called  to  the  inde- 
pendent manoeuvres  of  artillery  regiments  and  brigades  in 
the  country,  which  entail  large  expenditure,  and,  in  fact,  do 
more  harm  than  good.  They  must,  in  my  opinion,  be  aban- 
doned or  at  least  considerably  modified,  since  thair  possible 


TRAINING  AND  EDUCATION  213 

use  is  not  in  proportion  to  their  cost  and  their  drawbacks. 
They  lead  to  pronounced  tactics  of  position  (Stellungs- 
taktik)  which  are  impracticable  in  war;  and  the  most  im- 
portant lesson  in  actual  war — the  timely  employment  of 
artillery  within  a  defined  space  and  for  a  definite  object 
without  any  previous  reconnoitring  of  the  country  in  search 
of  suitable  positions  for  the  batteries — can  never  be  learnt 
on  these  manoeuvres.  They  could  be  made  more  instructive 
if  the  tactical  limits  were  marked  by  troops;  but  the  chief 
defect  in  these  manoeuvres — viz.,  that  the  artillery  is  re- 
garded as  the  decisive  arm — cannot  be  thus  remedied.  The 
usual  result  is  that  favourable  artillery  positions  are 
searched  for,  and  that  they  are  then  adhered  to  under 
some  tactical  pretence. 

After  all,  only  a  slight  shifting  of  the  existinz  centre 
of  gravity  may  be  necessary,  so  far  as  the  development  of 
the  fighting  tactics  of  the  various  branches  of  the  service 
is  concerned,  in  order  to  bring  them  into  line  with  mod- 
ern conditions.  If,  however  ,the  troops  are  to  be  educated 
to  a  higher  efficiency  in  operations,  completely  new  ground 
must  be  broken,  on  which,  I  am  convinced,  great  results 
and  an  undoubted  superiority  over  our  opponents  can  be 
attained.  Considerable  difficulties  will  have  to  be  sur- 
mounted, for  the  crucial  point  is  to  amass  immense  armies 
on  a  genuine  war  footing;  but  these  difficulties  are  not,  in 
my  opinion,  insurmountable. 

There  are  two  chief  points:  first,  the  practice  of  march- 
ing and  operations  in  formations  at  war  strength,  fully 
equipped  with  well-stocked  magazines  as  on  active  service; 
and,  secondly,  a  reorganization  of  the  manoeuvres,  which 
must  be  combined  with  a  more  thorough  education  of  the 
chief  commanders. 

As  regards  the  first  point,  practice  on  this  scale,  so  far 
as  I  know,  has  never  yet  been  attempted.  But  if  we  con- 
sider, firstly,  how  valuable  more  rapid  and  accurate  move- 
ments of  great  masses  will  be  for  the  war  of  the  future, 
and,  secondly,  what  serious  difficulties  they  involve,  we  shall 
be  rewarded  for  the  attempt  to  prepare  the  army  sys- 
tematically for  the  discharge  of  such  duties,  and  thus  to 


2i4    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

win   an   unquestioned   advantage   over   our   supposed   an- 
tagonist. 

The  preparation  for  the  larger  manoeuvres  of  this  sort 
can  naturally  also  be  carried  out  in  smaller  formation.  It 
is,  moreover,  very  important  to  train  large  masses  of  troops 
— brigades  and  divisions — in  long  marches  across  country 
by  night  and  day  with  pioneer  sections  in  the  vanguard, 
in  order  to  gain  experience  for  the  technique  of  such 
movements,  and  to  acquire  by  practice  a  certain  security  in 
them. 

Training  marches  with  full  military  stores,  etc.,  in  col- 
umns of  20  to  25  kilometres  depth  would  be  still  more 
valuable,  since  they  correspond  to  the  daily  needs  of  real 
warfare.  Should  it  not  be  possible  to  assemble  two  army 
corps  in  such  manoeuvres,  then  the  necessary  depth  of 
march  can  be  obtained  by  letting  the  separate  detachments 
march  with  suitable  intervals,  in  which  case  the  intervals 
must  be  very  strictly  observed.  This  does  not  ever  really 
reproduce  the  conditions  of  actual  warfare,  but  it  is  useful 
as  a  makeshift.  The  waggons  for  the  troops  would  have 
to  be  hired,  as  on  manoeuvres,  though  only  partly,  in  order 
to  save  expense.  The  supplies  could  be  brought  on  army 
transport  trains,  which  would  represent  the  pioneer  con- 
voys (Verpflegungsstaffel),  and  would  regulate  their  pace 
accordingly. 

Marching  merely  for  training  purposes  in  large  forma- 
tions, with  food  supplied  from  the  field-kitchens  during 
the  march,  would  also  be  of  considerable  value  provided 
that  care  is  taken  to  execute  the  march  in  the  shortest 
possible  time,  and  to  replace  the  provisions  consumed  by 
bringing  fresh  supplies  forward  from  the  rear;  this  pro- 
cess is  only  properly  seen  when  the  march,  with  supplies 
as  if  in  war,  is  continued  for  several  day.  It  is  naturally 
not  enough  to  undertake  these  manoeuvres  once  in  a  way; 
they  must  be  a  permanent  institution  if  they  are  intended 
to  develop  a  sound  knowledge  of  marching  in  the  army. 
Finally,  flank  marches  must  be  practised,  sometimes  in 
separate  columns,  sometimes  in  army  formation.  The  flank 
marches  of  separate  columns   will,   of  course,  be  useful 


TRAINING  AND  EDUCATION  215 

only  when  they  are  combined  with  practice  in  feeding 
an  army  as  if  in  war,  so  that  the  commissariat  columns 
march  on  the  side  away  from  the  enemy,  in  a  parallel 
line,  and  are  thence  brought  up  to  the  troops  at  the  close 
of  the  march.  Flank  marches  in  army  formation  will  have 
some  value,  even  apart  from  any  training  in  the  commis- 
sariat system,  since  the  simultaneous  crossing  of  several 
marching  columns  on  parallel  by-roads  is  not  an  easy  ma- 
noeuvre in  itself.  But  this  exercise  will  have  its  full  value 
only  when  the  regulation  commissariat  waggons  are  at- 
tached, which  would  have  to  move  with  them  and  furnish 
the  supplies. 

I  also  consider  that  operative  movements  in  army  forma- 
tion extending  over  several  days  are  desirable.  Practice 
must  be  given  in  moving  backwards  and  forwards  in  the 
most  various  combinations,  in  flank  movements,  and  in 
doubling  back,  the  lines  of  communication  in  the  rear  being 
blocked  when  necessary.  Then  only  can  all  the  difficulties 
which  occur  on  such  movements  be  shown  one  by  one, 
and  it  can  be  seen  where  the  lever  must  be  applied  in 
order  to  remove  them.  In  this  way  alone  can  the  higher 
commanders  gain  the  necessary  crtainty  in  conducting  such 
operations,  so  as  to  be  able  to  employ  them  under  the 
pressure  of  a  hostile  attack.  An  army  so  disciplined  would, 
I  imagine,  acquire  a  pronounced  superiority  over  any  op- 
ponent who  made  his  first  experiments  in  such  operations 
in  actual  war.  The  major  strategic  movements  on  both 
sides  in  the  Franco-German  War  of  1870-71  sufficiently 
showed  that. 

I  recognize  naturally  that  all  exercises  on  this  scale 
would  cost  a  great  deal  of  money  and  could  never  all  be 
carried  out  systematically  one  after  the  other.  I  wished, 
however,  to  ventilate  the  subject,  firstly,  in  order  to  recom- 
mend all  officers  in  high  command  to  study  the  points  of 
view  under  consideration — a  thing  they  much  neglect  to 
do;  secondly,  because  it  might  be  sometimes  profitable  and 
possible  to  carry  out  in  practice  one  or  other  of  them — 
at  the  Imperial  manoeuvres,  for  example,  or  on  some  other 
occasion.     How  much  could  be  saved  in  money  alone  and 


216    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

applied  usefully  to  this  purpose  were  the  above-mentioned 
country  manoeuvres  of  the  artillery  suspended?  From  rea- 
sons of  economy  all  the  commissariat  waggons  and  columns 
need  not  actually  be  employed  on  such  manoeuvres.  It 
would  be  useful,  however,  if,  in  addition  to  one  detach- 
ment equipped  on  a  war  footing,  the  head  waggons  of 
the  other  groups  were  present  and  were  moved  along  at 
the  proper  distance  from  each  other  and  from  the  de- 
tachment, which  could  mainly  be  fed  from  the  kitchen 
waggon.  It  would  thus  be  possible  to  get  a  sort  of  pre- 
sentation of  the  whole  course  of  the  commissariat  busi- 
ness and  to  acquire  valuable  experience.  It  is,  indeed, 
extraordinarily  difficult  to  arrange  such  manoeuvres  properly, 
and  it  must  be  admitted  that  much  friction  and  many  ob- 
stacles are  got  rid  of  if  only  the  heads  of  the  groups  are 
marked  out,  and  that  false  ideas  thus  arise  which  may 
lead  to  erroneous  conclusions;  but  under  careful  direction 
such  manoeuvres  would  certainly  not  be  wholly  useless, 
especially  if  attention  is  mainly  paid  to  the  matters  which 
are  really  essential.  They  would,  at  any  rate,  be  far  more 
valuable  than  many  small  manoeuvres,  which  can  frequently 
be  replaced  by  exercises  on  the  large  drill-grounds,  than 
many  expensive  trainings  in  the  country,  which  are  of  no 
real  utility,  or  than  many  other  military  institutions,  which 
are  only  remotely  connected  with  the  object  of  training 
under  active  service  conditions.  All  that  does  not  di- 
rectly promote  this  object  must  be  erased  from  our  sys- 
tem of  education  at  a  time  when  the  highest  values  are 
at  stake. 

Even  then  exercise  in  operations  on  a  large  scale  can- 
not often  be  carried  out,  primarily  because  of  the  probable 
cost,  and  next  because  it  is  not  advisable  to  interrupt  too 
often  the  tactical  training  of  the  troops. 

It  must  be  repeated  in  a  definite  cycle  in  each  large 
formation,  so  that  eventually  all  superior  officers  may  have 
the  opportunity  of  becoming  practically  acquainted  with 
these  operations,  and  also  that  the  troops  may  become  fa- 
miliarized with  the  modern  commissariat  system;  but  since 
such  practical  exercises  must  always  be  somewhat  incom- 


TRAINING  AND  EDUCATION  217 

plete,  they  must  also  be  worked  out  beforehand  theoretic- 
ally. It  is  not  at  all  sufficient  that  the  officers  on  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  and  the  Intendants  have  a  mastery  of  these  sub- 
jects. The  rank  and  file  must  be  well  up  in  them;  but 
especially  the  officers  who  will  be  employed  on  the  supply 
service — that  is  to  say,  the  transport  officers  of  the  stand- 
ing army  and  those  officers  on  the  furlough  establishment, 
who  would  be  employed  as  column  commanders. 

The  practical  service  in  the  transport  battalions  and 
the  duties  performed  by  the  officers  of  the  last-mentioned 
category  who  are  assigned  to  these  battalions  are  insufficient 
to  attain  this  object.  They  learn  from  these  mainly  prac- 
tical duties  next  to  nothing  of  the  system  as  a  whole.  It 
would  therefore  be  advisable  that  all  hese  officers  should 
go  through  a  special  preliminary  course  for  this  service,  in 
which  the  whole  machinery  of  the  army  movements  would 
be  explained  to  them  by  the  officers  of  the  General  Staff 
and  the  higher  transport  service  officers,  and  they  would 
then  learn  by  practical  examples  to  calculate  the  whole 
movement  of  the  columns  in  the  most  varied  position  with 
precise  regard  to  distances  and  time.  This  would  be  far 
more  valuable  for  war  than  the  many  and  often  excessive 
trainings  in  driving,  etc.,  on  which  so  much  time  is  wasted. 
The  technical  driver's  duty  is  very  simple  in  all  columns 
and  trains,  but  it  is  not  easy  to  know  in  each  position  what 
is  the  crucial  point,  in  order  to  be  able,  when  occasion 
arises,  to  act  independently. 

While,  therefore,  on  the  one  hand,  driving  instruction 
must  be  thorou^hlv  carried  out,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
institution  of  a  scientific  transport  service  course,  in  which, 
by  practical  examples  out  of  military  history,  the  impor- 
tance of  these  matters  can  be  explained,  is  under  present 
circumstances  an  absolute  necessity.  I  have  shown  else- 
where how  necessary  it  is  to  proceed  absolutely  system- 
atically in  the  arrangement  for  relays  of  supplies,  since  the 
operative  capabilities  of  the  army  depend  on  this  system. 
Its  nature,  however,  cannot  be  realized  by  the  officers  con- 
cerned like  a  sudden  inspiration  when  mobilization  takes 
place ;  knowledge  of  its  principles  must  be  gained  by  study, 


218    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

and  a  proof  of  the  complete  misapprehension  of  the  im- 
portance which  this  service  has  attained  under  modern  con- 
ditions is  that  officers  are  supposed  to  be  able  to  manage 
it  successfully  without  having  made  in  peace-time  a  pro- 
found scientific  study  of  the  matter. 

The  transport  service  has  advanced  to  a  place  of  extra- 
ordinary importance  in  the  general  system  of  modern  war- 
fare. It  should  be  appreciated  accordingly.  Every  active 
transport  service  officer  ought,  after  some  years'  service, 
to  attend  a  scientific  course;  all  the  senior  officers  on  the 
furlough  establishment  intended  for  transport  service  ought, 
as  their  first  duty,  to  be  summoned  to  attend  such  a  course. 
If  these  educational  courses  were  held  in  the  autumn  in  the 
training  camps  of  the  troops,  they  would  entail  little  extra 
cost,  and  an  inestimable  advantage  would  be  gained  with 
a  very  trifling  outlay. 

The  results  of  such  a  measure  can  only  be  fully  realized 
in  war,  when  the  superior  officers  also  thoroughly  grasp 
these  matters  and  do  not  make  demands  contrary  to  the 
nature  of  the  case,  and  therefore  impossible  to  be  met. 
They  should  therefore  be  obliged  to  undergo  a  thorough 
education  in  the  practical  duties  of  the  General  Staff,  and 
not  merely  in  leading  troops  in  action. 

This  reflection  leads  to  the  discussion  of  the  momentous 
question  how,  generally,  the  training  of  the  superior  officers 
for  the  great  war  should  be  managed  ,and  how  the  man- 
oeuvres ought  to  be  reorganized  with  a  view  to  the  training. 
The  essential  contradiction  between  our  obsolete  method 
of  training  and  the  completely  altered  demands  of  a  new 
era  appears  here  with  peculiar  distinctness. 

A  large  part  of  our  superior  commanders  pass  through 
the  General  Staff,  while  part  have  attended  at  least  the 
military  academy;  but  when  these  men  reach  the  higher 
positions  what  they  learnt  in  their  youth  has  long  become 
out  of  date.  The  continuation  school  is  missing.  It  can 
be  replaced  only  by  personal  study;  but  there  is  generally 
insufficient  time  for  this,  and  often  a  lack  of  interest.  The 
daily  duties  of  training  troops  claim  all  the  officer's  energy, 
and  he  needs  great  determination  and  love  of  hard  work 


TRAINING  AND  EDUCATION  219 

to  continue  vigorously  his  own  scientific  education.  The 
result  is,  that  comparatively  few  of  our  superior  officers 
have  a  fairly  thorough  knowledge,  much  less  an  inde- 
pendently thought  out  view,  of  the  conditions  of  war  on 
the  great  scale.  This  would  cost  dearly  in  real  war. 
Experience  shows  that  it  is  not  enough  that  the  officers 
of  the  General  Staff  attached  to  the  leader  are  competent 
to  fill  up  this  gap.  The  leader,  if  he  cannot  himself  grasp 
the  conditions,  becomes  the  tool  of  his  subordinates;  he 
believes  he  is  directing  and  is  himself  being  directed.  This 
is  a  far  from  healthy  condition.  Our  present  manoeuvres 
are,  as  already  mentioned,  only  occasionally  a  school  for 
officers  in  a  strategical  sense,  and  from  the  tactical  point 
of  view  they  do  not  meet  modern  requirements.  The 
minor  manoeuvres  especially  do  not  represent  what  is  the 
most  important  feature  in  present-day  warfare — i.e.,  the 
sudden  concentration  of  larger  forces  on  the  one  side  and 
the  impossibility,  from  space  considerations,  of  timely 
counter-movements  on  the  other.  The  minor  manoeuvres  are 
certainly  useful  in  many  respects.  The  commanders  learn 
to  form  decisions  and  to  give  orders,  and  these  are  two 
important  matters;  but  the  same  result  would  follow  from 
manoeuvres  on  the  grand  scale,  which  would  also  to  some 
extent  reproduce  the  modern  conditions  of  warfare. 

Brigade  manoeuvres  especially  belong  to  a  past  genera- 
tion, and  merely  encourage  wrong  ideas.  All  that  the 
soldiers  learn  from  them — that  is,  fighting  in  the  country — 
can  be  taught  on  the  army  drill-grounds.  Divisional  man- 
oeuvres are  still  of  some  value  even  to  the  commanders. 
The  principles  of  tactical  leadership  in  detail  can  be  exem- 
plified in  them;  but  the  first  instructive  manoeuvres  in 
the  modern  sense  are  those  of  the  army  corps ;  still  more 
valuable  are  the  manoeuvres  on  a  larger  scale,  in  which 
several  army  corps  are  combined,  especially  when  the 
operating  divisions  are  considered  part  of  one  whole,  and 
are  compelled  to  act  in  connection  with  one  grand  general 
scheme  of  operation.  The  great  art  in  organizing  man- 
oeuvres is  to  reproduce  such  conditions,  for  only  in  this 
way  can  the  strain  of  the  general  situation  and  the  col- 
lective mass  of  individual  responsibility,  such  as  exist  in 


220    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

actual  warfare,  be  distinctly  brought  home.  This  is  a  most 
weighty  consideration.  The  superior  officers  must  have 
clearly  brought  before  their  eyes  the  limits  of  the  possible 
and  the  impossible  in  modern  warfare,  in  order  to  be  trained 
to  deal  with  great  situations. 

The  requirements  which  these  reflections  suggest  are  the 
restriction  of  small-scale  manoeuvres  in  favour  of  the  large 
and  predominantly  strategical  manoeuvres,  and  next  the 
abolition  of  some  less  important  military  exercises  to  order 
to  apply  the  money  thus  saved  in  this  direction.  We  must 
subject  all  our  resources  to  a  single  test — that  they  con- 
duce to  the  perfecting  of  a  modern  army.  If  the  military 
drill-grounds  are  suitably  enlarged  (a  rather  difficult  but 
necessary  process,  since,  in  view  of  the  range  of  the  ar- 
tillery and  the  mass  tactics,  they  have  generally  become 
too  small)  a  considerable  part  of  the  work  which  is  done 
in  the  divisional  manoeuvres  could  be  carried  out  on  them. 
The  money  saved  by  this  change  could  be  devoted  to  the 
large  army  manoeuvres.  One  thing  is  certain:  a  great  im- 
pulse must  be  given  to  the  development  of  our  manoeuvre 
system  if  it  is  to  fulfill  its  purpose  as  formerly;  in  or- 
ganization and  execution  these  manoeuvres  must  be  modern 
in  the  best  sene  of  the  word. 

It  seems,  however,  quite  impossible  to  carry  out  this 
sort  of  training  on  so  comprehensive  a  scale  that  it  will 
by  itself  be  sufficient  to  educate  serviceable  commanders 
for  the  great  war.  The  manoeuvres  can  only  show  their 
full  value  if  the  officers  of  every  rank  who  take  part  in 
them  have  already  had  a  competent  training  in  theory. 

To  encourage  this  preliminary  training  of  the  superior 
officers  is  thus  one  of  the  most  serious  tasks  of  an  efficient 
preparation  for  war.  These  must  not  regard  their  duty 
as  lying  exclusively  in  the  training  of  the  troops,  but  must 
also  be  ever  striving  further  to  educate  themselves  and 
their  subordinates  for  leadership  in  the  great  war.  Strategic 
war  games  on  a  large  scale,  which  in  the  army  corps  can 
be  conducted  by  the  commanding  generals,  and  in  the  army- 
inspections  by  the  inspectors,  seem  to  me  to  be  the  only 
means  bv  which  this  end  can  be  attained.  All  superior 
officers  must  be  criticized  by  the  standard  of  their  efficiency 


TRAINING  AND  EDUCATION  221 

in  superior  commands.  The  threads  of  all  this  training 
will  meet  in  the  hands  of  the  Chief  of  the  General  Army 
Staff  as  the  strategically  responsible  authority. 

It  seems  undesirable  in  any  case  to  leave  it  more  or  less 
to  chance  to  decide  whether  those  who  hold  high  com- 
mands will  be  competent  or  not  for  their  posts.  The  cir- 
cumstances that  a  man  is  an  energetic  commander  of  a 
division,  or  as  general  in  command  maintains  discipline  in 
his  army  corps,  affords  no  conclusive  proof  that  he  is  fitted 
to  be  the  leader  of  an  army.  Military  history  supplies  many 
instances  of  this. 

No  proof  is  required  to  show  that  under  the  conditions 
of  modern  warfare  the  reconnoitring  and  screening  units 
require  special  training.  The  possibility  and  the  success 
of  all  operations  are  in  the  highest  degree  dependent  on 
their  activity.  I  have  for  years  pointed  out  the  absolute 
necessity  of  preparing  our  cavalry  officers  scientifically  for 
their  profession,  and  I  can  only  repeat  the  demand  that 
our  cavalry  riding-schools  should  be  organized  also  as 
places  of  scientific  education.  I  will  also  once  more  declare 
that  it  is  wrong  that  the  bulk  of  the  training  of  the  army 
cavalry  should  consist  in  the  divisional  cavalry  exercises 
on  the  military  drill-grounds.  These  exercises  do  not  cor- 
respond at  all  to  actual  conditions,  and  inculcate  quite 
wrong  notions  in  the  officers,  as  every  cavalry  officer  in 
high  command  finds  out  who,  having  been  taught  on  the 
drill-ground,  has  to  lead  a  cavalry  division  on  manoeuvres. 

The  centre  of  gravity  of  effectiveness  in  war  rests  on 
the  directing  of  operations  and  on  the  skilful  transition 
from  strategical  independence  to  combination  in  attack;  the 
great  difficulty  of  leading  cavalry  lies  in  these  conditions, 
and  this  can  no  more  be  learnt  on  the  drill-grounds  than 
systematic  screening  and  reconnaissance  duties.  The  per- 
petual subject  of  practice  on  the  drill-grounds,  a  cavalry 
engagement  between  two  divisions  in  close  formation,  will 
hardly  ever  occur  in  war.  Any  unprejudiced  examination 
of  the  present  conditions  must  lead  to  this  result,  and 
counsels  the  cavalry  arm  to  adopt  a  course  which  may  be 
regarded  as  a  serious  preparation  for  war. 

It  is  a  truly  remarkable  fact  that  the  artillery,  which,  in 


222    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

fact,  always  acts  only  in  combination  with  the  other  arms, 
carries  out  annually  extensive  independent  manoeuvres,  as 
if  it  had  by  itself  a  definite  effect  on  the  course  of  the 
campaign,  while  the  army  cavalry,  which  always  takes 
the  field  independently,  hardly  ever  trains  by  itself,  but 
carefully  practises  that  combination  with  infantry  which 
is  only  rarely  necessary  in  war.  This  clearly  demonstrates 
the  unsystematic  and  antiquated  methods  of  all  our  train- 
ing. 

Practice  in  reconnoitring  and  screening  tactics,  as  well 
as  raids  on  a  large  scale,  are  what  is  wanted  for  the  train- 
ing of  the  cavalry.  Co-operation  with  the  air-fleet  will  be 
a  further  development,  so  soon  as  aviation  has  attained 
such  successes  that  it  may  be  reckoned  as  an  integral  factor 
of  army  organization.  The  airship  division  and  the  cavalry 
have  kindred  duties,  and  must  co-operate  under  the  same 
command,  especially  for  screening  purposes,  which  are 
all-important. 

The  methods  for  the  training  of  pioneers  which  corre- 
spond fully  to  modern  requirements  have  been  pointed  out 
by  General  v.  Beseler.  This  arm  need  only  be  developed 
further  in  the  direction  which  this  distinguished  officer  has 
indicated  in  order  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  next  war. 

In  the  field  war  its  chief  importance  will  be  found  to  be 
in  the  support  of  the  infantry  in  attacks  on  fortified  posi- 
tions, and  in  the  construction  of  similar  positions.  Tactical 
requirements  must,  however,  be  insisted  upon  in  this  con- 
nection. The  whole  training  must  be  guided  by  considera- 
tions of  tactics.  This  is  the  main  point.  As  regards  sieges, 
especial  attention  must  be  devoted  to  training  the  miners 
since  the  object  is  to  capture  rapidly  the  outlying  forts  and 
to  take  the  fortresses  which  can  resist  the  attack  of  the 
artillery. 

The  duties  of  the  Army  Service  Corps*  are  clear.  They 
must,  on  the  one  hand,  be  efficiently  trained  for  the  intelli- 
gence department,  especially  for  the  various  duties  of  the 
telegraph  branch,  and  be  ready  to  give  every  kind  of 
assistance  to  the  airships ;  on  the  other  hand,  they  must 
look  after  and  maintain  the  strategical  capacities  of  the 
*  Verkehrstrubpen. 


TRAINING  AND  EDUCATION  223 

army.  The  rapid  construction  of  railroads,  especially  light 
railways,  the  speedy  repair  of  destroyed  lines,  the  pro- 
tection of  traffic  on  military  railways,  and  the  utilization 
of  motors  for  various  purposes,  are  the  duties  for  which 
these  troops  must  be  trained.  A  thorough  knowledge  and 
mastery  of  the  essential  principles  of  operations  are  in- 
dispensable qualifications  in  their  case  also.  They  can  only 
meet  their  many-sided  and  all-important  duties  by  a  com- 
petent acquaintance  with  the  methods  and  system  of  army 
movements  on  every  scale.  It  is  highly  important,  there- 
fore, that  the  officers  of  the  Army  Service  Corps  should 
be  thoroughly  trained  in  military  science. 

Thus  in  every  direction  we  see  the  necessity  to  improve 
the  intellectual  development  of  the  army,  and  to  educate 
it  to  an  appreciation  of  the  close  connection  of  the  multi- 
farious duties  of  war.  This  appreciation  is  requisite,  not 
merely  for  the  leaders  and  special  branches  of  the  service ; 
it  must  permeate  the  whole  corps  of  officers,  and  to  some 
degree  the  non-commissioned  officers  also.  It  will  bear 
good  fruit  in  the  training  of  the  men.  The  higher  the  stage 
on  which  the  teacher  stands,  and  the  greater  his  intellectual 
grasp  of  the  subject,  the  more  complete  will  be  his  influence 
on  the  scholars,  the  more  rapidly  and  successfully  will  he 
reach  the  understanding  of  his  subordinates,  and  the  more 
thoroughly  will  he  win  from  them  that  confidence  and  re- 
spect which  are  the  firmest  foundations  of  discipline.  All 
the  means  employed  to  improve  the  education  of  our  estab- 
lishment of  officers  in  the  science  of  war  and  general  sub- 
jects will  be  richly  repaid  in  efficient  service  on  every  other 
field  of  practical  activity.  Intellectual  exercises  gives  tone 
to  brain  and  character,  and  a  really  deep  comprehension  of 
war  and.  its  requirements  postulate  a  certain  philosophic 
mental  education  and  bent,  which  makes  it  possible  to  assess 
the  value  of  phenomena  in  their  reciprocal  relations,  and 
to  estimate  correctly  the  imponderabilia.  The  effort  to 
produce  this  higher  intellectual  standard  in  the  officers' 
corps  must  be  felt  in  their  training  from  the  military  school 
onwards,  and  must  find  its  expression  in  a  school  of  mili- 
tary education  of  a  higher  class  than  exists  at  present. 

A  military  academy  as  such  was  contemplated  by  Scharn- 


224    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

horst.  To-day  it  has  assumed  rather  the  character  of  a 
preparatory  school  for  the  General  Staff.  Instruction  in 
history  and  mathematics  is  all  that  remains  of  its  former 
importance.  The  instruction  in  military  history  was  entirely 
divested  of  its  scientific  character  by  the  method  of  appli- 
cation employed,  and  became  wholly  subservient  to  tactics. 
In  this  way  the  meaning  of  the  study  of  military  history 
was  obscured,  and  even  to-day,  so  far  as  I  know,  the  lec- 
tures on  military  history  primarily  serve  purposes  of  directly 
professional  education.  I  cannot  say  how  far  the  language 
teaching  imparts  the  spirit  of  foreign  tongues.  At  any  rate, 
it  culminates  in  the  examination  for  interpreterships,  and 
thus  pursues  a  directly  practical  end.  This  development 
was  in  a  certain  sense  necessary.  A  quite  specifically  pro- 
fessional education  of  the  officers  of  the  General  Staff  is 
essential  under  present  conditions.  I  will  not  decide  whether 
it  was  therefore  necessary  to  limit  the  broad  and  truly 
academical  character  of  the  institution.  In  any  case,  we 
need  in  the  army  of  to-day  an  institution  which  gives  oppor- 
tunity for  the  independent  study  of  military  science  from 
the  higher  standpoint,  and  provides  at  the  same  time  a 
comprehensive  general  education.  I  believe  that  the  mili- 
tary academy  could  be  developed  into  such  an  institution, 
without  any  necessity  of  abandoning  the  direct  preparation 
of  the  officers  for  service  on  the  General  Staff.  By  the 
side  of  the  military  sciences  proper,  which  might  be  limited 
in  many  directions,  lectures  on  general  scientific  subjects 
might  be  organized,  to  which  admission  should  be  free. 
In  similar  lectures  the  great  militarv  problems  might  be 
discussed  from  the  standpoint  of  military  philosophv,  and 
the  hearers  might  gain  some  insight  into  the  legitimacy  of 
war,  its  relations  to  politics,  the  co-operation  of  material 
and  imponderable  forces,  the  importance  of  free  personality 
under  the  pressure  of  necessary  phenomena,  sharp  contra- 
dictions and  violent  opposition,  as  well  as  into  the  duties 
of  a  commander  viewed  from  the  higher  standpoint. 

Limitation  and  concentration  of  the  compulsory  subjects, 
such  as  are  now  arranged  on  an  educational  plan  in  three 
consecutive  annual  courses,  and  the  institution  of  free 
lectures  on  subjects  of  general  culture,  intended  not  only 


TRAINING  AND  EDUCATION  225 

to  educate  officers  of  the  General  Staff,  but  to  train  men 
who  are  competent  to  discharge  the  highest  military  and 
civic  duties — this  is  what  is  required  for  the  highest  mili- 
tary educational  institution  of  the  German  army. 


CHAPTER  XII 
PREPARATION  FOR  THE  NAVAL  WAR 

"Germany's  future  lies  on  the  sea."  A  proud  saying, 
which  contains  a  great  truth.  If  the  German  people  wish 
to  attain  a  distinguished  future  and  fulfill  their  mission  of 
civilization,  they  must  adopt  a  world  policy  and  act  as  a 
World  Power.  This  task  can  only  be  performed  if  they 
are  supported  by  an  adequate  sea  power.  Our  fleet  must 
be  so  strong  at  least  that  a  war  with  us  involves  such  dan- 
gers, even  to  the  strongest  opponent,  that  the  losses,  which 
might  be  expected,  would  endanger  his  position  as  a  World 
Power. 

Now,  as  proved  in  another  place,  we  can  only  stake  our 
forces  safely  on  a  world  policy  if  our  political  and  military 
superiority  on  the  continent  of  Europe  be  immovably 
established.  This  goal  is  not  yet  reached,  and  must  be 
our  first  objective.  Nevertheless,  we  must  now  take  steps 
to  develop  by  sea  also  a  power  which  is  sufficient  for  our 
pretensions.  It  is,  on  the  one  hand,  indispensably  necessary 
for  the  full  security  of  our  Continental  position  that  we 
guard  our  coasts  and  repel  oversea  attacks.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  an  absolute  economic  necessity  for  us  to  protect 
the  freedom  of  the  seas — by  arms  if  needs  be — since  our 
people  depend  for  livelihood  on  the  export  industry,  and 
this,  again,  requires  a  large  import  trade.  The  political 
greatness  of  Germany  rests  not  least  on  her  flourishing 
economic  life  and  her  oversea  trade.  The  maintenance  of 
the  freedom  of  the  seas  must  therefore  be  always  before 
our  eyes  as  the  object  of  all  our  naval  constructions.  Our 
efforts  must  not  be  merely  directed  towards  the  necessary 
repulse  of  hostile  attacks;  we  must  be  conscious  of  the 
higher  ideal,  that  we  wish  to  follow  an  effective  world 

226 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  NAVAL  WAR     227 

policy,  and  that  our  naval  power  is  destined  ultimately  to 
support  this  world  policy. 

Unfortunately,  we  did  not  adopt  this  view  at  the  start, 
when  we  first  ventured  on  the  open  sea.  Much  valuable 
time  was  wasted  in  striving  for  limited  and  insufficient 
objects.  The  Emperor  William  II.  was  destined  to  be  the 
first  to  grasp  this  question  in  its  bearing  on  the  world's 
history,  and  to  treat  it  accordingly.  All  our  earlier  naval 
activity  must  be  set  down  as  fruitless. 

We  have  been  busied  for  years  in  building  a  fleet.  Most 
varied  considerations  guided  our  policy.  A  clear,  definite 
programme  was  first  drawn  up  by  the  great  Naval  Act  of 
1900,  the  supplementary  laws  of  1906,  and  the  regulations 
as  to  the  life  of  the  ships  in  1908.  It  is,  of  course,  improb- 
able that  the  last  word  has  been  said  on  the  subject.  The 
needs  of  the  future  will  decide,  since  there  can  be  no  certain 
standard  for  the  naval  forces  which  a  State  may  require: 
that  depends  on  the  claims  which  are  put  forward,  and  on 
the  armaments  of  the  other  nations.  At  first  the  only  ob- 
ject was  to  show  our  flag  on  the  sea  and  on  the  coasts  on 
which  we  traded.  The  first  duty  of  the  fleet  was  to  safe- 
guard this  commerce.  Opposition  to  the  great  outlay  thus 
necessitated  was  soon  shown  by  a  party  which  considered  a 
fleet  not  merely  superfluous  for  Germany,  but  actually  dan- 
gerous, and  objected  to  the  plans  of  the  Government,  which 
they  stigmatized  as  boundless.  Another  party  was  content 
with  a  simple  scheme  of  coast-protection  only,  and  thought 
this  object  attained  if  some  important  points  on  the  coast 
were  defended  by  artillery  and  cheap  flotillas  of  gunboats 
were  stationed  at  various  places. 

This  view  was  not  long  maintained.  All  discerning  per- 
sons were  convinced  of  the  necessity  to  face  and  drive  back 
an  aggressive  rival  on  the  high  seas.  It  was  recognized 
that  ironclads  were  needed  for  this,  since  the  aggressor 
would  have  them  at  his  disposal.  But  this  policy,  it  was 
thought,  could  be  satisfied  by  half-measures.  The  so-called 
Ausfallkorvetten  were  sanctioned,  but  emphasis  was  laid  on 
the  fact  that  we  were  far  from  wishing  to  compete  with 
the  existing  large  navies,  and  that  we  should  naturally  be 
content  with  a  fleet  of  the  second  rank.     This  standpoint 


228    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

was  soon  recognized  to  be  untenable,  and  there  was  a  fresh 
current  of  feeling,  whose  adherents  supported  the  view  that 
the  costly  ironclads  could  be  made  superfluous  by  building 
in  their  place  a  large  number  of  torpedo-boats.  These,  in 
spite  of  their  small  lighting  capacity,  would  be  able  to  attack 
the  strongest  ironclads  by  well-aimed  torpedoes.  It  was 
soon  realized  that  this  theory  rested  on  a  fallacy — that  a 
country  like  the  German  Empire,  which  depends  on  an  ex- 
tensive foreign  trade  in  order  to  find  work  and  food  for  its 
growing  population,  and,  besides,  is  hated  everywhere  be- 
cause of  its  political  and  economic  prosperity,  could  not 
forego  a  strong  armament  at  sea  and  on  its  coasts.  At  last 
a  standpoint  had  been  reached  which  corresponded  with 
actual  needs. 

The  different  abortive  attempts  to  solve  the  navy  question 
in  the  most  inexpensive  manner  have  cost  us  much  money 
and,  above  all,  as  already  stated,  much  time;  so  that,  at 
the  present  day,  when  we  stand  in  the  midst  of  a  great  crisis 
in  the  world's  history,  we  must  summon  all  our  strength 
to  make  up  for  lost  opportunities,  and  to  build  a  thoroughly 
effective  ocean-going  fleet  of  warships  in  addition  to  an 
adequate  guard  for  our  coasts.  We  have  at  last  come  to 
see  that  the  protection  of  our  commerce  and  the  defence 
of  our  shores  cannot  possibly  be  the  only  object  of  such  a 
fleet,  but  that  it,  like  the  land  army,  is  an  instrument  for 
carrying  out  the  political  ends  of  the  State  and  supporting 
its  justifiable  ambitions.  There  can  be  no  question  of  such 
limited  objects  as  protection  of  commerce  and  passive  coast 
defence.  A  few  cruisers  are  enough  to  protect  commerce 
in  times  of  peace;  but  in  war  the  only  way  to  safeguard  it 
is  to  defeat  and,  where  possible,  destroy  the  hostile  fleet. 
A  direct  protection  of  all  trade  lines  is  obviously  impossible. 
Commerce  can  only  be  protected  indirectly  by  the  defeat 
of  the  enemy.  A  passive  defence  of  the  coast  can  never 
count  on  permanent  success.  The  American  War  of  Seces- 
sion, amongst  others,  showed  that  sufficiently. 

The  object  of  our  fleet,  therefore,  is  to  defeat  our  possible 
rivals  at  sea,  and  force  them  to  make  terms,  in  order  to 
guarantee  unimpeded  commerce  to  our  merchantmen  and 
to  protect  our  colonies. 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  NAVAL  WAR     229 

It  is  therefore  an  erroneous  idea  that  our  fleet  exists 
merely  for  defence,  and  must  be  built  with  that  view.  It 
is  intended  to  meet  our  political  needs,  and  must  therefore 
be  capable  of  being  employed  according  to  the  exigencies 
of  the  political  position ;  on  the  offensive,  when  the  political 
situation  demands  it,  and  an  attack  promises  success;  on 
the  defensive,  when  we  believe  that  more  advantages  can 
be  obtained  in  this  way.  At  the  present  day,  indeed,  the 
political  grouping  of  the  Great  Powers  makes  a  strategical 
offensive  by  sea  an  impossibility.  We  must,  however, 
reckon  with  the  future,  and  then  circumstances  may  arise 
which  would  render  possible  an  offensive  war  on  a  large 
scale. 

The  strength  which  we  wish  to  give  to  our  fleet  must 
therefore  be  calculated  with  regard  to  its  probable  duties 
in  war.  It  is  obvious  that  we  must  not  merely  consider 
the  possible  opponents  who  at  the  moment  are  weaker 
than  we  are,  but  rather,  and  principally,  those  who  are 
stronger,  unless  we  were  in  the  position  to  avoid  a  conflict 
with  them  under  all  circumstances.  Our  fleet  must  in  any 
case  be  so  powerful  that  our  strongest  antagonist  shrinks 
from  attacking  us  without  convincing  reasons.  If  he  de- 
termines to  attack  us,  we  must  have  at  least  a  chance  of 
victoriously  repelling  this  attack — in  other  words,  of  in- 
flicting such  heavy  loss  on  the  enemy  that  he  will  decline 
in  his  own  interests  to  carry  on  the  war  to  the  bitter  end, 
and  that  he  will  see  his  own  position  threatened  if  he  ex- 
poses himself  to  these  losses. 

This  conception  of  our  duty  on  the  sea  points  directly 
to  the  fact  that  the  English  fleet  must  set  the  standard  by 
which  to  estimate  the  necessary  size  of  our  naval  prepara- 
tions. A  war  with  England  is  probably  that  which  we  shall 
first  have  to  fight  out  by  sea;  the  possibility  of  victoriously 
repelling  an  English  attack  must  be  the  guiding  principle 
for  our  naval  preparations ;  and  if  the  English  continuously 
increase  their  fleet,  we  must  inevitably  follow  them  on  the 
same  road,  even  beyond  the  limits  of  our  present  Naval 
Estimates. 

We  must  not,  however,  forget  that  it  will  not  be  possible 
for  us  for  many  years  to  attack  on  the  open  sea  the  far 


230    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

superior  English  fleet.  We  may  only  hope,  by  the  com- 
bination of  the  fleet  with  the  coast  fortifications,  the  air- 
fleet,  and  the  commercial  war,  to  defend  ourselves  success- 
fully against  this  our  strongest  opponent,  as  was  shown  in 
the  chapter  on  the  next  naval  war.  The  enemy  must  be 
wearied  out  and  exhausted  by  the  enforcement  of  the 
blockade,  and  by  fighting  against  all  the  expedients  which 
we  shall  employ  for  the  defence  of  our  coast;  our  fleet, 
under  the  protection  of  these  expedients,  will  continually 
inflict  partial  losses  on  him,  and  thus  gradually  we  shall 
be  able  to  challenge  him  to  a  pitched  battle  on  the  high 
seas.  These  are  the  lines  that  our  preparation  for  war 
must  follow.  A  strong  coast  fortress  as  a  base  for  our 
fleet,  from  which  it  can  easily  and  at  any  moment  take  the 
offensive,  and  on  which  the  waves  of  the  hostile  superiority 
can  break  harmlessly,  is  the  recognized  and  necessary  pre- 
liminary condition  for  this  class  of  war.  Without  such  a 
trustworthy  coast  fortress,  built  with  a  view  to  offensive 
operations,  our  fleet  could  be  closely  blockaded  by  the 
enemy,  and  prevented  from  any  offensive  movements. 
Mines  alone  cannot  close  the  navigation  so  effectively  that 
the  enemy  cannot  break  through,  nor  can  they  keep  it 
open  in  such  a  way  that  we  should  be  able  to  adopt  the 
offensive  under  all  circumstances.  For  this  purpose  perma- 
nent works  are  necessary  which  command  the  navigation 
and  allow  mines  to  be  placed. 

I  cannot  decide  the  question  whether  our  coast  defence, 
which  in  the  North  Sea  is  concentrated  in  Heligoland  and 
Borkum,  corresponds  to  these  requirements.  If  it  is  not  so, 
then  our  first  most  serious  duty  must  be  to  fill  up  the  exist- 
ing gaps,  in  order  to  create  an  assured  base  for  our  naval 
operations.  This  is  a  national  duty  which  we  dare  not 
evade,  although  it  demands  great  sacrifices  from  us.  Even 
the  further  development  of  our  fleet,  important  as  that  is, 
would  sink  into  the  background  as  compared  with  the 
urgency  of  this  duty,  because  its  only  action  against  the 
English  fleet  which  holds  out  any  prospect  of  success  pre- 
supposes the  existence  of  some  such  fortress. 

But  the  question  must  be  looked  at  from  another  aspect. 

The  Morocco  negotiations  in  the  summer  of  191 1  dis- 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  NAVAL  WAR     231 

played  the  unmistakable  hostility  of  England  to  us.  They 
showed  that  England  is  determined  to  hinder  by  force  any 
real  expansion  of  Germany's  power.  Only  the  fear  of  the 
possible  intervention  of  England  deterred  us  from  claim- 
ing a  sphere  of  interests  of  our  own  in  Morocco,  and, 
nevertheless,  the  attempt  to  assert  our  unquestionable  rights 
in  North  Africa  provoked  menacing  utterances  from  various 
English  statesmen. 

If  we  consider  this  behaviour  in  connection  with  Eng- 
land's military  preparations,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Eng- 
land seriously  contemplates  attacking  Germany  should  the 
occasion  arise.  The  concentration  of  the  English  naval 
forces  in  the  North  Sea,  the  feverish  haste  to  increase  the 
English  fleet,  the  construction  of  new  naval  stations,  un- 
disguisedly  intended  for  action  against  Germany,  of  which 
we  have  already  spoken;  the  English  espionage,  lately  vig- 
orously practised,  on  the  German  coasts,  combined  with 
continued  attempts  to  enlist  allies  against  us  and  to  isolate 
us  in  Europe — all  this  can  only  be  reasonably  interpreted 
as  a  course  of  preparation  for  an  aggressive  war.  At  any 
rate,  it  is  quite  impossible  to  regard  the  English  preparations 
as  defensive  and  protective  measures  only;  for  the  English 
Government  knows  perfectly  well  that  Germany  cannot 
think  of  attacking  England:  such  an  attempt  would  be 
objectless  from  the  first.  Since  the  destruction  of  the  Ger- 
man naval  power  lies  in  the  distinct  interests  of  England 
and  her  schemes  for  world  empire,  we  must  reckon  at  least 
with  the  possibility  of  an  English  attack.  We  must  make 
it  clear  to  ourselves  that  we  are  not  able  to  postpone  this 
attack  as  we  wish.  It  has  been  already  mentioned  that  the 
recent  attitude  of  Italy  may  precipitate  a  European  crisis; 
we  must  make  up  our  minds,  then,  that  England  will  attack 
us  on  some  pretext  or  other  soon,  before  the  existing  balance 
of  power,  which  is  very  favourable  for  England,  is  shifted 
possibly  to  her  disadvantage.  Especially,  if  the  Unionist 
party  comes  into  power  again,  must  we  reckon  upon  a  strong 
English  Imperial  policy  which  may  easily  bring  about  war. 

Under  these  circumstances  we  cannot  complete  our  arma- 
ment by  sea  and  our  coast  defences  in  peaceful  leisure,  in 
accordance  with  theoretical  principles.    On  the  contrary,  we 


232    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

must  strain  our  financial  resources  in  order  to  carry  on, 
and  if  possible  to  accelerate,  the  expansion  of  our  fleet,  to- 
gether with  the  fortification  of  our  coast.  It  would  be  justi- 
fiable, under  the  conditions,  to  meet  our  financial  require- 
ments by  loans,  if  no  other  means  can  be  found;  for  here 
questions  of  the  greatest  moment  are  at  stake — questions, 
it  may  fairly  be  said,  of  existence. 

Let  us  imagine  the  endless  misery  which  a  protracted 
stoppage  or  definite  destruction  of  our  oversea  trade  would 
bring  upon  the  whole  nation,  and,  in  particular,  on  the 
masses  of  the  industrial  classes  who  live  on  our  export 
trade.  This  consideration  by  itself  shows  the  absolute 
necessity  of  strengthening  our  naval  forces  in  combination 
with  our  coast  defences  so  thoroughly  that  we  can  look 
forward  to  the  decisive  campaign  with  equanimity.  Even 
the  circumstance  that  we  cannot,  perhaps,  find  crews  at  once 
for  the  ships  which  we  are  building  need  not  check  the 
activity  of  our  dockyards;  for  these  ships  will  be  valuable 
to  replace  the  loss  in  vessels  which  must  occur  in  any  case. 

The  rapid  completion  of  the  Kaiser-Wilhelm  Canal  is 
of  great  importance,  in  order  that  our  largest  men-of-war 
may  appear  unexpectedly  in  the  Baltic  or  in  the  North 
Sea.  But  it  does  not  meet  all  military  requirements.  It 
is  a  question  whether  it  is  not  expedient  to  obtain  secure 
communication  by  a  canal  between  the  mouth  of  the  Ems, 
the  Bay  of  Jahde,  and  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe,  in  order  to 
afford  our  fleet  more  possibilities  of  concentration.  All 
three  waters  form  a  sally-port  in  the  North  Sea,  and  it 
would  be  certainly  a  great  advantage  if  our  battleships  could 
unexpectedly  unite  in  these  three  places.  I  cannot  give  any 
opinion  as  to  the  feasibility  of  this  scheme.  If  it  is  feasible, 
we  ought  to  shirk  no  sacrifices  to  realize  it.  Such  a  canal 
might  prove  of  decisive  value,  since  our  main  prospect  of 
success  depends  on  our  ability  to  break  up  the  forces  of 
the  enemy  by  continuous  unexpected  attacks,  and  on  our 
thus  finding  an  opportunity  to  inflict  heavy  losses  upon  him. 

As  regards  the  development  of  the  fleet  itself,  we  must 
push  on  the  completion  of  our  battle-fleet,  which  consists 
of  ships  of  the  line  and  the  usual  complement  of  large 
cruisers.     It  does  not  possess  in  its  present  condition  an 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  NAVAL  WAR     233 

effective  value  in  proportion  to  its  numbers.  There  can  be 
no  doubt  on  this  point.  Five  of  the  ships  of  the  line,  of 
the  Kaiser  class,  are  quite  obsolete,  and  the  vessels  of  the 
Wittelsbach  class  carry  as  heaviest  guns  only  24-centimetre 
cannons,  which  must  be  considered  quite  inadequate  for  a 
sea-battle  of  to-day.  We  are  in  a  worse  plight  with  regard 
to  our  large  cruisers.  The  five  ships  of  the  Hansa  class 
have  no  fighting  value ;  the  three  large  cruisers  of  the  Prince 
class  (Adalbert,  Friedrich  Karl,  Heinrich)  fulfil  their  pur- 
pose neither  in  speed,  effective  range,  armament,  nor 
armour-plating.  Even  the  armoured  cruisers  Furst  Bis- 
marck, Roon,  York,  Gneisenau,  and  Scharnhorst  do  not 
correspond  in  any  respect  to  modern  requirements.  If  we 
wish,  therefore,  to  be  really  ready  for  a  war,  we  must 
shorten  the  time  allowed  for  building,  and  replace  as  rapidly 
as  possible  these  totally  useless  vessels — nine  large  cruisers 
and  five  battleships — by  new  and  thoroughly  effective  ships. 

Anyone  who  regards  the  lowering  thunder-clouds  on  the 
political  horizon  will  admit  this  necessity.  The  English 
may  storm  and  protest  ever  so  strongly :  care  for  our  coun- 
try must  stand  higher  than  all  political  and  all  financial  con- 
siderations. We  must  create  new  types  of  battleships,  which 
may  be  superior  to  the  English  in  speed  and  fighting  quali- 
ties. That  is  no  light  task,  for  the  most  modern  English 
ships  of  the  line  have  reached  a  high  stage  of  perfection, 
and  the  newest  English  cruisers  are  little  inferior  in  fighting 
value  to  the  battleships  proper.  But  superiority  in  indi- 
vidual units,  together  with  the  greatest  possible  readiness 
for  war,  are  the  only  means  by  which  a  few  ships  can  be 
made  to  do,  at  any  rate,  what  is  most  essential.  Since  the 
Krupp  guns  possess  a  certain  advantage — which  is  not,  in 
fact,  very  great — over  the  English  heavy  naval  guns,  it  is 
possible  to  gain  a  start  in  this  department,  and  to  equip 
our  ships  with  superior  attacking  power.  A  more  powerful 
artillery  is  a  large  factor  in  success,  which  becomes  more 
marked  the  more  it  is  possible  to  distribute  the  battery  on 
the  shp  in  such  a  way  that  all  the  guns  may  be  simul- 
taneously trained  to  either  side  or  straight  ahead. 

Besides  the  battle-fleet  proper,  the  torpedo-boats  play  a 
prominent  part  in  strategic  offence  and  defence  alike.    The 


234    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

torpedo-fleet,  therefore — especially  having  regard  to  the 
crushing  superiority  of  England — requires  vigorous  encour- 
agement, and  all  the  more  so  because,  so  far,  at  least,  as 
training  goes,  we  possess  a  true  factor  of  superiority  in 
them.  In  torpedo-boats  we  are,  thanks  to  the  high  standard 
of  training  in  the  personnel  and  the  excellence  of  construc- 
tion, ahead  of  all  other  navies.  We  must  endeavour  to 
keep  this  position,  especially  as  regards  the  torpedoes,  in 
which,  according  to  the  newspaper  accounts,  other  nations 
are  competing  with  us,  by  trying  to  excel  us  in  range  of 
the  projectile  at  high  velocity.  We  must  also  devote  our 
full  attention  to  submarines,  and  endeavour  to  make  these 
vessels  more  effective  in  attack.  If  we  succeed  in  develop- 
ing this  branch  of  our  navy,  so  that  it  meets  the  military 
requirements  in  every  direction,  and  combines  an  increased 
radius  of  effectiveness  with  increased  speed  and  seaworthi- 
ness, we  shall  achieve  great  results  with  these  vessels  in  the 
defence  of  our  coasts  and  in  unexpected  attacks  on  the 
enemy's  squadrons.  A  superior  efficiency  in  this  field  would 
be  extraordinarily  advantageous  to  us. 

Last,  not  least,  we  must  devote  ourseslves  more  ener- 
getically to  the  development  of  aviation  for  naval  purposes. 
If  it  were  possible  to  make  airships  and  flying-machines 
thoroughly  available  for  war,  so  that  they  could  be  em- 
ployed in  unfavourable  weather  and  for  aggressive  pur- 
poses, they  might  render  essential  services  to  the  fleet.  The 
air-fleet  would  then,  as  already  explained  in  Chapter  VIII., 
be  able  to  report  successfully,  to  spy  out  favourable  oppor- 
tunities for  attacks  by  the  battle-fleet  or  the  torpedo-fleet, 
and  to  give  early  notice  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy  in 
superior  force.  It  would  also  be  able  to  prevent  the  enemy's 
airships  from  reconnoitring,  and  would  thus  facilitate  the 
execution  of  surprise  attacks.  Again,  it  could  repulse  or 
frustrate  attacks  on  naval  depots  and  great  shipping  centres. 
If  our  airships  could  only  be  so  largely  developed  that  they, 
on  their  side,  could  undertake  an  attack  and  carry  fear  and 
destruction  to  the  English  coasts,  they  would  lend  still  more 
effective  aid  to  our  fleet  when  fighting  against  the  superior 
force  of  the  enemy.  It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  technical 
improvements  will  before  long  make  it  possible  to  perform 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  NAVAL  WAR     235 

such  services.  A  pronounced  superiority  of  our  air-fleet 
over  the  English  would  contribute  largely  to  equalize  the 
difference  in  strength  of  the  two  navies  more  and  more 
during  the  course  of  the  war.  It  should  be  the  more  pos- 
sible to  gain  a  superiority  in  this  field  because  our  supposed 
enemies  have  not  any  start  on  us,  and  we  can  compete  for 
the  palm  of  victory  on  equal  terms. 

Besides  the  campaign  against  the  enemy's  war-fleet, 
preparations  must  be  carefully  made  in  peace-time  for  the 
war  on  commerce,  which  would  be  especially  effective  in 
a  struggle  against  England,  as  that  country  needs  imports 
more  than  any  other.  Consequently  great  results  would 
follow  if  we  succeeded  in  disturbing  the  enemy's  commerce 
and  harassing  his  navigation.  The  difficulties  of  such  an 
undertaking  have  been  discussed  in  a  previous  chapter.  It 
is  all  the  more  imperative  to  organize  our  preparations  in 
such  a  way  that  the  swift  ships  intended  for  the  commercial 
war  should  be  able  to  reach  their  scene  of  activity  unex- 
pectedly before  the  enemy  has  been  able  to  block  our  har- 
bours. The  auxiliary  cruisers  must  be  so  equipped  in 
peace-time  that  when  on  the  open  sea  they  may  assume  the 
character  of  warships  at  a  moment's  notice,  when  ordered 
by  wireless  telegraphy  to  do  so. 

A  rapid  mobilization  is  especially  important  in  the  navy, 
since  we  must  be  ready  for  a  sudden  attack  at  any  time, 
possibly  in  time  of  peace.  History  tells  us  what  to  expect 
from  the  English  on  this  head. 

In  the  middle  of  peace  they  bombarded  Copenhagen  from 
September  2  to  September  5,  1807,  and  carried  off  the 
Danish  fleet.  Four  hundred  houses  were  burnt,  2,000  dam- 
aged, 3,000  peaceful  and  innocent  inhabitants  were  killed. 
If  some  explanation,  though  no  justification,  of  the  conduct 
of  England  is  seen  in  the  lawlessness  of  all  conditions  then 
existing,  and  in  the  equally  ruthless  acts  of  Napoleon,  still 
the  occurrence  shows  distinctly  of  what  measures  England 
is  capable  if  her  command  of  the  seas  is  endangered.  And 
this  practice  has  not  been  forgotten.  On  July  11  and  12, 
1882,  exactly  thirty  years  ago,  Alexandria  was  similarly 
bombarded  in  peace-time,  and  Egypt  occupied  by  the  Eng- 
lish under  the  hypocritical  pretext  that  Arabi  Pasha  had 


236    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

ordered  a  massacre  of  the  foreigners.     The  language  of 
such  historical  facts  is  clear.    It  is  well  not  to  forget  them. 

The  Russo-Japanese  War  also  is  a  warning  how  modern 
wars  begin;  so  also  Italy,  with  her  political  and  military 
attack  on  Turkey.  Turkish  ships,  suspecting  nothing  of 
war,  were  attacked  and  captured  by  the  Italians. 

Now,  it  must  not  be  denied  that  such  a  method  of  open- 
ing a  campaign  as  was  adopted  by  Japan  and  Italy  may  be 
justified  under  certain  conditions.  The  interests  of  the 
State  may  turn  the  scale.  The  brutal  violence  shown  to  a 
weak  opponent,  such  as  is  displayed  in  the  above-described 
English  procedure,  has  nothing  in  common  with  a  course 
of  action  politically  justifiable. 

A  surprise  attack,  in  order  to  be  justified,  must  be  made 
in  the  first  place  only  on  the  armed  forces  of  the  hostile 
State,  not  on  peaceful  inhabitants.  A  further  necessary 
preliminary  condition  is  that  the  tension  of  the  political 
situation  brings  the  possibility  or  probability  of  a  war 
clearly  before  the  eyes  of  both  parties,  so  that  an  expecta- 
tion of,  and  preparations  for,  war  can  be  assumed.  Other- 
wise the  attack  becomes  a  treacherous  crime.  If  the  re- 
quired preliminary  conditions  are  granted,  then  a  political 
coup  is  as  justifiable  as  a  surprise  attack  in  warfare,  since 
it  tries  to  derive  advantage  from  an  unwarrantable  care- 
lessness of  the  opponent.  A  definite  principle  of  right  can 
never  be  formulated  in  this  question,  since  everything  de- 
pends on  the  views  taken  of  the  position,  and  these  may 
be  very  divergent  among  the  parties  concerned.  History 
alone  can  pass  a  final  verdict  on  the  conduct  of  States.  But 
in  no  case  can  a  formal  rule  of  right  in  such  cases — espe- 
cially when  a  question  of  life  or  death  is  depending  on  it. 
as  was  literally  the  fact  in  the  Manchurian  War  as  regards 
Japan — limit  the  undoubted  right  of  the  State.  If  Japan 
had  not  obtained  from  the  very  first  the  absolute  command 
of  the  seas,  the  war  with  Russia  would  have  been  hopeless. 
She  was  justified,  therefore,  in  employing  the  most  extreme 
measures.  No  such  interests  were  at  stake  for  England 
either  in  1807  or  1882;  and  Italy's  proceedings  in  191 1  are 
certainly  doubtful  from  the  standpoint  of  political  morality. 
These  examples,  however,  show  what  we  may  expect 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  NAVAL  WAR     237 

from  England,  and  we  must  be  the  more  prepared  to  find 
her  using  this  right  to  attack  without  warning,  since  we 
also  may  be  under  the  necessity  of  using  this  right.  Our 
mobilization  preparations  must  therefore  be  ready  for  all 
such  eventualities,  especially  in  the  period  after  the  dis- 
missal of  the  reservists. 

Public  policy  forbids  any  discussion  of  the  steps  that 
must  be  taken  to  secure  that  our  fleet  is  ready  for  war 
during  this  time.  Under  all  circumstances,  however,  our 
coast  defences  must  be  continuously  ready  for  fighting,  and 
permanently  garrisoned  in  times  of  political  tension.  The 
mines  must  also  be  prepared  for  action  without  delay.  The 
whole  materiel  requisite  for  the  purpose  must  be  on  the 
spot  ready  for  instant  use.  So,  too,  all  measures  for  the 
protection  of  commerce  at  the  mouths  of  our  rivers  and  in 
the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal  must  be  put  in  force  directly 
the  situation  becomes  strained.  This  is  a  mere  simple  pre- 
cept of  self-protection.  We  must  also  attach  as  much 
importance  to  the  observation  and  intelligence  service  on 
our  coasts  in  peace-time  as  is  done  in  England. 

When  we  realize  in  their  entirety  the  mass  of  prepara- 
tions which  are  required  for  the  maintenance  of  our  place 
among  the  Great  Powers  by  the  navy,  we  see  that  ex- 
traordinarily exacting  demands  will  be  made  on  the  re- 
sources of  our  people.  These  weigh  the  heavier  for  the 
moment,  since  the  crisis  of  the  hour  forces  us  to  quite 
exceptional  exertions,  and  the  expenditure  on  the  fleet  must 
go  hand-in-hand,  with  very  energetic  preparations  on  land. 
If  we  do  not  possess  the  strength  or  the  self-devotion  to 
meet  this  twofold  demand,  the  increase  of  the  fleet  must 
be  delayed,  and  we  must  restrict  ourselves  to  bringing  our 
coast  defences  to  such  a  pitch  of  completeness  as  will  meet 
all  our  requirements.  Any  acceleration  in  our  shipbuilding 
would  have  to  be  provisionally  dropped. 

In  opposition  to  this  view,  it  is  urged  from  one  quarter 
that  we  should  limit  our  fortification  of  the  coast  to  what 
is  absolutely  necessary,  devote  all  our  means  to  developing 
the  fleet,  and  lay  the  greatest  stress  on  the  number  of  the 
ships  and  their  readiness  for  war,  even  in  case  of  the  re- 
serve fleet.    This  view  starts  from  the  presupposition  that, 


238    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

in  face  of  so  strong  and  well-equipped  a  fleet  as  the  Naval 
Act  contemplates  for  Germany,  England  would  never  re- 
solve to  declare  war  on  us.  It  is  also  safe  to  assume  that 
a  fleet  built  expressly  on  uniform  tactical  principles  repre- 
sents a  more  powerful  fighting  force  than  we  have  to-day 
in  an  equal  number  of  heterogeneous  battleships. 

I  cannot  myself,  however,  endorse  this  view.  On  the  one 
hand,  it  is  to  be  feared  that  the  fighting  strength  of  the 
hostile  fleets  increases  quicker  than  that  of  ours;  on  the 
other  hand,  I  believe  that  the  general  situation  makes  war 
with  England  inevitable,  even  if  our  naval  force  in  the 
shortest  time  reaches  its  statutory  strength  in  modern  men- 
of-war.  My  view,  therefore,  is  that  we  must  first  of  all  lay 
the  solid  foundation  without  which  any  successful  action 
against  the  superior  forces  of  the  enemy  is  unthinkable. 
Should  the  coast  fortifications  fail  to  do  what  is  expected 
from  them,  success  is  quite  impossible. 

It  is,  however,  all  the  more  our  duty  to  spare  no  sacri- 
fices to  carry  out  both  objects — the  enlargement  of  the 
fleet,  as  well  as  whatever  may  still  be  necessary  to  the  per- 
fecting of  our  coast  defences.  Though  this  latter  point  calls 
for  the  first  attention,  the  great  necessity  for  the  increase 
of  the  navy  admits  of  no  doubt.  If  we  do  not  to-day  stake 
everything  on  strengthening  our  fleet,  to  insure  at  least 
the  possibility  of  a  successful  war,  and  if  we  once  more 
allow  our  probable  opponent  to  gain  a  start  which  it  will 
be  scarcely  possible  to  make  up  in  the  future,  we  must 
renounce  for  many  years  to  come  any  place  among  the 
World  Powers. 

Under  these  circumstances,  no  one  who  cherishes  Ger- 
man sentiments  and  German  hopes  will  advocate  a  policy  of 
renunciation.  On  the  contrary,  we  must  try  not  only  to 
prosecute  simultaneously  the  fortification  of  the  coast  and 
the  development  of  the  fleet,  but  we  must  so  accelerate  the 
pace  of  our  shipbuilding  that  the  requirements  of  the  Naval 
Act  will  be  met  by  1914 — a  result  quite  possible  according 
to  expert  opinion. 

The  difficult  plight  in  which  we  are  to-day,  as  regards 
our  readiness  for  war,  is  due  to  two  causes  in  the  past.  It 
has  been  produced  in  the  first  place  because,  from  love  of 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  NAVAL  WAR     239 

the  pleasures  of  peace,  we  have  in  the  long  years  since  the 
founding  of  the  German  Empire  neglected  to  define  and 
strengthen  our  place  among  the  Powers  of  Europe,  and 
:o  win  a  free  hand  in  world  politics,  while  around  us  the 
other  Powers  were  growing  more  and  more  threatening. 
It  was,  in  my  opinion,  the  most  serious  mistake  in  German 
policy  that  a  final  settling  of  accounts  with  France  was  not 
effected  at  a  time  when  the  state  of  international  affairs 
was  favourable  and  success  might  confidently  have  been 
expected.  There  has,  indeed,  been  no  lack  of  opportunities. 
We  have  only  our  policy  of  peace  and  renunciation  to 
thank  for  the  fact  that  we  are  placed  in  this  difficult  posi- 
tion, and  are  confronted  by  the  momentous  choice  between 
resigning  all  claim  to  world  power  or  disputing  this  claim 
against  numerically  superior  enemies.  This  policy  some- 
what resembles  the  supineness  for  which  England  has  her- 
self to  blame,  when  she  refused  her  assistance  to  the 
Southern  States  in  the  American  War  of  Secession,  and 
thus  allowed  a  Power  to  arise  in  the  form  of  the  United 
States  of  North  America,  which  already,  although  barely 
fifty  years  have  elapsed,  threatens  England's  own  position 
as  a  World  Power.  But  the  consequences  of  our  peace 
policy  hit  us  harder  than  England  has  suffered  under  her 
former  American  policy.  The  place  of  Great  Britain  as  a 
Great  Power  is  far  more  secured  by  her  insular  position 
and  her  command  of  the  seas  than  ours,  which  is  threat- 
ened on  all  sides  by  more  powerful  enemies.  It  is  true  that 
one  cannot  anticipate  success  in  any  war  with  certainty, 
and  there  was  always  the  possibility  during  the  past  forty 
years  that  we  might  not  succeed  in  conquering  France  as 
effectually  as  we  would  have  wished.  This  uncertainty  is 
inseparable  from  every  war.  Neither  in  1866  nor  in  1870 
could  Bismarck  foresee  the  degree  of  success  which  would 
fall  to  him,  but  he  dared  to  fight.  The  greatness  of  the 
statesman  is  shown  when  at  the  most  favourable  moment 
he  has  the  courage  to  undertake  what  is  the  necessary  and, 
according  to  human  calculation,  the  best  course.  Just  Fate 
decides  the  issue. 

The  second  cause  of  our  present  position  is  to  be  seen 
in  the  fact  that  we  started  to  build  our  fleet  too  late.    The 


240    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

chief  mistake  which  we  have  made  is  that,  after  the  year 
1889,  when  we  roused  ourselves  to  vote  the  Brandenburg 
type  of  ship,  we  sank  back  until  1897  into  a  period  of  de- 
cadence, while  complete  lack  of  system  prevailed  in  all 
matters  concerning  the  fleet.  We  have  also  begun  far  too 
late  to  develop  systematically  our  coast,  defences,  so  that 
the  most  essential  duties  which  spring  out  of  the  political 
situation  are  unfulfilled,  since  we  have  not  foreseen  this 
situation  nor  prepared  for  it. 

This  experience  must  be  a  lesson  to  us  in  the  future.  We 
must  never  let  the  petty  cares  and  needs  of  the  moment 
blind  us  to  the  broad  views  which  must  determine  our 
world  policy.  We  mast  always  adopt  in  good  time  those 
measures  which  are  seen  to  be  necessary  for  the  future, 
even  though  they  make  heavy  financial  calls  on  our 
resources. 

This  is  the  point  of  view  that  we  must  keep  in  mind  with 
regard  to  our  naval  armament.  Even  at  the  eleventh  hour 
we  may  make  up  a  little  for  lost  time.  It  will  be  a  heinous 
mistake  if  we  do  not  perform  this  duty  devotedly. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  ARMY  AND  POPULAR  EDUCATION 

The  policy  of  peace  and  restraint  has  brought  us  to  a  posi- 
tion in  which  we  can  only  assert  our  place  among  the 
Great  Powers  and  secure  the  conditions  of  life  for  the 
future  by  the  greatest  expenditure  of  treasure  and,  so  far  as 
human  conjecture  can  go,  of  blood.  We  shall  be  compelled, 
therefore,  to  adopt,  without  a  moment's  delay,  special 
measures  which  will  enable  us  to  be  more  or  less  a  match 
for  our  enemies — I  mean  accelerated  ship-building  and 
rapid  increase  of  the  army.  We  must  always  bear  in  mind 
in  the  present  that  we  have  to  provide  for  the  future. 

Apart  from  the  requirements  of  the  moment,  we  must 
never  forget  to  develop  the  elements  on  which  not  only  our 
military  strength,  but  also  the  political  power  of  the  State 
ultimately  rest.  We  must  maintain  the  physical  and  mental 
health  of  the  nation,  and  this  can  only  be  done  if  we  aim 
at  a  progressive  development  of  popular  education  in  the 
widest  sense,  corresponding  to  the  external  changes  in  the 
conditions  and  demands  of  existence. 

While  it  is  the  duty  of  the  State  to  guide  her  citizens  to 
the  highest  moral  and  mental  development,  on  the  other 
hand  the  elements  of  strength,  rooted  in  the  people,  react 
upon  the  efficiency  of  the  State.  Only  when  supported  by 
the  strong,  unanimous  will  of  the  nation  can  the  State 
achieve  really  great  results;  she  is  therefore  doubly  inter- 
ested in  promoting  the  physical  and  mental  growth  of  the 
nation.  Her  duty  and  her  justification  consist  in  this  en- 
deavour, for  she  draws  from  the  fulfilment  of  this  duty  the 
strength  and  capacity  to  be  in  the  highest  sense  true  to  it. 

It  is,  under  present  conditions,  expedient  also  from  the 
merely  military  standpoint  to  provide  not  only  for  the 
healthy  physical  development  of  our  growing  youth,  but 

241 


242    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

also  to  raise  its  intellectual  level.  For  while  the  demands 
which  modern  war  makes  have  increased  in  every  direction, 
the  term  of  service  has  been  shortened  in  order  to  make  en- 
listment in  very  great  numbers  possible.  Thus  the  full  con- 
summation of  military  training  cannot  be  attained  unless 
recruits  enter  the  army  well  equipped  physically  and  men- 
tally, and  bringing  with  them  patriotic  sentiments  worthy  of 
the  honourable  profession  of  arms. 

We  have  already  shown  in  a  previous  chapter  how  im- 
portant it  is  to  raise  the  culture  of  the  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers  to  the  best  of  our  power,  in  order  to 
secure  not  only  a  greater  and  more  independent  individual 
efficiency,  but  also  a  deeper  and  more  lasting  influence  on 
the  men;  but  this  influence  of  the  superiors  must  always 
remain  limited  if  it  cannot  count  on  finding  in  the  men  a 
receptive  and  intelligent  material.  This  fact  is  especially 
clear  when  we  grasp  the  claims  which  modern  war  will 
make  on  the  individual  fighter.  In  order  to  meet  these  de- 
mands fully,  the  people  must  be  properly  educated. 

Each  individual  must,  in  modern  warfare,  display  a  large 
measure  of  independent  judgment,  calm  grasp  of  the  facts, 
and  bold  resolution.  In  the  open  methods  of  fighting,  the 
infantryman,  after  his  appointed  duty  has  been  assigned 
him,  is  to  a  great  degree  thrown  on  his  own  resources;  he 
may  often  have  to  take  over  the  command  of  his  own  sec- 
tion if  the  losses  among  his  superiors  are  heavy.  The 
artilleryman  will  have  to  work  his  gun  single-handed  when 
the  section  leaders  and  gun  captains  have  fallen  victims  to 
the  shrapnel  fire;  the  patrols  and  despatch-riders  are  often 
left  to  themselves  in  the  middle  of  the  enemy's  country; 
and  the  sapper,  who  is  working  against  a  counter-mine,  will 
often  find  himself  unexpectedly  face  to  face  with  the  enemy, 
and  has  no  resource  left  beyond  his  own  professional  knowl- 
edge and  determination. 

But  not  only  are  higher  claims  made  on  the  independent 
responsibility  of  the  individual  in  modern  warfare,  but  the 
strain  on  the  physique  will  probably  be  far  greater  in  the 
future  than  in  previous  wars.  This  change  is  due  partly 
to  the  large  size  of  the  armies,  partly  to  the  greater  efficiency 
of  the  firearms.    All  movements  in  large  masses  are  more 


THE  ARMY  AND  POPULAR  EDUCATION    243 

exacting  in  themselves  than  similar  movements  in  small  de- 
tachments, since  they  the  never  carried  out  so  smoothly. 
The  shelter  and  food  of  great  masses  can  never  be  so  good 
as  with  smaller  bodies ;  the  depth  of  the  marching  columns, 
which  increases  with  the  masses,  adds  to  the  difficulties  of 
any  movements — abbreviated  rest  at  night,  irregular  hours 
for  meals,  unusual  times  for  marching,  etc.  The  increased 
range  of  modern  fire-arms  extends  the  actual  fighting  zone, 
and,  in  combination  with  the  larger  fronts,  necessitates  wide 
detours  whenever  the  troops  attempt  enveloping  movements 
or  other  changes  of  position  on  the  battlefield. 

In  the  face  of  these  higher  demands,  the  amount  of  work 
done  in  the  army  has  been  enormously  increased.  The 
State,  however,  has  done  little  to  prepare  our  young  men 
better  for  military  service,  while  tendencies  are  making 
themselves  felt  in  the  life  of  the  people  which  exercise  a 
very  detrimental  influence  on  their  education.  I  specially 
refer  to  the  ever-growing  encroachments  of  a  social-demo- 
cratic, anti-patriotic  feeling,  and,  hand-in-hand  with  this, 
the  flocking  of  the  population  into  the  large  towns,  which  is 
unfavourable  to  physical  development.  This  result  is  clearly 
shown  by  the  enlistment  statistics.  At  the  present  day,  out 
of  all  the  German-born  military  units,  over  6.14  per  cent. 
come  from  the  large  towns,  7.37  per  cent,  from  the  medium- 
sized  towns,  22.34  per  cent,  from  the  small  or  country  towns, 
and  64.15  per  cent,  from  the  rural  districts;  while  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  population  between  town  and  country  is 
quite  different.  According  to  the  census  of  1905,  the  rural 
population  amounted  to  42.5  per  cent.,  the  small  or  country 
towns  to  25.5  per  cent.,  the  medium-sized  towns  to  12.9 
per  cent,  and  the  large  towns  to  19. 1  per  cent,  of  the  entire 
number  of  inhabitants.  The  proportion  has  probably 
changed  since  that  year  still  more  unfavourably  for  the 
rural  population,  while  the  large  towns  have  increased  in 
population.  These  figures  clearly  show  the  physical  deteri- 
oration of  the  town  population,  and  signify  a  danger  to  our 
national  life,  not  merely  in  respect  of  physique,  but  in  the 
intellect  and  compact  unity  of  the  nation.  The  rural  popu- 
lation forms  part  and  parcel  of  the  army.  A  thousand 
bonds  unite  the  troops  and  the  families  of  their  members, 


244    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

so  far  as  they  come  from  the  country ;  everyone  who  studies 
the  inner  life  of  our  army  is  aware  of  this.  The  interest 
felt  in  the  soldier's  life  is  intense.  It  is  the  same  spirit, 
transmitted  from  one  to  another.  The  relation  of  the  army 
to  the  population  of  the  great  cities  which  send  a  small  and 
ever-diminishing  fraction  of  their  sons  into  the  army  is 
quite  different.  A  certain  opposition  exists  between  the 
population  of  the  great  cities  and  the  country-folk,  who, 
from  a  military  point  of  view,  form  the  backbone  of  the 
nation.  Similarly,  the  links  between  the  army  and  the  large 
towns  have  loosened,  and  large  sections  of  the  population 
in  the  great  cities  are  absolutely  hostile  to  the  service. 

It  is  in  the  direct  interests  of  the  State  to  raise  the  phys- 
ical health  of  the  town  population  by  all  imaginable  means, 
not  only  in  order  to  enable  more  soldiers  to  be  enlisted,  but 
to  bring  the  beneficial  effect  of  military  training  more  ex- 
tensively to  bear  on  the  town  population,  and  so  to  help  to 
make  our  social  conditions  more  healthy.  Nothing  pro- 
motes unity  of  spirit  and  sentiment  like  the  comradeship 
of  military  service. 

So  far  as  I  can  judge,  it  is  not  factory  work  alone  in 
itscelf  which  exercises  a  detrimental  effect  on  the  physical 
development  and,  owing  to  its  monotony,  on  the  mental 
development  also,  but  the  general  conditions  of  life,  in- 
separable from  such  work,  are  prejudicial.  Apart  from 
many  forms  of  employment  in  factories  which  are  directly 
injurious  to  health,  the  factors  which  stunt  physical  de- 
velopment may  be  found  in  the  housing  conditions,  in  the 
pleasure-seeking  town  life,  and  in  alcoholism.  This  latter 
vice  is  far  more  prevalent  in  the  large  cities  than  in  the 
rural  districts,  and,  in  combination  with  the  other  influences 
of  the  great  city,  produces  far  more  harmful  results. 

It  is  therefore  the  unmistakable  duty  of  the  State,  first, 
to  fight  alcoholism  with  every  weapon,  if  necessary  by 
relentlessly  taxing  all  kinds  of  alcoholic  drinks,  and  by 
strictly  limiting  the  right  to  sell  them ;  secondly,  most  em- 
phatic encouragement  must  be  given  to  all  efforts  to  improve 
the  housing  conditions  of  the  working  population,  and  to 
withdraw  the  youth  of  the  towns  from  the  ruinous  influences 
of  a  life  of  amusements.    In  Munich,  Bavarian  officers  have 


THE  ARMY  AND  POPULAR  EDUCATION  245 

recently  made  a  praiseworthy  attempt  to  occupy  the  leisure 
time  of  the  young  men  past  the  age  of  attendance  at  school 
with  health-producing  military  exercises.  The  young  men's 
clubs  which  Field-Marshal  v.  d.  Goltz  is  trying  to  establish 
aim  at  similar  objects.  Such  undertakings  ought  to  be  vig- 
orously carried  out  in  every  large  town,  and  supported  by 
the  State,  from  purely  physical  as  well  as  social  considera- 
tions. The  gymnastic  instruction  in  the  schools  and  gym- 
nastic clubs  has  an  undoubtedly  beneficial  effect  on  physical 
development,  and  deserves  every  encouragement;  finally,  on 
these  grounds,  as  well  as  all  others,  the  system  of  universal 
service  should  have  been  made  an  effective  reality.  It  is 
literally  amazing  to  notice  the  excellent  effect  of  military 
service  on  the  physical  development  of  the  recruits.  The 
authorities  in  charge  of  the  reserves  should  have  been  in- 
structed to  make  the  population  of  the  great  cities  serve 
in  larger  numbers  than  hitherto. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  warning  must,  in  my  opinion,  be 
issued  aaginst  two  tendencies:  first,  against  the  continual 
curtailing  of  the  working  hours  for  factory  hands  and  arti- 
sans; and,  secondly,  against  crediting  sport  with  an  exag- 
gerated value  for  the  national  health.  As  already  pointed 
out,  it  is  usually  not  the  work  itself,  but  the  circumstances 
attendant  on  working  together  in  large  numbers  that  are 
prejudicial. 

The  wish  to  shorten  the  working  hours  on  principle,  ex- 
cept to  a  moderate  degree,  unless  any  exceptionally  un- 
favourable conditions  of  work  are  present,  is,  in  my  opinion, 
an  immoral  endeavour,  and  a  complete  miscomprehension 
of  the  real  value  of  work.  It  is  in  itself  the  greatest  bless- 
ing which  man  knows,  and  ill  betide  the  nation  which  re- 
gards it  no  longer  as  a  moral  duty,  but  as  the  necessary 
means  of  earning  a  livelihood  and  paying  for  amusements. 
Strenuous  labour  alone  produces  men  and  characters,  and 
those  nations  who  have  been  compelled  to  win  their  living 
in  a  continuous  struggle  against  a  rude  climate  have  often 
achieved  the  greatest  exploits,  and  shown  the  greatest 
vitality. 

So  long  as  the  Dutch  steeled  their  strength  by  unremitting 
conflict  with  the  sea,  so  long  as  they  fought  for  religious 


246    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

liberty  against  the  Spanish  supremacy,  they  were  a  nation  of 
historical  importance;  now,  when  they  live  mainly  for 
money-makine  and  enioyment.  and  lead  a  politically  neutral 
existence,  without  great  ambitions  or  great  wars,  their  im- 
portance has  sunk  low,  and  will  not  rise  again  until  they 
take  a  part  in  the  struggle  of  the  civilized  nations.  In 
Germany  that  stock  which  was  destined  to  bring  back  our 
country  from  degradation  to  historical  importance  did  not 
erow  up  on  the  fertile  banks  of  the  Rhine  or  the  Danube, 
but  on  the  sterile  sands  of  the  March. 

We  must  preserve  the  stern,  industrious,  old-Prussian 
feeling,  and  carry  the  rest  of  Germanv  with  us  to  Kant's 
conception  of  life;  we  must  continuously  steel  our  strength 
by  great  political  and  economic  endeavours,  and  must  not 
be  content  with  what  we  have  already  attained,  or  abandon 
ourselves  to  the  indolent  pursuit  of  pleasure :  thus  only  we 
shall  remain  healthy  in  mind  and  body,  and  able  to  keep 
our  place  in  the  world. 

Where  Nature  herself  does  not  compel  hard  toil,  or 
where  with  growing  wealth  wide  sections  of  the  people 
are  inclined  to  follow  a  life  of  pleasure  rather  than  of 
work,  society  and  the  State  must  vie  in  taking  care  that 
work  does  not  become  plav,  or  play  work.  It  is  work, 
regarded  as  a  duty,  that  forges  men,  not  fanciful  play. 
Sport,  which  is  spreading  more  and  more  amongst  us  too, 
must  always  remain  a  means  of  recreation,  not  an  end  in 
itself,  if  it  is  to  be  justified  at  all.  We  must  never  forget 
this.  Hard,  laborious  work  has  made  Germany  great:  in 
England,  on  the  contrary,  sport  has  succeeded  in  maintain- 
ing the  physical  health  of  the  nation ;  but  by  becoming  ex- 
aggerated and  by  usurping  the  place  of  serious  work  it 
has  greatly  injured  the  English  nation.  The  English  nation, 
under  the  influence  of  growing  wealth,  a  lower  standard  of 
labour  efficiency — which,  indeed,  is  the  avowed  object  of 
the  English  trades  unions — and  of  the  security  of  its  mili- 
tary position,  has  more  and  more  become  a  nation  of  gentle- 
men at  ease  and  of  sportsmen,  and  it  may  well  be  asked 
whether,  under  these  conditions,  Eneland  will  show  herself 
competent  for  the  great  duties  which  she  has  taken  on 
herself  in  the  future.    If,  further,  the  political  rivalry  with 


THE  ARMY  AND  POPULAR  EDUCATION    247 

the  great  and  ambitious  republic  in  America  be  removed 
by  an  Arbitration  Treaty,  this  circumstance  might  easily 
become  the  boundary-stone  where  the  roads  to  progress  and 
to  decadence  divide,  in  spite  of  all  sports  which  develop 
physique. 

The  physical  healthiness  of  a  nation  has  no  permanent 
value,  unless  it  comes  from  work  and  goes  hand-in-hand 
with  spiritual  development;  while,  if  the  latter  is  subordi- 
nated to  material  and  physical  considerations,  the  result 
must  be  injurious  in  the  long-run. 

We  must  not  therefore  be  content  to  educate  up  for  the 
army  a  physically  healthy  set  of  young  men  by  elevating 
the  social  conditions  and  the  whole  method  of  life  of  our 
people,  but  we  must  also  endeavour  to  promote  their  spir- 
itual development  in  every  way.  The  means  for  doing  so 
is  the  school.  Military  education  under  the  present-day 
conditions,  which  are  continually  becoming  more  severe, 
can  only  realize  its  aims  satisfactorily  if  a  groundwork  has 
been  laid  for  it  in  the  schools,  and  an  improved  preliminary 
training  has  been  given  to  the  raw  material. 

The  national  school  is  not  sufficient  for  this  requirement. 
The  general  regulations  which  settle  the  national  school 
system  in  Prussia  date  from  the  year  1872,  and  are  thus 
forty  years  old,  and  do  not  take  account  of  the  modern 
development  which  has  been  so  rapid  of  late  years.  It  is 
only  natural  that  a  fundamental  opposition  exists  between 
them  and  the  essentials  of  military  education.  Present-day 
military  education  requires  complete  individualization  and 
a  conscious  development  of  manly  feeling;  in  the  national 
school  everything  is  based  on  teaching  in  classes,  and  there 
is  no  distinction  between  the  sexes.  This  is  directly  pre- 
j  scribed  by  the  rules. 

In  the  army  the  recruits  are  taught  under  the  superin- 
tendence of  the  superiors  by  specially  detached  officers 
and  selected  experienced  non-commissioned  officers;  and 
even  instruction  is  given  them  in  quite  small  sections ;  while 
each  one  receives  individual  attention  from  the  non-com- 
missioned officers  of  his  section  and  the  higher  superior 
officers.  In  a  school,  on  the  contrary,  the  master  is  ex- 
pected to  teach  as  many  as  eighty  scholars  at  a  time;  in  a 


248    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

school  with  two  teachers  as  many  as  120  children  are 
divided  into  two  classes.  A  separation  of  the  sexes  is  only 
recommended  in  a  school  of  several  classes.  As  a  rule, 
therefore,  the  instruction  is  given  in  common.  It  is  certain 
that,  under  such  conditions,  no  insight  into  the  personality 
of  the  individual  is  possible.  All  that  is  achieved  is  to  im- 
part more  or  less  mechanically  and  inefficiently  a  certain 
amount  of  information  in  some  branch  of  knowledge,  with- 
out any  consideration  of  the  special  dispositions  of  boys 
and  girls,  still  less  of  individuals. 

Such  a  national  school  can  obviously  offer  no  preparation 
for  a  military  education.  The  principles  which  regulate 
the  teaching  in  the  two  places  are  quite  different.  That  is 
seen  in  the  whole  tendency  of  the  instruction. 

The  military  education  aims  at  training  the  moral  per- 
sonality to  independent  thought  and  action,  and  at  the  same 
time  rousing  patriotic  feelings  among  the  men.  Instruction 
in  a  sense  of  duty  and  in  our  national  history  thus  takes 
a  foremost  place  by  the  side  of  professional  teaching.  Great 
attention  is  given  to  educate  each  individual  in  logical 
reasoning  and  in  the  clear  expression  of  his  thoughts. 

In  the  national  school  these  views  are  completely  rele- 
gated to  the  background — not,  of  course,  as  a  matter  of 
intention  and  theory,  but  as  the  practical  result  of  the 
conditions.  The  chief  stress  in  such  a  school  is  laid  on 
formal  religious  instruction,  and  on  imparting  some  facility 
in  reading,  writing,  and  ciphering.  The  so-called  Realien 
(history,  geography,  natural  history,  natural  science)  fall 
quite  into  the  background.  Only  six  out  of  thirty  hours  of 
instruction  weekly  are  devoted  to  all  the  Realien  in  the 
middle  and  upper  standards ;  in  the  lower  standards  they  are 
ignored  altogether,  while  four  to  five  hours  are  assigned 
to  religious  instruction  in  every  standard.  There  is  no  idea 
of  any  deliberate  encouragement  of  patriotism.  Not  a  word 
in  the  General  Regulations  suggests  that  any  weight  is  to  be 
attached  to  this;  and  while  over  two  pages  are  filled  with 
details  of  the  methods  of  religious  instruction,  history,  which 
is  especially  valuable  for  the  development  of  patriotic  senti- 
ments, is  dismissed  in  ten  lines.  As  for  influencing  the 
character  and  the  reasoning  faculties  of  the  scholars  to 


THE  ARMY  AND  POPULAR  EDUCATION    249 

any  extent  worth  mentioning,  the  system  of  large  classes 
puts  it  altogether  out  of  the  question. 

While  the  allotment  of  subjects  to  the  hours  available  for 
instruction  is  thus  very  one-sided,  the  system  on  which  in- 
struction is  given,  especially  in  religious  matters,  is  also  un- 
satisfactory. Beginning  with  the  lower  standard  onwards 
(that  is  to  say,  the  children  of  six  years),  stories  not  only 
from  the  New  Testament,  but  also  from  the  Old  Testament 
are  drummed  into  the  heads  of  the  scholars.  Similarly  every 
Saturday  the  portions  of  Scripture  appointed  for  the  next 
Sunday  are  read  out  and  explained  to  all  the  children.  In- 
struction in  the  Catechism  begins  also  in  the  lower  standard, 
from  the  age  of  six  onwards ;  the  children  must  learn  some 
twenty  hymns  by  heart,  besides  various  prayers.  It  is  a 
significant  fact  that  it  has  been  found  necessary  expressly 
to  forbid  "the  memorizing  of  the  General  Confession  and 
other  parts  of  the  liturgical  service,"  as  "also  the  learning 
by  heart  of  the  Pericopes."  On  the  other  hand,  the  institu- 
tion of  Public  Worship  is  to  be  explained  to  the  children. 
This  illustrates  the  spirit  in  which  this  instruction  has  to 
be  imparted  according  to  the  regulations. 

It  is  really  amazing  to  read  these  regulations.  The  object 
of  Evangelical  religious  instruction  is  to  introduce  the  chil- 
dren "to  the  comprehension  of  the  Holy  Scriptures  and  to 
the  creed  of  the  congregation,"  in  order  that  they  "may  be 
enabled  to  read  the  Scriptures  independently  and  to  take  an 
active  part  both  in  the  life  and  the  religious  worship  of  the 
congregation."  Requirements  are  laid  down  which  entirely 
abandon  the  task  of  making  the  subject  suitable  to  the  com- 
prehension of  children  from  six  to  fourteen  years  of  age, 
and  presuppose  a  range  of  ideas  totally  beyond  their  age. 
Not  a  word,  however,  suggests  that  the  real  meaning  of 
religion — its  influence,  that  is,  on  the  moral  conduct  of  man 
— should  be  adequately  brought  into  prominence.  The 
teacher  is  not  urged  by  a  single  syllable  to  impress  religious 
ideas  on  the  receptive  child-mind;  the  whole  course  of  in- 
struction, in  conformity  with  regulations,  deals  with  a 
formal  religiosity,  which  is  quite  out  of  touch  with  practical 
life,  and  if  not  deliberately,  at  least  in  result,  renounces  any 


250    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

attempt  at  moral  influence.  A  real  feeling  for  religion  is 
seldom  the  fruit  of  such  instruction ;  the  children,  as  a  rule, 
are  glad  after  their  Confirmation  to  have  done  with  this 
unspiritual  religious  teaching,  and  so  they  remain,  when  their 
schooling  is  over,  permanently  strangers  to  the  religious 
inner  life,  which  the  instruction  never  awakened  in  them. 
Nor  does  the  instruction  for  Confirmation  do  much  to  alter 
that,  for  it  is  usually  conceived  in  the  same  spirit. 

All  other  subjects  which  might  raise  heart  and  spirit  and 
present  to  the  young  minds  some  high  ideals — more  espe- 
cially our  own  country's  history — are  most  shamefully  ne- 
glected in  favour  of  this  sort  of  instruction ;  and  yet  a  truly 
religious  and  patriotic  spirit  is  of  inestimable  value  for  life, 
and,  above  all,  for  the  soldier.  It  is  the  more  regrettable 
that  instruction  in  the  national  school,  as  fixed  by  the  regu- 
lations, and  as  given  in  practice  in  a  still  duller  form,  is 
totally  unfitted  to  raise  such  feelings,  and  thus  to  do  some 
real  service  to  the  country.  It  is  quite  refreshing  to  read  in 
the  new  regulations  for  middle  schools  of  February  10,  1910, 
that  by  religious  instruction  the  "moral  and  religious  ten- 
dencies of  the  child"  should  be  awakened  and  strengthened, 
and  that  the  teaching  of  history  should  aim  at  exciting  an 
"intelligent  appreciation  of  the  greatness  of  the  fatherland." 

The  method  of  religious  instruction  which  is  adopted  in 
the  national  school  is,  in  my  opinion,  hopelessly  perverted. 
Religious  instruction  can  only  become  fruitful  and  profitable 
when  a  certain  intellectual  growth  has  started  and  the  child 
possesses  some  conscious  will.  To  make  it  the  basis  of  in- 
tellectual growth,  as  was  evidently  intended  in  the  national 
schools,  has  never  been  a  success;  for  it  ought  not  to  be 
directed  at  the  understanding  and  logical  faculties,  but  at 
the  mystical  intuitions  of  the  soul,  and,  if  it  is  begun  too 
early,  it  has  a  confusing  effect  on  the  development  of  the 
mental  faculties.  Even  the  missionary  who  wishes  to 
achieve  real  results  tries  to  educate  his  pupils  by  work  and 
secular  instruction  before  he  attempts  to  impart  to  them 
subtle  religious  ideas.  Yet  every  Saturday  the  appointed 
passages  of  Scripture  (the  Pericopes)  are  explained  to  six- 
year-old  children, 


THE  ARMY  AND  POPULAR  EDUCATION    251 

Religious  instruction  proper  ought  to  begin  in  the  middle 
standard.  Up  to  that  point  the  teacher  should  be  content, 
from  the  religious  standpoint,  to  work  on  the  child's  imag- 
ination and  feelings  with  the  simplest  ideas  of  the  Deity, 
but  in  other  respects  to  endeavour  to  awaken  and  encourage 
the  intellectual  life,  and  make  it  able  to  grasp  loftier  con- 
ceptions. The  national  school  stands  in  total  contradiction 
to  this  intellectual  development.  This  is  in  conformity  to 
regulations,  for  the  same  children  who  read  the  Bible  inde- 
pendently are  only  to  be  led  to  "an  approximate  compre- 
hension of  those  phenomena  which  are  daily  around  them." 
In  the  course  of  eight  years  they  learn  a  smattering  of  read- 
ing, writing,  and  ciphering.*  It  is  significant  of  the  knowl- 
edge of  our  national  history  which  the  school  imparts  that 
out  of  sixty-three  recruits  of  one  company  to  whom  the 
question  was  put  who  Bismarck  was,  not  a  single  one  could 
answer.  That  the  scholars  acquire  even  a  general  idea  of 
their  duties  to  the  country  and  the  State  is  quite  out  of  the 
question.  It  is  impossible  to  rouse  the  affection  and  fancy  of 
the  children  by  instruction  in  history,  because  the  two  sexes 
are  taught  in  common.  One  thing  appeals  to  the  heart  of 
boys,  another  to  those  of  girls;  and,  although  I  consider  it 
important  that  patriotic  feelings  should  be  inculcated  among 
girls,  since  as  mothers  they  will  transmit  them  to  the  family, 
still  the  girls  must  be  influenced  in  a  different  way  from  the 
boys.  When  the  instruction  is  common  to  both,  the  treatment 
of  the  subject  by  the  teacher  remains  neutral  and  colourless. 
It  is  quite  incomprehensible  how  such  great  results  are  ex- 
pected in  the  religious  field  when  so  little  has  been  achieved 
in  every  other  field.  This  pedantic  school  has  wandered  far 
indeed  from  the  ideal  that  Frederick  the  Great  set  up.  He 
declared  that  the  duty  of  the  State  was  "to  educate  the 
young  generation  to  independent  thinking  and  self-devoted 
love  of  country." 

Our  national  school  of  to-day  needs,  then,  searching  and 

*  Recently  a  boy  was  discharged  from  a  well-known  national 
school  as  an  exceptionally  good  scholar,  and  was  sent  as  well  quali- 
fied to  the  office  of  a  Head  Forester.  He  showed  that  he  could  not 
copy  correctly,  to  say  nothing  of  writing  by  himself. 


252    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

thorough  reform  if  it  is  to  be  a  preparatory  school,  not  only 
for  military  education,  but  for  life  generally.  It  sends  chil- 
dren out  into  the  world  with  undeveloped  reasoning  facul- 
ties, and  equipped  with  the  barest  elements  of  knowledge, 
and  thus  makes  them  not  only  void  of  self-reliance,  but 
easy  victims  of  all  the  corrupting  influences  of  social  life. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  mind  and  reasoning  faculties  of  the 
national  schoolboy  are  developed  for  the  first  time  by  his 
course  of  instruction  as  a  recruit. 

It  is  obviously  not  my  business  to  indicate  the  paths  to 
such  a  reform.  I  will  only  suggest  the  points  which  seem 
to  me  the  most  important  from  the  standpoint  of  a  citizen 
and  a  soldier. 

First  and  foremost,  the  instruction  must  be  more  indi- 
vidual. The  number  of  teachers,  accordingly,  must  be  in- 
creased, and  that  of  scholars  diminished.  It  is  worth  while 
considering  in  this  connection  the  feasibility  of  beginning 
school  instruction  at  the  age  of  eight  years.  Then  all  teach- 
ing must  be  directed,  more  than  at  present,  to  the  object  of 
developing  the  children's  minds,  and  formal  religious  in- 
struction should  only  begin  in  due  harmony  with  intellectual 
progress.  Finally,  the  Realien,  especially  the  history  of  our 
own  country,  should  claim  more  attention,  and  patriotic 
feelings  should  be  encouraged  in  every  way;  while  in  re- 
ligious instruction  the  moral  influence  of  religion  should  be 
more  prominent  than  the  formal  contents.  The  training  of 
the  national  school  teacher  must  be  placed  on  a  new  basis. 
At  present  it  absolutely  corresponds  to  the  one-sided  and 
limited  standpoint  of  the  school  itself,  and  does  not  enable 
the  teachers  to  develop  the  minds  and  feelings  of  their 
pupils.  It  must  be  reckoned  a  distinct  disadvantage  for  the 
upgrowing  generation  that  all  instruction  ends  at  the  age 
of  fourteen,  so  that,  precisely  at  the  period  of  development 
in  which  the  reasoning  powers  are  forming,  the  children  are 
thrown  back  on  themselves  and  on  any  chance  influences. 
In  the  interval  between  school  life  and  military  service  the 
young  people  not  only  forget  all  that  they  learnt,  perhaps 
with  aptitude,  in  the  national  school,  but  they  unthinkingly 


THE  ARMY  AND  POPULAR  EDUCATION    253 

adopt  distorted  views  of  life,  and  in  many  ways  become  bru- 
talized from  a  lack  of  counteracting  ideals. 

A  compulsory  continuation  school  is  therefore  an  abso- 
lute necessity  of  the  age.  It  is  also  urgently  required  from 
the  military  standpoint.  Such  a  school,  to  be  fruitful  in 
results,  must  endeavour,  not  only  to  prevent  the  scholar 
from  forgetting  what  he  once  learnt,  and  to  qualify  him  for 
a  special  branch  of  work,  but,  above  all,  to  develop  his 
patriotism  and  sense  of  citizenship.  To  do  this,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  explain  to  him  the  relation  of  the  State  to  the  indi- 
vidual, and  to  explain,  by  reference  to  our  national  history, 
how  the  individual  can  only  prosper  by  devotion  to  the 
State.  The  duties  of  the  individual  to  the  State  should  be 
placed  in  the  foreground.  This  instruction  must  be  inspired 
by  the  spirit  which  animated  Schleiermacher's  sermons  in 
the  blackest  hour  of  Prussia,  and  culminated  in  the  doctrine 
that  all  the  value  of  the  man  lies  in  the  strength  and  purity 
of  his  will,  in  his  free  devotion  to  the  great  whole;  that 
property  and  life  are  only  trusts,  which  must  be  employed  for 
higher  ideals;  that  the  mind,  which  thinks  only  of  itself, 
perishes  in  feeble  susceptibility,  but  that  true  moral  worth 
grows  up  only  in  the  love  for  the  fatherland  and  for  the 
State,  which  is  a  haven  for  every  faith,  and  a  home  of 
justice  and  honourable  freedom  of  purpose. 

Only  if  national  education  works  in  this  sense  will  it 
train  up  men  to  fill  our  armies  who  have  been  adequately 
prepared  for  the  school  of  arms,  and  bring  with  them  the 
true  soldierly  spirit  from  which  great  deeds  spring.  What 
can  be  effected  by  the  spirit  of  a  nation  we  have  learnt 
from  the  history  of  the  War  of  Liberation,  that  never- fail- 
ing source  of  patriotic  sentiment,  which  should  form  the 
backbone  and  centre  of  history-teaching  in  the  national  and 
the  continuation  schools. 

We  can  study  it  also  by  an  example  from  most  recent 
history,  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  "The  education  of  the 
whole  Japanese  people,  beginning  at  home  and  continued  at 
school,  was  based  on  a  patriotic  and  warlike  spirit.  That 
education,  combined  with  the  rapidly  acquired  successes  in 
culture  and  warfare,  aroused  in  the  Japanese  a  marvellous 


254    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

confidence  in  their  own  strength.  They  served  with  pride 
in  the  ranks  of  the  army,  and  dreamed  of  heroic  deeds.  .  .  . 
All  the  thoughts  of  the  nation  were  turned  towards  the 
coming  struggle,  while  in  the  course  of  several  years  they 
had  spent  their  last  farthing  in  the  creation  of  a  powerful 
army  and  a  strong  fleet."*  This  was  the  spirit  that  led  the 
Japanese  to  victory.  "The  day  when  the  young  Japanese 
enlisted  was  observed  as  a  festival  in  his  family."* 

In  Russia,  on  the  contrary,  the  idea  was  preached  and 
disseminated  that  "Patriotism  was  an  obsolete  notion,"  "war 
was  a  crime  and  an  anachronism,"  that  "warlike  deeds  de- 
served no  notice,  the  army  was  the  greatest  bar  to  progress, 
and  military  service  a  dishonorable  trade."*  Thus  the  Rus- 
sian army  marched  to  battle  without  any  enthusiasm,  or 
even  any  comprehension  of  the  momentous  importance  of 
the  great  racial  war,  "not  of  free  will,  but  from  necessity." 
Already  eaten  up  by  the  spirit  of  revolution  and  unpatriotic 
selfishness,  without  energy  or  initiative,  a  mechanical  tool  in 
the  hand  of  uninspired  leaders,  it  tamely  let  itself  be  beaten 
by  a  weaker  opponent. 

I  have  examined  these  conditions  closely  because  I  attach 
great  importance  to  the  national  school  and  the  continuation 
school  as  a  means  to  the  military  education  of  our  people. 
I  am  convinced  that  only  the  army  of  a  warlike  and  patriotic 
people  can  achieve  anything  really  great.  I  understand,  of 
course,  that  the  school  alone,  however  high  its  efficiency, 
could  not  develop  that  spirit  in  our  people  which  we,  in 
view  of  our  great  task  in  the  future,  must  try  to  awaken  by 
every  means  if  we  wish  to  accomplish  something  great. 
The  direct  influence  of  school  ends  when  the  young  genera- 
tion begins  life,  and  its  effect  must  at  first  make  itself  felt 
very  gradually.  Later  generations  will  reap  the  fruits  of  its 
sowing.  Its  efficiency  must  be  aided  by  other  influences 
which  will  not  only  touch  the  young  men  now  living,  but 
persist  throughout  their  lives.  Now,  there  are  two  means 
available  which  can  work  upon  public  opinion  and  on  the 
spiritual  and  moral   education   of  the  nation;  one  is  the 

*  "The  Work  of  the  Russian  General  Staff,"  from  the  Russian  by 
Freiheu  v.  Tettau. 


THE  ARMY  AND  POPULAR  EDUCATION    255 

Press,  the  other  is  a  policy  of  action.  If  the  Government 
wishes  to  win  a  proper  influence  over  the  people,  not  in 
order  to  secure  a  narrow-spirited  support  of  its  momentary 
policy,  but  to  further  its  great  political,  social,  and  moral 
duties,  it  must  control  a  strong  and  national  Press,  through 
which  it  must  present  its  views  and  aims  vigorously  and 
openly.  The  Government  will  never  be  able  to  count  upon 
a  well-armed  and  self-sacrificing  people  in  the  hour  of 
danger  or  necessity,  if  it  calmly  looks  on  while  the  warlike 
spirit  is  being  systematically  undermined  by  the  Press  and 
a  feeble  peace  policy  preached,  still  less  if  it  allows  its  own 
organs  to  join  in  with  the  same  note,  and  continually  to 
emphasize  the  maintenance  of  peace  as  the  object  of  all 
policy.  It  must  rather  do  everything  to  foster  a  military 
spirit,  and  to  make  the  nation  comprehend  the  duties  and 
aims  of  an  imperial  policy. 

It  must  continually  point  to  the  significance  and  the  neces- 
sity of  war  as  an  indispensable  agent  in  policy  and  civiliza- 
tion, together  with  the  duty  of  self-sacrifice  and  devotion 
to  State  and  country. 

A  parliamentary  Government,  which  always  represents 
merely  a  temporary  majority,  may  leave  the  party  Press 
to  defend  and  back  its  views;  but  a  Government  like  the 
German,  which  traces  its  justification  to  the  fact  that  it 
is  superior  to  all  parties,  cannot  act  thus.  Its  point  of  view 
does  not  coincide  with  that  of  any  party ;  it  adopts  a  middle 
course,  conscious  that  it  is  watching  the  welfare  of  the 
whole  community.  It  must  therefore  represent  its  attitude, 
on  general  issues  as  well  as  on  particular  points,  indepen- 
dently, and  must  endeavour  to  make  its  aims  as  widely  un- 
derstood as  possible.  I  regard  it,  therefore,  as  one  of  the 
most  important  duties  of  a  Government  like  ours  to  use  the 
Press  freely  and  wisely  for  the  enlightenment  of  the  people. 
I  do  not  mean  that  few  large  political  journals  should,  in 
the  interests  of  the  moment,  be  well  supplied  with  news, 
but  that  the  views  of  the  Government  should  find  compre- 
hensive expression  in  the  local  Press.  It  would  be  an  ad- 
vantage, in  my  opinion,  were  all  newspapers  compelled  to 
print  certain  announcements  of  the  Government,  in  order 


256    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

that  the  reader  might  not  have  such  a  one-sided  account  of 
public  affairs  as  the  party  Press  supplies.  It  would  be  a 
measure  of  public  moral  and  intellectual  hygiene,  as  justifi- 
able as  compulsory  regulations  in  the  interests  of  public 
health.  Epidemics  of  ideas  and  opinions  are  in  our  old 
Europe  more  dangerous  and  damaging  than  bodily  illnesses, 
and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  State  to  preserve  the  moral  healthi- 
ness of  the  nation. 

More  important,  perhaps,  than  teaching  and  enlighten- 
ment by  the  Press  is  the  propaganda  of  action.  Nothing 
controls  the  spirit  of  the  multitude  so  effectually  as  energetic, 
deliberate,  and  successful  action  conceived  in  a  broad- 
minded,  statesmanlike  sense.  Such  education  by  a  power- 
ful policy  is  an  absolute  necessity  for  the  German  people. 
This  nation  possesses  an  excess  of  vigour,  enterprise,  ideal- 
ism, and  spiritual  energy,  which  qualifies  it  for  the  highest 
place;  but  a  malignant  fairy  laid  on  its  cradle  the  most  petty 
theoretical  dogmatism.  In  addition  to  this,  an  unhappy  his- 
torical development  which  shattered  the  national  and  re- 
ligious unity  of  the  nation  created  in  the  system  of  small 
States  and  in  confessionalism  a  fertile  soil  for  the  natural 
tendency  to  particularism,  on  which  it  flourished  luxuriantly 
as  soon  as  the  nation  was  no  longer  inspired  with  great  and 
unifying  thoughts.  Yet  the  heart  of  this  people  can  always 
be  won  for  great  and  noble  aims,  even  though  such  aims 
can  only  be  attended  by  danger.  We  must  not  be  misled 
in  this  respect  by  the  Press,  which  often  represents  a  most 
one-sided,  self-interested  view,  and  sometimes  follows  in- 
ternational or  even  Anti-German  lines  rather  than  national. 
The  soul  of  our  nation  is  not  reflected  in  that  part  of  the 
Press  with  its  continual  dwelling  on  the  necessity  of  uphold- 
ing peace,  and  its  denunciation  of  any  bold  and  comprehen- 
sive political  measure  as  a  policy  of  recklessness. 

On  the  contrary,  an  intense  longing  for  a  foremost  place 
among  the  Powers  and  for  manly  action  fills  our  nation. 
Every  vigorous  utterance,  every  bold  political  step  of  the 
Government,  finds  in  the  soul  of  the  people  a  deeply  felt 
echo,  and  loosens  the  bonds  which  fetter  all  their  forces. 
In  a  great  part  of  the  national  Press  this  feeling  has  again 


THE  ARMY  AND  POPULAR  EDUCATION    257 

and  again  found  noble  expression.  But  the  statesman  who 
could  satisfy  this  yearning,  which  slumbers  in  the  heart  of 
our  people  undisturbed  by  the  clamour  of  parties  and  the 
party  Press,  would  carry  all  spirits  with  him. 

He  is  no  true  statesman  who  does  not  reckon  with  these 
factors  of  national  psychology ;  Bismarck  possessed  this  art, 
and  used  it  with  a  master-hand.  True,  he  found  ready  to 
hand  one  idea  which  was  common  to  all — the  sincere  wish 
for  German  unification  and  the  German  Empire;  but  the 
German  nation,  in  its  dissensions,  did  not  know  the  ways 
which  lead  to  the  realization  of  this  idea.  Only  under  com- 
pulsion and  after  a  hard  struggle  did  it  enter  on  the  road 
of  success;  but  the  whole  nation  was  fired  with  high  en- 
thusiasm when  it  finally  recognized  the  goal  to  which  the 
great  statesman  was  so  surely  leading  it.  Success  was  the 
foundation  on  which  Bismarck  built  up  the  mighty  fabric 
of  the  German  Empire.  Even  in  the  years  of  peace  he 
understood  how  to  rivet  the  imagination  of  the  people  by 
an  ambitious  and  active  policy,  and  how,  in  spite  of  all 
opposition,  to  gain  over  the  masses  to  his  views,  and  make 
them  serve  his  own  great  aims.  He,  too,  made  mistakes  as 
man  and  as  politician,  and  the  motto  Homo  sum,  humani 
nihil  a  me  alienum  puto  holds  good  of  him ;  but  in  its  broad 
features  his  policy  was  always  imperial  and  of  world-wide 
scope,  and  he  never  lost  sight  of  the  principle  that  no  states- 
man can  permanently  achieve  great  results  unless  he  com- 
mands the  soul  of  his  people. 

This  knowledge  He  shared  with  all  the  great  men  of  our 
past,  with  the  Great  Elector,  Frederick  the  Incomparable, 
Scharnhorst  and  Blucher;  for  even  that  hoary  marshal  was 
a  political  force,  the  embodiment  of  a  political  idea,  which', 
to  be  sure,  did  not  come  into  the  foreground  at  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna. 

The  statesman  who  wishes  to  learn  from  history  should 
above  all  things  recognize  this  one  fact — that  success  is 
necessary  to  gain  influence  over  the  masses,  and  that  this 
influence  can  only  be  obtained  bv  continually  appealing  to 
the  national  imagination  and  enlisting  its  interest  in  great 
universal  ideas  and  great  national  ambitions. 


258    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

Such  a  policy  is  also  the  best  school  in  which  to  educate 
a  nation  to  great  military  achievements.  When  their  spirits 
are  turned  towards  high  aims  they  feel  themselves  com- 
pelled to  contemplate  war  bravely,  and  to  prepare  their 
minds  to  it: 

"The  man  grows  up,  with  manhood's  nobler  aims." 

We  may  learn  something  from  Japan  on  this  head.  Her 
eyes  were  fixed  on  the  loftiest  aims;  she  did  not  shrink 
from  laying  the  most  onerous  duties  on  the  people,  but 
she  understood  how  to  fill  the  soul  of  the  whole  people 
with  enthusiasm  for  her  great  ideals,  and  thus  a  nation  of 
warriors  was  educated  which  supplied  the  best  conceivable 
material  for  the  army,  and  was  ready  for  the  greatest  sacri- 
fices. 

We  Germans  have  a  far  greater  and  more  urgent  duty 
towards  civilization  to  perform  than  the  Great  Asiatic 
Power.  We,  like  the  Japanese,  can  only  fulfill  it  by  the 
sword. 

Shall  we,  then,  decline  to  adopt  a  bold  and  active  policy, 
the  most  effective  means  with  which  we  can  prepare  our 
people  for  its  military  duty?  Such  a  counsel  is  only  for 
those  who  lack  all  feeling  for  the  strength  and  honour  of 
the  German  people. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
FINANCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATION  FOR  WAR 

From  the  discussions  in  the  previous  chapter  it  directly 
follows  that  the  political  conduct  of  the  State,  while  affect- 
ing the  mental  attitude  of  the  people,  exercises  an  indirect 
but  indispensable  influence  on  the  preparation  for  war,  and 
is  to  some  degree  a  preparation  for  war  itself. 

But,  in  addition  to  the  twofold  task  of  exercising  this 
intellectual  and  moral  influence,  and  of  placing  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  military  authorities  the  necessary  means  for 
keeping  up  the  armaments,  still  further  demands  must  be 
made  of  those  responsible  for  the  guidance  of  the  State. 
In  the  first  place,  financial  preparations  for  war  must  be 
made,  quite  distinct  from  the  current  expenditure  on  the 
army ;  the  national  finances  must  be  so  treated  that  the  State 
can  bear  the  tremendous  burdens  of  a  modern  war  without 
an  economic  crash.  Further,  as  already  mentioned  in  an- 
other place,  there  must  be  a  sort  of  mobilization  in  the 
sphere  of  commercial  politics  in  order  to  insure  under  all 
eventualities  the  supply  of  the  goods  necessary  for  the  ma- 
terial and  industrial  needs  of  the  country.  Finally,  prepara- 
tions for  war  must  also  be  made  politically;  that  is  to  say, 
efforts  must  be  made  to  bring  about  a  favourable  political 
conjuncture,  and,  so  far  as  possible,  to  isolate  the  first 
enemy  with  whom  a  war  is  bound  to  com.e  If  that  cannot 
be  effected,  an  attempt  must  be  made  to  win  allies,  in  whom 
confidence  can  be  reposed  should  war  break  out. 

I  am  not  a  sufficient  expert  to  pronounce  a  definite  opin- 
ion on  the  commercial  and  financial  side  of  the  question. 
In  the  sphere  of  commercial  policy  especially  I  cannot  even 
suggest  the  way  in  which  the  desired  end  can  be  obtained. 
Joint  action  on  the  part  of  the  Government  and  the  great 
import  houses  would  seem  to  be  indicated.     As  regards 

259 


260    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

finance,  speaking  again  from  a  purely  unprofessional  stand- 
point, one  may  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  it  is  not  only  essen- 
tial to  keep  the  national  household  in  order,  but  to  main- 
tain the  credit  of  the  State,  so  that,  on  the  outbreak  of  war, 
it  may  be  possible  to  raise  the  vast  sums  of  money  required 
for  carrying  it  on  without  too  onerous  conditions. 

The  credit  of  State  depends  essentially  on  a  regulated 
financial  economy,  which  insures  that  the  current  outgoings 
are  covered  by  the  current  incomings.  Other  factors  are 
the  national  wealth,  the  indebtedness  of  the  State,  and,  lastly, 
the  confidence  in  its  productive  and  military  capabilities. 

As  regards  the  first  point,  I  have  already  pointed  out 
that  in  a  great  civilized  World  State  the  balancing  of  the 
accounts  must  never  be  brought  about  in  the  petty-State 
fashion  by  striking  out  expenditure  for  necessary  require- 
ments, more  especially  expenditure  on  the  military  forces, 
whose  maintenance  forms  the  foundation  of  a  satisfactory 
general  progress.  The  incomings  must,  on  the  contrary, 
be  raised  in  proportion  to  the  real  needs.  But,  especially 
in  a  State  which  is  so  wholly  based  on  war  as  the  German 
Empire,  the  old  manly  principle  of  keeping  all  our  forces 
on  the  stretch  must  never  be  abandoned  out  of  deference 
to  the  effeminate  philosophy  of  the  day.  Fichte  taught  us 
that  there  is  only  one  virtue — to  forget  the  claims  of  one's 
personality;  and  only  one  vice — to  think  of  self.  Ultimately 
the  State  is  the  transmitter  of  all  culture,  and  is  therefore 
entitled  to  claim  all  the  powers  of  the  individual  for  itself.* 
These  ideas,  which  led  us  out  of  the  deepest  gloom  to  the 
sunlit  heights  of  success,  must  remain  our  pole-star  at  an 
epoch  which  in  many  respects  can  be  compared  with  the 
opening  years  of  the  last  century.  The  peace-loving  con- 
tentment which  then  prevailed  in  Prussia,  as  if  the  age  of 
everlasting  peace  had  come,  still  sways  large  sections  of  our 
people,  and  exerts  an  appreciable  influence  on  the  Govern- 
ment. Among  that  peaceful  nation  "which  behind  the  ram- 
part of  its  line  of  demarcation  observed  with  philosophic 
calm  how  two  mighty  nations  contested  the  sole  possession 
of  the  world,"  nobody  gave  any  thought  to  the  great  change 

*  Treitschke. 


FINANCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATION    261 

of  times.  In  the  same  way  many  Germans  to-day  look 
contentedly  and  philosophically  at  the  partition  of  the  world, 
and  shut  their  eyes  to  the  rushing  stream  of  world-history 
and  the  great  duties  imposed  upon  us  by  it.  Even  to-day, 
as  then,  the  same  "super-terrestrial  pride,  the  same  super- 
clever  irresolution"  spreads  among  us  "which  in  our  history 
follows  with  uncanny  regularity  the  great  epochs  of  audacity 
and  energy/'* 

Under  conditions  like  the  present  the  State  is  not  only 
entitled,  but  is  bound  to  put  the  utmost  strain  on  the  finan- 
cial powers  of  her  citizens,  since  it  is  vital  questions  that 
are  at  stake.  It  is  equally  important,  however,  to  foster  by 
every  available  means  the  growth  of  the  national  property, 
and  thus  to  improve  the  financial  capabilities. 

This  property  is  to  a  certain  extent  determined  by  the 
natural  productiveness  of  the  country  and  the  mineral  wealth 
it  contains.  But  these  possessions  are  utilized  and  their 
value  is  enhanced  by  the  labour  of  all  fellow-countrymen — 
that  immense  capital  which  cannot  be  replaced.  Here,  then, 
the  State  can  profitably  step  in.  It  can  protect  and  secure 
labour  against  unjustifiable  encroachments  by  regulating  the 
labour  conditions;  it  can  create  profitable  terms  for  exports 
and  imports  by  concluding  favourable  commercial  agree- 
ments; it  can  help  and  facilitate  German  trade  by  vigorous 
political  representation  of  German  interests  abroad;  it  can 
encourage  the  shipping  trade,  which  gains  large  profits  from 
international  commerce  ;f  it  can  increase  agricultural  pro- 
duction by  energetic  home  colonization,  cultivation  of  moor- 
land, and  suitable  protective  measures,  so  as  to  make  us  to 
some  extent  less  dependent  on  foreign  countries  for  our 
food.  The  encouragement  of  deep-sea  fishery  would  add 
to  this.* 

From  the  military  standpoint,  it  is  naturally  very  im- 
portant to  increase  permanently  the  supply  of  bread-stuffs 

♦Treitschke,  "Deutsche  Geschichte." 

t  England  earns  some  70  millions  sterling  by  international  com- 
merce, Germany  about  15  millions  sterling. 

*We  buy  annually  some  2  millions  sterling  worth  of  fish  from 
foreign  countries. 


262    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

and  meat,  so  that  in  spite  of  the  annual  increase  in  popula- 
tion the  home  requirements  may  for  some  time  be  met  to 
the  same  extent  as  at  present;  this  seems  feasible.  Home 
production  now  supplies  87  per  cent,  of  the  required  bread- 
stuffs  and  95  per  cent,  of  the  meat  required.  To  maintain 
this  proportion,  the  production  in  the  next  ten  years  must 
be  increased  by  at  most  two  double-centners  per  hectare, 
which  is  quite  possible  if  it  is  considered  that  the  rye  harvest 
alone  in  the  last  twenty  years  has  increased  by  two  million 
tons. 

A  vigorous  colonial  policy,  too,  will  certainly  improve  the 
national  prosperity  if  directed,  on  the  one  hand,  to  produc- 
ing in  our  own  colonies  the  raw  materials  which  our  indus- 
tries derive  in  immense  quantities  from  foreign  countries, 
and  so  making  us  gradually  independent  of  foreign  coun- 
tries; and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  transforming  our  colonies 
into  an  assured  market  for  our  goods  by  effective  promo- 
tion of  settlements,  railroads,  and  cultivation.  The  less  we 
are  tributaries  of  foreign  countries,  to  whom  we  pay  many 
milliards/)"  the  more  our  national  wealth  and  the  financial 
capabilities  of  the  State  will  improve. 

If  the  State  can  thus  contribute  directly  to  the  increase 
of  national  productions,  it  can  equally  raise  its  own  credit 
by  looking  after  the  reduction  of  the  national  debt,  and  thus 
improving  its  financial  position.  But  payment  of  debts  is, 
in  times  of  high  political  tension,  a  two-edged  sword,  if  it 
is  carried  out  at  the  cost  of  necessary  outlays.  The  gain  in 
respect  of  credit  on  the  one  side  of  the  account  may  very 
easily  be  lost  again  on  the  other.  Even  from  the  financial 
aspect  it  is  a  bad  fault  to  economize  in  outlay  on  the  army 
and  navy  in  order  to  improve  the  financial  position.  The 
experiences  of  history  leave  no  doubt  on  that  point.  Military 
power  is  the  strongest  pillar  of  a  nation's  credit.  If  it  is 
weakened,  financial  security  at  once  is  shaken.  A  disastrous 
war  involves  such  pecuniary  loss  that  the  State  creditors 
may  easily  become  losers  by  it.     But  a  State  whose  army 

( 
t  We  obtained  from  abroad  in   1007,  for  instance,  476,400  tons 
of  cotton,  185,300  tons  of  wool,  8,500,000  tons  of  iron,  124,000  tons 
of  copper,  etc. 


FINANCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATION    263 

holds  out  prospects  of  carrying  the  war  to  a  victorious  con- 
clusion offers  its  creditors  far  better  security  than  a  weaker 
military  power.  If  our  credit  at  the  present  day  cannot  be 
termed  very  good,  our  threatened  political  position  is  chiefly 
to  blame.  If  we  chose  to  neglect  our  army  and  navy  our 
credit  would  sink  still  lower,  in  spite  of  all  possible  liquida- 
tion of  our  debt.  We  have  a  twofold  duty  before  us :  first 
to  improve  our  armament ;  secondly,  to  promote  the  national 
industry,  and  to  keep  in  mind  the  liquidation  of  our  debts  so 
far  as  our  means  go. 

The  question  arises  whether  it  is  possible  to  perform  this 
twofold  task. 

It  is  inconceivable  that  the  German  people  has  reached 
the  limits  of  possible  taxation.  The  taxes  of  Prussia  have 
indeed,  between  1893-94  and  1910-11,  increased  by  56  per 
cent,  per  head  of  the  population — from  20.62  marks  to  32.25 
marks  (taxes  and  customs  together) — and  the  some  pro- 
portion may  hold  in  the  rest  of  Germany.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  is  a  huge  increase  in  the  national  wealth.  This 
amounts,  in  the  German  Empire  now,  to  330  to  360  milliard 
marks,  or  5,000  to  6,000  marks  per  head  of  the  population. 
In  France  the  wealth,  calculated  on  the  same  basis,  is  no 
higher,  and  yet  in  France  annually  20  marks,  in  Germany 
only  16  marks,  per  head  of  the  population  are  expended  on 
the  army  and  navy.  In  England,  on  the  contrary,  where  the 
average  wealth  of  the  individual  is  some  1,000  marks  higher 
than  in  Germany  and  France,  the  outlay  for  the  army  and 
navy  comes  to  29  marks  per  head.  Thus  our  most  probable 
opponents  make  appreciably  greater  sacrifices  for  their  arma- 
ments than  we  do,  although  they  are  far  from  being  in  equal 
danger  politically. 

Attention  must  at  the  same  time  be  called  to  the  fact  that 
the  increase  of  wealth  in  Germany  continues  to  be  on  an 
ascending  scale.  Trades  and  industries  have  prospered 
vastly,  and  although  the  year  1908  saw  a  setback,  yet  the 
upward  tendency  has  beyond  doubt  set  in  again. 

The  advance  in  trade  and  industry,  which  began  with  the 
founding  of  the  Empire,  is  extraordinary.  "The  total  of 
imports  and  exports  has  increased  in  quantity  from  32  mil- 
lion tons  to  106  million  tons  in  the  1908,  or  by  232  per  cent., 


264    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

and  in  value  from  6  milliards  to  14^-16  milliards  marks 
in  the  last  years.  Of  these,  the  value  of  the  imports  has 
grown  from  3  to  8-9  milliards  marks,  and  the  value  of  the 
exports  from  3^2  to  63^-7  milliards.  .  .  .  The  value 
of  the  import  of  raw  materials  for  industrial  purposes  has 
grown  from  iy2  milliards  in  1879  to  4^2  milliards  marks 
lately,  and  the  value  of  the  export  of  such  raw  materials 
from  850  million  to  1^  milliard  marks.  The  import  of 
made  goods  had  in  1879  a  value  of  600  million  marks,  and 
in  1908  a  value  of  ij4  milliard  marks,  while  the  value  of 
the  export  of  manufactured  goods  mounted  from  1  to  4  mil- 
liards. The  value  of  the  import  of  food-stuffs  and  delicacies 
has  grown  from  1  to  2^2-2  1/3  milliard  marks,  while  the 
value  of  the  export  of  articles  of  food  remained  at  about  the 
same  figure. 

The  mineral  output  can  also  point  to  an  undreamed-of 
extension  in  Germany  during  the  last  thirty  years.  The 
amount  of  coal  raised  amounted  in  1879  to  only  42  million 
tons ;  up  to  1908  it  has  increased  to  148^2  million  tons,  and 
in  value  from  100  million  to  1^  milliard  marks.  The  quan- 
tity of  brown  coal  raised  was  only  11^2  million  tons  in  1879; 
in  1908  it  was  66^4  million  tons,  and  in  value  it  has  risen 
from  35  million  to  170  million  marks.  The  output  of  iron- 
ore  has  increased  from  6  million  tons  to  27  million  tons, 
and  in  value  from  27  million  to  1 19  million  marks .... 
From  1888  to  1908  the  amount  of  coal  raised  in  Germany 
has  increased  by  127  per  cent.;  in  England  only  by  about 
59  per  cent.  The  raw  iron  obtained  has  increased  in  Ger- 
many from  1888  to  1908  by  172  per  cent.;  in  England  there 
is  a  rise  of  2J  per  cent,  only."* 

Similar  figures  can  be  shown  in  many  other  spheres.  The 
financial  position  of  the  Empire  has  considerably  improved 
since  the  Imperial  Finance  reform  of  190Q,  so  that  the  hope 
exists  that  the  Budget  may  very  soon  balance  without  a 
loan  should  no  new  sacrifices  be  urgent. 

It  was  obvious  that  with  so  prodigious  a  development  a 
continued  growth  of  revenue  must  take  place,  and  hand-in- 
hand  with  it  a  progressive  capitalization.     Such  a  fact  has 

*  Professor  Dr.  Wade,  Berlin. 


FINANCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATION    265 

been  the  case,  and  to  a  very  marked  extent.  From  the  year 
1 892- 1 905  in  Prussia  alone  an  increase  of  national  wealth 
of  about  2  milliard  marks  annually  has  taken  place.  The 
number  of  taxpayers  and  of  property  in  the  Property  Tax 
class  of  6,000  to  100,000  marks  has  in  Prussia  increased  in 
these  fourteen  years  by  29  per  cent.,  from  1905- 1908  by 
11  per  cent.;  in  the  first  period,  therefore,  by  2  per  cent., 
in  the  last  years  by  3  per  cent,  annually.  In  these  classes, 
therefore,  prosperity  is  increasing,  but  this  is  so  in  much 
greater  proportion  in  the  large  fortunes.  In  the  Property 
Tax  class  of  100,000  to  500,000  marks,  the  increase  has  been 
about  48  per  cent. — i.  e.,  on  an  average  for  the  fourteen 
years  about  3  per  cent,  annually,  while  in  the  last  three  years 
it  has  been  4.6  per  cent.  In  the  class  of  500,000  marks  and 
upwards,  the  increase  for  the  fourteen  years  amounts  to 
54  per  cent,  in  the  taxpayers  and  6j  per  cent,  in  the  prop- 
erty ;  and,  while  in  the  fourteen  years  the  increase  is  on  an 
average  4.5  per  cent,  annually,  it  has  risen  in  the  three  years 
1905-1908  to  8.6  per  cent.  This  means  per  head  of  the 
population  in  the  schedule  of  6,000  to  100,000  marks  an 
increase  of  650  marks,  in  the  schedule  of  100,000  to  500,000 
marks  an  increase  per  head  for  6,400  marks,  and  in  the 
schedule  of  500,000  marks  and  upwards  an  increase  of  70,- 
480  marks  per  head  and  per  year. 

We  see  then,  especially  in  the  large  estates,  a  considerable 
and  annually  increasing  growth,  which  the  Prussian  Finance 
Minister  has  estimated  for  Prussia  alone  at  3  milliards  yearly 
in  the  next  three  years,  so  that  it  may  be  assumed  to  be  for 
the  whole  Empire  5  milliards  yearly  in  the  same  period. 
Wages  have  risen  everywhere.  To  give  some  instances,  I 
will  mention  that  among  the  workmen  at  Krupp's  factory 
at  Essen  the  daily  earnings  have  increased  from  1879- 1906 
by  yy  per  cent.,  the  pay  per  hour  for  masons  from  1885- 

1905  by  64  per  cent.,  and  the  annual  earnings  in  the  Dort- 
mund district  of  the  chief  mining  office  from  1886  to  1907 
by  121  per  cent.  This  increase  in  earnings  is  also  shown 
by  the  fact  that  the  increase  of  savings  bank  deposits  since 

1906  has  reached  the  sum  of  4  milliard  marks,  a  proof  that 
in  the  lower  and  poorer  strata  of  the  population,  too,  a  not 
inconsiderable  improvement  in  prosperity  is  perceptible.    It 


266 


GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 


can  also  be  regarded  as  a  sign  of  healthy,  improving  condi- 
tion of  things  that  emigration  and  unemployment  are  con- 
siderably diminished  in  Germany.  In  1908  only  20,000  emi- 
grants left  our  country;  further,  according  to  the  statistics 
of  the  workmen's  unions,  only  4.4  per  cent,  of  their  mem- 
bers were  unemployed,  whereas  in  the  same  year  336,000 
persons  emigrated  from  Great  Britain  and  10  per  cent,  (in 
France  it  was  as  much  as  11.4  per  cent.)  of  members  of 
workmen's  unions  were  unemployed. 

Against  this  brilliant  prosperity  must  be  placed  a  very 
large  national  debt,  both  in  the  Empire  and  in  the  separate 
States.  The  German  Empire  in  the  year  1910  had  5,016,- 
655,500  marks  debt,  and  in  addition  the  national  debt  of  the 
separate  States  on  April  1,  19 10,  reached  in — 


Marks. 

Prussia 

9421,770,800 

Bavaria 

2,165,942,900 

Saxony 

893,042,600 

Wiirtemberg 

606,042,800 

Baden 

557,859,000 

Hesse 

428,664,400 

Alsace-Lorraine 

3i,758,ioo 

Hamburg 

684,891,200 

Liibeck 

66,888,400 

Bremen 

263,431,400 

Against  these  debts  may  be  placed  a  considerable  prop- 
erty in  domains,  forests,  mines,  and  railways.  The  stock 
capital  of  the  State  railways  reached,  on  March  31,  1908, 
in  millions  of  marks,  in  — 


Prussia  (Hesse) 

Bavaria 

Saxony 

Wurtemburg 

Baden 

Alsace-Lorraine 


Marks. 

9,888 

1,694 

i,035 

685 

727 

724 


— a  grand  total,  including  the  smaller  State  systems,  of  15,- 
062  milliard  marks.  This  sum  has  since  risen  considerably, 
and  reached  at  the  end  of  191 1  for  Prussia  alone  11,050 


FINANCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATION    267 

milliards.  Nevertheless,  the  national  debts  signify  a  very 
heavy  burden,  which  works  the  more  disadvantageously  be- 
cause these  debts  are  almost  all  contracted  in  the  country, 
and  presses  the  more  heavily  because  the  communes  are 
also  often  greatly  in  debt. 

The  debt  of  the  Prussian  towns  and  country  communes 
of  10,000  inhabitants  and  upwards  alone  amounts  to  3,000 
million  marks,  in  the  whole  Empire  to  some  5,000  million 
marks.  This  means  that  interest  yearly  has  to  be  paid  to 
the  value  of  150  million  marks,  so  that  many  communes, 
especially  in  the  east  and  in  the  western  industrial  regions, 
are  compelled  to  raise  additional  taxation  to  the  extent  of 
200,  300,  or  even  400  per  cent.  The  taxes  also  are  not  at  all 
equally  distributed  according  to  capacity  to  pay  them.  The 
main  burden  rests  on  the  middle  class;  the  large  fortunes 
are  much  less  drawn  upon.  Some  sources  of  wealth  are  not 
touched  by  taxation,  as,  for  example,  the  speculative  income 
not  obtained  by  carrying  on  any  business,  but  by  speculations 
on  the  Stock  Exchange,  which  cannot  be  taxed  until  it  is 
converted  into  property.  Nevertheless,  the  German  nation 
is  quite  in  a  position  to  pay  for  the  military  preparations, 
which  it  certainly  requires  for  the  protection  and  the  ful- 
filment of  its  duties  in  policy  and  civilization,  so  soon  as 
appropriate  and  comprehensive  measures  are  taken  and  the 
opposing  parties  can  resolve  to  sacrifice  scruples  as  to  prin- 
ciples on  the  altar  of  patriotism. 

The  dispute  about  the  so-called  Imperial  Finance  reform 
has  shown  how  party  interests  and  selfishness  rule  the  na- 
tional representation;  it  was  not  pleasant  to  see  how  each 
tried  to  shift  the  burden  to  his  neighbour's  shoulders  in 
order  to  protect  himself  against  financial  sacrifices.  It  must 
be  supposed,  therefore,  that  similar  efforts  will  be  made  in 
the  fuure,  and  that  fact  must  be  reckoned  with.  But  a  con- 
siderable and  rapid  rise  of  the  Imperial  revenue  is  required 
if  we  wish  to  remain  equal  to  the  situation  and  not  to  aban- 
don the  future  of  our  country  without  a  blow. 

Under  these  conditions  I  see  no  other  effectual  measure 
but  the  speedy  introduction  of  the  Reichserbrecht  (Imperial 
right  of  succession),  in  order  to  satisfy  the  urgent  necessity. 
This  source  of  revenue  would  oppress  no  class  in  particular, 


268    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

but  would  hit  all  alike,  and  would  furnish  the  requisite 
means  both  to  complete  our  armament  and  to  diminish  our 
burden  of  debt. 

If  the  collateral  relations,  with  exception  of  brothers  and 
sisters,  depended  on  mention  in  the  will  for  any  claim — 
that  is  to  say,  if  they  could  only  inherit  when  a  testimentary 
disposition  existed  in  their  favour — and  if,  in  absence  of 
such  disposition,  the  State  stepped  in  as  heir,  a  yearly 
revenue  of  500  millions,  according  to  a  calculation  based  on 
official  material,  could  be  counted  upon.  This  is  not  the 
place  to  examine  this  calculation  more  closely.  Even  if  it 
is  put  at  too  high  a  figure,  which  I  doubt,  yet  the  yield  of 
such  a  tax  would  be  very  large  under  any  circumstances. 

Since  this,  like  every  tax  on  an  inheritance,  is  a  tax  on 
capital — that  is  to  say,  it  is  directly  derived  from  invested 
capital — it  is  in  the  nature  of  things  that  the  proceeds  should 
be  devoted  in  the  first  instance  to  the  improvement  of  the 
financial  situation,  especially  to  paying  off  debts.  Otherwise 
there  would  be  the  danger  of  acting  like  a  private  gentleman 
who  lives  on  his  capital.  This  idea  is  also  to  be  recom- 
mended because  the  proceeds  of  the  tax  are  not  constant, 
but  liable  to  fluctuations.  It  would  be  advisable  to  devote 
the  proceeds  principally  in  this  way,  and  to  allow  a  part  to 
go  towards  extinguishing  the  debt  of  the  communes,  whose 
financial  soundness  is  extremely  important.  This  funda- 
mental standpoint  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  that  in  a 
national  crisis  the  tax  may  be  exceptionally  applied  to  other 
important  purposes,  as  for  example  to  the  completion  of  our 
armaments  on  land  and  sea. 

There  are  two  objections — one  economic,  the  other  ethical 
— which  may  be  urged  against  this  right  of  the  State  or  the 
Empire  to  inherit.  It  is  argued  that  the  proceeds  of  the  tax 
were  drawn  from  the  national  wealth,  that  the  State  would 
grow  richer,  the  people  poorer,  and  that  in  course  of  time 
capital  would  be  united  in  the  hand  of  the  State,  that  the  in- 
dependent investor  would  be  replaced  by  the  official,  and 
thus  the  ideal  of  Socialism  would  be  realized.  Secondly, 
the  requirement  that  relations,  in  order  to  inherit,  must  be 
specially  mentioned  in  the  will,  is  thought  to  be  a  menace 
to  the  coherence  of  the  family.     "According  to  our  pre- 


FINANCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATION    269 

vailing  law,  the  man  who  wishes  to  deprive  his  family  of  his 
fortune  must  do  some  positive  act.  He  must  make  a  will, 
in  which  he  bequeathes  the  property  to  third  persons,  charit- 
able institutions,  or  to  any  other  object.  It  is  thus  brought 
before  his  mind  that  his  natural  heirs  are  his  relations, 
his  kin,  and  that  he  must  make  a  will  if  he  wishes  to 
exclude  his  legal  heirs.  It  is  impressed  upon  him  that  he 
is  interfering  by  testamentary  disposition  in  the  natural 
course  of  things,  that  he  is  wilfully  altering  it.  The  Im- 
perial right  of  succession  is  based  on  the  idea  that  the 
community  stands  nearer  to  the  individual  than  his  family. 
This  is  in  its  inmost  significance  a  socialistic  trait.  The 
socialistic  State,  which  deals  with  a  society  made  up  of 
atoms,  in  which  every  individual  is  freed  from  the  bonds 
of  family,  while  all  are  alike  bound  by  a  uniform  socialistic 
tie,  might  put  forward  a  claim  of  this  sort."* 

Both  objections  are  convincing. 

So  long  as  the  State  uses  the  proceeds  of  the  inheritances 
in  order  to  liquidate  debts  and  other  outgoings,  which  would 
have  to  be  met  otherwise,  the  devolution  of  such  inheritances 
on  the  State  is  directly  beneficial  to  all  members  of  the 
State,  because  they  have  to  pay  less  taxes.  Legislation  could 
easily  prevent  any  accumulation  of  capital  in  the  hands  of 
the  State,  since,  if  such  results  followed,  this  right  of  suc- 
cession might  be  restricted,  or  the  dreaded  socialization  of 
the  State  be  prevented  in  other  ways.  The  science  of  finance 
could  unquestionably  arrange  that.  There  is  no  necessity 
to  push  the  scheme  to  its  extreme  logical  conclusion. 

The  so-called  ethical  objections  are  still  less  tenable.  If 
a  true  sense  of  family  ties  exists,  the  owner  of  property 
will  not  fail  to  make  a  will,  which  is  an  extremely  simple 
process  under  the  present  law.  If  such  ties  are  weak,  they 
are  assuredly  not  strengthened  by  the  right  of  certain  next 
of  kin  to  be  the  heirs  of  a  man  from  whom  they  kept  aloof 
in  life.  Indeed,  the  Crown's  right  of  inheritance  would  pro- 
duce probably  the  result  that  more  wills  were  made,  and 
thus  the  sense  of  family  ties  would  actually  be  strengthened. 
The  "primitive  German  sense  of  law,"  which  finds  expres- 

*  Bolko  Vi  £$tts,  in  the  Krwmitmg  pf  Npvemter  *8,  1910, 


270    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

sion  in  the  present  form  of  the  law  of  succession,  is  summed 
up  in  the  notion  that  the  family  is  nearer  to  the  individual 
than  the  State,  has  so  far  borne  the  most  mischievous  re- 
sults. It  is  the  root  from  which  the  disruption  of  Ger- 
many, the  particularism  and  the  defective  patriotism  of  our 
nation,  have  grown  up.  It  is  well  that  in  the  coming  genera- 
tion some  check  on  this  movement  should  be  found,  and 
that  the  significance  of  the  State  for  the  individual,  no  less 
than  for  the  family,  should  be  thorougly  understood. 

These  more  or  less  theoretical  objections  are  certainly 
not  weighty  enough  to  negative  a  proposal  like  that  of  in- 
troducing this  Imperial  right  of  succession  if  the  national 
danger  demands  direct  and  rapid  help  and  the  whole  future 
of  Germany  is  at  stake. 

If,  therefore,  no  other  proposals  are  forthcoming  by 
which  an  equally  large  revenue  can  be  obtained,  the  im- 
mediate reintroduction  of  such  a  law  of  succession  appears 
a  necessity,  and  will  greatly  benefit  our  sorely-pressed 
country.  Help  is  urgently  needed,  and  there  would  be  good 
prospects  of  such  law  being  passed  in  the  Reichstag  if  the 
Government  does  not  disguise  the  true  state  of  the  political 
position. 

Political  preparations  are  not  less  essential  than  financial. 
We  see  that  all  the  nations  of  the  world  are  busily  securing 
themselves  against  the  attack  of  more  powerful  opponents 
by  alliances  or  ententes,  and  are  winning  allies  in  order  to 
carry  out  their  own  objects.  Efforts  are  also  often  made  to 
stir  up  ill-feeling  between  the  other  States,  so  as  to  have  a 
free  hand  for  private  schemes.  This  is  the  policy  on  which 
England  has  built  up  her  power  in  Europe,  in  order  to  con- 
tinue her  world  policy  undisturbed.  She  cannot  be  justly 
blamed  for  this;  for  even  if  she  has  acted  with  complete 
disregard  of  political  morality,  she  has  built  up  a  mighty 
Empire,  which  is  the  object  of  all  policy,  and  has  secured 
to  the  English  people  the  possibility  of  the  most  ambitious 
careers.  We  must  not  deceive  ourselves  as  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  this  English  policy.  We  must  realize  to  ourselves 
that  it  is  guided  exclusively  by  unscrupulous  selfishness, 
that  it  shrinks  from  no  means  of  accomplishing  it§  ajrns,  a^nd 

thw  iliows  admirable  dipjpmatic  skill. 


FINANCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATION    271 

There  must  be  no  self-deception  on  the  point  that  political 
irrangements  have  only  a  qualified  value,  that  they  are 
always  concluded  with  a  tacit  reservation.  Every  treaty  of 
alliance  presupposes  the  rebus  sic  stantibus;  for  since  it  must 
satisfy  the  interests  of  each  contracting  party,  it  clearly  can 
only  hold  as  long  as*  those  interests  are  really  benefitted. 
This  is  a  political  principle  that  cannot  be  disputed.  Nothing 
can  compel  a  State  to  act  counter  to  its  own  interests,  on 
which  those  of  its  citizens  depend.  This  consideration, 
however,  imposes  on  the  honest  State  the  obligation  of 
acting  with  the  utmost  caution  when  concluding  a  political 
arrangement  and  defining  its  limits  in  time,  so  as  to  avoid 
being  forced  into  a  breach  of  its  word.  Conditions  may 
arise  which  are  more  powerful  than  the  most  honourable 
intentions.  The  country's  own  interests — considered,  of 
course,  in  the  highest  ethical  sense — must  then  turn  the 
scale.  "Frederick  the  Great  was  all  his  life  long  charged 
with  treachery,  because  no  treaty  or  alliance  could  ever 
induce  him  to  renounce  the  right  of  free  self-determina- 
tion."* 

The  great  statesman,  therefore,  will  conclude  political 
ententes  or  alliances,  on  whose  continuance  he  wishes  to 
be  able  to  reckon,  only  if  he  is  convinced  that  each  of  the 
contracting  parties  will  find  such  an  arrangement  to  his 
true  and  unqualified  advantage.  Such  an  alliance  is,  as  I 
have  shown  in  another  place,  the  Austro-German.  The  two 
States,  from  the  military  no  less  than  from  the  political 
aspect,  are  in  the  happiest  way  complements  of  each  other. 
The  German  theatre  of  war  in  the  east  will  be  protected  by 
Austria  from  any  attempt  to  turn  our  flank  on  the  south, 
while  we  can  guard  the  northern  frontier  of  Austria  and 
outflank  any  Russian  attack  on  Galicia. 

Alliances  in  which  each  contracting  party  has  different 
interests  will  never  hold  good  under  all  conditions,  and 
therefore  cannot  represent  a  permantent  political  system. 

"There  is  no  alliance  or  agreement  in  the  world  that 
can  be  regarded  as  effective  if  it  is  not  fastened  by  the 

♦Treitschke,  "Deutsche  Geschichte,"  i.,  pp.  52-53. 


272    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

bond  of  the  common  and  reciprocal  interests;  if  in  am 
treaty  the  advantage  is  all  on  one  side  and  the  other  gels 
nothing,  this  disproportion  destroys  the  obligation."  These 
are  the  words  of  Frederick  the  Great,  our  foremost  political 
teacher  pace  Bismarck. 

We  must  not  be  blinded  in  politics  by  personal  wishes 
and  hopes,  but  must  look  things  calmly  in  the  face,  and 
try  to  forecast  the  probable  attitude  of  the  other  States  by 
reference  to  their  own  interests.  Bismarck  tells  us  that 
"Illusions  are  the  greatest  danger  to  the  diplomatist.  He 
must  take  for  granted  that  the  other,  like  himself,  seeks 
nothing  but  his  own  advantage/'  It  will  prove  waste  labour 
to  attempt  to  force  a  great  State  by  diplomatic  arrange- 
ments to  actions  or  an  attitude  which  oppose  its  real  in- 
terests. When  a  crisis  arises,  the  weight  of  these  interests 
will  irresistibly  turn  the  scale. 

When  Napoleon  III.  planned  war  against  Prussia,  he 
tried  to  effect  an  alliance  with  Austria  and  Italy,  and  Arch- 
duke Albert  was  actually  in  Paris  to  conclude  the  military 
negotiations.*  These  probably  were  going  on,  as  the  French 
General  Lebrun  was  in  Vienna  on  the  same  errand.  Both 
countries  left  France  in  the  lurch  so  soon  as  the  first  Prus- 
sian flag  flew  victoriously  on  the  heights  of  the  Geisberg. 
A  statesman  less  biassed  than  Napoleon  would  have  fore- 
seen this,  since  neither  Austria  nor  Italy  had  sufficient  in- 
terests at  stake  to  meddle  in  such  a  war  under  unfavourable 
conditions. 

France,  in  a  similar  spirit  of  selfish  national  interests, 
unscrupulously  brushed  aside  the  Conventions  of  Algeciras, 
which  did  not  satisfy  her.     She  will  equally  disregard  all 

*  When  Colonel  Stoffel,  the  well-known  French  Mliitary  Attache 
in  Berlin,  returned  to  Paris,  and  was  received  by  the  Emperor,  and 
pointed  out  the  danger  of  the  position  and  the  probable  perfection  of 
Prussia's  war  preparations,  the  Emperor  declared  that  he  was  better 
informed.  He  proceeded  to  take  from  his  desk  a  memoir  on  the 
conditions  of  the  Prussian  army  apparently  sent  to  him  by  Archduke 
Albert,  which  came  to  quite  different  conclusions.  The  Emperor 
had  made  the  facts  therein  stated  the  basis  of  his  political  and 
military  calculations.  (Communications  of  Colonel  Stoffel  to  the 
former  Minister  of  War,  v.  Verdy,  who  put  them  at  the  service 
of  the  author.) 


FINANCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATION    273 

further  diplomatic  arrangements  intended  to  safeguard  Ger- 
many's commercial  interests  in  Morocco  so  soon  as  she  feels 
strong  enough,  since  it  is  clearly  her  interest  to  be  undis- 
puted masted  in  Morocco  and  to  exploit  that  country  for 
herself.  France,  when  she  no  longer  fears  the  German 
arms,  will  not  allow  any  official  document  in  the  world  to 
guarantee  German  commerce  and  German  enterprise  any 
scope  in  Morocco;  and  from  the  French  standpoint  she  is 
right. 

The  political  behaviour  of  a  State  is  governed  only  by 
its  own  interests,  and  the  natural  antagonism  and  grouping 
of  the  different  Great  Powers  must  be  judged  by  that 
standard.  There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that  it  is  extra- 
ordinarily difficult  to  influence  the  political  grouping  with 
purely  selfish  purposes ;  such  influence  becomes  possible  only 
by  the  genuine  endeavour  to  further  the  interests  of  the 
State  with  which  closer  relations  are  desirable  and  to  cause 
actual  injury  to  its  opponents.  A  policy  whose  aim  is  to 
avoid  quarrel  with  all,  but  to  further  the  interests  of  none, 
runs  the  danger  of  displeasing  everyone  and  of  being  left 
isolated  in  the  hour  of  danger. 

A  successful  policy,  therefore,  cannot  be  followed  with- 
out taking  chances  and  facing  risks.  It  must  be  conscious 
of  its  goal,  and  keep  this  goal  steadily  in  view.  It  must  press 
every  change  of  circumstances  and  all  unforeseen  occur- 
rences into  the  service  of  its  own  ideas.  Above  all  things, 
it  must  be  ready  to  seize  the  psychological  moment,  and  take 
bold  action  if  the  general  position  of  affairs  indicates  the 
possibility  of  realizing  political  ambitions  or  of  waging  a 
necessary  war  under  favourable  conditions.  "The  great  art 
of  policy,"  writes  Frederick  the  Great,  "is  not  to  swim 
against  the  stream,  but  to  turn  all  events  to  one's  own 
profit.  It  consists  rather  in  deriving  advantage  from  favour- 
able conjunctures  than  in  preparing  such  conjunctures." 
Even  in  his  Rheinsberg  days  he  acknowledged  the  principle 
to  which  he  adhered  all  his  life :  "Wisdom  is  well  qualified 
to  keep  what  one  possesses ;  but  boldness  alone  can  acquire." 
"I  give  you  a  problem  to  solve,"  he  said  to  his  councillors 
when  the  death  of  Emperor  Charles  VI.  was  announced. 
"When  you  have  the  advantage,  are  you  to  use  it  or  not?" 


274    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

Definite,  clearly  thought  out  political  goals,  wise  fore- 
sight, correct  summing  up  alike  of  one's  own  and  of  foreign 
interests,  accurate  estimation  of  the  forces  of  friends  and 
foes,  bold  advocacy  of  the  interests,  not  only  of  the  mother- 
country,  but  also  of  allies,  and  daring  courage  when  the 
critical  hour  strikes — these  are  the  great  laws  of  political 
and  military  success. 

The  political  preparation  for  war  is  included  in  them. 
He  who  is  blinded  by  the  semblance  of  power  and  cannot 
resolve  to  act,  will  never  be  able  to  make  political  prepara- 
tions for  the  inevitable  war  with  any  success.  "The  brag- 
gart feebleness  which  travesties  strength,  the  immoral  claim 
which  swaggers  in  the  sanctity  of  historical  right,  the  timid- 
ity which  shelters  its  indecision  behind  empty  and  formal 
excuses,  never  were  more  despised  than  by  the  great  Prus- 
sian King,"  so  H.  v.  Treitschke  tells  us.  "Old  Fritz"  must 
be  our  model  in  this  respect,  and  must  teach  us  with  re- 
morseless realism  so  to  guide  our  policy  that  the  position  of 
the  political  world  may  be  favourable  for  us,  and  that  we 
do  not  miss  the  golden  opportunity. 

It  is  an  abuse  of  language  if  our  unenterprising  age  tries 
to  stigmatize  that  energetic  policy  which  pursued  positive 
aims  as  an  adventurist  policy.  That  title  can  only  be  given 
to  the  policy  which  sets  up  personal  ideals  and  follows  them 
without  just  estimation  of  the  real  current  of  events,  and 
so  literally  embarks  on  incalculable  adventures,  as  Napoleon 
did  in  Mexico,  and  Italy  in  Abyssinia. 

A  policy  taking  all  factors  into  consideration,  and  realiz- 
ing these  great  duties  of  the  State,  which  are  an  historical 
legacy  and  are  based  on  the  nature  of  things,  is  justified 
when  it  boldly  reckons  with  the  possibility  of  a  war.  This 
is  at  once  apparent  if  one  considers  the  result  to  the  State 
when  war  is  forced  on  it  under  disadvantageous  circum- 
stances. I  need  only  instance  1806,  and  the  terrible  catas- 
trophe to  which  the  feeble,  unworthy  peace  policy  of  Prus- 
sia led. 

In  this  respect  the  Russo-Japanese  War  speaks  a  clear 
language.  Japan  had  made  the  most  judicious  preparations 
possible,  political  as  well  as  military,  for  the  war,  when  she 
concluded  the  treaty  with  England  and  assured  herself  of 


FINANCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATION    275 

the  benevolent  neutrality  of  America  and  China.  Her 
policy,  no  less  circumspect  than  bold,  did  not  shrink  from 
beginning  at  the  psychological  moment  the  war  which  was 
essential  for  the  attainment  of  her  political  ends.  Russia 
was  not  prepared  in  either  respect.  She  had  been  forced 
into  a  hostile  position  with  Germany  from  her  alliance  with 
France,  and  therefore  dared  not  denude  her  west  front 
in  order  to  place  sufficient  forces  in  the  Far  East.  Internal 
conditions,  moreover,  compelled  her  to  retain  large  masses 
of  soldiers  in  the  western  part  of  the  Empire.  A  large 
proportion  of  the  troops  put  into  the  field  against  Japan 
were  therefore  only  inferior  reserves.  None  of  the  prep- 
arations required  by  the  political  position  had  been  made, 
although  the  conflict  had  long  been  seen  to  be  inevitable. 
Thus  the  war  began  with  disastrous  retreats,  and  was  never 
conducted  with  any  real  vigour.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
things  would  have  run  a  different  course  had  Russia  made 
resolute  preparations  for  the  inevitable  struggle  and  had 
opened  the  campaign  by  the  offensive. 

England,  too,  was  politically  surprised  by  the  Boer  War, 
and  consequently  had  not  taken  any  military  precautions 
at  all  adequate  to  her  aims  or  suited  to  give  weight  to 
political  demands. 

Two  points  stand  out  clearly   from  this  consideration. 

First  of  all  there  is  a  reciprocal  relation  between  the 
military  and  political  preparations  for  war.  Proper  political 
preparations  for  war  are  only  made  if  the  statesman  is 
supported  by  a  military  force  strong  enough  to  give  weight 
to  his  demands,  and  if  he  ventures  on  nothing  which  he 
cannot  carry  through  by  arms.  At  the  same  time  the  army 
must  be  developed  on  a  scale  which  takes  account  of  the 
political  projects.  The  obligation  imposed  on  the  General 
to  stand  aloof  from  politics  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war  only 
holds  good  in  a  limited  sense.  The  War  Minister  and  the 
Head  of  the  General  Staff  must  be  kept  au  courant  with  the 
all-fluctuating  phases  of  policy ;  indeed,  they  must  be  allowed 
a  certain  influence  over  policy,  in  order  to  adapt  their 
measures  to  its  needs,  and  are  entitled  to  call  upon  the 
statesman  to  act  if  the  military  situation  is  peculiarly  favour- 
able,  At  the  same  time  the  Minister  who  conduct  foreign 


276    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

policy  must,  on  his  side,  never  lose  sight  of  what  is  in  a 
military  sense  practicable;  he  must  be  constantly  kept  in- 
formed of  the  precise  degree  in  which  army  and  navy  are 
ready  for  war,  since  he  must  never  aim  at  plans  which 
cannot,  if  necessary,  be  carried  out  by  war.  A  veiled  or 
open  threat  of  war  is  the  only  means  the  statesman  has  of 
carrying  out  his  aims ;  for  in  the  last  resort  it  is  always  the 
realization  of  the  possible  consequences  of  a  war  which 
induces  the  opponent  to  give  in.  Where  this  means  is 
renounced,  a  policy  of  compromise  results,  which  satisfies 
neither  party  and  seldom  produces  a  permanent  settlement; 
while  if  a  statesman  announces  the  possibility  of  recourse 
to  the  arbitrament  of  arms,  his  threat  must  be  no  empty 
one,  but  must  be  based  on  real  power  and  firm  determina- 
tion if  it  is  not  to  end  in  political  and  moral  defeat. 

The  second  point,  clearly  brought  before  us,  is  that  a 
timid  and  hesitating  policy,  which  leaves  the  initiative  to 
the  opponent  and  shrinks  from  ever  carrying  out  its  pur- 
pose with  warlike  methods,  always  creates  an  unfavourable 
military  position.  History,  as  well  as  theory,  tells  us  by 
countless  instances  that  a  far-seeing,  energetic  policy,  which 
holds  its  own  in  the  face  of  all  antagonism,  always  reacts 
favourably  on  the  military  situation. 

In  this  respect  war  and  policy  obey  the  same  laws;  great 
results  can  only  be  expected  where  political  and  military 
foresight  and  resolution  join  hands. 

If  we  regard  from  this  standpoint  the  political  prepara- 
tion for  the  next  war  which  Germany  will  have  to  fight,  we 
must  come  to  this  conclusion:  the  more  unfavourable  the 
political  conjuncture  the  greater  the  necessity  for  a  deter- 
mined, energetic  policy  if  favourable  conditions  are  to  be 
created  for  the  inevitably  threatening  war. 

So  long  as  we  had  only  to  reckon  on  the  possibility  of 
a  war  on  two  fronts  against  France  and  Russia,  and  could 
count  on  help  in  this  war  from  all  the  three  parties  to  the 
Triple  Alliance,  the  position  was  comparatively  simple. 
There  were,  then,  of  course,  a  series  of  various  strategical 
possibilities;  but  the  problem  could  be  reduced  to  a  small 
compass:  strategical  attack  on  the  one  side,  strategical  de- 
fence on  the  other,  or,  if  the  Austrian  army  was  taken  into 


FINANCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATION    277 

calculation,  offensive  action  on  both  sides.  To-day  the 
situation  is  different. 

We  must  consider  England,  as  well  as  France  and  Russia. 
We  must  expect  not  only  an  attack  by  sea  on  our  North 
Sea  coasts,  but  a  landing  of  English  forces  on  the  continent 
of  Europe  and  a  violation  of  Belgo-Dutch  neutrality  by  our 
enemies.  It  is  also  not  inconceivable  that  England  may 
land  troops  in  Schleswig  or  Jutland,  and  try  to  force  Den- 
mark into  war  with  us.  It  seems  further  questionable 
whether  Austria  will  be  in  a  position  to  support  us  with  all 
her  forces,  whether  she  will  not  rather  be  compelled  to 
safeguard  her  own  particular  interests  on  her  south  and 
south-east  frontiers.  An  attack  by  France  through  Switzer- 
land is  also  increasingly  probable,  if  a  complete  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  grouping  of  the  European  States  is  effected. 
Finally,  we  should  be  seriously  menaced  in  the  Baltic  if 
Russia  gains  time  to  reconstruct  her  fleet. 

All  these  unfavourable  conditions  will  certainly  not  occur 
simultaneously,  but  under  certain  not  impossible  political 
combinations  they  are  more  or  less  probable,  and  must  be 
taken  into  account  from  the  military  aspect.  The  military 
situation  thus  created  is  very  unfavourable. 

If  under  such  uncertain  conditions  it  should  be  necessary 
to  place  the  army  on  a  war  footing,  only  one  course  is 
left:  we  must  meet  the  situation  by  calling  out  strategic 
reserves,  which  must  be  all  the  stronger  since  the  political 
conditions  are  so  complicated  and  obscure,  and  those  op- 
ponents so  strong  on  whose  possible  share  in  the  war  we 
must  count.  The  strategic  reserve  will  be  to  some  extent  a 
political  one  also.  A  series  of  protective  measures,  neces- 
sary in  any  case,  would  have  to  be  at  once  set  on  foot,  but 
the  mass  of  the  army  would  not  be  directed  to  any  definite 
point  until  the  entire  situation  was  clear  and  all  necessary 
steps  could  be  considered.  Until  that  moment  the  troops 
of  the  strategic  reserve  would  be  left  in  their  garrisons  or 
collected  along  the  railway  lines  and  at  railway  centres  in 
such  a  way  that,  when  occasion  arose,  they  could  be  des- 
patched in  any  direction.  On  the  same  principle  the  rolling- 
stock  on  the  lines  would  have  to  be  kept  in  readiness,  the 
necessary  time-tables  for  the  different  transport  arrange- 


278    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

ments  drawn  up,  and  stores  secured  in  safe  depots  on  as 
many  different  lines  of  march  as  possible.  Previous  arrange- 
ments for  unloading  at  the  railway  stations  must  be  made 
in  accordance  with  the  most  various  political  prospects.  We 
should  in  any  case  be  forced  to  adopt  a  waiting  policy,  a 
strategic  defensive,  which  under  present  conditions  is  ex- 
tremely unfavourable ;  we  should  not  be  able  to  prevent  an 
invasion  by  one  or  other  of  our  enemies. 

No  proof  is  necessary  to  show  that  a  war  thus  begun 
cannot  hold  out  good  prospects  of  success.  The  very 
bravest  army  must  succumb  if  led  against  a  crushingly 
superior  force  under  most  unfavourable  conditions.  A 
military  investigation  of  the  situation  shows  that  a  plan 
of  campaign,  such  as  would  be  required  here  on  the  inner 
line,  presents,  under  the  modern  system  of  "mass"  armies, 
tremendous  difficulties,  and  has  to  cope  with  strategic  con- 
ditions of  the  most  unfavourable  kind. 

The  disadvantages  of  such  a  situation  can  only  be  avoided 
by  a  policy  which  makes  it  feasible  to  act  on  the  offensive, 
and,  if  possible,  to  overthrow  the  one  antagonist  before  the 
other  can  actively  interfere.  On  this  initiative  our  safety 
now  depends,  just  as  it  did  in  the  days  of  Frederick  the 
Great.  We  must  look  this  truth  boldly  in  the  face.  Of 
course,  it  can  be  urged  that  an  attack  is  just  what  would 
produce  an  unfavourable  position  for  us,  since  it  creates  the 
conditions  on  which  the  Franco-Russian  alliance  would  be 
brought  into  activity.  If  we  attacked  France  or  Russia,  the 
ally  would  be  compelled  to  bring  help,  and  we  should  be  in 
a  far  worse  position  than  if  we  had  only  one  enemy  to 
fight.  Let  it  then  be  the  task  of  our  diplomacy  so  to  shuffle 
the  cards  that  we  may  be  attacked  by  France,  for  then  there 
would  be  reasonable  prospect  that  Russia  for  a  time  would 
remain  neutral. 

This  view  undoubtedly  deserves  attention,  but  we  must 
not  hope  to  bring  about  this  attack  by  waiting  passively. 
Neither  France  nor  Russia  nor  England  need  to  attack  in 
order  to  further  their  interests.  So  long  as  we  shrink  from 
attack,  they  can  force  us  to  submit  to  their  will  by  diplomacy, 
as  the  upshot  of  the  Morocco  negotiations  shows. 

If  we  wish  to  bring  about  an  attack  by  our  opponents, 


FINANCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATION    279 

we  must  initiate  an  active  policy  which,  without  attacking 
France,  will  so  prejudice  her  interests  or  those  of  England, 
that  both  these  States  would  feel  themselves  compelled  to 
attack  us.  Opportunities  for  such  procedure  are  offered 
both  in  Africa  and  in  Europe,  and  anyone  who  has  atten- 
tively studied  prominent  political  utterances  can  easily  satisfy 
himself  on  this  point. 

In  opposition  to  these  ideas  the  view  is  frequently  put 
forward  that  we  should  wait  quietly  and  let  time  fight  for 
us,  since  from  the  force  of  circumstances  many  prizes  will 
fall  into  our  laps  which  we  have  now  to  struggle  hard  for. 
Unfortunately  such  politicians  always  forget  to  state  clearly 
and  definitely  what  facts  are  really  working  in  their  own 
interests  and  what  advantages  will  accrue  to  us  therefrom. 
Such  political  wisdom  is  not  to  be  taken  seriously,  for  it 
has  no  solid  foundation.  We  must  reckon  with  the  definitely 
given  conditions,  and  realize  that  timidity  and  laissez-aller 
have  never  led  to  great  results. 

It  is  impossible  for  anyone  not  close  at  hand  to  decide 
what  steps  and  measures  are  imposed  upon  our  foreign 
policy,  in  order  to  secure  a  favourable  political  situation 
should  the  pending  questions  so  momentous  to  Germany's 
existence  come  to  be  settled  by  an  appeal  to  arms.  This 
requires  a  full  and  accurate  knowledge  of  the  political  and 
diplomatic  position  which  I  do  not  possess.  One  thing  only 
can  be  justly  said :  Beyond  the  confusion  and  contradictions 
of  the  present  situation  we  must  keep  before  us  the  great 
issues  which  will  not  lose  their  importance  as  time  goes  on. 

Italy,  which  has  used  a  favourable  moment  in  order  to 
acquire  settlements  for  her  very  rapidly  increasing  popula- 
tion (487,000  persons  emigrated  from  Italy  in  1908),  can 
never  combine  with  France  and  England  to  fulfil  her  polit- 
ical ambition  of  winning  the  supremacy  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, since  both  these  States  themselves  claim  this  place. 
The  effort  to  break  up  the  Triple  Alliance  has  momentarily 
favoured  the  Italian  policy  of  expansion.  But  this  incident 
does  not  alter  in  the  least  the  fact  that  the  true  interest  of 
Italy  demands  adherence  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  which  alone 
can  procure  her  Tunis  and  Biserta.  The  importance  of 
these  considerations  will  continue  to  be  felt. 


280    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

Turkey  also  cannot  permanently  go  hand-in-hand  with 
England,  France,  and  Russia,  whose  policy  must  always 
aim  directly  at  the  annihilation  of  present-day  Turkey. 
Islam  has  now  as  ever  her  most  powerful  enemies  in  Eng- 
land and  Russia,  and  will,  sooner  or  later,  be  forced  to  join 
the  Central  European  Alliance,  although  we  committed  the 
undoubted  blunder  of  abandoning  her  in  Morocco. 

There  is  no  true  community  of  interests  between  Russia 
and  England;  in  Central  Asia,  in  Persia,  as  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, their  ambitions  clash  in  spite  of  all  conventions,  and 
the  state  of  affairs  in  Japan  and  China  is  forcing  on  a 
crisis  which  is  vital  to  Russian  interests  and  to  some  degree 
ties  her  hands. 

All  these  matters  open  out  a  wide  vista  to  German  states- 
manship, if  it  is  equal  to  its  task,  and  make  the  general 
outlook  less  gloomy  than  recent  political  events  seemed  to 
indicate.  And,  then,  our  policy  can  count  on  a  factor  of 
strength  such  as  no  other  State  possesses — on  an  army 
whose  military  efficiency,  I  am  convinced,  cannot  be  suffi- 
ciently valued.  Not  that  it  is  perfect  in  all  its  arrangements 
and  details.  We  have  amply  shown  the  contrary.  But  the 
spirit  which  animates  the  troops,  the  ardour  of  attack,  the 
heroism,  the  loyalty  which  prevail  amongst  them,  justify 
the  highest  expectations.  I  am  certain  that  if  they  are  soon 
to  be  summoned  to  arms,  their  exploits  will  astonish  the 
world,  provided  only  that  they  are  led  with  skill  and  deter- 
mination. The  German  nation,  too — of  this  I  am  equally 
convinced — will  rise  to  the  height  of  its  great  duty.  A 
mighty  force  which  only  awaits  the  summons  sleeps  in  its 
soul.  Whoever  to-day  can  awaken  the  slumbering  idealism 
of  this  people,  and  rouse  the  national  enthusiasm  by  placing 
before  its  eyes  a  worthy  and  comprehensible  ambition,  will 
be  able  to  sweep  this  people  on  in  united  strength  to  the 
highest  efforts  and  sacrifices,  and  will  achieve  a  truly  mag- 
nificent result. 

In  the  consciousness  of  being  able  at  any  time  to  call  up 
these  forces,  and  in  the  sure  trust  that  they  will  not  fail  in 
the  hour  of  danger,  our  Government  can  firmly  tread  the 
path  which  leads  to  a  splendid  future ;  but  it  will  not  be  able 
to  liberate  all  the  forces  of  Germany  unless  it  wins  her  con- 


FINANCIAL  AND  POLITICAL  PREPARATION    281 

fidence  by  successful  action  and  takes  for  its  motto  the 
brave  words  of  Goethe: 

"Bid   defiance   to    every   power! 
Ever  valiant,  never  cower! 
To  the  brave  soldier  open  flies 
The  golden  gate  of  Paradise." 


EPILOGUE 

After  I  had  practically  finished  the  preceding  pages,  the 
Franco-German  convention  as  to  Morocco  and  the  Congo 
Compensation  were  published ;  the  Turko-Italian  War  broke 
out;  the  revolution  in  China  assumed  dimensions  which 
point  to  the  probability  of  new  disorders  in  Eastern  Asia; 
and,  lastly,  it  was  known  that  not  merely  an  entente  cordiale, 
but  a  real  offensive  and  defensive  alliance,  aimed  at  us, 
exists  between  France  and  England.  Such  an  alliance  does 
not  seem  to  be  concluded  permanently  between  the  two 
States,  but  clearly  every  possibility  of  war  has  been  foreseen 
and  provided  for. 

I  have  been  able  to  insert  all  the  needful  references  to 
the  two  first  occurrences  in  my  text;  but  the  light  which 
has  lately  been  cast  on  the  Anglo-French  conventions  com- 
pels me  to  make  a  few  concluding  remarks. 

The  German  Government,  from  important  reasons  which 
cannot  be  discussed,  have  considered  it  expedient  to  avoid, 
under  present  conditions,  a  collision  with  England  or 
France  at  any  cost.  It  has  accomplished  this  object  by  the 
arrangement  with  France,  and  it  may  be,  of  course,  assumed 
that  no  further  concessions  were  attainable,  since  from  the 
first  it  was  determined  not  to  fight  at  present.  Only  from 
this  aspect  can  the  attitude  of  the  Government  towards 
France  and  England  be  considered  correct.  It  is  quite  evi- 
dent from  her  whole  attitude  that  Great  Britain  was  re- 
solved to  take  the  chance  of  a  war.  Her  immediate  pre- 
parations for  war,  the  movements  of  her  ships,  and  the 
attack  of  English  high  finance  on  the  foremost  German 
banking  establishments,  which  took  place  at  this  crisis,  ex- 
clude all  doubt  on  the  point.  We  have  probably  obtained 
the  concessions  made  by  France  only  because  she  thought 
the  favourable  moment  for  the  long-planned  war  had  not 
yet  come.  Probably  she  will  wait  until,  on  the  one  hand, 
the  Triple  Alliance  is  still  more  loosened  and  Russia's  effici- 

282 


EPILOGUE  283 

ency  by  sea  and  land  is  more  complete,  and  until,  on  the 
other  hand,  her  own  African  army  has  been  so  far  strength- 
ened that  it  can  actively  support  the  Rhine  army. 

This  idea  may  sufficiently  explain  the  Morocco  policy  of 
the  Government,  but  there  can  be  no  doubt,  if  the  con- 
vention with  France  be  examined,  that  it  does  not  satisfy 
fully  our  justifiable  wishes. 

It  will  not  be  disputed  that  the  commercial  and  political 
arrangement  as  regards  Morocco  creates  favourable  condi- 
tions of  competition  for  our  manufacturers,  entrepreneurs 
and  merchants;  that  the  acquisition  of  territory  in  the 
French  Congo  has  a  certain  and  perhaps  not  inconsider- 
able value  in  the  future,  more  especially  if  we  succeed  in 
obtaining  the  Spanish  enclave  on  the  coast,  which  alone  will 
make  the  possession  really  valuable.  On  the  other  hand, 
what  we  obtained  can  never  be  regarded  as  a  sufficient  com- 
pensation for  what  we  were  compelled  to  abandon. 

I  have  emphasized  in  another  place  the  fact  that  the 
commercial  concessions  which  France  has  made  are  valu- 
able only  so  long  as  our  armed  force  guarantees  that  they 
are  observed;  the  acquisitions  in  the  Congo  region  must, 
the  Triple  Alliance  is  still  more  loosened  and  Russia's  effici- 
as  the  Imperial  Chancellor  announced  in  his  speech  of 
November  9,  191 1,  be  regarded,  not  only  from  the  point 
of  view  of  their  present,  but  of  their  future  value;  but, 
unfortunately,  they  seem  from  this  precise  point  of  view 
very  inferior  to  Morocco,  for  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  in 
the  future  Morocco  will  be  a  far  more  valuable  possession 
for  France  than  the  Congo  region  for  Germany,  especially 
if  that  Spanish  enclave  cannot  be  obtained.  The  access  to 
the  Ubangi  and  the  Congo  has  at  present  a  more  or  less 
theoretical  value,  and  could  be  barred  in  case  of  war  with 
us  by  a  few  companies  of  Senegalese. 

It  would  be  mere  self-deception  if  we  would  see  in  the 
colonial  arrangement  which  we  have  effected  with  France 
the  paving  of  the  way  for  a  better  understanding  with  this 
State  generally.  It  certainly  cannot  be  assumed  that  France 
will  abandon  the  policy  of  revanche,  which  she  has  carried 
out  for  decades  with  energy  and  unflinching  consistency, 
at  a  moment  when  she  is  sure  of  being  supported  by  Eng- 


284    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

land,  merely  because  she  has  from  opportunist  considera- 
tions come  to  terms  with  us  about  a  desolate  corner  of 
Africa.  No  importance  can  be  attached  to  this  idea,  in 
spite  of  the  views  expounded  by  the  Imperial  Chancellor, 
v.  Bethmann-Hollweg,  in  his  speech  of  November  9,  191 1. 
We  need  not,  therefore,  regard  this  convention  as  definitive. 
It  is  as  liable  to  revision  as  the  Algeciras  treaty,  and  indeed 
offers,  in  this  respect,  the  advantage  that  it  creates  new 
opportunities  of  friction  with  France. 

The  acquisition  of  territory  in  the  Congo  region  means 
at  first  an  actual  loss  of  power  to  Germany;  it  can  only  be 
made  useful  by  the  expenditure  of  large  sums  of  money, 
and  every  penny  which  is  withdrawn  from  our  army  and 
navy  signifies  a  weakening  of  our  political  position.  But, 
it  seems  to  me,  we  must,  when  judging  the  question  as  a 
whole,  not  merely  calculate  the  concrete  value  of  the  objects 
of  the  exchange,  but  primarily  its  political  range  and  its 
consequences  for  our  policy  in  its  entirety.  From  this  stand- 
point it  is  patent  that  the  whole  arrangement  means  a 
lowering  of  our  prestige  in  the  world,  for  we  have  certainly 
surrendered  our  somewhat  proudly  announced  pretensions 
to  uphold  the  sovereignty  of  Morocco,  and  have  calmly 
submitted  to  the  violent  infraction  of  the  Algeciras  conven- 
tion by  France,  although  we  had  weighty  interests  at  stake. 
If  in  the  text  of  the  Morocco  treaty  such  action  was  called 
an  explanation  of  the  treaty  of  1909,  and  thus  the  notion 
was  spread  that  our  policy  had  followed  a  consistent  line, 
such  explanation  is  tantamount  to  a  complete  change  of 
front. 

An  additional  political  disadvantage  is  that  our  relations 
with  Islam  have  changed  for  the  worse  by  the  abandonment 
of  Morocco.  I  cannot,  of  course,  judge  whether  our  diplo- 
matic relations  with  Turkey  have  suffered,  but  there  can 
be  little  doubt  that  we  have  lost  prestige  in  the  whole  Mo- 
hammedan world,  which  is  a  matter  of  the  first  importance 
for  us.  It  is  also  a  reasonable  assumption  that  the  Morocco 
convention  precipitated  the  action  of  Italy  in  Tripoli,  and 
thus  shook  profoundly  the  solidity  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 
The  increase  of  power  which  France  obtained  through  the 
acquisition  of  Morocco  made  the  Italians  realize  the  im- 


EPILOGUE  285 

portance  of  no  longer  delaying  to  strengthen  their  position 
in  the  Mediterranean. 

The  worst  result  of  our  Morocco  policy  is,  however, 
undoubtedly  the  deep  rift  which  has  been  formed  in  conse- 
quence between  the  Government  and  the  mass  of  the 
nationalist  party,  the  loss  of  confidence  among  large  sec- 
tions of  the  nation,  extending  even  to  classes  of  society 
which,  in  spite  of  their  regular  opposition  to  the  Govern- 
ment, had  heartily  supported  it  as  the  representative  of  the 
Empire  abroad.  In  this  weakening  of  public  confidence, 
which  is  undisguisedly  shown  both  in  the  Press  and  in  the 
Reichstag  (although  some  slight  change  for  the  better  has 
followed  the  latest  declarations  of  the  Government),  lies 
the  great  disadvantage  of  the  Franco-German  understand- 
ing ;  for  in  the  critical  times  which  we  shall  have  to  face,  the 
Government  of  the  German  Empire  must  be  able  to  rely 
upon  the  unanimity  of  the  whole  people  if  it  is  to  ride  the 
storm.  The  unveiling  of  the  Anglo-French  agreement  as 
to  war  removes  all  further  doubt  on  this  point. 

The  existence  of  such  relations  between  England  and 
France  confirms  the  view  of  the  political  situation  which  I 
have  tried  to  bring  out  in  the  various  chapters  of  this  book. 
They  show  that  we  are  confronted  by  a  firm  phalanx  of 
foes  who,  at  the  very  least,  are  determined  to  hinder  any 
further  expansion  of  Germany's  power.  With  this  object, 
they  have  done  their  best,  not  unsuccessfully,  to  break  up 
the  Triple  Alliance,  and  they  will  not  shrink  from  a  war. 
The  English  Ministers  have  left  no  dqubt  on  this  point.* 

The  official  statements  of  the  English  statesmen  have,  in 
spite  of  all  pacific  assurances,  shown  clearly  that  the  paths 
of  English  policy  lead  in  the  direction  which  I  have  indi- 
cated. The  warning  against  aggressive  intentions  issued  to 
Germany,  and  the  assurance  that  England  would  support 
her  allies  if  necessary  with  the  sword,  clearly  define  the 
limits  that  Germany  may  not.  transgress  if  she  wishes  to 
avoid  war  with  England.  The  meaning  of  the  English 
Minister's  utterances  is  not  altered  by  his  declaration  that 
England  would  raise  no  protest  against  new  acquisitions  by 

*  Cf.  speech  of  Sir  E.  Grey  on  November  27,  191 1. 


286    GERMANY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

Germany  in  Africa.  England  knows  too  well  that  every 
new  colonial  acquisition  means  primarily  a  financial  loss 
to  Germany,  and  that  we  could  not  long  defend  our  colonies 
in  case  of  war.  They  form  objects  which  can  be  taken  from 
us  if  we  are  worsted.  Meanwhile  a  clear  commentary  on 
the  Minister's  speech  may  be  found  in  the  fact  that  once 
more  the  Budget  includes  a  considerable  increase  in  the 
naval  estimates. 

In  this  position  of  affairs  in  would  be  more  than  ever 
foolish  to  count  on  any  change  in  English  policy.  Even 
English  attempts  at  a  rapprochement  must  not  blind  us 
as  to  the  real  situation.  We  may  at  most  use  them  to 
delay  the  necessary  and  inevitable  war  until  we  may  fairly 
imagine  we  have  some  prospect  of  success. 

If  the  Imperial  Government  was  of  the  opinion  that  it 
was  necessary  in  the  present  circumstances  to  avoid  war, 
still  the  situation  in  the  world  generally  shows  there  can 
only  be  a  short  respite  before  we  once  more  face  the  ques- 
tion whether  we  will  draw  the  sword  for  our  position  in  the 
world  or  renounce  such  position  once  and  for  all.  We  must 
not  in  any  case  wait  until  our  opponents  have  completed 
their  arming  and  decide  that  the  hour  of  attack  has  come. 

We  must  use  the  respite  we  still  enjoy  for  the  most 
energetic  warlike  preparation,  according  to  the  principles 
which  I  have  already  laid  down.  All  national  parties  must 
rally  round  the  Government,  which  has  to  represent  our 
dearest  interests  abroad.  The  willing  devotion  of  the  peo- 
ple must  aid  it  in  its  bold  determination  and  help  to  pave 
the  way  to  military  and  political  success,  without  carrying 
still  further  the  disastrous  consequences  of  the  Morocco 
policy  by  unfruitful  and  frequently  unjustified  criticism  and 
by  thus  widening  the  gulf  between  Government  and  people. 
We  may  expect  from  the  Government  that  it  will  prosecute 
the  military  and  political  preparation  for  war  with  the  energy 
which  the  situation  demands,  in  clear  knowledge  of  the 
dangers  threatening  us,  but  also  in  correct  appreciation  of 
our  national  needs  and  of  the  warlike  strength  of  our  people, 
and  that  it  will  not  let  any  conventional  scruples  distract 
it  from  this  object. 

Repeal  of  the  Five  Years  Act,  reconstruction  of  the  army 


EPILOGUE  287 

on  an  enlarged  basis,  accelerated  progress  in  our  naval 
armaments,  preparation  of  sufficient  financial  means — these 
are  requirements  which  the  situation  calls  for.  New  and 
creative  ideas  must  fructify  our  policy,  and  lead  it  to  the 
happy  goal. 

The  political  situation  offers  many  points  on  which  to 
rest  our  lever.  England,  too,  is  in  a  most  difficult  position. 
The  conflict  of  her  interests  with  Russia's  in  Persia  and  in 
the  newly  arisen  Dardanelles  question,  as  well  as  the  power 
of  Islam  in  the  most  important  parts  of  her  colonial  Empire, 
are  the  subjects  of  permanent  anxiety  in  Great  Britain. 
Attention  has  already  been  called  to  the  significance  and 
difficulty  of  her  relations  with  North  America.  France 
also  has  considerable  obstacles  still  to  surmount  in  her  Afri- 
can Empire,  before  it  can  yield  its  full  fruits.  The  dis- 
turbances in  the  Far  East  will  probably  fetter  Russia's  forces, 
and  England's  interests  will  suffer  in  sympathy.  These  are 
all  conditions  which  an  energetic  and  far-sighted  German 
policy  can  utilize  in  order  to  influence  the  general  political 
situation  in  the  interests  of  our  Fatherland. 

If  people  and  Government  stand  together,  resolved  to 
guard  the  honour  of  Germany  and  make  every  sacrifice  of 
blood  and  treasure  to  insure  the  future  of  our  country  and 
our  State,  we  can  face  approaching  events  with  confidence 
in  our  rights  and  in  our  strength ;  then  we  need  not  fear  to 
fight  for  our  position  in  the  world,  but  we  may,  with  Ernst 
Moritz  Arndt,  raise  our  hands  to  heaven  and  cry  to  God : 

"From  the  height  of  the  starry  sky- 
May  thy  ringing  sword  flash  bright; 
Let  every  craven  cry 
Be  silenced  by  thy  might!" 


GERMANY  AND  THE 
NEXT  WAR 

By  GENERAL  F.  VON  BERNHARDI 
Popular  Edition,  50c.  net 


{{rilHIS  singular  book  is  a  very  wholesome  study  for 
English  readers,  for  in  it  they  will  be  able  to  ex- 
amine the  German  point  of  view  with  a  vengeance. 
"They  will  find  almost  everything  they  assume  to  be 
true  about  the  relations  of  Britain  and  Germany  turned 
upside  down,  and  assumed  by  the  author  to  be  true  in  a 
precisely  contrary  sense.  Instead  of  Germany  challenging 
British  power,  Britain  is  planning  attacks  on  Germany: 
instead  of  Germany  stepping  into  Morocco  (where  she 
had  no  very  clear  rights  either  from  traditional  interest  or 
from  her  proportion  of  trade  in  the  country)  and  unex- 
pectedly hectoring  France,  Great  Britain  and  France  conduct 
a  'put-up  job'  in  order  to  humiliate  Germany.  So  it  goes 
on:  the  coolness  with  which  the  author  assumes  his  views 
to  be  true,  without  argument  or  evidence,  takes  one's  breath 
away.  General  von  Bernhardi  asserts  plainly  and  re- 
peatedly that  war  between  Britain  and  Germany  is  inevitable ; 
and  if  the  German  Government  believe  only  half  of  what 
General  von  Bernhardi  says,  it  is  clearer  than  ever  that  it 
is  waste  of  time  to  hope  that  Germany  would  agree  to  a 
reduction  of  armaments.  Perhaps  a  large  number  of  Ger- 
mans think  the  author's  opinions  exaggerated,  but  it  is 
nevertheless  salutary  to  have  the  German  point  of  view 
expressed  in  an  extreme  form.  We  at  least  know  the  worst. 
.  It  is  an  unforgetable  assertion  of  the  German 
principle  that  war  is  an  instrument  of  policy." — The  Spec- 
tator. 


14  DAY  USE  mn  j 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWBD  | 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  ate  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


17Jan'6lLU 


>  LD 


— JAH27REGD" 


^&#- 


EE&21WI 


C'V 


NOV  1  7 


__.— — 


-ft'.toy'MBQ- 


-nJAN— - 


t;- 


LOJBtiimi^ 


General  Library 

Unirersiry  of  California 

Berkeley 


J     H  I 


i3i 


U.C.  BERKELEY  LIBRARIES 


CD3flS3bQ3D 


g»     l# 


865820 

J&6 

/f/4-OL 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


